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**Third-Generation Indian Perceptions  
of the Kashmir Issue**

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The foreign policy of a State is the product of a complex interplay of domestic, regional and international forces. Domestically, it is shaped and influenced by history, geography, culture, religion and perceptions of national interests by the ruling elite. Indo-Pak relations for the last half a century have been determined by their respective stands on Kashmir. Though a few wars were fought and a number of talks held between the two countries, much progress could not be made towards finding a solution. The failure resulted in mutual distrust and suspicion over the years. At the end of the twentieth century, Kashmir is the only dispute that continues to remain unresolved. To find a solution, an imaginative, peaceful, alternative approach becomes necessary.

India and Pakistan have been able to settle some of their conflicts, but not the Kashmir issue. The conflicts resolved are: division of assets after Partition; redistribution of property; distribution of river waters after Partition; demarcation of the Kutch boundary in 1966; and the Salal Dam agreement in 1978. They had agreements (confidence building measures) such as the Tashkent agreement in 1966, the Simla Agreement in 1972, No-attack agreement on each other's nuclear installations in December 1988, advance notice for military exercises and manoeuvres in April 1991, prevention of air space violations in April 1991, joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons in 1992, and the Lahore Declaration in February 1999. The problem with these two countries was not the failure of confidence building measures, but with mistrust, suspicion and mutual acceptance.

### The Problem Defined

There are few countries in the world which have more commonalities as India and Pakistan do. A few decades ago, these two countries were one Indian State ruled by the British. Geographically and culturally, both countries are close. People of both countries speak four common languages. They are similar in dress, food habits, manner, customs and way of life. Two religions form major groups in the countries: Muslims are in the majority in Pakistan but are a minority in India, whereas Hindus are a majority in India and a minority in Pakistan. Their trade with each other is minimal compared to their trade with other countries.

Kashmir is one factor that has led to tensions between India and Pakistan. For India, the Kashmir problem is not the core issue, whereas for Pakistan, it is an essential prerequisite for improvement of ties. Both parties are unwilling to compromise. Since the inception of the problem, series of talks were held between the countries but failed to resolve the dispute. The historical legacy of the past seems to be deeply rooted in the minds of the ruling elite as well as the public on either side. Both countries find fault with each other for the present situation in Kashmir. As a result, there is neither mutual confidence nor a will to normalize relations.

The first generation, which was involved in the freedom movement, did not accept a division of Kashmir on the basis of religion. Even during Partition, this generation opposed Jinnah's proposal of dividing united India on the basis of religion and advocated a unified India on the principles of secularism and democracy. The second generation (which also witnessed the dawn of Independence), and witnessed the 1965 war between India and Pakistan and the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, responded differently mentally and a majority of them developed animosity, mistrust and suspicion towards each other. Using nationalistic perspectives, this generation was not prepared to maintain friendly relations with each other. As historical memories recede, the third generation,<sup>1</sup> which belongs to the age group of 20–35, is not emotionally swayed as the earlier generations. The third generation did not witness any large-scale war between India and Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Emotional detachment helped them to rise above psychological barriers and be more forward-looking and future-oriented. As Stephen Cohen rightly argues:

“A Third Generation is now emerging...the third generation does not have a sense of responsibility for the gloomy history. Their competence and their interest in the things that matter—above all a fresh approach to economic issues, plus the collapse of many institutions dominated by a generation in the past—will bring them to power sooner rather than later. More than any other development in the region, this new group of regional leaders will make it possible for a change to occur.<sup>3</sup>”

In the new century, changing trends in all fields of knowledge and the emphasis of people-to-people contact has become important for promoting mutual understanding between India and Pakistan. More and more dialogues need to be initiated to create greater regional understanding and cooperation. The present political leadership on both sides has difficulty in coping with the issues, and efforts must be continued to better the future of the people of the region. The need to exercise the collective will of people on both

sides in shaping a better future is now greater than ever before. In this context, the study proposed to elicit the views of the Indian third generation on the Kashmir issue.

### **Importance and Scope of the Study**

The need for this study arises because a conflict-ridden South Asia would affect the prospects of the younger generations in terms of education, employment, standard of living, health, etc. When the younger generation is seen as the future policy makers deciding the fate of millions, its understanding and perceptions on important regional issues, in contradistinction to those of earlier generations, become relevant. Thus, the study conducted a survey on the perceptions of Indian youth on the Kashmir issue.

### **Objectives**

The study focused on the following objectives.

- To bring to light the predominant perceptions of the third generation on the Kashmir issue.
- To examine whether India's current policy is consonant with third-generation opinion.
- To see what steps need to be taken to reduce the misunderstanding over the problem, to minimize tension between the two nations, and possible options which India and Pakistan could consider.

### **Formulations**

The following are some of the formulations tested during the course of the study.

- The third generation is not as emotional as the earlier generations, and is more global rather than nationalistic compared to earlier generations.
- The third generation feels that governments have created unnecessary 'fear' over the Kashmir issue to divert the attention of the people from the real issues faced by the nation.
- The third generation treats the issue as political, and is more concerned with economic and social issues.
- The third generation feels that expenditure on the military is detrimental to the economic development of the nation.

- The younger generation is pacifist by nature and wants to settle disputes with neighbouring countries peacefully.

## Methodology

A survey was carried out in four cosmopolitan cities of India, viz. New Delhi (North India), Kolkata (Calcutta, eastern India), Mumbai (Bombay, western India) and Hyderabad (South India). An interview schedule was used to elicit views from a cross section of society—academicians and students in universities, journalists, lawyers, politicians, and people working in non-governmental organizations. The survey was conducted during November 1998–January 1999. The sample size was 240 (40 people from each field). However, the respondents were 238, out of which 132 were male and 106 female.

This study is descriptive and analytical and is based on primary and secondary sources. Interviews with third-generation respondents constitute the primary source. Secondary sources are documents, books, articles and newspapers. A questionnaire was provided to the respondents to elicit their views on the problems based on snowballing method with an emphasis on educated people. The study tries to find out the difference of opinion on Kashmir by the respondents on the basis of region, gender and professional background. A statistical package for social sciences was used for cross-tabulation and analysis and to ascertain the pattern of response.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup>The term ‘Third Generation’ was first used by Stephen P. Cohen in the context of future relations between India and Pakistan, and between both and the US. According to him, Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel and Mohammad Ali Jinnah belonged to the first generation and fought for independence. The second generation, he argues, was not prepared to solve the problems left by Partition. The third generation, he believes, has a more realistic assessment and does not blame the other side. See his “A Generational Change”, *Seminar*, no. 422, October 1994, pp. 17–20.

<sup>2</sup>The Kargil war which took place in May 1999 was a low-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan. The survey was conducted prior to the Kargil conflict. Had the survey been carried out after the Kargil intrusion, it would have had some impact on the respondents’ perceptions.

<sup>3</sup>Stephen P. Cohen, “Every Fifth Person: The Origins of War and Conditions for Peace in South Asia”, in *Non-Official Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Prospects and Problems*, Aqil S. Shah, forthcoming ACDIS paper, Urbana: University of Illinois, August 1997, p. 5. John Thompson argues “...it would seem that the first generation experienced a severe trauma, the second generation did little to address it and the third attempted to settle accounts”: Abu Taha, “The Thomson Theory about Kashmir and the MQM”, *The Friday Times*, 4–10 July (year not mentioned), p. 2, cited in *ibid.*, p. 5.

## Chapter II

### **Background of the Kashmir Issue**

The state of Jammu & Kashmir consists of five regions: Kashmir (15,948 sq km), Jammu (26,293 sq km), Ladakh (96,701 sq km), 'Azad' Kashmir (13,297 sq km) and the Northern Areas (72,495 sq km).<sup>1</sup> The total population on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh was estimated at 7.7 million in 1981.<sup>2</sup> It had 64.3 per cent Muslims, 32.1 per cent Hindus, 2.16 per cent Sikhs, 1.17 per cent Buddhists and 0.26 per cent others.<sup>3</sup> No census was conducted in 1991, but the population of J&K was estimated at 7,718,700 for that year.<sup>4</sup> One-third of Kashmir is under the control of Pakistan since 1947–48. The Kashmir issue started immediately after the partition of India in 1947. Partition was advocated by the leaders of Pakistan on the basis of the two-nation theory propounded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah (who belongs to the first generation), a leader of the Muslim League.<sup>5</sup> However, Indian leaders did not accept the two-nation theory. They approved the partition on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination. Jawaharlal Nehru (who also belongs to the first generation) said "It was perfectly clear that it was quite impossible to divide it [India] on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other. They overlapped. So, it was clearly understood that those communities which became the minority communities on this side or that must have the fullest protection and fullest security of their lives; otherwise, the whole structure which we had built up collapsed."<sup>6</sup> The Kashmir issue became contentious when its ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, thought of remaining independent even after Partition.<sup>7</sup> However, Pakistan felt that since the majority of the people in Kashmir were Muslims, Jinnah brought pressure on the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. In an attempt to force Kashmir to become part of it, Pakistani rulers encouraged Pathan tribals to invade Kashmir. The invasion began on 22 October 1947 to capture the state's territory. The Maharaja felt that it would not be possible for his forces to repel the aggression and sought the assistance of the Indian Government to confront the invaders.<sup>8</sup> However, the Government of India felt that without Kashmir acceding to the Indian Union, it could not send Indian troops to Kashmir. At this juncture, the Maharaja wrote to Lord Mountbatten, the last Governor General of India, on 26 October 1947 that he wanted to accede to the Indian Union. The Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with India on 26 October 1947, and the Governor General of

India accepted the accession on 27 October.<sup>9</sup> However, the Government of India declared that India would like the state's accession to be ratified by the Kashmiri people.<sup>10</sup> The state of Jammu & Kashmir was conferred special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.<sup>11</sup> This Article allows the Indian Union to exercise control over three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications. India sent its forces to evict the invading tribals. Once the invading forces were out of it, Kashmir became like other states of India. It must be noted that Kashmir was not a part of British India, but was a princely State under the rule of Hari Singh till its accession to India in 1947. India argues that any settlement of the present situation must be within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Contesting the accession of Kashmir to India, Pakistan, in 1948, claimed that India annexed Kashmir by force. According to Pakistan, since the ruler of Kashmir State was a Hindu, he made his State a part of India on his own. The accession of Kashmir to India was never accepted by Pakistan on the ground that it was annexed by force. Since the majority of the people of Kashmir are Muslims, Pakistan argues, they belong to Pakistan. It is further argued that Kashmir is important in economic terms since the major rivers of Pakistan have their source in Kashmir, so it wanted to annex Kashmir to its territory.<sup>12</sup> India too claimed Kashmir was important to it for strategic reasons.<sup>13</sup> If the Kashmir Valley was under Pakistan, it would be difficult for India to send troops to Kargil and Leh.<sup>14</sup> Prime Minister Nehru asked the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 22 December 1947 to stop the military and other supplies to the raiders. But there was no response. Meanwhile, India evicted the Pakistani invaders, but one-third of Kashmir remained under Pakistani control.<sup>15</sup> India brought the issue to the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948.<sup>16</sup> The Indian representative sought justice from the Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter, and sought Pakistan's withdrawal from Kashmir.<sup>17</sup>

### **Role of the UN Security Council**

The United Nations Commission on India Pakistan (UNCIP), on its own, on 13 August 1948 submitted a draft resolution to the Council.<sup>18</sup> India felt unhappy with this resolution, as the Commission did not criticize Pakistan for its aggression on Kashmir. It called upon both the parties on 17 January 1948 to cease hostilities.<sup>19</sup>

On 14 March 1950, the US along with the UK, Cuba and Norway called for the demilitarization of Jammu & Kashmir and for self-determination through an impartial plebiscite.<sup>20</sup> India rejected the plebiscite proposal on 15 September 1950 on the following grounds.<sup>21</sup>

- Pakistan was an aggressor and it would mean a surrender to aggression to allow it to take part in the plebiscite.
- The provision relating to the UN administration would mean that the Government of the state would be superseded, and it went beyond what was necessary for the purpose in view.
- Participation of people belonging to the state of Jammu & Kashmir alone has to be ensured in the “campaign” over plebiscite.
- The security of the state would be in jeopardy.

