

**EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA:
*THE CASE OF THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI AND SHIV SENA***

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Extremism in Pakistan and India:
The Case of the Jamaat-e-Islami and Shiv Sena

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The design and proposal for this monograph emerged from a collaborative research fellowship initiated by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS, Colombo) for young scholars from South Asia. The monograph is essentially a study of two political parties, the Shiv Sena (of India) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI, of Pakistan) with the aim of understanding the extremist political ideology adopted by them. Both the Shiv Sena and the JI have shaped their political policies within a rightist framework and have openly supported the cause of the majority religious community in their respective countries. In a number of instances they have either instigated or participated in violent movements to achieve their goals which are often purely political in nature. The study has taken up the Shiv Sena and the JI and explores the possibilities and challenges that these parties create within a democracy, and in the case of the latter, in a country where the military has had a significant position in shaping the political and social lives of the countrymen.

Both India and Pakistan have witnessed the emergence of right-wing organizations in their countries which threaten the foundations of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Both countries, as discussed in the study have come under the spell of different versions of right-wing extremism. This work does not even attempt to elaborately address all the facets of right-wing extremism in both the countries, but to provide a glimpse into the problem of right-wing extremism by discussing the two case studies in detail. The idea is to bring to the forefront the possible answers to the threat posed by right-wing extremist parties. How will democracies like India, and Pakistan, with a dominant history of authoritarian regimes and struggling democracies, tackle the problem of right-wing extremism?

Several studies have been initiated on the subject of extremist organizations in both countries. The study of Hindutva organizations in India and similar right-wing organizations including the Jamaat in Pakistan has been explored and written about by several scholars. What has perhaps not been initiated is a collaborative effort in understanding the dynamics of right-wing organizations in both the countries, a subject that can affect them equally and transcend the quagmire of Indo-Pak relations. Moreover, the attempt through this study is to bring to the forefront a South Asian perspective, as against an Indian or Pakistani understanding on the subject. While it would be useful in understanding the roots of the problem in a democratic system as well as a military-dominated polity, attempts would also be made to assimilate theoretical explanations, if any, for the rise of rightist forces in the different polities. The Shiv Sena and the JI are interesting and challenging cases of extremist groups as both have used democratic electoral means to legitimize their ideologies. There are significant differences as far as the origin, growth and influence of the two parties are concerned, which further enhances the reason for undertaking a collaborative research on the growth of extremist groups with the aim of building on the comparative literature. The attempt would be to unveil the paradox of the success of anti-democratic parties within a democratic framework, the Shiv Sena being a case study for this; and the functioning of a similar extremist political party, the JI in Pakistan. The Shiv Sena has both an anti-pluralist ideology and has often catered to violent action while trying to achieve its agenda. The study would try and configure the circumstances under which the two parties have taken up violent measures and when they have preferred negotiation over violence.

The discourse of tackling right-wing extremism in South Asia is largely dominated by a nationalist perspective. There is a discussion on the legislative and legal means to tackle the problems posed by right-wing extremist parties and groups. While such an approach is useful, this study would argue that other such attempts which do not always involve the state, particularly at the level of civil society, have not yet caught the attention of many people writing on the subject.

The main objective of the study is to analyse the existence, growth and mode of operations of right-wing organizations in two different political environments (i.e. predominantly military supremacy in Pakistan, and democratic India), its impact on societies in the two countries, and explore the ways and means to curb the growing influence of right-wing extremist groups. Drawing insights from the existing theoretical views, the study attempts to understand the origin and growth of right-wing organizations in India and Pakistan and facilitate a conceptual clarity on the definition of extremism based on the particular case studies.

The research has been divided in five different parts. Chapter I, Right-Wing Extremism: Indian and Pakistani experiences, would focus on development of right-wing extremism in India and Pakistan and analyse the different theoretical positions for the origin, growth and impact of right-wing organizations in both the countries. Chapter II is on the organizational structure of the Shiv Sena and the JI, concentrating on the activities of the two organizations, including the social and political space within which they operate. Chapter III, Right-Wing Extremism, Governance and Security: The linkages, deals with possible strategies and policy measures to reduce the political and social spaces of these organizations, with particular emphasis on the role of civil-society organizations in India and Pakistan. Chapter IV on Models for Combating Right-Wing Extremism is on ways to address the problem of right-wing extremism both at the governmental level and at the levels of Track Two and Three diplomacy. The final chapter would draw the various conclusions of the study based on the arguments made in the previous chapters. It also lists best practices and lessons learnt.

We express our special gratitude to the RCSS for supporting this research through a Mahbub-ul-Haq research award 2005-6, which promotes collaborative researches on non-traditional security issues in South Asia. We thoroughly enjoyed this collaborative research, and encourage the RCSS to further the cause of supporting young researchers from the region to add to the body of knowledge on significant security debates in South Asia. A note of thanks is particularly due to all the interviewees who cooperated while we

conducted our field research in the two districts for each case study. We are particularly grateful to the different libraries which we visited during the course of our research to access the resources related to the subject of our study. The resources of the Nehru Memorial Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University Library and the Mumbai University Library were particularly helpful while conducting this research. From Pakistan, we are thankful to Mr Zahur Ahmed Choudhri and Mr Abdul Rauf for their support in the form of comments, suggestions and help in data collection.

**Zahid Shahab Ahmed and
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Contents

	Preface	05
I	Right-Wing Extremism: Indian and Pakistani experiences	13
II	The Shiv Sena and Jamaat-e-Islami: Structure, Ideology, and Challenges	31
III	Right-Wing Extremism, Governance and Security: The Linkages	105
IV	Models for Combating Right-Wing Extremism	133
V	Conclusion	151
	Bibliography	155

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*Right-Wing Extremism:
Indian and Pakistani Experiences*

The recent surge in right-wing extremism in the 1980s and 1990s is not a phenomenon which is by any means unique to South Asia (contrary to what most people in the subcontinent have been led to believe), but most parts of Europe and the US have witnessed the revival of right-wing extremist parties with alarming consistency, right from the 1970s through the 1990s. In many of the European parliaments right-wing extremist parties acquired a fair share of power and right-wing extremism became a transnational phenomenon in Europe. In Austria, it was in the 1990s that for the first time since the Second World War, a party of an extreme right-wing nature became a major coalition member.¹ In the 1990s, Sweden was among the countries which had to face the most vicious right-wing extremist hate crimes witnessed in Europe.² Some of the other countries which have also had to deal with right-wing extremism and violence in Europe in the last couple of decades include France, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Therefore, right-wing extremism and anti-democratic ideologies have continued to emerge irrespective of time and place all over the world. In a subtler form, right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties have been a permanent part of the European political spectrum for years. Although in most countries they do not pose an acute threat to the democratic system, they have repeatedly succeeded in mobilizing a significant part of the population and voters.³

Similarly, in the context of South Asia, Pakistan and India have had to grapple with a serious problem of right-wing extremism since the last three decades. Debates on the measures to tackle the

activities of Islamist organizations in Pakistan and Hindutva forces in India are an intrinsic part of the discourse in political, public and academic circles in both these countries. While in Pakistan, on a few occasions, the government has come down heavily on these organizations, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in India was not able to enact a comprehensive Bill to tackle communal riots, which was one of its central agendas before coming to power.⁴ The frequent occurrence of communal violence in India in the past few years, and the direct participation of the Hindutva organizations in the 2002 communal carnage in Gujarat have made it imperative to deal with the activities of the extremist organizations in the country. Likewise, in Pakistan, the mushrooming of extremist groups (e.g. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Al Badr [associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami, JI], Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, Muttahida Jihad Council, etc.) has adversely impacted the social and political structures of the country.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore right-wing extremism, the meaning attributed to it in a much wider context before narrowing it down to the South Asian experience. The chapter would then try answering whether the wider definition of right-wing extremism correlates with the presence of similar factions within the subcontinent, or there are significant differences in our experience of right-wing extremism. The chapter would try addressing this by providing the Indian and Pakistani experiences of right-wing extremism. Finally, this chapter will focus on two case studies from India and Pakistan by providing reasons for attributing them as right-wing extremist parties, along with a comparative study between them.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The term right-wing extremism has come to be associated with political movements which have their ideological roots in nationalism, racism and anti-democracy.⁵ Right-wing extremists propagate a political system in which the State and the people amalgamate to form a single unity. From the literature on right-

wing extremism, it becomes clear that it is not a homogeneous term and has been associated with political movements, organizations and even parties that have taken a more hostile position on certain issues than advanced by other parties, movements or persons. Defining the radical right, Peter H. Merckyl and Leonord Weinberg in their book, *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, suggest that given a particular issue of importance, for example, migration or the rights of asylum, an extreme or radical right position is likely to take a more hostile or punitive position than other political parties or groups.⁶

In the European context, it is often associated with those political parties or movements which, over a period of time, have threatened stringent measures against illegal migrants and questioned the rights of foreign-based legal citizens. Parties with similar ideological roots have revived in the 1990s, particularly in France and other parts of Europe along with their emergence in the US and Canada. They have caught the attention of political science analysts and sociologists who have written extensively on the causes of their revival and emergence in their respective countries.

Perhaps, the roots of right-wing extremism can be traced back to Europe during the 1930s when fascism and Nazism emerged in Germany, Italy and Japan.⁷ With the revival of similar movements and parties in Europe in the 1990s, fascism is being viewed by many as an ideology under the wider definition of right-wing extremism, with, of course, differences with similar political parties and movements of the present. Instead of treating fascism as a historical phenomenon which came to an end with the demise of Nazism, some scholars view it as an ideology, and the present revival of right-wing extremism as an extension of that ideology.⁸ The National Front in France and the National Alliance in Italy, two leading political parties in Europe, have their roots in classical fascism. Some of the leaders of these political parties have, at different points, called themselves fascist or 'neo-fascist', and on certain other occasions 'post-fascist' as and when each of these terminologies suited them.⁹ There are a few others like Herbert Kitscelt, who view the revival of the radical right in Western Europe as a political response to the large-scale

socio-structural transformation of advanced capitalist societies and reject the continuity between the present extremist movements with fascism.¹⁰ What is common to both these explanations—and most others which have tried to define and explain the phenomenon of right-wing extremism—is the ability of these political movements or parties to exploit the prevailing economic situations in their respective countries, and try and provide a temporary answer to the riddles of economic distress or disillusionment of the masses. This was also true of the fascist movement in Europe, which tried expressing the frustration and resentment of those layers of society that felt left behind by the process of modernization and feared social marginalization. In Europe, these parties are distinguished by their neo-fascist and anti-system stances, which, in recent years, have concentrated on immigrants and foreign workers.¹¹ The emergence or revival of the right-wing extremist political forces in Europe has been found directly proportional to situations when unemployment was prevalent and jobs were scarce. For example, the French National Front gained popularity because of its slogan, ‘two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work’, and criticized other political parties and the government for their inability to address the problem.¹² Similarly, in the 1990s in Germany, right-wing extremists believed that lack of legitimization of the socialist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic caused a gap between the State and the people where importance was given to foreigners rather than to locals.¹³ Therefore, the argument most often made is that mediocre economic performance and subsequent high levels of unemployment provide a favourable environment for political crusades of the form favoured by the extreme right to flourish and gain electoral and populist support, and their xenophobic appeals are provided fertile ground.¹⁴

Given this trend of right-wing extremism in other parts of the world and the reasons for its revival in the 1990s, ranging from post-industrial economic problems to inherent characteristics of democracy like the multiparty system and vote bank politics which have promoted the revival of such political movements and parties, it becomes essential to understand what makes them different from

other conservative and fundamentalist groups. Right-wing extremist parties are believed to be different from conservative parties, both in their aim, and, more apparently, in their uninhibited use of any means to achieve an end, which include subversion and violence. Extremist politics also tends to be particularly intolerant of plurality of opinions and disdainful of those who come up with 'complicated answers to simple questions'.¹⁵ Like right-wing extremism, fundamentalism also demands unconditional obedience from its rank and file, to differentiate between 'pure' and 'impure', and build impenetrable dogmatic fortresses around 'a truth' which, according to them, is the ultimate reality. The basic premise of fundamentalism is derived from religion on the basis of which it calls upon its followers to make the ultimate sacrifice.¹⁶ In the case of extremist organizations, religion could be one of the criteria for differentiating between the right and the wrong, but this is not always necessary for an extremist organization.

In the US context, right-wing extremism has been correlated with fascism and anti-communism also. But defining extremism under the bracket of anti-communism in the US has run into its own problems, as a number of scholars have suggested that not everyone who is anti-communist can be considered to be a right-wing extremist, as the other attributes of a right-wing extremist might not be prevalent. There is certainly no definitional agreement on explaining right-wing extremism in most parts of the world. For example, in the US, some have defined it within the confines of 'status politics', where such movements appeal to the uncommon resentments of individuals or groups which desire to improve their social status.¹⁷ There are others who define right-wing extremism as an expression of the discontent of what they call 'the discontented classes'. This discontent particularly centres around the new middle class in American society.¹⁸ While these differences persist in defining the extreme right, there is an agreement in recognizing the political nature of most right-wing extremist movements. The difference, perhaps, between the European and the US expressions of right-wing extremism, is that the presence of the two-party system in the US and the attempt by the two parties to compete for the support

of a heterogeneous electorate tends to reduce the difference between them and does not provide the space for extremist parties and groups to gain legitimate power through institutional mechanisms. Right-wing extremist groups advocate change which is designed to be implemented through a political framework, which, in turn, is evidence of their political character.

G. B. Rush, in his paper on right-wing extremism in the US, cites a number of characteristics of these parties. He suggests that right-wing extremist groups are often opposed to a strong central government, but believe in strong governments and leaders at the local level. They have a general distrust of the federal government and are opposed to increased government spending, higher taxes and to urban renewal. They are opposed to modern education and racial integration and are suspicious of any kind of collectivism.¹⁹ On the basis of some of these attributes, it can be concluded that the extreme right in the US is generally against any form of collectivism, and particularly against the government's aid and welfare programmes which are directed at the minorities. Right-wing extremist groups and individuals in the US are also described on the basis of their militant ideology, which maintains a principle of 'limited individualism', while in opposition to modern concepts of education and social structures.

From the above it can be inferred that universal definitions of right-wing extremism do not exist. They have been defined on the basis of individual experiences of right-wing extremism. Nevertheless, there are some common features of right-wing extremist parties and their ideology mostly centres on a strong sense of nationalism, which is not inclusive of all communities, intolerance to concepts like pluralism, anti-democratic sentiments, and a willingness to resort to violence to achieve their goals and objectives. At this point, it is important to understand that many of the right-wing extremist groups have participated in elections in Europe irrespective of their anti-democratic sentiments, but this should not be taken as accommodation of the general principles of democracy.

The Indian and Pakistani experiences of right-wing extremism

elaborately discussed in the next few pages have their own unique thresholds and characteristics, based on which it would be interesting to view whether a similar understanding of right-wing extremism emerges from these two countries.

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

Before we move on to the specific attributes of right-wing extremism in India, it would be useful to trace the emergence of right-wing politics, which has undergone phases of extremism. Right-wing politics has drawn the attention of researchers and the media in recent years, particularly after the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 and the subsequent emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a dominant force in Indian politics. The events in Gujarat after February 2002, which included the burning of the Sabarmati Express train and the subsequent communal riots, were analysed as not only the revival of right-wing politics, but also the consolidation of the same. In India, the politics of the right wing has been studied under the umbrella of what is termed Hindu nationalism. It is important to clarify at this stage that the terms right-wing politics or Hindu nationalism are not being used as synonymous with right-wing extremism, but the argument being made here is that right-wing politics has, on certain occasions, resulted in extremist propaganda catering to widespread violence, and, therefore, it would be necessary to trace the emergence of Hindu nationalism to understand the experience of right-wing extremism in India.