Sir Owen Dixon, the UN Representative for India and Pakistan in 1950, proposed a plan which envisaged a division of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. India accepted the plan but Pakistan did not. The plan proposed two options. The first option recommended several plebiscites, area by area. The second option was to allocate parts of Kashmir with known preferences towards India and Pakistan without holding a plebiscite. Plebiscite would be confined to those parts of Kashmir claimed by both countries. In October 1950, the ruling party of Kashmir, the National Conference, designated Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah as the Prime Minister of J&K, declaring that its goal was to convene a Constitutional Assembly to decide the future of Kashmir. This decision was against the UN proposal which had tried to decide the future of Kashmir through a plebiscite. In January 1951, at the Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at London, the Kashmir issue came up for discussion. At this meeting, Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies suggested three possible measures to demilitarize Kashmir.<sup>22</sup> Pakistan approved these terms but India rejected them. As a result, the UN Security Council appointed Senator Dr. Frank P. Graham, Democrat (North Carolina), Defence Manpower Administrator in the Department of Labor in Washington, as a mediator on 30 April 1951.<sup>23</sup> India rejected it outright and claimed that the Council was partial towards Pakistan.

On 31 October 1951, Kashmir elected a Constituent Assembly. Pakistan criticised this move and challenged it in the Security Council in 1952. The US and UK introduced a resolution asking that the issue be decided through plebiscite.<sup>24</sup>

In 1952, for the first time, the Soviet Union raised its voice against the US–UK policy on Kashmir. On 17 January 1952, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the Security Council, claimed that the Anglo-American policy was not directed towards solving the problem. Instead, it held that the West wanted to keep the issue alive, so that it would be possible to

convert Kashmir as their protectorate. Admiral Chester Nimitz from the US was designated as the Plebiscite administrator by the UN in 1953. India opposed his appointment because the administrator was to be designated from a small country and not a big one.<sup>25</sup> Pakistan, on the other hand, rejected India's plea to replace Nimitz as the administrator.

In a public meeting on 13 April 1956, Jawharlal Nehru stated that India would agree to the partition of Kashmir on the basis of the cease-fire line. However, Pakistan did not agree to his proposal. Pakistani Foreign Minister Hamidul Haq Chaudhuri argued that "Kashmir is not a piece of property to be divided between India and Pakistan... Direct talks can (take) place only when India agrees to discuss with us ways and means of holding a plebiscite."<sup>26</sup> V. K. Krishna Menon (who belongs to the first generation), the Indian representative to the UN, argued that the Kashmir problem was not a territorial dispute, but a question of aggression. He maintained that "the Indian commitment about a plebiscite was not like the laws of the Medes and Persians but a mere expression of wish on their part, which is less than an international obligation. If n. 2 does not happen n. 3 is out of court."<sup>27</sup> In the Security Council on 23 January 1957, Menon argued that "If an offer is made and is not accepted at the time it is made it can not be maintained that it is still an open offer. The offer terminates when it is not accepted."<sup>28</sup>

On 28 March 1958, Frank Graham, the US Representative in the UN, submitted his report to the Security Council. The report contained five recommendations envisaging direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, and these were:<sup>29</sup>

- a renewed declaration in line with the UN resolution of 17 January 1948 and part I of the UNCIP resolution, according to which the two Governments were to appeal to their respective people to assist in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable for further negotiations and to refrain from making statements and taking actions which would aggravate the situation;
- reaffirmation of respect for the integrity of the cease-fire line;
- a prompt study under the auspices of the UN representative to work out the modalities of administering the territory evacuated by Pakistan pending final solution; consideration of stationing UN troops on the Pakistani side of Kashmir;
- an agreement between India and Pakistan on conducting plebiscite in the contested territory; and

- convening a conference of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan at the earliest possible date.

Pakistan approved this report but India did not.<sup>30</sup> However, President Ayub declared on 20 October 1958:

“The first thing to note about Kashmir is that, apart from any other consideration, from the purely military and security point of view, we have to continue the struggle for the liberation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In no circumstances can we give up that struggle.... We shall be infinitely glad to have a settlement through peaceful means. But if we are forced to adopt means other than peaceful, the blame will surely lie at the doorsteps of India.”<sup>31</sup>

At a press conference on 4 April 1958, Prime Minister Nehru rejected that “Any consideration of this problem which ignores certain basic issues and which endeavours to put us on the same level as Pakistan—that is the aggressor and the aggressed countries on the same level—is not agreeable to us and will not be accepted by us.”<sup>32</sup> Further, he declared in Parliament, “The accession of Kashmir to India is entirely in conformity with the Indian Independence Act and the negotiation that preceded it is also fully in accord to India.”<sup>33</sup> Putting forth India’s position at the Security Council on 3 May 1962, Menon stated, “Accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India was final and complete, its status could be altered only by the Government of India, and the Government of India could not permit secession of any unit of the union.”<sup>34</sup> Menon contended that the conduct of plebiscite in Kashmir would be irrelevant. Further emphasizing that the Security Council was meeting for the 104<sup>th</sup> time on the issue, he said:

“You can hold 200 meetings, we will come here and every time you ask us, but on no condition shall we trade our sovereignty. On no condition shall we sell our heritage. On no condition shall we open the door for the disruption and the disintegration of India, which would be a calamity not only for the Indian people but for the whole of that part of the world...”<sup>35</sup>

Lal Bahadar Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister (who belongs to the first as well as second generations), in his letter on 14 September 1965 to the Secretary General of the UN during the war between India and Pakistan, stated that “...no pressures or attacks will defeat us from our firm resolve to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, of which the state of J&K is an integral part of India”.<sup>36</sup>

Both the parties were unwilling to compromise. Though a series of talks were held between the two countries, they failed to resolve the dispute. The leaders of both countries found fault with each other. Consequently, there is neither mutual confidence nor the will to normalize relations. Indo-Pakistan relations were based on mutual animosity and confrontation that found expression in the statements of leaders of both countries on the Kashmir issue.

### **Internal Dimension**

Kashmir also has an internal dimension. From the 1980s onwards, certain sections of the Kashmiri people have been involved in violence against the Indian State. Different groups are using people for various purposes. Violence, killings, molestation of women have become the order of the day. The voices are many and varied. One section believes in acceding Kashmir to Pakistan, another group articulates the idea of remaining independent both from India and Pakistan, while some other section desires to be part of India. In this pluralistic game, guns are superseding politics. In the name of religion, secularism and *Kashmiriyat* (the unique Kashmiri way of life), hundreds and thousands are being killed or eliminated. In this brutal game, the voices of the ordinary Kashmiris are being more or less neglected.

### **Public Opinion on the Kashmir Issue**

The historical legacy of the past was deeply rooted in the minds of the people of India. (It does not mean that the legacy of the past was not rooted in the minds of the Pakistanis.) Though there was no detailed study on the attitude of the first generation on Kashmir, there was considerable opposition against Pakistan's policy on Kashmir. Since this generation witnessed the 1947–48 war between India and Pakistan, it had developed animosity towards Pakistan. In Sisir Gupta's words, "Pakistan was perhaps the only external issue on which public opinion was formulated by deep-rooted psychological factors (the partition and communal killings) were the most unforgettable experiences for millions of people all over India...."<sup>37</sup> The first generation was not happy over dividing the subcontinent. Gerard Brauntal conducted a survey in Bolpur village in West Bengal during February–March and May 1966. His survey reveals that 65 per cent of the respondents did not treat the Kashmir issue as a *problem*, because it was *an integral part of India*.<sup>38</sup> People echoed Nehru's line of thought on international issues. Opposition leaders also did not deviate from Nehru's official policy. Krishna Menon stated that Nehru "knew the pulse of the

people”<sup>39</sup> and declared that “no policy can go very far if it is quite divorced from the people’s thinking”.<sup>40</sup> People endorsed the Government’s stand on Kashmir. Menon’s nine-hour speech on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in 1957 (which caused him to faint several times during the oration) gave him the public image of a hero fighting for the nation, and he was elected as a Member of Parliament in the General Elections with a majority.<sup>41</sup> From the above, one can have an idea about the perceptions of the first generation on the Kashmir issue.

The unresolved issue in the UN Security Council turned into a war in 1965 and further intensified the strain in Indo-Pakistan ties. Since then, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved.

### **The Indo-Pak War of 1965**

The Rann of Kutch is located between India’s western state of Gujarat and the Sindh region of western Pakistan along the coast of the Arabian Sea. The Rann of Kutch consists of 21,504 sq km of land which remains under water for about half of the year. In early April 1965, Pakistan claimed that some 8,960 sq km of this territory, which it argued “had always been under the control and administration of Sindh, until at the time of the partition of the subcontinent, it became a subject of dispute with India.”<sup>42</sup> Pakistan claimed that the Rann was a lake and according to international law, the boundary line between India and Pakistan must be drawn through the middle of the Rann.<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that Sindh and Kutch became part of Pakistan and India respectively after the partition of 1947. India argued that the Rann of Kutch was a “marsh” rather than a lake.<sup>44</sup> In February 1956, the Pakistani forces entered the Kutch and attacked Indian troops. However, in 1960, both India and Pakistan agreed to collect further data regarding the boundary. But in 1965, tension resurfaced between them. With the involvement of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, both countries made an agreement on 30 June 1965 to have negotiations on the dispute. However, a war started between them in August 1965. Pakistan first launched an attack on the Rann. Consequently, India opened a diversionary move in Kashmir. Indian Army units attacked the Pakistani forces at the Haji Pir pass, which was the major infiltration route for Pakistani guerrilla forces entering Kashmir. Further, for the first time, India opened a front in the north by penetrating towards Lahore.

On 20 September 1965, the superpowers (US and USSR) concurred in the Security Council to call for a cease-fire within 48 hours. Pakistan and India accepted the call on 21 and 22 September 1965 respectively. Indo-Pak negotiations began and both sides agreed for a cease-fire. It was

estimated that nearly 3,000 people were killed on each side. With the initiative of Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union, Indian Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan (both belonging to the first as well as second generations) agreed to the Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966. The main points of the Declaration were:

- to restore “normal and peaceful” relations between them;
- to withdraw their respective Armed Forces, not later than 25 February 1966, to the positions they held before 5 August 1965;
- to repatriate captured prisoners of war;
- to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges;
- to end hostile propaganda; and
- to deal with the question of refugees and illegal immigrants.

### **Public Opinion**

There was not much detailed study on people’s attitude towards the 1965 war, but there was considerable opposition against Pakistan. In a survey, 65 per cent of the respondents (who can be called as first and second generation) did not consider the Kashmir issue as a problem, because it was an integral part of India.<sup>45</sup> There were protests from the public and political parties, labour organizations and business groups against Pakistan.<sup>46</sup> They felt that even after the cease-fire agreement, Pakistan attacked India and treated Pakistan as a enemy. K. Rangaswami argued:

The entire edifice of Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir was built on the theory that Islam is a powerful influence and inevitably the Kashmiri Muslims would plump for accession to Pakistan. But not a dog barked in the valley when the presence of Pakistan’s raiders was officially announced.<sup>47</sup>

All Indians were one in stopping Pakistan’s aggression.<sup>48</sup>

It has been clearly shown that the people of Kashmir are not enthusiastic supporters of Pakistan and that the armed raiders have no popular backing among the Muslims of the valley. If there is any popular sentiment that has to be tested, it is the feelings of the people of ‘Azad Kashmir’ about Pakistani rule.<sup>49</sup>

Ayub Khan was saying that India was never reconciled to the existence

of Pakistan as a separate homeland for Muslims. *But Pakistan was never reconciled to the fact that Kashmir chose to unite with India.* Kashmir was not the root cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict, Partition itself was the main cause.<sup>50</sup> “It has left so many sores and wounds, several of which still bleed and even get septic. The real remedy, therefore, seems to be to provide for a coming together of India and Pakistan, rather than a further division of Kashmir.”<sup>51</sup> It was felt that the Indian people wanted to resolve the Kashmir ‘issue’ by getting back the lost territory.<sup>52</sup> If India accepted division of Kashmir, that would show “our weakness and lack of determination and furthermore would only encourage further aggression on our territory”.<sup>53</sup> There was also opposition to the conduct of a plebiscite in Kashmir.<sup>54</sup> It was felt that to accept plebiscite in Kashmir, there should be plebiscite in the Pakhtun area (Pakistan) and also in East Pakistan. Also, that the Pakistan Government should allow the people of Pakistan to decide by a free vote whether they liked to be under a dictator like Ayub Khan, or have a democratic government.<sup>55</sup> From the above, it is clear that the legacy of the past was deeply rooted in the minds of the people.