The emergence of Hindu nationalism cannot be seen as a recent phenomenon, but is one of the oldest ideological streams in India.²⁰ In fact, the roots of the movement are professed in the establishment of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) way back in 1925. After the formation of the RSS, the next organization to take shape was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951, which later became the BJP. Over a period of time, there were other affiliates formed, like the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad in 1948, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in 1964, and the Bajrang Dal formed in 1984 is the militant

youth wing of the VHP. All these organizations come under the gamut of what is called the Sangh Parivar. The Hindu nationalist movement from the beginning has believed that a true India is a Hindu India, and the minorities can live provided they accept the Hindu cultural dominance.²¹ The objective of the RSS and the other affiliates of the Sangh Parivar has been to create a sense of nationalism which is rooted through the Hindu culture, Hindu symbols, and a distorted version of history where there is a certain glorification of the Hindu past. The idea of Hindu nationalism was crystallized in reaction to a certain imagined threat, initially from the Christian missionaries and the West in general, and much later from the Muslims.²² Golwalkar and the RSS represented the extreme version of Hindu nationalism.

The non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ungratefulness towards this land and its age-old traditions but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion instead—in a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in this country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privilege, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizens' rights.²³

Therefore, similar to the nationalistic aspirations of the right-wing political parties in Europe, the Hindu nationalist movement propagated a nationalistic sentiment which was not only exclusionary, but was based on the superior status of the majority religion and culture. Given this larger objective of the Hindu nationalist movement, it becomes important to understand the strategy adopted by the Sangh Parivar to achieve this.

The Hindu nationalist movement has two aspects. One is moderate, where the BJP has positioned itself as a patriotic organization with its belief in national unity, and the RSS is stationed as an organization to propagate the Hindutva ideology and infuse new physical strength into the majority community (by establishing

akharas, gymnasiums). The other aspect of the Hindu nationalist movement is militant and violent, and, for the purposes of this work, where the attempt is to understand the Indian experience of right-wing extremism, it would be more useful to shed light on this phase. Both these trends of the Hindu nationalist movement are simultaneously at work and there is a significant overlapping between the two.²⁴

The initial stage of the militant form of Hindu nationalism was sensed all over the country when attacks were carried out by the activists of the Sangh Parivar against religious conversions. The Sangh Parivar viewed conversion as 'a denial of Hindu identity and therefore a rejection of being Indian and the missionaries as an instrument of foreign oppression'.²⁵ Based on this understanding of conversion, the RSS has openly criticized conversions from Hinduism, and the VHP and Bajrang Dal have initiated several violent attacks against the Christian missionaries in their attempt to threaten them.²⁶ The Sangh Parivar has also launched 'reconversion' programmes known as *Ghar Vapsi* (Return to Home) for those already converted and started schools and other welfare activities particularly in tribal areas.²⁷ The VHP and the RSS have conducted several anti-Christian rallies in different locations of the adivasi belt in Gujarat. Apart from organizing rallies, in the last few years the Hindu extremist organizations have attacked nuns, damaged churches and burnt copies of the New Testament.²⁸

While conversion remained the bone of contention for these organizations, the militant phase of the Hindu nationalist movement reached a completely different stage when the Sangh Parivar launched its protest against the government's verdict on the Shah Bano case,²⁹ and later the mobilization for constructing the Ram Mandir at Babri Masjid, the disputed site in Ayodhya. The mobilization for the Ram Mandir (Ram Temple) in Ayodhya resulted in the organization of rallies and the Rath Yatra (Chariot March) led by the BJP leader L. K. Advani ending in the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya by a frenzied crowd and activists of the Sangh Parivar. The extremism did not end with the destruction of the Babri Masjid, but resulted in large-scale communal violence

across north India where thousands were killed and minorities were systematically attacked. Violence was not only witnessed in this larger campaign of the Sangh Parivar, but the VHP, Bajrang Dal and Durga Vahini activists have played an active role in repeatedly attacking minorities, both Christians and Muslims, and their places of worship, a trend particularly apparent during the period when the BJP was the main coalition partner of the union government in 1999.³⁰

The Hindu extremist agenda was perhaps seen in its most vociferous and dangerous form when, in February 2002, large-scale rioting which continued for several months took place in Gujarat after the Sabarmati Express returning from Ayodhya and carrying *kar sewaks* (religious volunteers) was burnt near Godhra. These riots were different from any previous communal violence as minorities were systematically targeted, the nature of the violence included public acts of sadism and the celebration of terror was witnessed in its most open form.³¹ The impact and intensity of violence was of a dimension that its repercussions are still being borne by the minorities in Gujarat.

The extremist phase of the Sangh Parivar completed a full circle with the violence in Gujarat, and after the BJP's poor performance in the 2004 Parliamentary elections along with the internal power struggle within the Parivar, there seems to be a lull in the extremist camp of the Hindu nationalist movement. While Indian politics was entering a completely new phase with Hindu nationalist politics being brought to the forefront by the Sangh Parivar, the movement was joined by another partner with a strong base in the regional politics of Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena. This political party from Maharashtra has been equally active in driving forward the Hindu nationalist agenda and engaged in large-scale violence (particularly within Maharashtra) to achieve this end. Since the late 1980s the Shiv Sena has been vocal about the concept of a 'Hindu Rashtra' (Hindu Nation) and was the main force behind the 1993 riots in Mumbai which took place soon after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.³² Unlike the Sangh Parivar, the Shiv Sena did not emerge as a political force with the aim of building a Hindu

Rashtra. The Sena initially emerged as a movement against the marginalization of Maharashtrians, and later converted itself into a political party. Like the extremist groups in the Sangh Parivar, violence has been an important tool of the Shiv Sena, right from the time of its inception till recent times, with the shift in its focus towards Hindu nationalism.

In India too, some of the explanations for the emergence of right-wing forces have drawn comparisons with fascism. Those who have argued that Hindu right-wing mobilization in India is fascist in nature suggest that though the Hindu national movement has rejected most of what it terms 'Western' in the writings of the majority of their leaders, there is admiration for fascist leaders and movements. Moreover, their ideology is deliberately modelled on fascist ideology, particularly their redefinition of the Indian state based on the Hindu Rashtra.³³ Those who have made this line of argument also believe that a wide range of ideologies, regimes and movements which are not necessarily the same can be brought under a 'fascist paradigm', and irrespective of their differences, they are in some fundamental way linked to the same design and draw inspiration from it.³⁴ The fundamental way in which all these movements are linked is related to an anti-liberal conception of nationalism, anti-rationalist critique of modernity, and belief in a glorious past which never existed. Hindu right-wing politics, which includes the politics of the Sangh Parivar and Shiv Sena, is seen as part of the same fascist design.

There are others who correlate the emergence of Hindu right-wing politics with communalism and suggest that, unlike fundamentalism, the right-wing mobilization in India has not coherently defined how the economy should be governed or legal system is to be reformed or how a religious state is to be created. Their mobilization is essentially based on picking up certain features of religious identity and surcharging them emotionally.³⁵ Also, the Hindu right wing has, in principle, accepted the separation between religion and state and does not believe in a religious alternative to the secular.³⁶ It is rather interested in creating a state where the majority religion is the dominant one, and other minority religions

should accept this dominance.

While accepting these different ways of understanding the right-wing politics and extremism in India, this work would argue that there are different expressions to right-wing extremism, and, as discussed above, its militant expression along with its defining of a nation which is exclusionary in character and its intolerance to concepts like pluralism brings it closer to right-wing extremism. More than the Sangh Parivar's mobilization, this work would like to argue that the Shiv Sena's tactics, its activities and organizational structure relates more to an extremist right-wing party. This argument (as would be explained further in the next chapter) is being made on the premise that the Sena initially emerged in Mumbai based on the agenda of an anti-migration, and more precisely, against the non-Maharashtrian population in Mumbai. Like the extremist parties in other parts of the world, the Shiv Sena was able to exploit the prevailing economic conditions in Mumbai in the 1960s to propagate its ideas. Also, the emergence of the Sena was promoted by the other political forces to curb the growth of communist forces in Maharashtra. What makes the Shiv Sena an interesting case study of right-wing extremist politics is that, over the years, it has believed in the legitimate use of violence to achieve its objectives, whether it was with the 'sons of the soil' issue, or the shift to Hindu nationalism as an agenda in the last two decades. The attempt in the next few chapters would be to understand the tactics, organizational structure, and leadership of the Sena as a right-wing extremist party, along with the challenges that emanate from the emergence and growth of the Shiv Sena in a democracy like India.

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

Like the Hindu nationalist movement in India, the Islamic nationalists in Pakistan also perceive the state as a Muslim homeland, and that the religious minorities can live as per defined rules of the majority religion (Islam). The right-wing politics in Pakistan is somehow deeply embedded in the two-nation theory,³⁷ which provide minority Muslims of the subcontinent with a justification

for having a separate homeland. After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the JI advanced its aim of declaring Pakistan an Islamic state with a religiously-endorsed constitution. There is a popular misconception that Maududi and his JI were against the creation of Pakistan: actually, he was in favour of a separate homeland for Muslims, but objected strongly to Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League's vision and plan of action for Pakistan.³⁸

While the JI projects itself as a pan-Islamic movement rather than a political party, this has not stopped it from taking part in most of the general elections in Pakistan, irrespective of not being able to garner a significant vote share. On most occasions, the party takes antagonistic positions on certain issues, such as human rights in general and women's rights in particular, in comparison to most other parties. The JI, while being in disagreement with popular Western ideals of democracy, goes on to take part in elections and the practice they consider as a means to obtaining people's support to get into the circles of power in Pakistan.

The JI demands change not only in Pakistan but also in the entire Muslim world, which is to unite and rise again. Even the JI's founder, Sayyid Abul Aala Maududi, presented this ideal with examples of the fall of Muslim empires in Spain and in the Indian subcontinent. The JI's founder wanted the party to always follow a peaceful path and to practice non-violent activism for achieving desired goals. However, the non-violent path was not followed for long, as in the 1980s the JI drifted towards the Pakistani military's agenda of exploiting jihad (holy war) to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. That was the time when their ideology got tainted by fundamentalism, with demands for sacrifices in the name of the religion of Islam.

With slogans of people's power, human rights, poverty alleviation, security of people and communities, etc. the right-wing extremists in Pakistan still openly practice means such as subversion and violence to satisfy their demands. If right-wing groups have been advocating human rights, then the scope of the advocacy campaign has been limited to the rights of Muslims or the people belonging to their ethnicity. In the 1950s, the JI and orthodox

Sunni Islamists demanded exclusion of Ahmadiyas from Islam. The state was reluctant to make this move, which caused riots followed by attacks on Ahmadiya mosques and members.

The JI's nationalism is camouflaged under the party's ideologies and operations. It is somewhat similar to Pervez Musharraf's famous slogan, '*Sab se pehlay...Pakistan*' ('First of all...Pakistan'), but the JI's intention and access is globalized with affiliations with similar pan-Islamic movements in other parts of the world.³⁹ Islamic nationalism in Pakistan emerged out of the insecure pre-Partition atmosphere, when the Muslim League had demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The JI, particularly Maududi, was sceptical of the fact that the Muslim League or Congress Party represented the Muslims. The idea of the JI was initially anti-Muslim League and anti-Congress, and in the post-Partition period the party slowly moved from anti-India to anti-West, and currently anti-US as well as against the so-called Jewish lobby. However, over the course of the past six decades, the JI has been practising street power with slogans in resistance to democratic leaders, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and in recent times opposing the dictatorship of Musharraf. Overall, the JI was denouncing the secularism of Bhutto and the pro-West 'enlightened moderation' of Musharraf. The JI labels its rivals as 'traitors', 'CIA agents', 'Indian agents', 'Israeli agents', or simply as 'infidels'. In fact, it seems as if such aggressive remarks help in bringing in more people on the streets to add to the JI's power. A significant portion of the JI's strength comes from the party's students' wings, particularly the Islami Jamiat Talaba (IJT). The IJT is widespread, authoritative, and violent, and knows nothing but to preach their radical version of Islam and build the JI's strength. Nevertheless, the IJT has been the success behind the street power of the party.

There is another movement with the name of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM).⁴⁰ It was initiated with the so-called objective of challenging feudalism in the country. The party demands a change for the poor by eliminating exploitation of the elite and feudals. Basically, the MQM was created with the help of internal and external forces to counter the power of the

Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the JI. Since 1992, its leader Altaf Hussain has been living in exile in London, but he still manages to direct the affairs of the party as the final verdict comes from Hussain. The opponents of the MQM have labelled Altaf Hussain an 'Indian agent'. The MQM has managed to attain unconditional obedience from its ranks, who believe in the charismatic personality of Altaf Hussain. Ironically, the party's website is filled with stuff from condemning terrorism to promoting peaceful rallies, but on the contrary, the MQM has been demonstrating power in Karachi through violence in the form of clashes with the local Pashtuns. The bitter reality is that the propagation of violence and hatred has been justified by the party's leadership, and this orientation is constant since the emergence of the MQM. To implement its agenda, the party is flooded with a blindly-obedient youth force to ensure its sustainability in urban Sindh at any cost.

The MQM emerged out of a violent student politics which was initiated at Karachi University with the name of the All-Pakistan Muhajir Students' Organization (APMSO) in 1978. Under the leadership of Altaf Hussain, the APMSO changed into the Muhajir Quami Movement in 1984, which became the sole voice of the Urdu-speaking community in urban Sindh, predominantly in Karachi. The MQM is known for creating turmoil in Karachi due to violent acts. In May 2007, the MQM, under the patronage of Musharraf, successfully blocked the lawyers' movement from arriving in their territory, Karachi. It was mainly to show the party's loyalty to Musharraf as the MQM was grooming well under the authoritarian rule. Parties like the MQM like to come into coalition with any of the ruling elite, and history says that they don't mind shaking hands with democrats or dictators, because their primary objective is to have their ethnic representation in the parliament and fulfil certain demands. However, in the riots on 12 May, it is reported that approximately 50 people lost their lives and there was also continuous shooting going on for several hours on the office of Aaj TV in Karachi with the state machinery absent from the streets of Karachi. After this terrible incident, there was a strong reaction against the MQM from various political leaders in

Pakistan, including the head of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Imran Khan. Inside the National Assembly of Pakistan, the JI's leader Liaqat Baloch strongly condemned the MQM for the bloodshed in Karachi. It is not only the pervasive violence; the MQM members have been threatening people in their constituencies so as to generate funds from the businesses as well as the local community.

The JI and MQM hold different levels of right-wing extremism as far as their leadership and party structures are concerned. The MQM leadership, with its founding member Altaf Hussain still being the leader, exercises more influence over its ranks. That was true of the JI in the initial years of the party when Maududi, the founding father of the party, was still the president, but over the years it seems to have changed with the introduction of internal reforms in the form of inner-party democratization where decision making is a virtue of consensus.