### **Crisis in East Pakistan: Emergence of Bangladesh**

Before 1969, the people of East Pakistan felt that they were being exploited by West Pakistan. The East Pakistani population was some 75 million, whereas in West Pakistan it was about 60 million. Though the East Pakistani people were more than West Pakistanis, they were being neglected in decision making in the Government of Pakistan.<sup>56</sup> In the national elections held in Pakistan in December 1970, the Awami League led by Mujib-ur-Rehman won 158 seats out of 160 allotted to East Pakistan and secured the required majority in the National Assembly of 300 members. Rehman, the leader of East Pakistan, demanded complete autonomy for East Pakistan. However, Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan then (who belonged to the second generation), refused to accede to Rehman’s demand. Consequently, the East Pakistanis formed themselves into the Mukti Bahini (“Liberation Force”). Yahya Khan could not tolerate the movement and sent in the Army to suppress the movement. As the conflict intensified, several East Pakistanis entered Indian territory. The persistent inflow of East Pakistanis evicted by the Pakistani Forces posed a direct threat to India’s security. India felt that the presence of millions of refugees (10 million) would create tension in the states bordering East Pakistan.

### **India and the East Pakistan Crisis**

India criticized the Government of Pakistan, which was committing

brutal genocide in the East. India requested Pakistan to agree to a political settlement which would allow the refugees to return home, as their continued presence was a threat to the Indian economy, as also the stability and security of India. Apart from this, India had cultural affinity with the people of Bangladesh and genocide in East Pakistan made India support the movement. On 31 March 1971, the Parliament of India expressed “its profound sympathy for, and solidarity with, the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life” and called upon “all peoples and Governments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which amounts to genocide”. The people of East Bengal were assured that “their struggle and sacrifice will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India”.<sup>57</sup> Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (who belonged to the second generation), participating in the Lok Sabha debate on this issue on 24 May 1971 stated,

We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so.... The great powers have a special responsibility. If they exercise their power rightly and expeditiously then only we can look forward to durable peace on our Subcontinent.<sup>58</sup>

Further, the Minister of External Affairs stated in the UN General Assembly on 27 September 1971:

The first and foremost action which this Assembly and all other international organs, within or without the United Nations system, can take is to impress on the military regime of Islamabad the fact that force will not succeed, and that, therefore, a political settlement between the military regime and the already elected leaders is essential. We consider it wholly shortsighted to wait until worse crises have arisen. Bilaterally, all governments can do their utmost to ensure, by whatever means are available to them, that the military regime stops its repression, enters into negotiations with the elected leaders to achieve a political settlement with their consent, and send the army back to the barracks.<sup>59</sup>

In November, Indira Gandhi visited several countries essentially to persuade the US, Britain, France, West Germany and others to pressurize Pakistan to accept negotiations with Rehman, but her trip was futile, as India failed to convince them to adopt an objective stance on the issue.

Meanwhile, the movement in East Pakistan for liberation from West Pakistan had intensified. The people of East Pakistan declared the birth of the Republic of Bangladesh. Pakistani troops commenced operations in early November 1971 in the eastern sector to suppress the movement.<sup>60</sup> On 24 November, Pakistan declared a state of emergency. On 3 December, the Pakistan Armed Forces attacked Indian airfields along the frontier in Punjab, Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir. The next day, Indira Gandhi announced in the Lok Sabha that the Pakistan Government had declared war on India. She announced that “Today we are fighting to safeguard our territorial integrity and national honour. Above, all, we are fighting for the ideals we cherish and the cause of peace.”<sup>61</sup> However, Pakistan alleged that the Indian Armed Forces had launched an attack on 21 November in the south-eastern sector of East Pakistan.<sup>62</sup> India recognized the birth of Bangladesh on 6 December. The Indian Army along with the Mukti Bahini fought the Pakistani troops. Finally, their commander, Gen. A. A. A. Niazi, capitulated to the strength of the Indian Army and sought a cease-fire: 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh surrendered to the Indian Army on 16 December. The same day, India ordered a unilateral cease-fire. Thus, the war ended on 17 December 1971 and East Pakistan was liberated from Pakistan’s military rulers. India reoccupied 204.7 sq km of territory of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, 957.31 sq km of Punjab and 12,198.84 sq km of Kutch. Pakistan held 134.58 sq km of Indian territory in the Chhamb sector of J&K; 175.87 sq km in Punjab and 1.48 sq km in Rajasthan.<sup>63</sup>

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan had talks at Simla from 28 June 1972 and concluded the Simla Agreement on 3 July 1972. They agreed upon the following.

- The Charter of the UN would govern the relations between the two countries.
- They would settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.
- Both countries committed themselves to peaceful coexistence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
- They would refrain from the use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

Indian and Pakistani forces withdrew to their side of the international border. The agreement voided the possibility of third-party intervention in the Kashmir issue. India argued that the Kashmir issue should be discussed

and solved bilaterally. However, this agreement did not answer the legal question of sovereignty over Kashmir.<sup>64</sup> The war between them had serious consequences for the Kashmir problem. Pakistan felt that India was responsible for breaking the united Pakistan, whereas India was not able to digest the partition of 1947. Thereafter, there were many low-intensity conflicts between them. In 1999, Pakistani Forces entered Kargil, which is part of Indian Kashmir. Consequently, there was a small-scale war between India and Pakistan. Finally, India was able to throw out the Pakistan Army.

### **Public Opinion**

The people of India supported Indira Gandhi's policy on the East Pakistan crisis. There was pressure on the Indian Government to recognize an independent Bangladesh.<sup>65</sup> In a survey, 67 per cent of the respondents opposed the withdrawal of Indian Forces from Pakistan territory without settling the Kashmir problem.<sup>66</sup> People (who can be called as those of the second generation) continued their animosity and suspicion towards Pakistan. For instance, G. K. Reedy, a noted journalist, felt that Pakistan was a

...most illogical and irrational nation. As a political monstrosity and geographical absurdity, it was conceived in strife, born amidst bloodshed and nurtured with hate. Falling a prey to its own pathetic fallacies, this ill-fated nation is now going through the agonies of disintegration and shedding the coils of its life and Bangladesh becomes a reality in one form or the other as the Yahya regime realizes that military massacres have failed to cow down the heroic East Bengal people.<sup>67</sup>

“The declaration of a 1,000-year war with India by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, though amusing and ludicrous prima facie, is another concrete evidence of his deep-seated hatred towards India.”<sup>68</sup> People felt that the emergence of Bangladesh had proved that religion was not the basis of nationalism.<sup>69</sup> In its editorial, *The Hindu* mentioned that:

The rulers of Pakistan should be realized enough to see that it will be even more difficult in the future than in the past to challenge India in Kashmir or anywhere else.... The people of Pakistan could rest assured that if their leaders followed a constructive policy and gave up their hatred of India and what it stands for they would get India's fullest co-operation.<sup>70</sup>

Some expressed the view that India should not withdraw its forces from Pakistan's territory until the latter agreed to hand over POK.<sup>71</sup> From

the above, it can be observed that people of the first and second generations developed mistrust and suspicion about Pakistan. They could not forget the wars between India and Pakistan, which took place from 1948 onwards. They felt that Pakistan was meddling in the internal affairs of India.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup> See The Kargil Review Committee Report, *From Surprise to Reckoning*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999, pp. 36–38.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Jinnah argues, “We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life”: *The Gandhi–Jinnah Talks*, Delhi, 1994, p. 16, cited in A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, *India’s Foreign Policy and Relations*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985, p. 57.

He felt that adequate safeguards for the minority Muslim community were not possible in a unified India with an overwhelming Hindu majority, he demanded a separate state for the Indian Muslims to be called “Pakistan”. The leaders of the Indian National Congress rejected communalism as the basis of State formation and envisaged a unified India founded on the principles of secularism and democracy. However, the two parties could not come to an agreement and agreed to the creation of two States: the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

<sup>6</sup> See *Parliament Debates*, vol. 3, no. 3. 50/821, 1700: *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> During the British rule of India, two categories of states existed: (1) the States ruled directly by Whitehall (by the British Governor); and (2) the British under the Doctrine of Paramountcy ruled states known as the “Princely States” indirectly. Under this doctrine, the Princely States enjoyed varying degrees of internal autonomy, but the rulers of the Princely States recognized the suzerainty of the British monarch.

<sup>8</sup> Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966, p. 123.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Article 370 provides for *temporary provisions* in respect of the state of J&K. It confers special status on J&K. As a result, the powers of Parliament to make laws for J&K are limited. Consequently, the laws passed by Parliament are not directly applicable to the state of J&K unless adopted by the legislature of that state. However, the President is empowered to declare that Article 370 shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with certain exceptions or modifications. For details of Article 370, see *The Constitution of India*, New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1990, pp. 111–12.

<sup>12</sup> Sir Zafrullah Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan, commented on the importance of Kashmir: “The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and the strategic points of view become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign state.” Cited in Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> “Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India, it has been so ever since the dawn of history. Its northern provinces give direct gateways to the north-western province of Pakistan and northern Punjab. It is India’s only window to the Central Asian Republics in the north, China on the east and of Afghanistan on the west. Out of the five gateways opening into the geographic entity called India–Quetta, Gurrul and Kuram valleys, Khyber and Chitral—the last one, in Kashmir is the most easily accessible and at the lowest altitude”, cited in *ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>14</sup> Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941–1969*, Bombay: B. I. Publications, 1972, p. 511.

<sup>15</sup> Sumantra Bose, *The Challenges in Kashmir*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 67.

<sup>16</sup> *UN Year Book 1947–1948*, New York: Department of Public Information, UN, 1949, p. 387.

<sup>17</sup> The Indian Representative sought UN assistance to:

- 1) prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of J&K state;
- 2) urge other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in J&K; and
- 3) to deny to the invaders access to use of its territory for operations against Kashmir: *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Part I of the resolution contained the provisions for a cease-fire. Part II of the resolution dealt with the principle of a truce agreement, which stated that the Pakistan Army should withdraw from the state and India should reduce its forces with the approval of the commission, to maintain law and order in the state. Part III of the resolution was important and it stated: “The Government of India and Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir shall be determined according to the will of the people. To that end, upon acceptance of the Truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.” See *United Nations Security Council Official Records (UNSCOR)*, Fourth Year, Special Supplement no. 7, 1949, S/11430, pp. 21–23.

<sup>19</sup> P. L. Lakhan Pal, *Essential Documents: Notes on the Kashmir Dispute*, New Delhi: International Books, 1968, p. 136.

<sup>20</sup> *UN Year Book, 1950*, New York: Department of Public Information, UN, 1951, p. 308.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>22</sup> The Australian Prime Minister’s proposals were:

- 1) to bring outside military forces to assist in demilitarization and policing the state during the plebiscite period;
- 2) joint Indian–Pakistani forces for conducting plebiscite;
- 3) to introduce forces recruited locally by the plebiscite Administrator with officers chosen from outside (cited in *Foreign Relations of United States, 1951*, Part II, vol. 6, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 1707).

<sup>23</sup> *UN Year Book, 1951*, New York: Department of Public Information, UN, 1952, p. 344.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2241.