Since the early 1990s, the MQM has maintained success with 19 seats in the National Assembly in the 1990, 1997, 2002 and 2008 general elections. In the financial capital of Pakistan, Karachi, the party enjoys 'uni-polar domination', and except for the 2002 elections, the MQM has never obtained less than 40 per cent votes in Karachi.⁴¹ The results clearly depict that the party has managed to sustain solely from the support of muhajirs.⁴² The party represents a significant number of muhajirs in urban Sindh, from where it wins most seats in the national elections. In the 2008 general elections, the MQM was voted for by 2,507,813 people, which was 7.4 per cent of the total votes,⁴³ much higher in comparison to votes received by any other right-wing party, including the JI. Basically, since the 1993 general elections, the party has managed to come into a bargaining position with parties looking for coalitions to form a government in the centre as well as in the province of Sindh.

Bearing in mind the magnitude of its student body, MQM chief Altaf Hussain decided in 2006 to formally set up the All-Pakistan Muttahida Students' Organization (APMSO). Since then, the status of the MQM student group has been significantly uplifted, which was not the case for over two decades. This happened because the MQM leaders felt the desire to reach out to students in the

academic institutions in interior Sindh. On the 28th anniversary of the APMSO the founder of MQM recalled that the student body 'got strength from the blood and sweat of the members who did not even hesitate to lay down their lives for the sake of principles'.⁴⁴ It is basically through the APMSO that the party manages to spread mass fear of its strength, and also reaches out to youngsters.

Students' groups of both the JI and the MQM are armed and members of these students' bodies keep or have access to small weapons. There have been violent clashes between the students' groups at Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad), University of the Punjab (Lahore), Peshawar University, and Karachi University. And on most occasions, one will find the involvement of the IJT or APMSO. On some occasions, violence initiated by fascist students' organizations does transcend boundaries of academic institutions; the IJT especially has been involved in off-campus violent demonstrations. On 11 February 2008, there was a fight between the members of the IJT and the APMSO in Karachi, and reports found that six students were injured. Students from both sides fought with sticks, stones and even shot at each other.⁴⁵ Students' groups quarrel with each other to achieve more authority in the respective educational institutions, which, in return, also brings in more students. Generally, new members look for a stronger student body to join, because new college and university students have no prior political affiliations, and, therefore, they go with the mightiest one.

Some define right-wing extremism as the 'status politics' originating from groups voicing concerns of unheard people to advance their social status. In Pakistan, such movements haven't been that rare, but they mostly rise to voice their concerns and reservations either against the central government or the dominating province of Punjab. There is the Awami National Party (ANP) of Pashtuns in the NWFP, the Jeay Sindh Quami Mahaz in Sindh, and the Baluchistan National Party in Baluchistan. These parties demand more authority and power in the central government for their people, as well as provincial autonomy. Overall, most of the right-wing extremists in Pakistan present their agenda by projecting

their party's non-discrimination on the basis of caste, sect, ethnicity, language and economic status. It is hard to say if any of these parties really follow their party's non-discrimination approach, because most such groups are primarily aimed at uplifting the socio-economic and political status of a particular ethnic group, except the JI, which aims at Muslims as a community. This ideology is likely to discriminate against religious minorities if such parties come into power. The JI has often been bracketed as fundamentalist, as it has an extremist streak to it which is violent and intolerant of anything that is 'modern' in the Western sense of the term.

Successive governments in Pakistan have made successful and not-so-successful attempts to either crush or limit the scope of right-wing extremism in Pakistan. The fact that the JI and the MQM survived through difficult times is due to the parties' organization, and also because some of the governments exploited such parties to legitimize their rules, and that is the fundamental factor behind the frequent ups and downs in the development of right-wing extremism. The following chapters will further explore the organizational and ideological aspects of the JI and will also discuss the party's operations in relation to governance and security in Pakistan and beyond.

*The Shiv Sena and Jamaat-e-Islami:
Structure, Ideology, and Challenges*

This chapter would relate to the political, social and economic spaces of the Shiv Sena and the JI and make an enquiry into the functioning of right-wing organizations in a democracy like India, and in Pakistan, a country with a dominant history of authoritarian regimes and struggling democracies. There are different strands of extremism within South Asia as was argued in the previous chapter, and the Shiv Sena and JI provide an understanding of this.

The first section of the chapter provides an account of the organization, ideology, and functioning of the Shiv Sena bringing out the various facets of the party, and how the party has come to acquire the image of a right-wing extremist organization over a period of time. The last part of this section would deal with why the Sena has not been able to sustain and perform consistently to gain electoral success on the basis of its extremist ideology in India. How the image of the 'other' as an enemy gets rooted in the minds of common Indians and Pakistanis through the propaganda mechanisms of these right-wing parties would be explored in the chapter.

THE SHIV SENAS AS A RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST PARTY

Irrespective of the plethora of writings on the Shiv Sena,⁴⁶ the success of the minor affiliate of the Hindu nationalist movement in India still remains a paradox. The stature and popularity that the party occupies in Mumbai remains unshaken, as was proved during the Mumbai municipal elections of 2007.⁴⁷ The chapter explores the context and the reasons for the emergence of the Shiv

Sena in Maharashtra. The first section of the chapter would analyse the Shiv Sena and its mode of operation. The Shiv Sena emerged under the aegis of its leader Bal Thackeray as a fiercely regional and the most militant propagator of the Hindu nationalist agenda. This section would elaborately discuss the Sena's ideology, whether it has an extremist agenda, and the way it constructs its enemies within this ideological structure. In the case of the Shiv Sena, there are different variables providing an account of the extremist shade of the political party, and they can be traced by analysing the reasons for its emergence, to the mode of functioning, ideology of the party, symbols and tools that mediate its extremist image, and, finally, the challenges posed to the Shiv Sena's extremism.

HISTORICAL AND BACKGROUND FACTORS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHIV SENA

The Shiv Sena, which initially emerged as a movement, was launched on 19 June 1966 in Bombay. The idea for the Shiv Sena movement came from its leader Bal Thackeray, a cartoonist in the *Free Press Journal*, which he left in the 1950s to start his own cartoon weekly, *Marmik* (literally, the essence). It is vital to trace the background under which the Shiv Sena emerged as a political party to understand the present position that the party occupies in Maharashtra, and particularly its relationship with Mumbai. Though the Shiv Sena movement was formally launched in the 1960s, the ground work began somewhere in the late 1950s when the demand for the formation of a separate state (province) of Maharashtra was at a pivotal stage. The Maharashtra movement was based on an excessive pride in the Marathi identity. A certain degree of chauvinism was always visible in the society and politics within Maharashtra.⁴⁸ It is essential to understand this ingrained sense of chauvinism in the Maharashtrian society to make sense of the Shiv Sena and the extremist position that it has adopted over the years. Even before the Shiv Sena became the bastion for the indigenous Maharashtrians, there was always a certain sense of discomfort among the Maharashtrians on the growing wealth of

Gujaratis and people who came from other states.⁴⁹ The 'others' were considered as 'exploitative', and the Maharashtrians were projected as the exploited community. The glorification of the Maharashtrian subnational identity was a visible characteristic even in the 1950s. There were strong vibes against the union government within the movement for independence.

When the Shiv Sena emerged in the late 1960s and took up the cause of the Maharashtrians, raising the slogan of 'sons of the soil', it was primarily exploiting the already-prevalent discontent among the majority of Maharashtrians. The massive support of around 200,000 people that Bal Thackeray witnessed in the founding rally of the movement and the overwhelming response when thousands reportedly volunteered within the first few years by signing the Shiv Sena pledge is suggestive of the sentiments of the Maharashtrians.⁵⁰ The Shiv Sena began its movement under the rubric of a conspiracy theory against the Maharashtrians. The Shiv Sena's contention was that the Maharashtrians were being deprived of jobs and economic opportunities in Bombay by non-Maharashtrian migrants to the city.⁵¹ One of the background factors under which the Shiv Sena emerged was the presence of regionalism in Maharashtrian culture and politics. This distant presence of Maharashtrian identity was provided a definite shape not by the Shiv Sena, but by the Samayukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS), which fought for a unilingual State of Maharashtra between 1955 and 1960. The SMS, therefore, facilitated the Shiv Sena's cause of taking up the regional idiom, at a much later stage.⁵² Also, the existence of 'nativism'⁵³ in Maharashtrian culture and politics facilitated the emergence and growth of the Shiv Sena during the initial stages of its inception.

The SMS was not the reason for the emergence of the Shiv Sena, but the argument being made here is that the Shiv Sena movement was able to cash on the dominant sentiment of Maharashtrian consciousness prevalent among the people of Maharashtra, and this consciousness was given definitiveness by the SMS. It was much later that the Shiv Sena pursued an anti-Muslim stance in the 1980s, when the party was taking steps towards revival. As an extremist political party, the Sena's politics was based on exclusion,

and pursuing an anti-Muslim approach seemed electorally lucrative given the scheme of national politics.

Another important reason for the emergence and dominance of the Shiv Sena is the complex relationship that the party has with the city of Mumbai.⁵⁴ The Sena has a vast network, both formal and informal, through which it has strengthened its base within Mumbai. An important factor for the rise in popularity of the Shiv Sena is the long-prevalent *dada* (a local tough or goon) culture in Mumbai as a popular model of authority and power.⁵⁵ *Dadagiri* (assertion of authority by local toughs) was about masculine, violent, assertive, strong men whose clout and power were based on the establishment of networks of loyalty. Though this culture was not created by the Shiv Sena in Mumbai, it was able to utilize it in most of its campaign and political agendas. A historical legitimacy was provided to both violence and masculinity through the Shiv Sena by using the image of Shivaji⁵⁶ as the brave Maratha warrior and the protector of Maratha pride. The Shiv Sena institutionalized the system of masculine community centres like gymnasium or *Mitra Mandals* (Friends' Groups) where young men would have their meetings, and, eventually, provide the reservoir of recruitment for the Shiv Sena.

Mumbai, during this time, was also witnessing a change in inter-religious relations, particularly between the Hindus and Muslims. In the 1970s and 1980s, Maharashtra witnessed a rise of both Hindu and Muslim militant organizations like the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) which is now a banned outfit in India. A number of Hindu militant organizations like the Maratha Mahasangha, Hindu Ekta Andolan, and Ekatmata Yatra Campaigns, organized by the RSS were established in Mumbai during this time. There was a strong anti-Muslim rhetoric in Mumbai during this time which could be observed in a number of vernacular writings of the 1980s. The Shiv Sena, after the 1984 Bhiwandi riots, was successful in using this rhetoric to its own electoral advantage, and this took an extremely militant form when it came to its position on Muslims in Maharashtra. An essential aspect of the Shiv Sena's rise and growth in Maharashtra has been its ability to capitalize

on sentiments of regional identity, and, later, the anti-Muslim rhetoric among the people to its own advantage. The Shiv Sena was quick to grasp the changing nature of inter-religious relations within Maharashtra after the Bhiwandi riots of 1970 and 1984, and provided a militant form to the growing antagonism against the Muslims within Mumbai.

While the *dada* culture and anti-Muslim rhetoric in Mumbai accentuated the growth of the Shiv Sena, the demographic and economic structure of Mumbai facilitated its rise in the city. Right from the initial stages, Maharashtrians had a less significant role to play in the growth of the city. Considering the fact that Bombay was an industrial and financial centre, it was natural for the non-Maharashtrian business community of the city to associate more actively with the development of the city. The Maharashtrians who migrated to Bombay ended up getting the jobs of manual labourers in the factories owned by the non-Maharashtrians, such as Gujaratis and south Indians in particular.⁵⁷ Over the years, there was an increase of the Maharashtrian population in the city, but the dominance of non-Maharashtrians in the political, economic and intellectual spheres continued. The SMS, after its formation, demanded a separate State of Maharashtra with Bombay as the capital with the aim of removing this imbalance of non-Maharashtrian dominance. Later, in the 1960s, the Shiv Sena came up with a similar movement where they stressed on providing employment opportunities to Maharashtrians as against those from other states. Unlike the BJP and its sister organizations, for the Shiv Sena, mobilization has not always been on the basis of religious identity.

The Shiv Sena has been successful in organizing populist movements which were on questions of language, regional identity, and, much later, on the basis of religious identity. These movements and mobilizations acquired an extremist form because of the violence and issues attached to them.⁵⁸ Even in the initial stages of its inception, the Shiv Sena movement was alleged to have used violence as a means to end the communist dominance in Maharashtra, particularly in Mumbai. The Sena came to popularity and acquired support for destroying the communist stronghold in Mumbai. There

was a time when a number of industrialists supported the Shiv Sena in the 1960s since it was seen as an answer to the uprooting of workers' politics in Mumbai. Sena goons targeted them, accusing them of snatching jobs away from Maharashtrians. They disrupted union meetings, beat up activists and smashed union offices.⁵⁹ In recent years, the Shiv Sena has involved itself in creating religious rifts within Maharashtra. The Sena has particularly spoken and carried out violent attacks against the Muslim minorities, unlike the VHP, which has organized violent attacks on *all* minority groups, maybe because Muslims form a significant minority in Mumbai as compared to other religious communities. Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray called for the formation of 'Hindu suicide squads' to counter 'their terrorism', in a statement published in his party's newspaper *Saamna*.⁶⁰ During his Dussehra-day⁶¹ rally in Mumbai, he said, 'Trouble-making Muslims should be wiped out from the country...kick out the four crore Bangladeshi Muslims and then the country will be secure.'⁶²

The Sena's emergence both as a movement and political party would not have been possible without the support of the Congress Government which was in power during the 1960s in Maharashtra. It is believed that the Congress not only remained a mute spectator to the activities of the Shiv Sena, but the then Chief Minister, V. P. Naik, and the Maharashtra Congress Chief, Vinayakrao Patil, provided tacit support to the Shiv Sena by attending various functions organized by it. The Shiv Sena journal *Marmik* was distributed widely among the police forces in Maharashtra to popularize the Sena's agenda, and, as a result, the Sena even enjoyed the sympathy of the police which turned a blind eye to the violence initiated by the Sena against non-Maharashtrians.⁶³

While all these reasons have contributed considerably to the emergence of the Shiv Sena and its ascent from a movement to a political party, which successfully came to occupy power in 1995, scholars have differed in contributing the predominance of one factor over the other for the initial rise of the Shiv Sena. It is possible that the Sena at some point had the advantage of the support that it received from the Congress leadership and some industrialists who

might have helped its cause. Similarly, the economic and cultural factors prevalent within Mumbai cannot be ignored for the growth of the Shiv Sena, along with its ability to exploit these factors, whether in raising the slogan of 'sons of soil', or making inroads into the workers' politics. For the purpose of this study, it is important to understand that all these factors, including the tensions within the Indian federal system and the growth of regional parties across India, contributed to the rise and ascent of the Shiv Sena. After analysing the background factors for the emergence of the Shiv Sena movement, an essential part of this work would focus on the organization of the Sena and the policies and methods adopted by it over the years. By focusing on the organization, structure, policies and methods of the Shiv Sena, the attempt would be to understand the extremist image of the Shiv Sena, while successfully wielding the image of a democratic political party by contesting elections.

THE PARTY ORGANIZATION

An important variable to assess and understand the extremist nature of the Shiv Sena would be to examine its organizational structure, where power is centred on the supreme leader with simultaneous diffusion of power into various *shakhas* (branches), functioning as quasi-autonomous bodies. The organizational base of the Shiv Sena is at the level of *shakhas*, which are located in every municipal ward in Maharashtra. Since most of the activities of the Shiv Sena are organized at the level of *shakhas*, they are the 'organizational wing' of the Shiv Sena. The Shiv Sena's *shakhas* are local branches of the party which are headed by a *Shakha Pramukh* (Head), and are seen as the providers of the basic rights of the common people. One of the *Shakha Pramukhs* from Ambernath said during an interview that the *shakhas*' primary task was to facilitate the basic necessities of the people. 'The activists of the Shiv Sena worked on the questions of water, meter and gutter.' He then explained that the *shakhas* ensured that the people of the area were provided with sanitation facilities, electricity and water which, according to them, were the basic requirements of a person.⁶⁴ The

Shakha Pramukh at Bandra said that the *shakha* was a place of worship for them, and high moral standards were maintained by them inside the *shakha*.⁶⁵

The *shakha* office generally opens in the evening where the local people come to meet the *Pramukh* with their complaints, ranging from problems between husband and wife to admission for children in a school. Apart from the *Shakha Pramukh*, the Shiv Sena activities are managed by a *Gata Pramukh* who manages 1,000 people under him, the *Upshakha Pramukh*, and the *Vibha Pramukh*.⁶⁶ The *Vibha Pramukh* manages the activities of 10 *shakhas* and holds an important position within the Shiv Sena hierarchy.

This decentralization of work within the Shiv Sena does not get translated into democratic decision making within the party. There are *shakhas* all over Mumbai, and a Shiv Sena *shakha* board can be seen in every municipal ward of Mumbai. Most *shakhas* are small rooms where the *Shakha Pramukh* and the other ward members of the *shakha* get together in the evening to address the local issues of the area and any problem with which they are approached by the people. Some of the *shakha* offices are also in the houses of the *Shakha Pramukhs*, and most have a portrait of Shivaji along with one of Balasaheb Thackeray. For a Shiv Sena activist, a *shakha* is equivalent to a Hindu temple, where one is required to remove one's footwear before entering.⁶⁷ In Mumbai alone there are 230 Shiv Sena *shakhas* with 50–70 workers in each one of them. By the end of 1988, it had about 40,000 branches spread all over Maharashtra.⁶⁸

According to the Shiv Sena activists, anyone irrespective of their religion and caste can come to the *shakha* with their problems and it would get resolved. In Bandra, a Muslim woman said that she sometimes approached one of the *shakha* leaders at Bandra whenever there was a problem, but added that she would not visit the *shakha* as it was not a 'comfort zone' for her.⁶⁹ The Shiv Sena also has a *shakha* in Mumbai where all the members including the *Pramukh* are Muslims. Whenever the Shiv Sena leaders during conversation with them stressed that the Sena was not a communal party, they would give the example of Shabir Sheikh, the Shiv Sena leader from

Ambernath who was the Member of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly for 14 years. The electoral politics and the compulsions of democratic politics perhaps compel parties like the Shiv Sena to symbolically prove that their organization was essentially pluralistic. The Shiv Sena and its members would explain the presence of Muslim members in their party as not only a symbol of their secular beliefs, but in no uncertain terms that the party and its *Pramukh* would give space to only those members of the minority community who were nationalistic in spirit and their activities.⁷⁰ The inclusion of the minority community is not without the application of conditions and the ability of its members to successfully prove their nationalistic spirit. While interviewing Shabir Shaikh, the Shiv Sena former Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), an interesting observation was the ring tone of his mobile which had the Vande Mataram (national song) tune.⁷¹ These symbolic gestures are more common to the Muslim leaders of the Sena than with their Hindu counterparts. Therefore, the inclusion of Muslims as members in the Shiv Sena or the presence of an exclusively Muslim *shakha* of the Shiv Sena does not mean that the party really has pluralistic designs as part of its ideological apparatus.

Decisions within the Shiv Sena are taken by its founder, the Shiv Sena *Pramukh*, Bal Thackeray, who has the final authority to do so on all matters of the party. A senior Shiv Sena leader in Kalyan said, 'Adesh (orders) from Bal Thackeray must be followed and anything against him has to be fought.' After the Shiv Sena *Pramukh*, the next in the hierarchy is his son Udhav Thackeray, who is the working President of the party. All other leaders including the ex-Chief Minister, Manohar Joshi, late Anand Dighe, Subhash Desai or Pramod Navalkar either act on the decisions taken by Bal Thackeray or seek his approval on a decision taken by them. Autonomy within the Shiv Sena is encouraged as long as it does not threaten the decision-making powers of the Shiv Sena *Pramukh* and power remains within the Thackeray family. When this power was threatened by his nephew Raj Thackeray for not being promoted to the position of working President, the Sena *Pramukh* expelled him from the party and Raj Thackeray later formed his own party, the

Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS). It is interesting to observe that while the MNS was formed by Raj Thackeray to move away from the shadow of Bal Thackeray and the violent divisive politics of the Shiv Sena, the party has not been able to achieve this objective. Members of the MNS have been attacking the north Indian residents of Mumbai with the aim of finding a base in Mumbai by playing the politics of hate and violence. But this relatively new party is not doing anything ideologically different from the Shiv Sena.⁷²

Though most of the activities of the Shiv Sena are based on the functioning of the *shakha* which, through direct action, is the focal linkage point between the higher hierarchy of the Shiv Sena and the common people of Maharashtra. The decision-making power remains completely within the hands of its *Pramukh*, Bal Thackeray. Describing his relationship with the Sainiks (workers), Bal Thackeray has said, 'I look upon the Sainiks as my children. A family can only run when one man takes the decisions.'⁷³ The party is run autocratically where there are no party elections but selection and votes are never taken.⁷⁴

Apart from the *shakha*, the Shiv Sena operates through a number of other organizations which it has floated from time to time. The Sena was particularly dependent on the Bharatiya Kamgar Sena in the initial stages for making inroads into the working-class sections of Mumbai. There are several similar organizations like the Shramik Sena, Cotton Workers' Sena, Shramjivi Kamgar Sena and Municipal Workers' Union through which the Shiv Sena operates. Over the years, a separate Students' Union and women's organizations have also been formed as affiliates of the Shiv Sena. These specific organizations provide the support structure to the political party by addressing the interests of different sections in Maharashtra.

SYMBOLS AS A FORM OF EXTREMISM

The Shiv Sena believes in driving forward its agenda through the use of symbols. Symbols are signified in the Shiv Sena shakhas where there is invariably a portrait of Shivaji, which refers to the party's parochial and regional agenda. A shakha is also symbolized by Sainiks

(members of the Shiv Sena) as a sacred temple of Shivaji where they are not expected to smoke or consume alcohol.⁷⁵ Over the years, the Sena has used popular occasions such as the Ganesh and Navaratri festivals as a means of reaching out to the common people. The party sponsors many of the 3,000 Ganesh mandals (stages) across Mumbai. Most of the mandals make clear political and provocative statements signified by their decorations and props, often attempting to rouse jingoistic sentiments. In 1993, following the bomb blasts in Mumbai, one of the mandals depicted the scene of the blast at the Gateway of India, complete with a blown-up taxi and dummy dead bodies. In another attempt at generating nationalist feelings, the BJP and the Sena resurrected the maha-aarti (grand religious chorus). The aartis were conducted soon after the blasts, ostensibly 'for the people of Mumbai'.⁷⁶ During the 1992–93 violence, maha-aartis were explicit tools by which youthful crowds were incited to act collectively, leading to the rampages and violent assaults against Muslim residents of Mumbai.⁷⁷ When Ganesh Chaturthi is celebrated across Maharashtra and the image of Lord Ganapati is taken in a procession to be immersed in the sea, Shiv Sainiks and the Sena flags are visible in every neighbourhood. The celebration of these festivals through large-scale processions serves the dual purpose of creating jingoistic nationalistic sentiments among Maharashtrians, and also in popularizing the Shiv Sena which organizes these festivities. Fig. 1 shows the organizational structure of the Shiv Sena.




Fig. 1 Hierarchy of the Shiv Sena

Symbols have been a form of propaganda for the Shiv Sena right from its inception. Bal Thackeray used caricatures to mock the level of politics in Maharashtra in the 1960s when he had started the Shiv Sena movement. Caricatures of various political leaders, particularly from the Communist Party, were drawn by Bal Thackeray to mock them and their policies. These cartoons published in *Marmik*

became very popular as everyone could easily relate to them. Even the uneducated classes could easily associate with these caricatures, and this was one of the tools used by the Sena to popularize their ideas. While the early success of the Shiv Sena was very much a result of the symbolic representations in *Marmik*, in later years the party was able to popularize its message of Hindutva through its daily newspaper, *Saamna*, first published in Marathi in 1989 and expanded into a Hindi edition in 1993.

The symbols attributed by the Shiv Sena have never been subtle, but always bold and often relate to nationalism, parochialism and communalism in their most extreme form. In attaching a symbolic value, there is a particular construction of the image of the 'other', which is viewed and projected as the enemy. For example, in the initial stages when the Shiv Sena tried to project migrants as the cause for rising unemployment among Maharashtrians and started targeting south Indians, there was a certain symbolic value attached to *lungis* (a dress of a sheet for wrapping around the waist and legs), and most south Indians were seen as *lungiwallahs* who were the reason for all the problems of Maharashtrians. Similarly, when Hindutva—and more precisely religious nationalism—became the driving force for the Shiv Sena, it has time and again brought forward images of treachery and betrayal by Muslims, projecting them as threats to the Indian state. While the south Indian *lungiwallahs* were projected by the Shiv Sena as cunning and the Maharashtrians were warned against their skills in chicanery, the Muslims (and especially Bangladeshi migrants) are termed as parasites.

While defending such image constructions, Bal Thackeray has suggested in many of his interviews that he is not against Muslims, but only against antinational Muslims.⁷⁸ An antinational Muslim is seen as somebody who bursts crackers when India loses a cricket match against Pakistan. When Shabir Sheikh, the only Muslim Shiv Sena MLA (from Ambernath), was asked how he could associate himself with the Shiv Sena when the party was directing violence against Muslims, he was quick to respond that the Sena was only against antinational Muslims. He clarified that he had joined the Sena when the party began its innings for the cause of

Maharashtrians, and that he believed in the ideological stand taken by the party on the lines of Hindutva. For him, Hindutva was not a religion, but a culture.⁷⁹

Changing the name of the city from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995 was also a form of symbolic extremism of the Shiv Sena. While the Sena claimed that the city was called Mumbai before the region came under British influence, and that it was important to restore the past, in reality both Bombay and Mumbai existed in the vocabulary of the people and they did not necessarily have to make a choice between the two. But by changing the name to Mumbai for all official purposes, the Sena was directing the people to choose 'Mumbai' in all languages.⁸⁰

VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO AN END

Central to the Shiv Sena's ideology and its functioning is to force its objectives and agenda by systematic violence or combativeness. After the Sena came to power and formed a coalition government in Maharashtra in 1995, Bal Thackeray stated in an interview to *Frontline*, 'I want my government to inspire fear.'⁸¹ The use of violence, as Eckert rightly points out, has not just been the prerogative of the Shiv Sena in India. A number of political parties are connected to criminal violence, their candidates having criminal records, the parties themselves getting involved in booth capturing, and political violence in general has been a key feature of elections in India.⁸² Perhaps, the vital difference between the Sena and other political parties is the legitimacy that it attaches to violence to achieve its agendas. The Shiv Sena attaches manliness and courage and a certain sense of pride to violence. Militancy and aggression are upheld as 'manly', as masculine virtues.⁸³ Those opposing 'direct action' are branded as effeminate or worse. It is perhaps this which has attracted the youth to join the Shiv Sena. The Sena has provided young men—and in some cases even women—the power to resolve local issues through the use of violence. This highly masculinist rhetoric no doubt pulls young men towards the Sena. It is not surprising that, by one report, a full two-thirds of all Shiv Sena-BJP supporters are male.⁸⁴

While interviewing a number of young Sena activists from a *shakha*, it became clear that violence provides them a certain sense of achievement or power. One of the Sena activists from Dadar said, ‘The Shiv Sena has given me the space to help the people who come to me and I solve their problems. Being a Shiv Sainik, half my job is done...If anybody refuses to listen to us, then we have other means to get our job done.’⁸⁵ Therefore, the social service element of the Shiv Sena, often written about, is not free from violence, particularly at the level of *shakhas*. Most of the problems which are brought at the level of *shakhas* are either solved through an element of fear, and in cases where fear does not work, violence is the remedy and answer to all problems. Gerard Heuze observes that the element of social service of *shakhas* has been replaced by a sort of gangster/underworld element, more interested in the benefits coming from the trading of illicit goods like liquor and even drugs.⁸⁶

The continuous application of violence at the level of *shakhas* has particularly resulted in the recruitment of gangsters and underworld elements in the party which has corrupted its image of providing resources at the lowest level. Not only has this violence given a new meaning for many young Shiv Sainiks, it has perhaps given them the strength to start their own work independently within their respective spheres of influence. Bal Thackeray’s charisma is an important feature for these young recruits, but they are also taking advantage of his name to start their own private enterprises and small businesses and it becomes easy to get a licence by taking the name of the Shiv Sena *Pramukh*.⁸⁷ These private enterprises are not always legal, and even in these, an association with the Sena is helpful, essentially because of the fear factor. The Shiv Sena had a specific agenda to recruit the youth particularly when it began as a movement and later became a political party in a couple of years. There were specific programmes organized to attract the youth like typewriting classes and stenography, along with the taking out of religious processions and other cultural activities.⁸⁸ Though, to start with, the Sena had a focused group of young men who were educated and had zeal to prove themselves, the same cannot be said of the Shiv Sena now. It has a mixed group of young people

of which some have close links with the gangster world and have applied their connections to achieve personal ends at the grass-roots level.

Violence has been an important instrument of the Shiv Sena from the time of its inception. As said earlier, the party achieved popularity in Mumbai on the basis of violent attacks on non-Maharashtrians and communists, whom the party openly declared itself to be against. The anti-communism of the Shiv Sena reached a flashpoint when a CPI MLA, Krishna Desai, was murdered in 1970, allegedly by youth belonging to the Shiv Sena.⁸⁹ This instrument has been an unchanging feature of the Shiv Sena, though the party seems to have shifted its priority often from working for the cause of Maharashtrians to making a wider base in the late 1980s and 1990s when it declared itself as a party of the Hindus and particularly being anti-Muslim.