<sup>25</sup> Mahmudul Huque, *The Role of the USA in the India–Pakistan Conflict 1947–71*, Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 50.

<sup>26</sup> Gupta, n. 8, p. 305.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 313.

<sup>28</sup> *UNSCOR*, 762–64 meetings, 1957, cited in Gupta, *op. cit.*, n. 8, p. 314. M. C. Chagla, Indian Representative in the Security Council, argued on 10 February 1964, “Did Pakistan permit the people of the Princely States in Pakistan to exercise the right of self-determination after the Rulers had acceded to Pakistan? ... the accession of Bahawalpur had been forced on the Ruler of that State. When Pakistan purchased ... the territory of Gwaadar from the Sultan of Muscat, what happened to Pakistani solicitous regard for the people’s right to self-determination?” See *ibid.*, p. 60. The intention is not to say who is right and who is wrong, but to show how both countries tried to justify their policies on Kashmir.

<sup>29</sup> *UNSCOR*, 13th year, supplement 1958, s/3984, pp. 41–42.

<sup>30</sup> India did not approve the report because it equated India with Pakistan. The report did not mention that Pakistan was an aggressor. See *UNSCOR*, n. 15, p. 23.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in Appadorai and Rajan, n. 5, p. 96.

<sup>32</sup> *The Hindu*, 5 April 1958: *ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>33</sup> Cited in Jawaharlal Nehru, *India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches 1946–1961*, New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1961, pp. 467–68.

<sup>34</sup> *UNSCOR*, 17th year, 1009th meeting, 3 May 1962, pp. 13–14.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>36</sup> UN Security Council Press Release, 65/21501, pp. 3–7, cited in Ved Vati Chaturshreni, *Indo-US Relations*, New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1980, p. 150.

<sup>37</sup> Sisir Gupta, “India’s Policy Towards Pakistan”, *International Studies*, vol. 8, nos. 1–2, July–October 1966, p. 39.

<sup>38</sup> Gerard Braunthal, “An Attitude Survey in India,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 1969, p. 82.

<sup>39</sup> Shashi Tharoor, *Reasons of State: Political Development & India’s Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi 1966–1977*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1982, p. 36.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 569, *ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>42</sup> Letter dated 19 April 1965 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/6291, 20 April 1965, cited in Appadorai and Rajan, n. 5, p. 70.

<sup>43</sup> R. P. Anand, “The Kutch Award”, *India Quarterly*, vol. 24, July–September 1963, pp. 184–85.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Braunthal, n. 38, p. 82.

<sup>46</sup> *The Hindu*, 8 September 1965.

<sup>47</sup> *The Hindu*, 20 August 1965.

<sup>48</sup> *The Hindu*, Editorial, 4 September 1965.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 13 October 1965.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> *National Herald*, 24 August 1965.

<sup>53</sup> *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 30 September 1965. Also see *National Herald*, under Letters to the Editor, 17 August 1965.

<sup>54</sup> *The Hindu*, Editorial, 18 September 1965.

<sup>55</sup> *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 20 September 1965. For further details regarding peoples' attitude towards Pakistan during the war, see *The Hindu*, 17, 21, 24 August 1965; 2, 11, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23 September 1965; 4, 6 October 1965.

<sup>56</sup> For instance, 87 per cent of senior officers were from West Pakistan in 1960. See Appadorai and Rajan, n. 5, p. 101.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>58</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, New Delhi: Parliamentary Secretariat, vol. 2, no. 5, 24 May 1971, col. 188.

<sup>59</sup> Appadorai and Rajan, n. 5, p. 103.

<sup>60</sup> Indian Representative Samar Sen's statement on 6 October 1971 at the United Nations Security Council. See *United Nations Security Council Official Records*, 26th year, 1608th meeting, S/PV, 6 December 1971, p. 92.

<sup>61</sup> *The Times of India*, 4 December 1971.

<sup>62</sup> *United Nations Security Council Official Records*, 1606th meeting, S/PV, 4 December 1971, pp. 42, 74–75.

<sup>63</sup> *Ministry of Defence Report, 1971–1972*, p. 34: Appadorai and Rajan, n. 5, p. 105.

<sup>64</sup> Parth S. Ghosh, "Need for Open Diplomacy", *The Hindu*, 11 May 1999.

<sup>65</sup> David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Assertion", *Asian Survey*, vol. 12, no. 2, February 1972, p. 92. In a survey, 57 per cent of the respondents supported early recognition of Bangladesh in mid-1971. See Tharoor, n. 39, p. 299.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>67</sup> *The Hindu*, 16 November 1971.

<sup>68</sup> *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 13 December 1971.

<sup>69</sup> *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 14, 15 December 1971. G. K. Reedy felt that the East Pakistan crisis proved that the two-nation theory had no place in the subcontinent. See *The Hindu*, 30 December 1971. For more details regarding views of people, see *The Hindu*, under Letters to the Editor, 7, 22, 24 November 1971; 9, 10, 14, 22, 24 December 1971; 3, 4 January 1972.

<sup>70</sup> *The Hindu*, 17 December 1971.

<sup>71</sup> *The Hindu*, 19, 20, 22 December 1971.

## Chapter III

### Survey Findings

The present study was conducted during November 1998–January 1999 among the educated elite belonging to different fields (lawyers, journalists, people working in non-governmental organizations, students and teachers) in the age group of 20–35 in four metropolitan cities of India: Kolkata (Calcutta), Hyderabad, Mumbai (Bombay) and New Delhi. This survey provides descriptive information about the third-generation perceptions of the Kashmir issue—the nature of the conflict and violence, strategies or mechanisms of conflict resolution, implications of the conflict, the Kashmiri people’s attitude and role of the youth.

#### **Nature of the Conflict and Violence**

There are a few sets of questions related to the nature of conflict and violence.

##### *Most Important Problem*

India, as one of the developing countries, faces many problems. The respondents were asked to give priority in selecting their preference regarding the problems being faced by India. Only 5 per cent of the respondents considered the Kashmir issue the most important concern facing the country. Poverty, terrorism, communalism, liberalization and the nuclear issue ranked above the Kashmir issue<sup>1</sup> for the majority of the respondents (Table 3.1). This is because they are preoccupied with many problems like unemployment: the Kashmir issue is in no way a concern for them. However, there is no consistency/correlation between respondents rating the Kashmir issue and the importance of the issue. In response to separate questions, 31 per cent of them treated the issue as very important (Table 3.1).

##### *Knowledge of the Issue*

The majority of the respondents (52 per cent) are “just informed” (i.e. had a bare knowledge) about Kashmir (Table 3.1). Since the source of information is an important tool to understand the problem, respondents were asked to reveal their source of information: 45 per cent are influenced by newspapers and magazines, and 19 and 18 per cent respectively had come under the influence of books and television. The rest (18 per cent) are influenced by many factors such as parents and elders, teachers, friends,

Table 3.1 Knowledge of the Issue

Problem	%	Importance of the problem	%	Knowledge of the issue	%	Nature of the issue	%	Attachment	%
Poverty	60	Very important	31	Well informed	43	Political	42	Very emotional	21
Terrorism	13	Important	38	Just informed	52	Religious	11	Somewhat emotional	49
Communalism	9	Important to some extent	26	Do not know	5	Bilateral	32	Not emotional	29
Liberalization	7					International	1	No response	1
Nuclear	6	Not important	3			All the above	14		
Kashmir	5	Neither/nor	2						

political leaders and NGOs. Since newspapers and magazines influenced a majority of them, understanding and co-operation will be increased if the media play a positive role.

#### *Nature of Kashmir*

Of the respondents, 42 per cent understood the nature of the Kashmir issue as political in nature, another 32 per cent viewed it as a bilateral one and 11 per cent of them felt that it was religious. However, 1 per cent considered it as an international problem and 14 per cent opined all the above (Table 3.1).

#### *Attachment for the Kashmir Issue*

Emotional quotient has been accepted as an important trait of the human personality to understand the individual. When the respondents were asked to express their emotional feelings on Kashmir, only 21 per cent are very emotional and 49 per cent somewhat emotional about the issue. In other words, a little less than two-thirds of the respondents are emotional on the issue, 29 per cent not emotional, and 1 per cent did not respond (Table 3.1). Who is Responsible for the Tension in Kashmir

Of the respondents, 45 per cent argued that both India and Pakistan are responsible for the tension in Kashmir. As individuals, respondents found Pakistan at greater fault (27 per cent) than India (2 per cent), while 9 per cent held the US responsible, 4 per cent felt China was, 3 per cent viewed the Kashmiri people as themselves being responsible, and 11 per cent felt that all these countries are responsible (Table 3.2).

#### *Pakistan's Policy on Kashmir*

Of the respondents, 40 per cent felt that Pakistan is unnecessarily

Table 3.2 Opinion of Policy

Responsible for the tensions in Kashmir	%	Pakistan's policy	%	India taking the issue to the U.N	%	India and Kashmir	%	Kashmir in Indo-Pakistan Relations	%
India	2	Unnecessary interference	40	Supported	42	Pakistan is not co-operating	39	Major source of tension	90
Pakistan	27	It has no right to talk	28	Opposed	58	India is not serious	24	Not a major issue	10
Both India and Pakistan	45	It has right to interfere	5			India failed to curb terrorism	17		
People of Kashmir	3	Its policy is motivated by religion	19			No response	5		
U.S	9	Others	5			Others	15		
China	4	No response	3						
All the above	11								

interfering in the Kashmir issue and 28 per cent argued that Pakistan has no right to talk about the issue. While 5 per cent said Pakistan has a right to talk about the issue as it is a bilateral one, 19 per cent maintained that Pakistan's policy is motivated by the religious factor. Three per cent did not respond, while 5 per cent observed the following.

- When India could interfere in the East Pakistan crisis, Pakistan has every right to do so in Kashmir.
- Pakistan has a right to take up the issue of Kashmir in international fora as one of the parties.
- Pakistan's policy on Kashmir is based on the very idea of its origin, i.e. the two-nation theory. It calls it "the unfinished agenda".
- It has become an integral part of Pakistan's domestic politics (Table 3.2).

#### *Opinion about India Taking the Kashmir Issue to the UN*

The majority of the respondents (58 per cent) viewed that India's step was a political blunder, because instead of referring it to the UN, it should have repelled the invaders. Others (42 per cent) supported whatever India did on the ground that as an international organization, the UN could have played a positive role in resolving the dispute (Table 3.2). They further felt that there was nothing wrong on India's part in taking the issue to the UN, but the permanent members of the Security Council precipitated the issue as they wanted to capitalize on it during the Cold War.

### *India and Kashmir*

When India has been able to solve many issues with neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, it is strange that it is not able to resolve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. In this regard, for 39 per cent, the issue is continuing because Pakistan is not cooperating with India over the issue, while 24 per cent felt that India is not taking serious steps in the direction to resolve the problem.<sup>2</sup> Another 17 per cent felt that the problem persists as India is not able to curb cross-border terrorism in Kashmir; 5 per cent did not respond to the issue whereas another 15 per cent gave reasons such as:

- India has not been able to redress the economic grievances of the Kashmiris and usher in economic development.
- Absence of dialogue with Pakistan has resulted in its encouragement of infiltration across the border.
- The Kashmiri viewpoint is not taken into account.
- The Indian and Pakistani Governments have to be serious and sit with the Kashmiris in resolving it.
- As the views of the Pakistani and Indian Governments are diametrically opposed, there seems to be little meeting ground. Further, as the issue is closely connected to the domestic politics of Pakistan, the issue is very emotional with the masses.
- The Union Government of India is not making efforts seriously as the Centre is experiencing instability.
- Both India and Pakistan failed to adopt a creative and dynamic approach while addressing the problem.
- India should have clinched the issue during the Simla meeting after the 1971 war. By frittering away its advantage, it is paying a heavy price now.
- India adopted the faulty federal approach since its independence while addressing the Kashmir problem.
- Both countries refuse to compromise and come to an understanding.
- The Indian Government's mishandling and Pakistan's provocation.
- Political parties are guided by their narrow interests and not by national interest. Hence, the problem persists.