It was at this stage that the party's use of violence reached its acme, where it was not only alleged but held responsible by the Srikrishna Commission to have organized and participated vociferously in the riots in Mumbai in 1993 which followed after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. The role of the Shiv Sena during the Mumbai riots has not only been discussed in academic writings of various scholars and in media reports, but the official version of the riots that came out in the form of a report of the Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry clearly stated that it was the Shiv Sena under its leader Bal Thackeray which was responsible for the communal riots in Mumbai.⁹⁰ During the hearing of the Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry, apart from the statements of the victims of the riots, prominent leaders of the Shiv Sena also accepted their involvement in the riots. Sarpotdar clearly stated before the Commission that the Shiv Sena believed in retaliation even if the victims were innocent, and confirmed the widespread perception that the Shiv Sena had played a pivotal role in the riots.⁹¹ The Shiv Sena counsel insisted during the proceedings about the retaliation principle, 'Both in December and January it was the minority community who started the violence and the Hindus came out only in retaliation and self defence.'⁹²

Therefore, on most occasions the legitimacy and justification

for the acts of violence by the Shiv Sena is sought in retaliation and the claim that violence was necessary for self-defence. 'The right to self-defence is bestowed upon every citizen by the Constitution.'⁹³ The self-defence principle was further supported by Chief Minister Manohar Joshi, who, after the Srikrishna Commission's report indicting the Shiv Sena, said that Hindus would have been annihilated but for the courageous defence by the Shiv Sena. Manohar Joshi had said, 'I will not call them Shiv Sainiks. They were all anguished Hindus who were spontaneously reacting to what happened in Jogeshwari.'⁹⁴

There are different meanings attached to violence at different points of time, depending on who resorts to violence. While a violent attack against a Muslim during the Mumbai riots was considered as self-defence for the Hindus, the use of violence at the level of *shakhas* is seen as a way of getting things done without much trouble, and, therefore, equated with power. Violence is also empowerment for the women's wing of the Shiv Sena, called the Mahila Agadi. Since its inception in 1985, the Mahila Agadi has adopted a philosophy of justice which can be achieved through the use of brute force. The *Pramukh* of the women's wing of the Shiv Sena proudly claimed in an interview that it was only because of the backing of the Shiv Sena *shakhas* that all disputes get settled readily.⁹⁵ One of the women Shiv Sena activists said in an interview, 'When they lead a morcha against those seeking dowry or against a husband who has harassed his wife, it gives me an immense sense of power and I feel empowered.'⁹⁶

The Sena's explanation of retaliation and self-defence has been given on occasions when the party activists have dug up a cricket ground hosting an India-Pakistan match, or smashing up cinema halls showing movies like *Fire*, or attacking Richard Gere for kissing Shilpa Shetty, an Indian film actress. On all these occasions, the Sena has claimed to be a protector of either Hindu culture or of national pride, which it claimed was at stake if the Indian and Pakistani cricket teams played on Indian soil. Action through violence has been a common feature of the Shiv Sena in all its campaigns and across Maharashtra, though it has tried targeting different social

bases in urban and rural Maharashtra purely for electoral political gains.

The Shiv Sena has been built on the edifice of violence. Even the funds for running a political party with so many *shakhas* throughout Maharashtra and other parts of India come through extortion. The fact also remains that the Sena has been able to gain funds through its control over Mumbai's real estate, which is a result of the party's repeated victories in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. But a larger share of these funds is gathered from routine practices of neighbourhood collections by the *shakha* members which are often made in the name of 'religious collections'. The key method of acquiring this money is extortion, which is done either in exchange of protecting a trader's business from being destroyed, or from a small-time Muslim trader.

The Shiv Sena has not been able to achieve similar clout over the media with intimidation and violence. The Sena is known for repeatedly attacking well-known Marathi literary writers and journalists of the vernacular press who have dared to write either against the Shiv Sena or have launched a protest against the party. Shiv Sena activists have repeatedly attacked the newspaper offices of *Mahanagar* and its editor Nikhil Wagle who has carried editorial pieces against the Shiv Sena and its chief in his newspaper.⁹⁷ Several other journalists have been physically attacked or abused allegedly by the members of the Shiv Sena and media circles are also not free from the Sena's terror tactics. The home of Haroon Rashid of *Blitz* newspaper was attacked and all his possessions were burned, including 3,000 books and diaries he had been safeguarding for the purpose of later compiling an autobiography. In Aurangabad, *Lokmat* was attacked, allegedly by Shiv Sena workers because of its critique of a Sena leader. Four employees were injured, machines were destroyed and files were torched.⁹⁸

CHARISMA AS A FACTOR IN THE SHIV SENA

Most political parties with a strong organizational structure seek their source of power from a leader whose charisma is respected by

the majority within the organization. This is true of the Congress in India, which has been heavily dependent on the Gandhi family for direction and clarity of action. The success of fascism and Nazism in Europe till the Second World War can be attributed to two men, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, whose charisma made a significant contribution in the emergence of a strong, cadre-based political organizations.

The Shiv Sena, whose organizational structure ensures strong allegiance not only to the party but also to its leader, is no different. The party emerged as a movement, and later given the vision and direction of a political party by its charismatic leader Bal Thackeray. In the 1960s, when the states reorganization movement and the emergent Maharashtrian identity were still very strong among the people, Bal Thackeray launched his weekly magazine, *Marmik*. The trademark of the magazine was its biting satire and the vitriolic writing of its editor, Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray. The editorial style of *Marmik* complemented the public image of the outfit, i.e. a forum for protest and resistance of the Marathi-speaking people 'wronged' by its enemies, the non-Marathi speakers. *Marmik* was used effectively to ridicule the outfit's political opponents and communist unions in Mumbai were often the favoured enemies.⁹⁹ It was through *Marmik* that Bal Thackeray was able to reach out to the masses and propagate his views on the employment problem among the Maharashtrians and waged a systematic attack on the communists.

Thackeray, from being a cartoonist, soon turned into a demagogue because of his famous speeches which involved a certain abuse of the enemy and direct attacks turning the listeners into a frenzied mass. This is another feature of all charismatic leaders: their ability to articulate the grievances of the masses and convince them. Thackeray has been able to do this particularly because he has not himself held any public office even after the Sena-BJP coalition came to power in the state in 1995. His non-occupancy of any public office makes him more believable for the people, as he is seen as someone above the attractions of power. Thackeray believes in leading the Shiv Sena through a combination of factors

which involves his speeches, writings, hysterics and legitimacy that he keeps giving to the use of violence. There is a strong sense of 'us' and 'them' in most of Thackeray's speeches, whether referring to south Indians or non-Maharashtrians in the earlier phase of the Shiv Sena or the recent reference to the Sena being anti-Muslim. For instance, he said in one of his speeches, 'I shall only tell one thing to the Muslims, living here—stay as our Hindustan's citizens. Do not stay as our enemies...' Or, 'here onwards we shall not die in the hands of these people in our own motherland...'¹⁰⁰

While it is now believed that power structures in the Shiv Sena are shifting and Udhav Thackeray, after being anointed as the working president of the Sena has taken over the reins of the party. The cadres at the lower level still symbolize the party with their leader Bal Thackeray. One of the party workers from Thane presented it aptly: 'We cannot move without the direction of our leader. He is the Shiv Sena for us and we follow his orders.'¹⁰¹ While this represents one of the viewpoints within the party, which apparently cannot be ignored, there are others, particularly the older generation of Shiv Sena leaders, who suggest that Bal Thackeray perhaps does not enjoy the same stature as he did during his earlier days. The disillusionment was apparent among the earlier generation of Shiv Sena members, particularly with the way their leader handled the family feud and his inability to fulfil the promises of protecting the interests of the Maharashtrians in the state.¹⁰²

Public appearances of the leader suggest that he still holds the power to mesmerize the masses through his speeches and writings which appear in their daily, *Saamna*. The power of the leader to exploit mass sentiment is apparent from the response he gets during the Dussehra appearance every year, when he gives a new direction to his party and its members. It was in one such Dussehra speech that Thackeray had talked about forming Hindu suicide squads which resulted in considerable excitement in the Sena camp for the implementation of such a programme. Thackeray's Dussehra-day message is viewed as an order by his party workers and members.¹⁰³ Thackeray projects the image of a leader who remains unquestioned and whose authority can never be shaken by any of the members

of the party. While this remains the authority and power that the 'Supreme' leader—as he is often addressed—visualizes himself to possess, in reality, this position has been questioned more than once. The severest challenge to Thackeray's power, which, to a large extent undermined his authority, came from within the family when his nephew Raj Thackeray decided to form his own political party, the MNS. There are other leaders like Nirupam and Narayan Apte who have defected from the Shiv Sena to join other political parties particularly in the hope of greener pastures.

The next section deals with the constraints that democracy generates for political parties like the Shiv Sena that do not believe in inner-party democracy, and even while following most of the procedural norms of democratic electioneering, they seek to undermine the substantial understanding of democracy.

CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR THE SHIV SENA IN A DEMOCRACY

Given the Shiv Sena's success in Maharashtra, for which all the above factors have been contributory, including the party's shifting ideological stand from regional identity to religious identity, it becomes important to first analyse the electoral success of the party within Maharashtra, which, to a large extent would determine its social base, and then the constraints and challenges that an extremist political party like the Shiv Sena faces while functioning in a democracy.

The Shiv Sena contested the Mumbai municipal elections for the first time in 1968, two years after its origin, and was able to win one-third of the seats in the municipal corporation. During this early period, the party was able to establish a firm place for itself in the municipal corporation, with party members securing the mayorship on at least four occasions during the 1970s.¹⁰⁴ Though the party was able to make its imprint in the local elections in Mumbai, it was not until the 1980s that it tasted success in the Assembly and parliamentary elections. The 1970s saw the Shiv Sena involving itself in electoral politics on a more regular basis. In 1971, it allied with

the Congress (O) and fielded three candidates for Parliament from Mumbai and Konkan, losing in all three constituencies. In 1972, the Shiv Sena fielded 26 candidates for the Assembly election and could win only one seat from Mumbai city.¹⁰⁵ The Shiv Sena was not able to expand its base much in the next few years, but from the 1980s, it spread in the Marathwada region while maintaining its hold over the Mumbai and Konkan regions. The Sena concentrated particularly on spreading its base in rural Maharashtra and defined Hindutva accordingly, where it translated the Hindutva discourse into the dominant political idiom of Maratha valour and rustic virtues.¹⁰⁶ This provided a sudden impetus to the Hindutva ideology, with which the people of Maharashtra were easily able to relate.

While the Shiv Sena has performed more or less consistently (with some rough patches here and there) in the municipal elections, the most distinguishing factor has been the success of the political party in the Maharashtra Assembly elections in the 1990s. It won 52 out of the 183 seats it contested in the Assembly elections in 1990, and 73 out of the 169 seats contested in 1995 and went on to form the coalition government along with the BJP in Maharashtra. The Saffron wave in Maharashtra was apparent when the Sena-BJP alliance won 33 of the 48 parliamentary seats in Maharashtra in the 1996 general elections.¹⁰⁷ In 1999, the Sena won 69 out of the 161 seats contested, but was voted out of power by the Congress.¹⁰⁸ The Sena's performance in the 2004 Assembly elections further receded when the party won only 62 seats out of the 163 it contested.¹⁰⁹ It remains the main opposition party in Maharashtra, and in the Maharashtra civic polls held in February 2007, the Shiv Sena-BJP jointly won 111 out of 226 seats, and out of the 111, the Shiv Sena won 83. In the 2009 Maharashtra Assembly elections, it managed only 44 seats, and in Mumbai, which has been a stronghold of the party, it could not make an impression.¹¹⁰ Most of the seats earlier won by the Sena were claimed by another extremist party, the MNS, an offshoot of the Shiv Sena. While the Sena's influence in terms of vote share might have gone down in the past few years, its influence and ability to turn the wave cannot be undermined. This inconsistent performance of the Shiv Sena is primarily because

of the dynamics of electoral politics in a multiparty democracy like India.

Perhaps the principal constraint which the Shiv Sena has witnessed over the years is its inability to expand its base outside Maharashtra, because it began as a political party to ensure the rights of local Maharashtrians over those who had come from other states. Democracy, the Sena soon realized, is a system where it was important to accommodate everyone to perform consistently in elections. This realization made the Shiv Sena expand from Mumbai and Thane Districts to rural areas of Maharashtra. The Sena has done this skilfully by shifting its ideological stand from regional nationalism to religious and cultural nationalism. In fact, the party has maintained regional identity as an important agenda, but has tried to bring it under the larger discourse of religious identity. In the initial years, the Sena was primarily able to attract the lower-middle and middle classes because of its stress on the economic problems of these segments. Since then, the Shiv Sena has come a long way from being a political party representing the urban middle class to a party which now represents people from all regions of the state.

Within Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena has performed particularly well and garnered support from the Vidarbha region, but has not been able to push its agenda in the southern districts of Maharashtra. Nevertheless, the success of the Shiv Sena within Maharashtra can be attributed to some organizational consolidation of the party, and particularly its ability to drive the Hindutva agenda in a forceful and violent manner within the state. But this success was made easier because of factionalism in the Congress, which ultimately resulted in Sharad Pawar forming a separate political party facilitating the Shiv Sena–BJP alliance to benefit from the infighting within the Congress.

While on the one hand the Shiv Sena has found it difficult to provide space to all the religious communities and classes within Maharashtra driving on an extremist agenda, the party has certainly found a vote bank among the majority community, particularly those belonging to the middle class. The vote bank politics for

electoral success and the space that democracy provides to political parties with varied ideological bases has been utilized skilfully by the Shiv Sena leadership. Apart from the dynamics of multiparty competition in a democracy which has proved to be advantageous for the Shiv Sena, the other factor which has perhaps helped the party and has been widely written about, is its ability to raise funds for the party activities through various means, of which extortion has been an important mechanism to extract money from various sources.

It is difficult for political parties like the Shiv Sena to function within the boundaries of democratic compulsions. As far as participation in the political process through a system of elections is concerned, the Shiv Sena has followed this norm, but the party has not been able to adhere to more substantial principles of democratic functioning which relate to pluralism and tolerance. There have been a number of political parties and organizations in India which have not adhered to the principle of pluralism and respect for different points of view, but the Shiv Sena is different as it believes in violent direct action to achieve goals which can be bracketed on most occasions as extreme. Therefore, it would be interesting to situate the challenges that the Shiv Sena faces while functioning in a democracy like India.

The dynamics of functioning within a democracy has provided challenges for the Shiv Sena which most political parties witness in the long run. Irrespective of being a party which functions completely under the diktat of its supremo Bal Thackeray without much of scope left for rebellion or devolution of power, the Shiv Sena has encountered defections with a number of its members joining other parties. Though the MNS under Raj Thackeray has not been able to emerge as a significant rival to the Shiv Sena, it was certainly viewed as a threat when it was founded in 2005. More than emerging as a political party which could threaten the Shiv Sena's position in Maharashtra, the formation of the MNS resulted in the Shiv Sena losing its vibrant young leader Raj Thackeray, who was being projected as a youth leader in Maharashtra. Even before Raj Thackeray's exit from the Shiv Sena, the party went through a

major crisis when its leader Narayan Rane from Konkan, a Sena stronghold, decided to leave the party due to differences with Bal Thackeray over the succession issue.¹¹¹ Democracy perhaps provides the space for individuals to not only move away from the Shiv Sena and the diktat of its leader, but also an opportunity for them to join other political parties or form new alliances of their own.

The ability to find a balance between the extremist image of the party and function within the principles of democracy is something that the Shiv Sena has performed over the years. It is this dual character of the Shiv Sena which makes it a political party of contradictions. On one hand, it is a party which has a multilayered structure organizationally where there are separate heads of *shakhas* at the lower level, though strong control is exercised from above. The party began as a movement with anti-democratic comments from its mentor, but soon started participating in elections protecting firmly its image of a violent extremist.

There are images of the party being involved in social service particularly at the *shakha* level, yet these images have a counter-image where *shakha* members are involved in extortion of funds and resort to violent means for solving problems at their level. These contradictions though, do not elude an understanding the true image of the Shiv Sena. It has always associated itself with a parochial construction of the 'nation' with an excessive claim to nationalism, and even while shifting its political position within the framework of Hindutva, it has explained it in the context of religious and cultural nationalism. The party, like most right-wing extremist organizations, has believed in legitimizing violence through 'direct action'. The party has been able to cultivate a strong cadre-based organization and propagate anti-communal and anti-Dalit sentiments riding under the banner of Bal Thackeray's charismatic leadership. Functioning under a democratic framework, the party has been able to legitimize its extremist agenda, particularly by gaining control over institutional power structures.