- India's Kashmir policy was faulty from the beginning.
- Lack of trust between the two countries (Table 3.2).

### *Kashmir in Indo-Pak Relations*

Overwhelmingly, respondents (90 per cent) identified Kashmir as a major source of tension between India and Pakistan. The remaining 10 per cent opined that it is not a major issue between the two (Table 3.2). Among the respondents who opined Kashmir as a major irritant, one observed that Pakistan is obsessed with Kashmir and cannot think beyond it. Hence it became the source of tension in Indo-Pak relations.

### *Role of Indian Political Leadership*

The majority of the respondents (59 per cent) felt that the political leadership is responsible for the situation prevailing today in Kashmir, whereas 21 per cent answered negatively and another 20 per cent maintained that it is difficult to decide (Table 3.3). The respondents mainly found fault with the Indian National Congress (40 per cent) and Congress-I (24 per cent) (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Opinion of Political Parties

Are Political Parties responsible for the present situation	%	Responsibility of Indian political parties	%
Yes	59	Indian National Congress	40
No	21	Congress-I	24
Cannot say	20	Janata Party	2
		National Party	2
		BJP	12
		CPI/CPM	—
		National Conference	8
		All the above	12

### *Present Government's policy*

The present Government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party<sup>3</sup> stressed more on resolving the Kashmir issue as well as curbing the terrorism in the state. In this regard, respondents viewed the Government's policy from different angles as follows.

- The present Government would continue with the same old policy of earlier Governments (43 per cent).
- The Government wants to solve the issue (30 per cent).

- The Government wants to precipitate the issue (11 per cent).
- The Government is indifferent to the issue (6 per cent).
- The Government wants to perpetuate its desire of an *Akhand Bharat* (10 per cent) (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Opinion of Terrorist and Military Forces Activities in Kashmir

Deployment of forces	%	Violation of human rights	%	Terrorist activities	%	Hot pursuit in curbing terrorist activities	%	Government's policy	%
Support	73	Major	27	Major	69	Support	59	Continues with old policy	43
Oppose	27	Considerable	54	Considerable	25	Oppose	41	Wants to solve the problem	30
		Negligible	19	Negligible	6	Consequences: Bring war between Indo-Pak	11	Wants to precipitate the issue	11
						Widen the area of conflict	20	Indifferent to the issue	6
						Contain external interference	41	Others	10
						May localize the problem	23		
						May bring peace in J&K	5		

*Military and Terrorist Activities in Kashmir*

In a separate question, the majority (54 per cent) felt that violation of human rights by the Indian Forces are considerable. There was no correlation between respondents supporting the Forces and violation of human rights by military forces. Respondents who did not support the deployment of the Forces also felt that human rights violations are taking place on a large scale (27 per cent). The remaining 19 per cent viewed violations as being negligible (Table 3.4).

Sixty-nine per cent of respondents argued that terrorist activities in J&K are very high; 25 per cent felt that they are considerable, and 6 per cent of them said terrorist activities are negligible (Table 3.4). If a comparison is made, it is clear that the majority of the respondents felt that terrorist activities are greater than the human rights violations in Kashmir. Though 73 per cent supported deployment of forces, but only 69 per cent argued that terrorism in J&K is high. The difference is small and insignificant

on the issue of military and militants' activities in Kashmir.

### *Opinion on India Taking the Course of Hot Pursuit in Curbing Terrorist Activities*

The majority of the respondents (59 per cent) justified hot pursuit against terrorists in Kashmir, whereas the remaining (41 per cent) disapproved of hot pursuit (Table 3.4). In an early question only 21 per cent of the respondents (Table 3.1) are very emotional about the Kashmir issue. The reason may be because they are not being directly affected by the Kashmir issue, whereas terrorist activities carried out in different parts of India had their impact on the respondents all over the country.

The respondents who justified it observed the following consequences from such an action: (1) it may prevent external interference (41 per cent); (2) it may localize the problem (23 per cent); (3) such actions may widen the area of conflict (20 per cent); (4) it may result in a war between India and Pakistan (11 per cent); and (5) it would bring peace in J&K (5 per cent) (Table 3.4).

### *Deployment of Indian Forces*

The majority of the respondents (73 per cent) supported the deployment of the Indian Forces in Kashmir on the ground that the security conditions are very bad. The remaining 27 per cent respondents who opposed the deployment of forces maintained that it would lead to further escalation of terrorist activities (Table 3.4).

### *Opinion on India getting back Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)*

Majority of the respondents (34 per cent) strongly opposed to get back Pakistan occupied Kashmir, 24 per cent of them neither supported nor opposed. Nineteen per cent supported to an extent, 12 per cent strongly supported, whereas 8 per cent opposed to an extent and 3 per cent did not response (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Opinion on POK

Opinion	%
Strongly support	12
Support to an extent	19
Strongly oppose	34
Oppose to an extent	8
Neither support nor oppose	24
No response	3

*Opinion on Special Status to Kashmir*

Regarding the special status to Kashmir majority of the respondents (39 per cent) preferred a national debate on its status; 30 per cent favoured its continuation; 27 per cent wanted to remove the special status and 4 per cent of them did not respond (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Opinion on Article 370

Opinion	%
Should be continued	30
Should be removed	27
Should be decided after national debate	39
No response	4

**Strategies or Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution***Third-Party Mediation*

As earlier mentioned in the Background, India does not want third-party mediation<sup>4</sup> whereas Pakistan insists on it on the Kashmir issue. On the issue, 80 per cent of them agreed with the Government policy because the issue is more a bilateral one and India and Pakistan should settle it, whereas the remaining 20 per cent preferred third-party mediation as both countries failed to come to an understanding in settling the problem over half a century (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Opinion of third party mediation

Third party mediation	%	If yes whose mediation	%
Yes	20	UN	80
No	80	US	13
		UK	2
		Neutral country	5

The respondents who favoured third-party mediation in Kashmir have given the following options: The UN is the only international organization having almost all States as its members, and it should mediate in resolving the issue (80 per cent); the US should play a role (13 per cent); the UK can also be involved in settling the problem (2 per cent). Neutral countries (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) should be involved in the dispute settlement mechanism (5 per cent) (Table 3.7).

*US Mediation on the Kashmir Problem*

Thirteen per cent of respondents who supported US mediation have given different reasons: (1) Since the US is the only superpower, it has the ability to solve the problem (55 per cent); (2) Since the US is the main donor of India and Pakistan, it should be allowed to play the mediator's role in settling the dispute (36 per cent); and (3) The US is genuinely interested in the welfare of the people of India and Pakistan (9 per cent) (Table 3.8).

At the same time, all the respondents opined that after the Cold War there is a shift in US policy on South Asia. The relations of the US with Pakistan are under strain. The abrogation of US military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1990 and suspension of supply of F 16 aircraft to Pakistan contributed to this. Unlike the Cold War period, Indo-US relations improved and both have common interests in different areas, viz. curbing terrorism, containing fundamentalism and upgrading economic linkages.

Those who opposed US mediation gave the following reasons : (1) Since the issue is bilateral, there should not be any scope for third-party mediation (56 per cent); (2) The US is acting like a world policeman (23 per cent) ; (3) Since Pakistan had a security alliance with the US, the latter cannot play a mediator's role (6 per cent); (4) The US has already declared its stand for a plebiscite (3 per cent);<sup>5</sup> (5) It wants to destabilize India (3 per cent); and (6) The US helped the insurgency in Kashmir (1 per cent). A few of them (8 per cent) gave the following reasons for not accepting US mediation.

- India is a sovereign state and capable of handling the issue on its own.
- Any third party acting as a mediator has some vested interest.
- If the US makes its stand clear on the Kashmir issue vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, then one would be able to express an opinion about its mediation on the issue.
- The US should not mediate on Kashmir, as its strategic interests will tilt the balance in favour of Pakistan. Fifty years of US–South Asia relations reveals this.
- The US has never till date given an impression that it is neutral on the issue.
- The credentials of the US are doubtful (Table 3.8).

Table 3.8 Opinion on US Mediation

Reasons for supporting	%	Reasons for opposition	%
US is genuinely concerned	9	Pakistan is an ally of the US	6
US is main donor	36	US supports plebiscite in Kashmir	3
US is only superpower	55	US has helped the insurgents in Kashmir	1
		US has been acting like a policeman	23
		US wants to destabilize India	3
		Dispute is a bilateral	56
		Others	8

*India Initiating a Dialogue on Kashmir*

The majority of them (78 per cent) felt that India should initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue; 15 per cent opposed any initiative over the issue, on the ground that Kashmir is an integral part of India;<sup>6</sup> 7 per cent expressed their inability to say anything about the dialogue (Table 3.9).

Those who favoured a dialogue gave the following answers to the questions with whom India should initiate a dialogue: 25 per cent favoured a dialogue with the Pakistan Government, on the ground that if Pakistan and India settled the issue then it would not be difficult to suppress the activities of militants because further support would not be extended by Pakistan; 18 per cent preferred a dialogue with the leaders of the militant groups;<sup>7</sup> 57 per cent of them desired to have dialogue both with the Pakistan

Table 3.9 Opinion of Various Possible Mechanisms

India initiating a dialogue	%	Dialogue with whom	%	Ideal solution	%	CBMs between India and Pakistan	%
Supported	78	Militant groups	25	Maintain the status quo	5	Greater people to people contact	20
Opposed	15	Pakistani Govt.	18	Recognize LAC as an international border	25	More discussions between intelligientia of India and Pakistan	9
Difficult to say	7	Both	57	Make Kashmir an independent country	2	More talks between Indian and Pakistani Governments	13
				Cede Kashmir to Pakistan	—	Improve trade relations	9
				More autonomy to Kashmir	28	Involve Kashmiri leadership	11
				Conduct plebiscite	13	All the above	35
				Curb terrorist activities	23	Others	3
				Others	4		

Government as well as military groups, because without the participation of both, the problem would not be solved (Table 3.9).

### *Ideal Solution*

Twenty-eight per cent desired to give more autonomy to J&K,<sup>8</sup> while 25 per cent and 23 per cent of the respondents wanted to recognize the LAC as an international border between India and Pakistan and curb terrorist activities in Kashmir respectively. Thirteen per cent suggested plebiscite in Kashmir as it would facilitate the people of Kashmir to decide their future, 5 per cent supported the status quo, and 2 per cent favoured Kashmir becoming an independent country.<sup>9</sup> Another 4 per cent gave the following opinions.

- Conduct plebiscite in Kashmir as a whole.
- Remove the special treatment for Kashmir to allow Indians throughout the country to settle down there.
- Curb terrorism first and then conduct plebiscite.
- Develop diplomatic relations with Pakistan and settle the issue bilaterally.
- The Government of India must create conditions generating confidence among the Kashmiri people.
- Improve trade relations with Pakistan (Table 3.9).

### *CBMs Between India and Pakistan*

No two neighbouring countries in the world have as much misunderstanding as India and Pakistan have had for the last half a century. In this regard, the respondents were asked about the steps to be taken to reduce prevailing misunderstanding between India and Pakistan: 20 per cent of the respondents felt that there should be greater contact between the people of India and Pakistan (Table 3.9).<sup>10</sup> The author, who participated in the Summer Workshop organized by King's College, University of London—the workshops were later taken up by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo—had an opportunity to discuss this with Pakistani scholars. During their discussion, they realized that their respective Governments were following policies based on mistrust. Individually, such conferences would promote more understanding between them. They did not feel that they were different from each other and were comfortable in exchanging views. They maintained that they should not blame each other, and for them the other side was not responsible for the present situation. They realized the fact that they should not repeat the same policies adopted

by their elders and believed that dialogue between India and Pakistan was necessary to solve the conflict and to restore confidence among the people.<sup>11</sup> The people were not responsible for the present situation but only the ruling political parties in India and Pakistan. Ultimately, it was the people who suffered a lot due to the conflict.