A SHADE OF EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN:
THE CASE OF THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI

Generally, nationalism refers to social movements emerging from or aiming at a particular nation. Social movements are group actions to achieve a social change by resisting or demanding reforms in the socio-political or religious spheres. The JI Pakistan considers itself a religious movement, which is aimed at establishing the Islamic order at home and also to bring about a global revolution by uniting the Muslim nations under the umbrella of the umma (the community of Muslims), which is ultimately to revive the glorious past of Muslims. The ideal is to establish the Caliphate as an Islamic institution to govern the umma as per Islamic codes of conduct.

Roy Oliver asserts that many of the conventional Islamic movements have deviated from a struggle in the name of a supranational Muslim community into a kind of Islamic nationalism. These activists want to be fully recognized as legitimate actors on the domestic political scene, recognize the nation and the state (and often identify with both), and have largely given up the supranational agenda that was part of their ideology. These Islamo-nationalist movements want the sharia (Islamic law) to be taken into account, but they want that to be a state law by replacing existing systems of judiciary.

The Islamo-nationalists do recognize the importance of essential State institutions, such as a parliament and elections. These movements, according to Roy, struggle to reshape nationalism in terms of Islam (or the reverse), and tend to promote foreign-policy objectives linked to their state, and not a wider Muslim agenda. Most of the Islamic movements, he claims, have been shaped by national particularities and their main agendas are within their state.¹¹² Islamo-nationalism in Pakistan is promoted by several religious organizations, but the JI Pakistan is the pioneer of a pan-Islamic movement in the country. The party is more focused on the Islamization of Pakistan, which is their principle aim since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. This chapter specifically aims at exploring the organizational and ideological aspects, as well as possible challenges the party is faced with to achieve its objectives.

THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI: STRUCTURE,
IDEOLOGY AND CHALLENGES

The JI emerged as a counter-movement to what Abul Aala Maududi called Hindu nationalism under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

Hindu nationalism flourished to that extent that it considered itself becoming the British successor in the subcontinent. This dominance of Hindu nationalism appeared as a bomb blast to Muslims in 1937 elections, when the Congress established its government. It was clear that the English rule wouldn't stand against Congress for a long time.¹¹³

This became one of the reasons for Muslims to organize.

Pakistan has been an Islamic state since 1952. Pakistan's ideological foundation was tense, as the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, couldn't play his role in the development of the state's very first constitution, as he died in 1948. While Jinnah was able to reap the benefits by making an appeal on the basis of Islam, which was the essence of the two-nation theory, he called for religious pluralism soon after the establishment of an independent State of Pakistan. There were a few Islamic scholars (ulema) who opposed Jinnah's and the Muslim League's ideology, simultaneously when he was uniting Muslims in the name of Islam. Some of these ulema who ended up being in Pakistan after Partition in 1947 started lobbying for the Islamization of the state. Two successive constitutions of Pakistan in 1956 and 1962 had avoided realization of the Islamic ideology by consecutive secular governments.¹¹⁴

Maududi recalls that the actual discussion on declaring Pakistan an Islamic state commenced in 1938. There were reservations from supporters of secularism, mainly from the Muslim League, as they perceived that with the implementation of the sharia, the hands of several thousand would be cut off and if Pakistan became an Islamic state, then Hindus in Hindustan (land of Hindus) would form their religious state in response. But one of the most popular arguments presented by seculars was to first form an Islamic society and then,

in response, the government would be Islamic as well. Those who were secular felt that the Pakistani society was not ready to accept an Islamic state. These debates continued even after Partition. The secular demanded an Islamic state to first create an Islamic society, and the ulema like Maududi were of the view that the state should join them in promoting Islamic values in the society so as to create an Islamic state.¹¹⁵ Proponents of an Islamic state always justified their point of view on the basis of the two-nation theory, which they interpreted as the basis for forming an Islamic state executing the sharia. The secular were even thinking of the lives of the millions of Muslims who would be living in India after Partition, and, on the other hand, the ulema were Pakistan-centred in accomplishing their ultimate goal of Islamization of the country.

Previously, in 1949, Pakistan's Constituent Assembly declared that the South Asian Muslims had created Pakistan to live their lives according to the teachings of Islam. There were also suggestions for adopting Arabic as the national language of Pakistan, and also to change Bengali from its Sanskrit script to the Arabic-Persian one. At the same time, the ruling Muslim League announced that Pakistan would become a platform to unite Muslims of the world by re-initiating a pan-Islamic movement. At that point in history, to promote pan-Islamism, the Government of Pakistan also sponsored the World Muslim Conference at Karachi in February 1949.¹¹⁶ Such state-sponsored pan-Islamic initiatives greatly motivated Islamists in Pakistan, in particular the ones hoping to get rid of secularism from the country's working methodology.

Before exploring the organizational and ideological aspects of the JI, it is crucial to understand and analyse the circumstances in which Maududi felt the need to form a party.

BACKGROUND

In the early twentieth century, the Muslim world was faced with numerous challenges in the form of colonialism and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. It was around this time that thinkers like Moulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi began to recall the glorious

past of Muslim nations in their scholarship, Muslim history talking of the fact that Muslims had been ruling almost the whole of the Indian subcontinent for well over a thousand years. The Mughals were criticized for not working on *da'wah* (a call to people to embrace Islam), and for some ulema like Maududi, this was the reason that Muslims remained a minority in the subcontinent. While talking of the history of Islam in India, Maududi was of the view that Islam's 'success depended on controlling the centres of power. It was the decline of Muslim power after Aurangzeb that had straddled the boundary between Islam and Hinduism, arrested the spread of Islam, and ultimately caused the collapse of Muslims in India.'¹¹⁷

Generally, leaders of similar Islamic movements believe that Muslims have to follow the particular path of living life as per the principles of Islam, and that those well-versed in Islamic law were competent enough to survive on the particular path. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that Muslims were victorious everywhere as long as they followed the directions prescribed in Islam, and when the level of faith in their hearts declined, so did their glory. Islamic movements aiming at the unity of Muslims are to revive the celebrated past of Muslims by revitalizing Muslim consciousness.¹¹⁸ In the subcontinent, some ulema were concerned over the Congress Party's values of secularism and multiple nationalism and this revived group mobilizations for Muslim unity in response. In the context of the independence movement in the subcontinent, there was a parallel effort from Muslims to protect the symbol of Muslim unity (umma): the Ottoman Empire (the caliphate in Turkey).¹¹⁹ The Khilafat Movement (1919–24) was a political struggle initiated by Muslims in the region to persuade the British rulers to protect the Ottoman Empire during the aftermath of the Second World War. This was the religious and political context in which the JI's leader, Maududi, developed his vision and long-term ideology on Islamic revivalism. Therefore, from the very beginning, he articulated his notion of the umma, which is similar to notions of Muslim brotherhood in general, but more focused on unity of Muslims in the subcontinent. In response to his philosophy on the

umma, Maududi enthusiastically joined the Tahrik-e-Hijrat or the migration movement in 1921. The Tehrik was initiated to resist the British rule in India and to encourage Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan as India was no longer a *dar-al-Islam* (land of Islam).¹²⁰

In the pre-Partition period, there were two factions of Muslims: (1) those supporting the Congress Party and persuading fellow Muslims to join their cause in supporting the Congress; and (2) another group of Muslim intellectuals and politicians who joined Jinnah's Muslim League in struggle against the British rule and demanded a separate homeland for Muslims in the subcontinent.¹²¹ Some say that Maududi was also in the list of prominent ulema in opposition to a separate homeland for Muslims. In response, the JI says that he neither opposed either the Pakistan Movement nor 'practically' had he taken part in the movement, because he had his own philosophy of Islamic revivalism and course of action in relation to problems faced by the Muslim world. He originally entered politics with the idea of restricting the rising power of Hindus so as to convert India to Islam. Vali Nasr says that, contrary to popular assertion, Maududi 'was not opposed to Pakistan, but he objected to Jinnah and the Muslim League's conception of it. Much like Jinnah, Maududi viewed the activities of the Congress with apprehension'.¹²² By the late 1930s, he had accepted the possibility of partition of the subcontinent. He reacted to the Muslim League's construct of Pakistan and the party policies and also declared secular politics as blasphemy (*kufri*).¹²³

INTRODUCTION

Maududi (1903–79) was known as a 'liberal' Muslim and has been preaching the rejuvenation of Islam by 'throwing off from medieval shackles'.¹²⁴ He was born in Aurangabad to an educated family from Delhi. In the very beginning, he found a career in journalism and moved to Hyderabad-Deccan in 1932 where he founded an Urdu daily, *Tarjuman-ul-Qur'an* (Interpreter of the Koran). His adroit scholarship attracted the attention of Allama Iqbal. In 1937, Iqbal persuaded Maududi to move to Pathankot to manage the affairs of the Waqf, a printing press, and that is where

Maududi's actual professional career started. Maududi became a part of Project Dar-al-Islam at the Waqf. In July 1938, he said the objective of this project was to make India a *dar-al-Islam*. This was also the time when Maududi's physical appearance had started to change because he became bearded. As per the agreement, Maududi was asked to refrain from any political activity during his time at the Waqf. However, he couldn't keep his promise and kept voicing his opinion on political issues strongly through writings at the Waqf. This caused a conflict between Maududi and the Waqf administration due to which he resigned and left for Lahore in 1939.¹²⁵ He reached Lahore at a time when other communal rivals, namely Hindus, Sikhs and Ahmadiyas were already organized, but Muslims could not come up with any organization to represent their political views. In Lahore, there were discussions going on in ulema circles to create an Islamic party, but it was Maududi who took the lead in forming one.¹²⁶

Maududi founded the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) or Islamic Unity Council on 26 August 1941 in Lahore. Maududi is the soul and spirit of the party even today. He believed that a person was Muslim when he subscribed to and upheld the ideology which is Islam, and not by belonging to a particular nationality, race, class or country. Primarily, the JI 'was founded on the idea of the umma as an unadulterated and exclusive embodiment of the vision of Islam that would preclude cultural coexistence with Hindus'.¹²⁷

To form the JI, Maududi had organized a convention in Lahore which was attended by approximately 75 ulema. The convention concluded by electing Maududi as the first amir (president) of the JI, and the gathering also approved the formation of four regional chapters of the party in Bareilly, Sara Mir, Umar Abad and Kapurthala. It was then that the working methodology of the JI was defined with consensus to initially spread the party's message through local newspapers and also hold annual conferences for the party members.

The basic idea was to form a party to establish the Islamic way of life to promote the religion of Islam or the 'Government of God' so that Muslims could fulfil the will of God and thus

achieve salvation in the life hereafter. At the time of its inception, the major objective of the JI was to act as a religious revivalist party. The JI in Pakistan keeps special affiliations with similar pan-Islamic organizations in South-East and South Asia. Other than the JI Pakistan, the following are the JI factions in South Asia:

- Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh;¹²⁸
- Jammat-e-Islami Hind (India);¹²⁹
- Jammat-e-Islami Kashmir (Jammu & Kashmir, India); and
- Jammat-e-Islami Sri Lanka.

The party's political philosophy centres around the concept of 'theo-democracy', stating that the political government formed through the platform of the JI would not be a group of 'religious fundamentalists' but a democratic representative of the community, governing according to the rules of the Koran and Sunna. It is a form of democracy where people are not allowed to legislate for matters that are clearly defined in either of the Islamic doctrines. In simple words, what is written in the Koran and authentic Hadith books could not be challenged. Maududi's political ideology strongly connects religion with politics by highlighting differences between 'Islamic' and 'un-Islamic'. In brief, Maududi's theo-democracy is about elected representatives managing the state affairs in the light of what he interpreted as Islamic laws and principles.¹³⁰ His basic contention with pure democracy is that the very nature of this ideology puts the people's will above Allah's will. Dr Fathi Osman viewed this conception as merely theocratic, since democracy works in accordance with socio-cultural foundations and Muslims would not accept any decision against Islam.¹³¹

After Pakistan came into being, Maududi became more of a politician with less emphasis on personal scholarly attributes, changing the course of the JI from an Islamic movement into a political party.¹³² Since the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the JI has established the reputation of mobilizing people for protests against the state, the West and the US, and, therefore, people generally think that the party is limited to blackmailing the state to accomplish its primary objective of establishing Islamic law in Pakistan. However, before 1989, the JI

had seldom issued anti-US statements, because then the JI was an ardent supporter of the American drive against communism and was dubbed a pro-imperialist religious party in Pakistan by leftist groups. The JI claims to be voicing the concerns of the poor and the deprived and objects to exploitation by the elite and feudals. However, as discussed in coming pages, the JI is called an intolerant group of religiously fanatic people who want to impose their will on others, and, therefore, have no respect for fundamental human rights, such as the right of association, freedom of speech, right to protect one's own religion, etc. Mostly, the JI doesn't raise a voice for the downtrodden people of Pakistan because it is just over-occupied by anti-state and anti-West reactions.

The JI has a defined philosophy and structure to promote unity of the Muslim brotherhood (umma) not only in Pakistan and South Asia, but also in the whole world. Maududi was not that happy even with the creation of Pakistan, and that is when he said that:

Islam which was spread by our ancestors in Hindustan for consecutive centuries is now restricted to two small regions of Pakistan. And if now we will take a wrong step then Islam's one thousand year old history in Hindustan will be washed away. From three-fourth of this continent Islam is being removed by others but here in Pakistan it will be our action, and therefore we have to step forward with a lot of thinking.¹³³

The JI's electoral performance has been very poor, especially until the 2002 general elections in Pakistan. So is the JI more than merely a group of people frequently protesting and marching on the streets of Pakistan? To answer this and many other questions, it is significant to understand the JI from the inside and outside, specially in relation to domestic and regional security. It is significant to explore various dimensions of the party, such as the philosophy, constitution, leadership and the organizational make-up.

STRUCTURE

The party has successfully built and continues to establish alliances with Islamic parties in other countries and has recruited

members through a widespread network of Islamic schools (madrassas) and its students' wings. The party aims to 'serve as the vanguard of a gradual Islamic revolution'.¹³⁴ At the organizational level, the JI is headed by an amir, who is elected directly by the party members through secret ballot. The amir holds office for five years and could be re-elected. The leader or the amir is subject to impeachment from office provided a two-thirds majority of the Shura (Central Consultative Council) goes against him. The JI amir is responsible for overall organization of the JI and is liable to prepare party policies on all issues, though in consultation with the Central Consultative Council. The amir is the supreme authority in the JI and can demand the obedience of all members, but he is bound constitutionally because doctrinal issues are dealt with by the Shura. In case the amir disagrees with the Shura on any issue, he has a right of veto to refer the issue back to the Shura. In this case, the amir must either accept the decision made by the Shura, or resign from his position. In addition, to carry out required responsibilities, the amir is assisted by the general secretary. In financial and administrative matters the amir is liable to follow decisions of the *Majlis-e-Amelah* (Working Committee), whose members are appointed from the Shura. Presently, the JI's operations work with its leadership comprising an amir (president), seven *naib* amir (vice presidents) and a *qayyim* (secretary general). Each lower-level amir, provincial or district, is elected by members of that particular constituency. Even though with a structure similar to that of communist parties, the JI is definitely more democratic than other political parties as far as intra-party affairs are concerned.

The Central Consultative Council or *Majlis-e-Shura* is comprised of 82 members who are elected by the party members. The general secretary, the provincial amirs and provincial general secretaries are automatically inducted into the Shura. The JI Shura is elected for three years, and this period could be increased or reduced by the amir. The Shura is supposed to meet once a year. However, there is a provision for special sessions if requested by one-fourth of the party members. General members of the party may attend sessions of the Shura with prior permission of the amir, but only to observe.

The JI headquarters and central secretariat are in Lahore. The headquarters has various departments dealing with organizational, financial, publications, workers' training, labour welfare, social services, public schools, adult education, Arabic and English translation, theological institutions, and information.

After Partition in 1947, the JI re-strategized to strengthen its organizational structure in Pakistan with offices of the amir, *naib* amir (vice president), secretary general, and the Shura. The party's structure is based on a series of concentric circles and the smallest unit is called a *maqam* or *halqa*, consisting of two or more members. Decisions are made at the national level in the headquarters where the amir sits with his subordinates, assistants and advisers. There are also national-level meetings (*Ijtima-e-Aam*) through which the party aims to promote solidarity in the group by bringing in members from smallest as well as provincial units.

In terms of intra-party democracy, the JI dominates in Pakistan. Looking at other political parties shows that most of the decisions are not made by virtue of consensus among all members of a party. For example, in the PPP, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto died and the party leadership automatically came into the hands of his daughter Benazir Bhutto. Apparently, Benazir left a letter in the form of her will before her death stating that her son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari be a co-chair of the PPP along with her husband Asif Ali Zardari. In 2008, Zardari became the president of Pakistan. Benazir didn't consult members of even the party's central executive committee. In the JI, the Shura decides on three members for the elections of the amir, and the decision is purely up to the party members to elect the amir through secret ballot. Generally, candidates for the position of the amir are from the most senior-layer cadre of the party. The elections are overseen by the *Nazim-e-Intikhabat* (Controller of Elections) who is appointed by the Shura to fulfil the expected responsibilities at the JI Secretariat in Lahore. Fig. 2 shows the organizational structure of the JI.




Fig. 2 Organization of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan

There is a massive infrastructure at the Mansoorah, the JI headquarters in Lahore for administrative, research, health care and educational purposes. Some of the institutions at Mansoorah are as follows.

- The Islamic Research Academy, which was founded in 1963 to explore problems facing the Muslim world. The academy is an important institution to bring forth publications looking at significant issues in the light of Islam.

- Mansoorah Hospital, which was actually set up in 1982 to provide services to the victims of the Afghan war. Later, the hospital extended its services to the local community.
- The Markaz Ulum-al-Islamia (Centre for Islamic Education) was established in 1980 to equip young minds with the knowledge of Islam.
- There are Mansoorah Model Schools for boys and girls as well as the Mansoorah Model Degree College.
- The Syed Mawdoodi International Educational Institute was launched in 1982. It is an internationally renowned institution with highly qualified faculty and international networks to teach Islamic and secular subjects such as history, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and computer science.
- The Jamiat-ul-Muhsinat (Center for Islamic Education for Girls) is based at the JI headquarters since 1990 with the primary objective of providing Islamic education to girls.
- There is also the Markaz Tehfiz-ul-Quran (Center for Learning the Koran by Heart), which presently has about 80 local and 40 foreign students.

The autonomous but JI-affiliated policy research think-tank, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) in Islamabad plays a crucial role and supplements the party's contemporary policies on domestic and international issues. The IPS was established in 1979 and JI *Naib* Amir Prof. Khushid Ahmad chairs the institute. The institute has a renowned Islamic scholar in its team, Dr Anis Ahmed, who was the vice president of the Islamabad-based International Islamic University.

LEADERSHIP

The party was headed by some influential people, such as the charismatic writer and philosopher Maududi from 1941 to 1972 followed by Zia's close affiliate Mian Tufail Mohammed from 1972 to 1987, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad from 1987 to 2009 with numerous domestic and international connections. The party was in deep crisis

due to close association with Gen. Zia, so Mian Tufail had to resign in 1987. Later, Qazi Hussain Ahmad was elected as the party amir through party elections in October 1987 due to the fact that Qazi was a populist figure after becoming a key member for the party's liaison with the Army in the Afghan jihad. In addition, on a temporary basis, the party charge as amir was taken up by 13 people from 1941 to 2009. The top layer of the JI leadership is only comprised of men, and so far no women have been elected as amir or *naib* amir even from the party's Halqah-e-Khawatin (Women's Wing). Table 1 gives the names of the leaders of the top layers of the party.

TABLE 1 THE JI'S LEADERSHIP (NOVEMBER 2009)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>
Syed Munawar Hasan	Amir
Prof. Khushid Ahmad	Naib Amir
Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad	Naib Amir
Ch. Aslam Saleemi	Naib Amir
Maulana Adbul Haq Baloch	Naib Amir
Hafiz M. Idrees	Naib Amir
Liaqat Baloch	Qayyim
Dr Farid Parachi	Naib Qayyim
Mian Maqsood Ahmad	Naib Qayyim
M. Ashraf Malik	Naib Qayyim

A prominent feature of the JI is the global reach of not only the party but also of its leadership, as the party leaders since the Maududi days have been travelling abroad to campaign for their cause. The party leaders have been visiting the US, Canada, the European and Gulf countries and have never hesitated to appear in front of the media.

MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES

The JI still has a limited number of members, and even with progress in the party it could not increase the number. The reason

is that the party is highly doctrinal, so it has not much attraction for the intelligentsia, and it is very strict and careful over offering random memberships to people. Any Muslim can join the party, but only by fulfilling certain membership criteria, such as that a prospective member has to: (1) accept the party discipline, (2) act in accordance with the sharia, (3) abstain from sins and refrain from the practices condemned by Islam, (4) give up such property as was acquired through means prohibited by Islam, and (5) dissociate his/her membership from any association repugnant to the JI. Overall, the new members are obliged to acquire knowledge of the Koran and Sunna (practices of Prophet Muhammad), and think in accordance with Islamic principles. Fig. 3 shows the membership of the JI.




Fig. 3 Jamaat-e-Islami Members (1941–2009)

Sources: Jamaat-e-Islami,¹³⁶ and *Gulf News*¹³⁷

Due to the strict criteria for the party membership and duties imposed on members, there are merely 30,000 members. There were and are many who subscribed to the JI's aims and programmes and are willing to cooperate with the party without formally joining it as a member. These affiliates are called *mutafeqeen* or associates.

The associates have been helping the party in spreading the party's scope and also by cooperating in many other respects. By the end of 1956 there were 23,724 associates organized into 1,102 circles.¹³⁸ In 1997, the JI campaigned to approach the common people and registered around 2.2 million people to endorse the party's mandate, basically those people who are in agreement with the party's Islamic ideology. The party has more *mutafeqeen* from Punjab. As of 2007, the JI had roughly 5 million associates, which was the JI target to be achieved by October 1997.¹³⁹

The educated class is significantly represented in the JI, and this fact makes the party spread across various fields, specially the public services and academia. It has been successful in achieving a following among students, teachers, professionals, military officers, and the lower middle class.¹⁴⁰ The analysis of the role, strength and tactics of the students' wing of the JI is presented in a separate section in the present chapter.

The JI has workers' training programmes to guarantee that everyone belonging to the party has the same level of understanding of the JI's ideology, working methodology and action plans. The training programmes are implemented by the Department of Workers' Training at the JI headquarters. There are also specialized training programmes for the party leaders and for this purpose there is a comprehensive one-month training course to enable participants to impart similar programmes in their respective JI offices. Generally, the JI's training deals with the Koran and Hadith in the light of various authentic interpretations, specially in connection with contemporary circumstances. Such training, in a way, helps to reduce possibilities of intra-party disputes leading to breaking up of the JI into different factions, as has been the case with one of the major political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The PML is now divided into [N]awaz, [Q]uaid and [J]unejo blocs, and so is the case with the PPP, with separate camps of Benazir Bhutto and Murtaza Bhutto. There has never been a split or conflict between the JI leadership causing the party to break up. However, there was once a time when the JI had a split over the policy towards Gen. Zia's Government as there was the JI Karachi

Group having reservations over the party's ideological downfall with continuous mushrooming under the authoritarian rule.¹⁴¹

The JI pays a lot of attention to projects promoting intellectual work, education, social work and publications, but it is through its women's and students' wings that the party has gained considerable influence.

JAMAAT WOMEN

The group operates to increase the JI's woman representation, and the JI women's wing also provides free education and homes to destitute women. The women's wing is represented by several education members. There are members with scholarly reputations and a few have also presented papers at an international forum in Baku (Azerbaijan) on 'Expanding the Role of Women in Cross-Cultural Dialogue', 11–12 June 2008. In addition, some of the Jamaat women were represented in the National Assembly and provincial assemblies due to the MMA quota seats, 12 in total, for women after the 2002 general elections.¹⁴²

The Jamaat women have been vocal in supporting the JI's stance on the Hudood Ordinance in the parliament by criticizing discussion on controversial Hudood laws. In an article on the Jamaat women's website, Sadia Rahat writes in support of the Hudood laws: 'Today if we survey the crime-corners of newspapers, there are plenty of stories of rape, gang-rape or murders which are committed due to the non-implementation of the Islamic laws.'¹⁴³

The Jamaat Women's website¹⁴⁴ publishes articles on issues of contemporary importance and others targeting Muslim women, such as the hajj (pilgrimage) techniques for women, as well as on issues demanding debates in Islamic contexts, for example, whether celebrating Valentine's Day is un-Islamic or not.

STUDENT POLITICS

Student politics has been a pillar of support to the JI's political outreach by not only persuading young minds in colleges and

universities but also in promoting the party's ideology at grass-roots level. The JI students' wing is called the Islami Jamiat Talaba (IJT),¹⁴⁵ and there is also the IJT women's group known as the Jamiat Talibat.¹⁴⁶ The IJT is also known as the Jamiat and was founded in December 1947. Since 1976, the IJT is supervised by a *naib* amir of the JI.

The IJT is a group of strongly-bonded students from universities and colleges across Pakistan. To recruit new students into the IJT, the group organizes welcome gatherings and Islamic lectures. The newcomers are mostly looking for their voices to be heard in educational institutions dominated by student politics, and out of them the ones with religious inclination do get attracted by the IJT.

The IJT is distinctive from other students' bodies because the group organizes regular meetings and functions to promote the JI's cause and also to showcase the Islamic orientation of the IJT. If other students' groups organize singing and dance functions, then on the other hand the IJT is devoted to arranging competitions on recitation of the Koran and *naat-e-Rasool-e-Maqbool* (praise for the Prophet Muhammad).

To attract members from the cyber-generation, the IJT has an interactive and attractive website. The website has quotations from the Koran and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad (the Hadith). The website does not merely project the activities of the IJT, but also has an active resource centre with literature, posters, stickers and audio-visual aids to promote the JI's philosophy. The website also serves as a networking tool with links to the IJT's forum on Yahoo. There is also an IJT group on Facebook, and the group had 218 members as of 6 March 2009.

If the IJT manages to receive any form of support from the administration of educational institutions, then the student body is not hesitant to prohibit mixed gatherings of boys and girls in cafeterias, libraries and gardens. By doing this, the IJT attempts to enforce their version of the Islamic code of conduct in educational institutions. This is how the Pakistani youth are exposed to the extremism of the JI, which believes in implementing its own version of traditional Islam with strict rules and regulations. And to satisfy

the party's agenda of implementing some sort of the sharia on university campuses, the party is facilitated by the IJT. This, in a way, creates a sense of insecurity not only for students but also for teachers in educational institutions under the rule of the IJT, and such an atmosphere is not conducive to providing quality education.

The JI, in particular the IJT, has been challenging any secular move from the authorities and all that in the name of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. One such example is when Governor of Punjab Khalid Maqbool approved the policy of starting music and drama courses at higher degree level in the province. On hearing this, the IJT and the Muttahida Talaba Mahaz (a coalition of students' organizations) organized a campaign against music and drama courses and also against the governor. The agitators distributed pamphlets after the Friday prayers at the main Punjab University mosque, and strongly condemned secularism and Musharraf's enlightened moderation. Even the mosque imam (head of a mosque) supported this stance of the IJT. However, the Punjab government authorities didn't pay any heed to such criticism.¹⁴⁷

It was in the early 1960s that the JI decided to devote its student power to fight against the left and to oppose Ayub Khan's modern religious and secular policies. The JI, through protests against Ayub Khan, initiated unrest on campuses to initially resist higher education reforms in the country, and later to protest against the concessions made by the government to India after the 1965 war with India. The IJT-led agitations led to clashes, arrests and incarcerations. After Ayub Khan, the government of Yahya Khan (1917–80) came into power faced with insurgency in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan, faced with numerous challenges, obtained support from the JI and the IJT to campaign against the Awami League in East Pakistan.¹⁴⁸ In May 1971, the IJT joined the Army's counterinsurgency operations in East Pakistan. With the help of the Army, the IJT organized two jihadi groups, Al-Badr and Al-Shams, to counter the Bengali guerrillas. Many IJT members were killed in these violent operations.

The IJT has played an efficacious role in cementing the street power of the JI and the members of the student group

were vital in organizing highly disruptive street protests against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977, which caused the fall of the Bhutto Government.¹⁴⁹ During protests against Bhutto, members of the IJT ‘became embroiled in a new cycle of violence, fuelled by rivalry with other student organizations’.¹⁵⁰ Instances of campus violence in the country from 1982 to 1988 took the lives of approximately 80 student leaders. This ongoing violence promoted the ‘Kalashnikov culture’ and even the JI couldn’t control the IJT, because the student body had gone out of control. All this was happening during the era of Gen. Zia, who, finding no other way to control student bodies like the IJT, finally imposed a ban on students’ organizations in February 1984. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr says that:

the Jama’at’s ideological perspective, central as it has been to the IJT, has failed to keep the student organization in check. The IJT and the Jama’at have been tied together by Maududi’s works and their professed ideological perspective, and IJT members are rigorously indoctrinated in the Jama’at’s ideology.¹⁵¹

The students’ body has a strong presence in all provinces of Pakistan, specially at the University of the Punjab (Lahore), and University of Agriculture (Faisalabad). On several occasions, the IJT has displayed its muscular strength and the University of the Punjab almost belongs to them because there is hardly any opposition from other students’ bodies. In November 2007, Imran Khan, leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, was held by the IJT members after a clash on campus at the University of the Punjab.¹⁵²

It is not only that the IJT has been supporting the JI’s mission of supporting factions in Kashmir and Afghanistan, as the students’ group is and has been active in supporting anti-government struggles in Pakistan also. In 2009, the IJT leadership claimed that they were supporting the extremists in Swat and Waziristan in their struggle against the government, and called the government’s war against terrorism dubious, killing innocent people.¹⁵³ The students’ wing is highly politicized and violent and works for the JI in promoting the party’s agenda at home and abroad.

Since 2007, students from various universities have been coming under the umbrella of the Unemployed Youth Movement (UYM) and strategizing to counter the IJT's power on campuses at universities across the country. Students at the University of the Punjab also organized an anti-IJT rally, chanting 'Go Jamiat Go' to show their animosity against the fascist students' group.¹⁵⁴ It is evident that the IJT is being challenged at a few university campuses for its violent activism, and this might lead to more violence at Pakistani educational institutions because it is very likely that the IJT will come in direct clash with such opponents.

In most educational institutions, the IJT arranges camps for blood donation with the name of 'Give Blood, Give Life' project. People who are interested in donating blood can leave their contact details at the IJT website. This aspect of the IJT is very well-organized, as the students also arrange camps to identify blood groups of students, particularly those living in college and university hostels. Such activities are intended to change the violent image of the IJT.