Thirteen per cent suggested a larger number of open official talks between the Indian and Pakistan Governments at frequent intervals, whereas 11 per cent advocated involving the Kashmiri leadership in Indo-Pakistan talks on the issue. Nine per cent of each suggested more discussions between the intelligentsia and improvement of trade relations between India and Pakistan respectively.<sup>12</sup> Another 35 per cent opted for all the above steps to reduce misunderstanding over the issue and 3 per cent opined that the media should play a positive role in bringing the people of the two countries closer (Table 3.9).

### Implications of the Conflict

The following issues have implications for the conflict.

#### *Economic Development vs Security*

Overwhelmingly, respondents (60 per cent) argued that expenditure on the military in Kashmir was detrimental, whereas some of them (26 per cent) responded in the negative and felt that the country did not have a choice, though it was detrimental to development. A few respondents (14 per cent) said that it was difficult to comment on it (Table 3.10).

Those who opined that the expenditure on the military in Kashmir was not detrimental to economic development were asked whether security was more important than economic development. They were divided into two groups. (1) A high proportion of the respondents (60 per cent) maintained that security was more important. For them, security was a prerequisite for economic development. (2) Forty per cent of the respondents felt that expenditure on the military in Kashmir was not detrimental to the economic development of the nation, but that did not mean that security was more

#### 3.10 Opinion on Economic Development Vs. Security

Impact of military expenditure on economic development	%	If no why	%
Yes	60	Security is pre-requisite for development	60
No	26	It is India's duty to protect Kashmir	40
Difficult to say	14		

important than economic development. Since Kashmir was under the control of the Indian Union, it was its duty to protect the state (Table 3.10).

### *Impact of the Kashmir Problem on South Asian Cooperation*

Respondents gave different views on whether Kashmir has become an obstacle for South Asian cooperation. They are: (1) Kashmir has become an obstacle for South Asian cooperation (35 per cent); (2) the Kashmir problem is not preventing cooperation (21 per cent); (3) the issue is partly affecting cooperation in the region (32 per cent); and (4) it is difficult to say whether the issue has become an obstacle or not (12 per cent) (Table 3.11).

Table 3.11 Opinion on Impact of Kashmir Problem

Impact of Kashmir problem on South Asian cooperation	%	Impact of Kashmir issue on nuclear war	%	Nuclear fallout	%
Yes	35	Yes	73	Increase tension between Indo-Pak	32
No	21	No	27	Ruled out war	
Partly	32			Internationalize the issue	16
Difficult to say	12			Unnecessary action	18
				No impact	20
					14

### *Whether the Kashmir Problem Would Lead to a Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan*

Most of the respondents (73 per cent) did not see a relation between the Kashmir issue and nuclear tests, whereas the rest of them felt that the Kashmir issue could lead to a nuclear war between them. There was no consistency between the respondents. Earlier, 32 per cent of them felt that the tests carried out by India and Pakistan would increase tension on the Kashmir issue. However, here, 27 per cent of them expressed that there was a relationship between the Kashmir issue and nuclear tests (Table 3.11).

### *Nuclear Fallout*

India and Pakistan carried out a series of tests in May 1998. Both countries claimed themselves as nuclear weapon States. In this regard, the respondents were asked about the impact of the tests on the Kashmir issue.<sup>13</sup> They gave the following answers: (1) the tests would increase tension between India and Pakistan (32 per cent); (2) both of them had adopted an

unnecessary course (20 per cent); (3) the tests had internationalized the Kashmir issue (18 per cent); (4) the tests had ruled out the possibility of Indo-Pak war on the Kashmir issue (16 per cent);<sup>14</sup> and (5) there was no impact on the Kashmir issue (14 per cent) (Table 3.11).

### *Order of Preference in Indo-Pak Relationship*

Of the respondents, 41 per cent wished to solve the problem peacefully and amicably. Only 12 per cent of them felt that relations would be improved only through economic cooperation,<sup>15</sup> while 26 per cent gave importance to national security while dealing with Pakistan, 20 per cent gave preference for all the above three, and 1 per cent specified that mutual mistrust and suspicion must be removed for normalizing Indo-Pak relations (Table 3.12). There is also no correlation between the respondents on CBMs and the order of preference in Indo-Pak relations. When a question was asked on CBM, 9 per cent suggested improvement in trade relations (Table 3.9), whereas in order of preference, 12 per cent opted for economic cooperation (Table 3.12).

Table 3.12 Opinion on Order of Preference in Indo-Pak Relations

Opinion	%
National security	26
Economic co-operation	12
Peaceful co-existence	41
All the above	20
Others	1

## **Kashmiri People's Attitude to the Problem**

### *Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims*

A high proportion of respondents (45 per cent) felt that the Kashmiri people are not happy with the Government, while 15 per cent of them felt that they were; 40 per cent said that they did not know the conditions in Kashmir (Table 3.13).

The respondents who felt that the Kashmiri people are not happy with the Government gave the following reasons: (1) India did not combat terrorism effectively (20 per cent); (2) economic development is ignored in Kashmir (18 per cent); (3) violation of human rights by the security forces in Kashmir led to people's discontent (15 per cent); (4) people are not happy because the Indian Government did not tackle increasing unemployment (12 per cent); (5) India is not serious about bringing peace to Kashmir (12 per cent); (6) rampant corruption is one of the causes (9 per cent); (7) it is due to Pakistani propaganda (8 per cent); (8) J&K is a Muslim-majority

state (4 per cent); and (9) other reasons (2 per cent): Kashmiris perceive that they are forcibly made to remain with India while they desire independence, and the issue has been pending for so long that they could not wait any more (Table 3.13).

Nine of the respondents were Kashmiris. Among them five of them are Pandits and remaining four were Muslims. The Pandits expressed the view that Article 370 (of the Constitution) should be abolished and amendments be made to the Constitution, so that people from other parts of India could go and settle in Kashmir. They argued that abolishing the Article was a prerequisite to bringing normalcy in Kashmir. Otherwise, safeguards for them would not be possible, with an overwhelming Muslim majority in the state. Four of the Muslim respondents felt that the special status to Kashmir should not be removed because their identity would be in danger.

**Role of the Youth**

The majority of the respondents (83 per cent) wanted the Indian Government to give importance to their views. They gave the following suggestions: (1) youths’ views must be taken into consideration (36 per cent); (2) the representatives of youth from India and Pakistan must be given the task of jointly resolving the Kashmir issue (28 per cent); (3) they must be allowed to have greater contact with the Pakistani youth (24 per

Table 3.13 Opinion on Kashmiris’ Attitude Towards Government

Are Kashmiri people happy with the Government	%	If not, why?	%
Yes	15	Because the Government of India (GOI) has not helped in the economic development of the state.	18
No	45	Because GOI is not able to tackle increasing unemployment	12
Do not know	40	Because GOI is not being able to combat terrorism in the state	12
		Because GOI is not serious about bringing peace to the state	9
		Because of rampant corruption in Kashmir	8
		Because of Pakistan’s propaganda	20
		Because Jammu and Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state	4
		Because of human rights violations by Indian security forces	15
		Other	2

cent); (4) a special counter-insurgency force of the youth should be created (7 per cent); and (5) the youth should be sent to Kashmir to counter Pakistan's propaganda (5 per cent) (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14 Opinion on Role of Youth

Importance of youth views	%	Suggestions	%
Supported	83	A special counter-insurgency force of the youth should be created	7
Opposed	17	Youth should be sent to Kashmir to counter Pakistan's propaganda	5
Impact of liberalization on youth		Their views must be taken into consideration	36
Yes	61	Allow them to have greater contact with the youth of Pakistan	24
No	37	Representatives of the youth from India and Pakistan must be given the task of jointly resolving the Kashmir issue	28
Do not know	2		

The remaining 17 per cent of the respondents answered negatively on the ground that it was not necessary to single out youths' perceptions, as their views may not be different from the perceptions of other generations (Table 3.14). They felt that animosity is maximum among the youth. For instance, one can observe the feelings of the majority of the youth while watching an Indo-Pak cricket test. They felt that due to the attachment to or influence of parents/elders, youth do not think rationally. For them, history and experience cannot be totally washed away by the youth.

#### *Impact of End of Cold War and Liberalization on Youth*

The majority of the respondents (61 per cent) emphasized that the end of the Cold War and the impact of liberalization have diverted the youth's attention from Indo-Pak rivalry, whereas 37 per cent did not feel so, and 2 per cent are not sure of the impact of these on youth (Table 3.14).

### **Analysis**

The following are more detailed findings from the survey.

### **Variations**

#### *Biographical Characteristics*

A majority of lawyers (55 per cent) opined that they did not know whether Kashmiris are happy with the Indian Government, whereas a

majority of the teachers working in the universities (52 per cent), NGOs (52 per cent), journalists (55 per cent), students (51 per cent) and students belong to Organizations (41 per cent) felt the other way around (Table 3.15).

Regarding the question about the ideal solution to the Kashmir problem, the majority of the lawyers (37 per cent) and teachers (32 per cent) wanted the Government to curb terrorist activities, whereas NGOs (34 per cent) and journalists (28 per cent) preferred more autonomy for J&K and students (who did not have affiliation to any organization) (33 per cent) favoured making the LAC as the international border. Students belong to organization gave equal importance to recognize LAC (27 per cent) as well as to give more autonomy to Kashmir (27 per cent) (Table 3.15). The majority of the lawyers (43 per cent) and students (44 per cent) saw the nature of the Kashmir issue as bilateral whereas teachers (40 per cent), NGOs (43 per cent), journalists (44 per cent) and students belong to organizations (37 per cent) looked the issue in political terms (Table 3.15).

On Article 370, a majority of the lawyers (47 per cent) wanted to remove the special status, whereas a majority of NGOs (35 per cent) favoured its continuation; others (teachers (52 per cent); journalists (39 per cent); students (48 per cent); student organizations (38 per cent) preferred a national debate on its status (Table 3.16). Though a majority of the respondents opposed plebiscite in Kashmir, lawyers (72 per cent) were in a majority among them (Table 3.16). However in response to a question (if yes, what is the reason), the majority of the lawyers (54 per cent) opined that, legally, India was bound to conduct a plebiscite because it had agreed to do so (Table 3.16). They must have treated the issue from a legal perspective, whereas few other groups wanted to conduct plebiscite because the people of Kashmir should be allowed to decide their own future.

On human rights violations by the Indian forces in J&K, the majority of the lawyers (34 per cent) considered violations are negligible, whereas majority of others (teachers (44 per cent); NGOs (42 per cent); journalists (37 per cent); students (30 per cent) and Student organizations (35 per cent) viewed them as considerable (Table 3.17). Though majority of all the respondents of all fields supported deployment of Indian forces, journalists (87 per cent) and lawyers (83 per cent) are more in number. Among the respondents, lawyers (32 per cent) are more in favour of getting POK back, whereas majority of the faculty (42 per cent) and students (31 per cent) neither supported nor opposed it. However, 51 per cent of the NGOs opposed it. Same per cent of student organizations also felt in the same way. Thirty one per cent of journalists opposed it (Table 3.17). It is clear that there is some inconsistency in the views expressed by the people

Table 3.15 Respondents of Different Fields View on Various Issues

Issues	Respondents					
	Lawyers %	Faculty %	NGO's %	Journalists %	Students %	St. Org %
1. Are Kashmiris happy with Govt.						
Yes	25	15	15	—	5	28
No	20	52	52	55	51	41
Do not know	55	33	33	45	44	31
2. Ideal solution						
Maintain the status quo	9	2	5	10	2	—
Recognize LAC as international border	24	22	32	16	33	27
Make Kashmir an independent country	—	9	—	2	2	—
Cede Kashmir to Pakistan	—	—	—	—	2	—
More autonomy to Kashmir	17	20	34	28	12	27
Conduct plebiscite	9	13	8	16	18	12
Curb terrorism	37	32	15	26	27	24
Others	4	2	5	2	4	10
3. Nature of the issue						
Political	37	40	43	44	36	37
Religious	7	6	14	16	9	14
Bilateral	43	36	27	20	44	33
International	—	4	—	—	—	2
All the above	9	14	16	18	11	12
Others	4	—	—	2	—	2

who are working for NGOs. At one place regarding the ideal solution, majority of them (34 per cent) (Table 3.15) preferred more autonomy for J&K. They treated the issue more as a domestic problem. While answering another question, they opposed India's striving to get POK back. Here, they treated Kashmir as a problem between India and Pakistan. One can conclude that they preferred peace in the region, as any efforts to get POK back might probably lead to conflict. To a question whether Kashmir had become an obstacle in forging regional co-operation in South Asia, more lawyers (36 per cent) viewed it negatively, whereas majority of others (teachers (37 per cent); NGOs (34 per cent); journalists (53 per cent); students (46 per cent) and student organizations (33 per cent) responded positively (Table 3.17).

Table 3.16 Respondents of Different Fields View on Various Issues

Issues	Respondents					
	Lawyers %	Faculty %	NGO's %	Journalists %	Students %	St. Org %
1. Special status						
Should be continued	23	30	35	38	26	28
Should be removed	47	13	25	23	23	31
Should be decided after national debate	27	52	30	39	48	38
No response	3	5	10	—	3	3
2. Plebiscite in Kashmir						
Yes	28	34	34	40	35	36
No	72	63	63	60	64	56
No response	—	3	3	⊕	1	8
3. If yes why						
Kashmiris should decide their future	13	73	35	68	71	57
India agreed to conduct plebiscite	54	7	30	11	—	38
It is way of solving the issue	33	13	25	21	29	5
Others	—	7	10	—	⊕	⊕

### *Gender variations*

The survey found a few variations in the perceptions of males and females.

Women in greater number (52 per cent) treated the issue as a bilateral one without any scope for third party mediation. However, they are less in number than men (60 per cent) (Table 3.18). Further 33 per cent of women viewed the US acting like a world policeman, whereas only 13 per cent of men felt in the similar way (Table 3.18). Majority of women (61 per cent) opposed plebiscite. However, if comparison is made men constituted more in number (66 per cent) (Table 3.18). Women (38 per cent) are more than men (30 per cent) in supporting plebiscite (Table 3.18). Regarding the question related to reasons for conducting plebiscite 56 per cent of women and 51 per cent of men opined that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future (Table 3.18). Most of the women (44 per cent) compared to men (35 per cent) favoured a national debate on Article 370 before it was removed (Table 3.18).

Table 3.17 Respondents of the Different Fields View on Some Issues

Issues	Respondents					
	Lawyers %	Faculty %	NGO's %	Journalists %	Students %	St. Org %
1. Violation of human rights						
Major	13	13	18	13	21	31
Considerable	25	44	42	37	30	35
Negligible	34	30	15	15	18	23
Do not know	28	13	25	35	28	8
No response	—	—	—	—	3	3
2. Deployment of forces						
Support	83	73	62	87	64	71
Oppose	17	27	38	13	36	29
3. India getting back POK						
Strongly support	32	5	9	11	5	10
Support to an extent	18	20	10	27	21	18
Strongly oppose	17	25	51	31	29	51
Oppose to an extent	8	8	10	8	9	5
Neither support nor oppose	20	42	20	23	31	8
No response	5	—	—	—	5	8
4. Impact of Kashmir on South Asian cooperation						
Yes	15	37	34	53	46	33
No	36	15	18	15	13	23
Partially	32	33	30	27	36	31
Difficult to say	17	15	18	6	5	13

Men (68 per cent) are less than women (70 per cent) in arguing that terrorist activities in Kashmir are very high (Table 3.19). But the difference is small and insignificant. In another question only 19 per cent of women and 17 per cent of men considered violation of human rights by military forces are high (Table 3.19). If a comparison is made, it is clear that majority of women and men felt that terrorist activities are greater than human rights violations in Kashmir. Since they felt that terrorist activities were very high, majority of women (69 per cent) and men (78 per cent) supported deployment of forces in Kashmir (Table 3.19). However, compared to women, a majority of men are more inclined to the deployment of Indian forces in Kashmir (Table 3.19).

Table 3.18 Women Views on Some Issues

Issues	Respondents	
	Male	Female
1. Reasons for opposing for US mediation		
Pakistan is friendly with Pakistan	6	6
US supported plebiscite in Kashmir.	3	3
US has helped the insurgents in Kashmir	1	1
US has been acting like a policeman	13	33
US wants to destabilize India	2	3
Dispute is a bilateral	60	52
Others	15	2
2. Plebiscite		
Supported	30	38
Opposed	66	61
No response	4	1
3. Reasons for conducting plebiscite		
Kashmiri people should decide their future	51	56
India agreed to conduct plebiscite	26	21
It is way of solving the issue	19	21
Others	4	2
4. Special status to Kashmir		
Should be continued	33	26
Should be removed	29	25
Should be decided after a national debate	35	44
No response	3	5

For a majority of men and women, economic development is more important than security. However, women (62 per cent) are slightly greater in number than men (58 per cent) (Table 3.20). Majority of women (58 per cent) compared to men (33 per cent) found fault with both India and Pakistan for the present situation in Kashmir. Whereas 33 per cent of men and 21 per cent of women maintained that Pakistan is responsible (Table 3.20). Majority of men (48 per cent) supported the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan whereas only 26 per cent of women supported. Women (46 per cent) are greater in number compared to men (32 per cent) in opposing the tests (Table 3.20).<sup>16</sup> From the above, it is clear that majority of women did not want a war between India and Pakistan and they did not support spending more money on nuclear programme. They preferred a dialogue and debate on the issues related to Kashmir.

Table 3.19 Women's Views on Terrorist and Military Activities in Kashmir

Issues	Respondents	
	Male	Female
1. Terrorist activities		
Major	68	70
Considerable	24	25
Negligible	5	—
Do not know	3	4
No response	—	1
2. Human rights violations		
Major	17	19
Considerable	38	33
Negligible	28	16
Do not know	15	32
No response	2	—
3. Deployment of forces		
Supported	78	69
Opposed	16	20
Do not know	4	10
No response	2	1

### *Regional Differences*

There were some differences in opinion across regions. The following are the views of the respondents of different cities in India on Kashmir.

The majority of the respondents from Delhi (40 per cent) are more emotional regarding the Kashmir issue than the respondents from other regions (Table 3.21). It may be due to their geographical proximity to Kashmir compared to other respondents. The views might also be influenced by the Kashmiri Pandits who migrated to Delhi from the Valley. Majority of the respondents from Mumbai (67 per cent), Kolkata (56 per cent) and Hyderabad (46 per cent) are some what emotional (Table 3.21). Majority of the respondents of Kolkata (44 per cent), Delhi (51 per cent) and Hyderabad (45 per cent) opined that Kashmiri people are not happy with the Indian government, whereas majority of the respondents of Mumbai (50 per cent) expressed that they did not know whether Kashmiri people are happy with the government (Table 3.21). The majority of the respondents from Delhi (29 per cent) and Mumbai (29 per cent) felt that

Table 3.20 Women's Views on Some Issues

Issues	Respondents	
	Male	Female
1. Expenditure on military is detrimental to economic development		
Yes	58	62
No	32	20
Cannot say	10	18
2. Who is responsible for the present situation		
India	3	1
Pakistan	33	21
Both	33	58
People of Kashmir	4	2
US	10	8
China	4	3
All the above	13	7
3. Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan		
Supported	48	26
Opposed	32	46
Partly	18	24
Cannot say	2	4

curbing terrorism would be the ideal solution to the Kashmir problem, whereas respondents of Kolkata (38 per cent) considered that recognition of the LAC as an international border would be ideal. Respondents of Hyderabad (36 per cent) considered granting more autonomy to J&K as ideal (Table 3.21).

Respondents of Delhi (40 per cent) considered Kashmir as a bilateral issue, whereas majority of others differed with the Delhites and for them it is a political issue (Table 3.22). A large number of the respondents from Kolkata (51 per cent) and Delhi (39 per cent) favoured a national debate in deciding the fate of special status for Kashmir, whereas respondents from Hyderabad (38 per cent) wanted its continuation and respondents from Mumbai (38 per cent) felt that 370 Article should be removed (Table 3.22). The majority of the respondents of Mumbai may be influenced by the opinion of the ruling elite of Shiva Sena–BJP as they were in power in Maharashtra at the time of conducting the survey.

Table 3.21 Regional Differences on Various Issues

Issues	Respondents			
	Calcutta %	Delhi %	Hyderabad %	Mumbai %
1. Attachment of Kashmir issue				
Very emotional	14	40	15	15
Somewhat emotional	56	24	46	67
Not emotional	29	35	38	18
No response	1	1	1	—
2. Are Kashmiris happy with Government				
Yes	17	17	17	10
No	44	51	45	40
Do not know	39	32	38	50
3. Ideal solution				
Maintain the status quo	3	3	10	5
Recognize LAC as international border	38	20	20	22
Make Kashmir as an independent country	1	3	3	2
Cede Kashmir to Pakistan	—	—	—	—
More autonomy to Kashmir	25	26	36	26
Conduct plebiscite	11	16	13	14
Curb terrorism	20	29	16	29
Others	1	2	1	1

### *Inconsistency*

Of the respondents, only 5 per cent considered the Kashmir issue as an important problem facing the country, whereas in another context, 31 per cent felt that the issue as very important. Only 13 per cent opted for plebiscite as an ideal solution of the Kashmir issue. However, when an independent question was asked, 34 per cent supported plebiscite. It is to be noted that there is some inconsistency in the perceptions of the respondents. Lawyers are in a majority of those who opposed plebiscite. However, to a separate question, the majority of the lawyers opined that India was legally bound to conduct plebiscite. Here, one comes across inconsistency among them in understanding the problem. Twenty-one per cent of the respondents are emotional about the Kashmir problem, but 59 per cent of them wanted the Indian Government to take a tough stand on terrorism. This variation may be because the majority of them are not being directly affected by the

Table 3.22 Regional Differences on Various Issues

Issues	Respondents			
	Calcutta %	Delhi %	Hyderabad %	Mumbai %
1 Nature of Kashmir issue				
Political	45	32	44	45
Religious	7	15	11	11
Bilateral	29	40	30	29
International	3	1	—	—
All the above	16	12	15	15
2 Special Status to Kashmir				
Should be continued	23	33	38	26
Should be removed	23	28	20	38
Should be decided after national debate	51	39	35	31
No response	3	—	7	5

Kashmir issue, whereas terrorist activities carried out in different parts of India had their impact on the respondents in the rest of the country. From the above, it is clear that the youth had inconsistency in expressing views on some of the issues.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup> In a survey carried out by David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo in 1994 on Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy, it was found that only 6 per cent of the respondents considered the nuclear issue as the most important. The study was conducted among the educated elite belonging to various fields without giving any specified age limit. For details, see David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds, *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996, pp. 3–22. In the present survey, all other issues ranked above the Kashmir issue.

<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy to mention that George Fernandes, who was Minister of Kashmir Affairs in 1990, said: “I do not believe that any foreign hand engineered the Kashmir problem. The problem was created by us, and if others decided to take advantage of it, I do not believe that one should make that an issue.” Cited in George Fernandes, “India’s Policies in Kashmir: An Assessment and Discourse” in Raju C. Thomas, ed., *Perspectives on Kashmir*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 286.

<sup>3</sup> The survey was conducted during the second term of A. B. Vajpayee as Prime Minister.

<sup>4</sup> “Third party role can be relevant under two conditions. One, the parties concerned are not on talking terms, which is not the case between India and Pakistan. Two, the parties concerned can be persuaded to compromise on basic position in response to certain incentives or rewards, which may be offered by the 3rd party. In the case of India and Pakistan, they value their basic positions so much that no incentive will be enough to lead them to compromise”: *Kashmir Trends*, New Delhi, vol. 6, nos. 252–53, 21–28 September 1998.

<sup>5</sup> The US became involved in the Kashmir issue since the matter was brought to the notice of the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948. In the beginning, the US wanted to settle the problem peacefully because its interests necessitated maintaining friendly relations both with India and Pakistan. Friendly relations between India and Pakistan were necessary to secure a barrier against expanding Communism in the South Asian region. To this end, it called upon both parties to resolve the issue amicably. The US opined that Kashmir should either become part of India or Pakistan, and was reluctant to recognize it as an independent State. The reason behind its refusal might be due to the proximity of Kashmir to both the Soviet Union and China. The US felt that these two Communist countries might not allow Kashmir to be independent. Notwithstanding this stance, the US maintained that the plebiscite recommended by the UNCIP should be conducted to resolve the dispute. This was against India’s interest. India’s argument was that if the US gave due respect to self-determination, then why did the US itself fight a civil war to prevent its southern states from exercising self-determination. The US, over the years, accorded support to Pakistan on the Kashmir question essentially because of its strategic linkages with Pakistan. On this score, India’s stance did not get the support of the US, more so due to its non-aligned stance. India’s refusal to be part of the US-sponsored military alliance led the US to support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The survey was conducted before the Kargil issue, wherein the US, for the first time, supported India and persuaded Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, to withdraw Pakistani forces. During the visit to India by Clinton, the US supported the status quo, did not favour plebiscite, and asked Pakistan to restrain itself in being involved in Kashmir. There is a general feeling in Government circles that there is a shift in US policy towards Kashmir after the Kargil episode.

<sup>6</sup> Gerard Braunthal conducted a survey in Bolpur village in West Bengal during February–March and May 1966. His survey reveals that 65 per cent of the respondents did not consider the Kashmir issue as a problem, because it was an integral part of India. See Gerard Braunthal,

“An Attitude Survey in India”, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 1969, p. 82.

<sup>7</sup> Chakravorthy argues: “...First, talk to the leaders of the more accredited among the militant groups. Second, when some tangible progress is made toward an understanding, then the Pakistan government could be approached for a positive attitude toward such an endeavor, toward a settlement based on mutual understanding and good will. Realism, therefore, demands that any meaningful progress toward South Asian regional cooperation has to begin with improved and enduring understanding between India and Pakistan. The priority issue in this sector is the settlement of the Kashmir question. And for settling the Kashmir question, there is no other way but to talk directly to the leaders of the militants.” See Nikhil Chakravorthy, “Give Peace a Chance”, *Economic Times*, 27 December 1994.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, a specialist on South Asia, feels: “It cannot be achieved without Pakistan’s cooperation, for an autonomous Kashmir can then be infiltrated by Pakistan-based Jihadists.” See Rajesh Ramachandran, “Hobson’s Choice”, *The Hindustan Times*, 26 March 2000.

It is noteworthy to quote Kuldip Nayyar, columnist, who argues, “If posterity ever apports blame for the conditions in Jammu & Kashmir, New Delhi will have far more to explain than Islamabad. From the beginning, we have made a hash of things in that state. We jailed Sheikh Abdullah, who was instrumental in the integration of Jammu & Kashmir in the Indian Union. We never allowed the people of the state to choose their rulers as the rest of the country did and saw to it that New Delhi’s choice was Srinagar’s choice.” Cited in *Indian Express*, 14 October 1996.

<sup>9</sup> India and Pakistan did not agree to the third option: that of independence. Though Pakistan demands a plebiscite, it has never agreed to self-determination.

<sup>10</sup> A Pakistani journalist noted that the biggest hurdles in the way of a tension-free relationship between India and Pakistan are the distorted perceptions, which have been fostered by vested interests on both sides. They are the result mostly of lack of contact and communication at the people-to-people level, which would dissipate if formal and informal exchanges of visits by non-officials were allowed to continue. Some such process has been discernible in recent years. See M. H. Askari, “Obstacles to Normalization”, *The Dawn*, 21 May 1997, cited in Moonis Ahmar, *The Road to Peace in South Asia: Lessons for India and Pakistan from the Arab-Israel Peace Process*, ACDIS Paper, Urbana: University of Illinois, August 1996, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Waslekar aptly pointed out that “this generation gap is clearly evident in track two dialogue. Most retired army or government officials tend to be obsessed with problems in terms of some treaty, resolution or conflict of ten or twenty years earlier. Most young people look at problems in terms of what it means for their future.” Cited in Sandeep Waslekar, “Track Two Diplomacy in South Asia”, ACDIS Paper, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, Urbana: University of Illinois, October 1995, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> It is notable that illegal trade was substantially higher than formal trade between them.

<sup>13</sup> A survey has been carried out on youth (the same respondents who were interviewed for the present study) perceptions on the nuclear issue. For further details, see A. Subramanyam Raju, “Indian Youth Perceptions on Nuclear Issue: Some Observations”, in A. Subramanyam Raju, ed., *Nuclear India: Problems and Perspectives*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2000, pp.147–60.

<sup>14</sup> Perhaps they agree with Kenneth Waltz’s argument that international stability would be possible by nuclear proliferation, and more nuclear weapon states would create less international aggression. See James Kurth, “‘Inside the Cave’, The Banality of I. R. Studies”, *National Interest*, no. 53, Fall 1998, p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> Aurangzeb Khan opines: “As bilateral trade and both economies progressively integrate and as the benefits become larger and more evident, policy makers will become aware of the importance of sustaining and further consolidating bilateral economic and political ties. As political ties improve, the level of bilateral tension and mutual suspicion may subside... it may prompt both governments to start channeling resources away from their bloated defence establishments to their acutely neglected social, infrastructures and other developmental spheres.” See Aurangzeb Z. Khan, “Confidence Building Through Free Trade and Joint Ventures” in Sony Devabhaktuni, ed., *Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Prospects and Problems*, Occasional Paper, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 1997, p. 47, cited in Aqil S. Shah, *Non-Official Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Prospects and Problems*, ACDIS Paper, Urbana: University of Illinois, August 1997, p. 11. Unofficial trade between India and Pakistan through cross-border smuggling and routing through third countries like Dubai and Singapore amounts to one billion dollars per annum. See *ibid*.

However, Pakistan does not want to improve trade relations unless the Kashmir issue is resolved. For instance, to quote a leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, in a seminar argued “unless the Kashmir issue is solved the agreements of trade relations with India will amount to hamper[ing] the Kashmir movement and concurrently Indian hegemony would be established. Although trade could not be rejected with any country for financial benefit, economic ties with India would mean to forget the sacrifices of Kashmir and bargaining on national interests under the new world order, as the Western world wants to make India an elder brother of [the] South Asian region.” *The Frontier Post*, 13 August 1994, cited in Ahmar, n. 10, p. 44.

<sup>16</sup> Feminists argue: “Women are more peace-loving, more nurturing and more connected with life, it is they who may be our only hope of salvation in the nuclear age.” See Sandra Whitworth, *Feminism and International Relations*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 17. Sara Ruddick writes: “There is a real basis for the conventional association of women with peace. Women are daughters who learn from their mothers the activity of preservative love and the maternal thinking that arises from it. These ‘lessons from her mother’s house’ can shape a daughter’s intellectual and emotional life even if she rejects the activity, its thinking, or, for that matter, the mother herself. Preservative love is opposed in its fundamental values to military strategy.... A daughter, one might say, has been trained to be unsoldierly”, *ibid*, p. 3. Feminists argue that men are more aggressive, hierarchical and power seeking than women. If this is true, then it would be important to bring women into decision-making.

## Chapter IV

### Conclusion

The survey reveals a diffused pattern of response on many issues by the respondents on the basis of gender, region and occupation and with less political influence. Whether the results of the survey of four cities in India tally with the views of youth in other parts of India is a matter of conjecture. The study is more of an exploratory attempt to study how the youth understand and analyse the problem being faced by the country.

The majority of the respondents seemed to have acquired knowledge of the Kashmir issue mainly through newspapers and magazines. Bringing the people of both countries together through frequent visits would most probably facilitate exchange of information about each other, which in turn would create a healthy atmosphere to work for peace between India and Pakistan. If the media play a positive role, it will be possible to develop cordial relationships among the people of both countries.

#### **Differences Between the Third and Two Earlier Generations**

The first and second generations wanted to get back POK, whereas the third generation wanted to solve the issue peacefully and amicably. One can understand that the people who belong to the first and second generations did not oppose Nehru taking the issue to the UN Security Council, whereas the third generation did not support it. The people of earlier generations, who witnessed the wars between India and Pakistan, did not trust Pakistan. They felt that Pakistan was responsible for not solving the Kashmir problem. However, the youth felt that both India and Pakistan are responsible for the present situation in Kashmir. The earlier generations did not have hopes to resolve the problem, because of Pakistan's non-cooperation. But young people suggested more people-to-people contacts between India and Pakistan and more discussions between the intelligentsia and official talks between the Indian and Pakistan Governments at frequent intervals. Though the third generation also has a nationalistic approach, but compared to earlier generations it is less emotional about Kashmir as an issue between India and Pakistan. The earlier generations criticized the two-nation theory. The historical legacy was deeply rooted in the minds of the earlier two generations. (Their feelings can be seen in Chapter II.) But from the survey, one can see that the majority of respondents did not have animosity towards Pakistan. Another reason may be because this generation unlike the earlier

two generations did not witness any full-scale war between India and Pakistan.

The earlier generations supported the Indian Government's policy on Kashmir. The present generation felt that the political leadership was responsible for the situation prevailing in Kashmir today. The earlier generations felt that negotiations were not the means of resolving the issue (Chapter II), whereas the present generation advocated that negotiations are the proper means. The gap between the earlier and the present generation may be due to the changes that have taken place in the international system after the Cold War. Negotiations have become a major means of resolving conflicts among States after the end of the Cold War. Kashmir is the only issue where no such serious effort has been made so far. The present generation may be influenced by the ongoing change in the international system, advocating that the time has come to start negotiation over the Kashmir issue to resolve it peacefully and amicably, as they are no winners and losers in a war in our times.

### **Third Generation's Views and Indian Government Policy**

The majority of the respondents' views are in consonance with the Government's policy on the following issues: there should not be any mediation because the nature of the issue is bilateral and should be settled by India and Pakistan; violations of human rights are not taking place on a large scale in Kashmir; terrorist activities in Kashmir *are* taking place on a large scale; deployment of Indian forces in Kashmir is necessary to curb terrorist activities.

The following are some views which the majority of the respondents expressed on India's policy on Kashmir issue, which undermines the credibility of the Government on the issue: the Kashmiri people are not happy with the Indian Government; the Indian Government should give more autonomy to J&K; the political leadership has created unnecessary fear over the Kashmir issue to divert the attention of people from the real issues faced by India and Pakistan; the present Government would continue with the same old policy of Indian Governments; and the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan would increase tension between them.

### **Suggestions**

- Both India and Pakistan should give up their rigid positions on the Kashmir issue. Both should play positive roles and give up conspiracy for any movement or development in Kashmir.

- They should stop propaganda through state-controlled media.<sup>1</sup>
- They should understand each other's society: there is no direct knowledge about each other's society after Partition in 1947.
- They should allow flow of books, literature and free movement of people, frequent meetings of scholars, and thus it may be possible to build trust and goodwill among the people.
- Non-interference in each other's internal affairs. (It is reported that the Pakistan Government is instigating the activities of militants in Indian Kashmir, and India through RAW leading to the rise of Sindh against Pakistan.)
- They should reduce their defence expenditure.
- There should be transparency and verification measures in the field of defence. Both countries should have joint military exercises, periodical meetings of defence chiefs and ministers, and work for regional security.
- They should stop all military and terrorist activities in Kashmir. Since the Kashmiri people are the fundamental party to the dispute, therefore their participation is a must in any negotiations between India and Pakistan.
- They should refrain from making statements which would aggravate the situation.

### **Note**

<sup>1</sup> The Indian media focus on killing of people by militants, whereas Pakistani channels project violation of human rights by Indian forces. India and Pakistan blame each other's activities, instead of projecting what is really happening in Kashmir.

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