The IJT is dissimilar to students' wings of other political parties in Pakistan because of the ascent of members of the JI students' wing in the party hierarchy. To date, approximately one-third or more of the JI leadership has come from the IJT, and some prominent names in this list are: Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Prof. Khushid Ahmad, Sayyid Munawar Hasan, Chaudhry Aslam Salimi, Liaqat Baluch, Hafiz Mohammad Idrees, Prof. Mohammed Ibrahim, and Dr Meraj-ul Huda Siddiqui.¹⁵⁵ It clearly validates the fact that the IJT is dear to the JI, and is not as autonomous as the party presents it to be, because many of its high-ranking leaders come from a significant leadership experience in the IJT.

SOCIAL WORK

Since its formation, the JI is engaged in social work with welfare projects reaching marginalized segments across the country. In 1957, the party set up around 60 dispensaries for free medical check-up and treatment. During 1954–55, the JI spent about Rs.

260,236 on medical aid followed by Rs. 303,325 in 1955–56 to provide services to overall 1,837,430 people.¹⁵⁶ Here, it is important to quote Freeland Abbott saying that ‘it would be unfair, however, to indicate that the medical schemes exist purely to spread Jamaat political propaganda. Undoubtedly they also exist because the Jamaat feels that its role as an Islamic party requires it to support social welfare in every way possible’.¹⁵⁷ It is clear that the JI attempts to promote its ideology, and, thus, vote bank, through such activities, mostly in marginalized communities of the country, though with no intention of exploiting the beneficiaries in any extremist activity. In a way, the brief message of the large-scale social work is to tell a person that if the state or ruling elite don’t care for them, the JI does, by following the will of God of serving the common people.

The party has played an impressive role through its relief efforts during floods in Punjab and earthquakes in Quetta and after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir). In 2008, as a gesture of solidarity with the victims of war against terrorism in Pakistani tribal areas, the JI leader announced a fund of Rs. 20 million.¹⁵⁸

The JI-affiliated Al-Khidmat Foundation is a registered national non-governmental organization.¹⁵⁹ The foundation was set up initially in 1951 with projects in both East and West Pakistan. It got registered formally with this name in 1992. Social-work projects through the foundation reach women by following strict religious and social customs with the help of the Al-Khidmat Khwateen Wing (Womens’ Wing). The services provided don’t discriminate on the basis of religion. The foundation has education, health, orphan homes and shelters, emergency relief and community services, and has established a good reputation in local communities.

FUNDING

Obviously, money is required to keep organizational matters running routinely, especially if an organization is as widespread as the JI. Initially, the party budget was borne by the members, associates and sympathizers. In fact, the JI members and associates are expected

to contribute financially to the party's budget. Every year, the party generates substantial funds by selling skins of animals sacrificed by Muslims on the occasion of Eid ul-Adha (annual Muslim religious festival). Other sources of income are the party publications, zakat (alms), and other donations. The JI has been receiving funds from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,¹⁶⁰ because Maududi kept brotherly relations with the kingdom and also managed to convince the Saudi royals to support the growth of Islam and pan-Islamism through the JI platform. Maududi also received the prestigious Shah Faisal Award and contributed to some JI projects with the prize money. However, Saudi support declined due to the failure of the JI leadership to support Saudi Arabia's cause during the 1991 Gulf War. It was a time when the Saudis diverted their funds from the JI to Deobandi and Wahabi groups in Pakistan, and this also deteriorated the JI's dominance in Pakistan.¹⁶¹ In the recent past, the JI has managed to recover its cordial relations with Saudi Arabia, which means that a stable flow of funds will continue towards the party.

IDEOLOGY

The JI is one of the oldest and leading Islamic revivalist movements of contemporary times. The party's ideology and plan of action are aimed at uniting the Muslims for an Islamic revolution and thus 'have made the party a primary example of what the West has feared most in revivalism'.¹⁶² Ideologically, the JI centres on Islamism, Islamic democracy or theo-democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. Basically, the JI envisions an Islamic government in Pakistan governed by the sharia. The founder of the party, Maududi, said in a speech that 'the JI is created to change the system of the entire world. To change the world's ethics, politics, economy and society. To change the world's system as per the will of God and to achieve this we need to fight against all evil forces.'¹⁶³

The JI claims that the party's ideological inspiration comes from the work of Maududi and Allama Iqbal. The great poet and philosopher Iqbal was the first person to talk about a separate homeland for Muslims in the subcontinent. JI literature has

attempted to find connections between Maududi's vision and Iqbal's philosophy. The *dar-al-Islam* was a link for the party to find a basis of connection with Iqbal. The idea of *dar-al-Islam* was promoted and actualized by Iqbal where Maududi worked in the 1930s.¹⁶⁴

The party opposes almost all 'isms' apart from Islamism, such as Americanism, feminism, secularism, imperialism, socialism, liberalism, capitalism, modernism, communism, nationalism, commercialism, and so on. The JI defines the party's standpoint on democracy in an article about 'Islam and the New World Order'.

There is no scope for theocracy in Islam, because in a theocracy a particular religious class has the right to interpret religious law and wield political power. Islam does not subscribe to any such theocratic arrangement. Instead it establishes rule of law and equality of all before the law. It is based on the principle of accountability and formation and change of government through the will of the people.¹⁶⁵

With the above-mentioned statements, the JI has been attempting to change its anti-democracy image, but this is not the case in reality, because the party opposes the current form of democracy in the country on the basis of its theo-democratic and anti-secular ideology. Theo-democracy is where 'God the sovereign is the primary law-giver, while agents such as the Islamic state and the Khalifa (God's agents on earth) enjoy marginal autonomy necessary to implement and enforce the laws of their sovereign.'[□] This is the Islamic form of democracy for many thinkers like Maududi, who believes that the complete code of life in Islam comes from the Koran and Hadith.

Maududi said, 'If going for elections and the assembly is to implement [a] secular democratic system, then this is against our religion.'¹⁶⁷ In many of his writings he labelled 'secular' as *la deeni* (irreligious), which clearly shows that the participation of multiple faiths in Pakistan's politics and policy making was not acceptable to him, as he always wanted an Islamic state under the implementation of the sharia. Therefore, any secular policy appeared un-Islamic to him and the party. There is great ideological tension between secular Muslims and conservative/traditionalist blocs of Muslims. Advocates

of secularism in Muslim societies believe that there is a lot to learn from models of the secular West. On the other hand, conservative Muslims view the Western world's advocacy of human rights as propaganda by which the West intends to establish its hegemony over the Muslim world.¹⁶⁸ In addition, most conservatives from the Muslim world don't believe in international norms, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

Maududi also argued that, 'if democracy is conceived as a limited form of popular sovereignty, restricted and directed by God's law, there is no incompatibility with Islam...Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy based solely on the sovereignty of the people'.¹⁶⁹ On the contrary, there are Islamists like Sayyid Qutb, who believe in the principle of shura (consultation), and that the sharia or Islamic law is comprehensive enough to be implemented to achieve the objectives of democracy.¹⁷⁰

There have also been concerns of advocates of secularism that Islam and politics are too rigid to adapt in contemporary times to address modern problems. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan in the 1990s was guided by some ulema who implemented conservative and radical laws in the country. Debating the compatibility of Islam and democracy critically, Ali R. Abootalebi says that it is known to all Muslims that as per the Koran and the sharia, Allah is the ultimate authority, but there is no mention that Muslims can't take certain actions to improve their communities. 'If a government rules in the name of Allah, then it must respect the fact that Allah regards individuals and not the state as responsible for their actions, for it is they who will be punished or rewarded accordingly on Judgement Day.'¹⁷¹

Maududi said that:

implementation of religion is not an application of its specific aspect but submission to [a] complete form of religion in individual and social life. No part of Islam is non-essential. It is a responsibility of [a] Muslim to try to follow the complete Islam without any analysis and division [and] Islam is not merely a religion; it is a complete code of life.¹⁷²

It is an ideology solely of fundamentalists, which aims at returning to the past in recapturing the roots of the Islamic religion,¹⁷³

the way it was introduced by Prophet Muhammad. While talking of the Hadith or Sunna, many pan-Islamists ignore the significance of a democratic precedent set by the prophet himself by reaching an agreement on *Dustur al-Madina* (The Constitution of Madina). It was when the prophet migrated from Mecca in 622 CE to establish an Islamic state and he basically ruled as a political head due to the tripartite pact between the Muslim immigrants from Mecca, the indigenous Muslims of Madina, and the Jews of Madina.¹⁷⁴ Islam talks of peace and plurality as well as democracy to promote harmony in a state. This aspect is mostly missing from conservative interpretations of democracy in Islam and pluralism. The question does arise with a significant number of non-Muslims living in Muslim countries. The JI and other Islamic parties in Pakistan are there to completely execute the sharia, but with this what will happen to the marginalized 3.54 per cent religious minorities (Christians, Hindus, Ahmadiyas, Parsis, Sikhs, Buddhists, etc.) in the country? What will be the role of minorities in the country's decision-making process? At the moment, with secular parties dominating in Pakistan there are reserved seats for religious minorities in the parliament, and the Constitution of Pakistan clearly allows a joint electorate comprising all religious minorities, and this system has recovered since the 2002 general elections.¹⁷⁵

The JI aims at replacing Pakistan's Anglo-Muhammadan law with the sharia because the party considers Islam as the *raison d'être* of the state. The logic behind this ideology is that Pakistan was created to become an Islamic homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Maududi, the JI founder, strongly opposed nationalism and considered that the very notion divides the Muslim brotherhood (*umma*). He also perceived political Islam where there is no difference between mosque and state.¹⁷⁶ In the words of Graham E. Fuller, in spite of its rough street tactics, the JI has won for itself an important role as an ideological party whose founder, Maududi, remains a key thinker in the Sunni Muslim world even after his death.¹⁷⁷

Maududi's Islamic ideology seeks to follow Prophet Muhammad's mission, which he described as:

(1) To revolutionize the intellectual and mental outlook of humanity and to instil the Islamic attitude towards life and morality to such an extent that their way of thinking, ideals of life, and standards of values and behaviour become Islamic; (2) To regiment all such people who have accepted Islamic ideals and moulded their lives after the Islamic pattern with a view to struggling for power and seizing it by the use of all available means and equipment; (3) To establish Islamic rule and organize the various aspect of social life on Islamic bases, to adopt such means as will widen the sphere of Islamic influence in the world.¹⁷⁸

Perhaps the JI is the first movement to analytically develop an Islamic ideology.¹⁷⁹ The JI 'has a well-developed, well-expressed, logical philosophical expression of its position on almost every subject' from women's issues to the country's economy.¹⁸⁰ The party's Islamic orientation respects some form of modernism vis-à-vis demands of the contemporary world by advocating equal rights to education for men and women. Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr writes about Maududi's scholarship on religion and politics:

Mawdudi systematically mixed religion with politics, faith with social action, he streamlined the Islamic faith so that it could accommodate its new found aim. He reinterpreted concepts and symbols, giving them new meanings and connotations. This allowed him to set down a political reading of Islam, in which religious piety was transformed into a structure of authority.¹⁸¹

The official party document claims that, 'the Jamaat-e-Islami is revolutionary in the sense that the objectives it cherishes, the ideology it upholds and the programme it sponsors, is fundamentally different from, and comparably more dynamic, than those of other parties in the world'.¹⁸² Another aspect of the party's ideology is depicted in this statement, which is the party's global vision, the pan-Islamism nature. And in the party's *Article of Faith*, the JI reiterates the fact of the universality of *al-Din* (the religion) Islam, and also that the 'Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan is totally committed to the concept of the umma (the Muslim community) which embodies the unity of the

Muslim people'.¹⁸³ The umma to wipe out evils,¹⁸⁴ which, for the party, are the West, Israel and India, as well as ideologies such as imperialism, communism, modernism, and so on. This dimension takes another shift in the JI's defence policy, wherein the party aims to develop Pakistan's defence capabilities to the maximum level by using all modes, including nuclear weapons.¹⁸⁵ In an article on the JI website, the author talks about the ideal of the umma by accepting the reality of Muslim nation states as a starting point and explicitly says that:

We want to bring about a greater sense of unity in the Islamic umma, greater cooperation and increasing integration between the different Muslim states. Under Islamic idealism, every nation state would gradually become an ideological state and these would go to make up the commonwealth of Islam.¹⁸⁶

The party is pro-jihad, and has been pushing the Pakistani government on several occasions to launch jihad against India and other so-called enemies of the country. The party also used the 'jihad' notion to increase its militant cadre during the Afghan–Soviet war. In its preamble, the party talks of the basis of society and says that 'jihad (legitimate struggle) is a paramount and inalienable duty. Its aim is to uphold the word of Allah on earth and defend the Islamic Order with all means at one's command.'¹⁸⁷ In its defence policy, the party also talks of considering 'aggression against any Muslim country as aggression against the entire Muslim world', and of establishing close defence relations with the Muslim world.¹⁸⁸

In August 1947 when the Muslim League came into power after getting freedom from the British, the JI felt that the Muslim League leadership was pushing Pakistan towards secularism and democratization comparable to what Kamal Atatürk (1881–1938) had achieved in Turkey. The JI deemed such efforts by the pioneer Pakistani leadership as un-Islamic. The JI wanted Pakistan to be declared an Islamic state by incorporating Islamic principles into the very first constitution of Pakistan. Therefore, after the independence of Pakistan, there was a conflict between the modernists from the Muslim League and the traditionalists led by ulema from parties like

the JI. 'At least in theory, the traditionalists have been successful in imposing their agenda on the political system, both under civilian and military regimes.'¹⁸⁹ Relating to this, well-known scholar Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr identifies the JI as 'the self-styled flag bearer of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan and the most articulate advocate of a state based on the injunctions of the Shari'a'.¹⁹⁰ Maududi believed that 'without knowledge of religion a person can never follow a religious path. And if people don't know religion and its path then the dream of establishing [an] Islamic system will never be actualized.'¹⁹¹

The traditionalists from the party leadership had pledged according to its constitution to not resort to radical or revolutionary methods to satisfy the objective of Islamization of the Pakistani constitution. Until 1956, when Pakistan's Constitution was finally adopted, most of the JI's activities centred on framing of an Islamic constitution. For the JI, Pakistan was created to be an Islamic state where Muslims of the subcontinent could freely practise their religion. To satisfy the objective of an Islamic constitution in Pakistan, the JI campaigned by mobilizing public opinion through the mass media and worked to influence the members of the Constituent Assembly. Islamists in Pakistan have been committed to breaking the fusion between the state and popular Islam so as to replace it with purist or traditional Islam. After achieving the Islamic Constitution in Pakistan, the party embarked upon another goal: of establishing the Islamic Order in the country. It is about translating the constitution into religious values penetrating the society, and, thereby, harmony between the nation's blueprint and way of living.

The JI's 'fundamental' approach is different even in comparison to other Islamic parties in Pakistan and the credit for this goes to Maududi himself, who, during the course of his intellectual development, was known as a modern Muslim. The party's ideology is very rigid in restricting itself to from narrow sectarian politics, which makes the JI get alienated from other religious parties.¹⁹² The antinationalism aspect of the philosophy is favourable for Pakistan's solidarity, as the greatest challenge to the state in the country comes from ethnic disparities. The challenge is in the form of a centralized

state struggling to find balance by acknowledging major ethnic differences (Baluchi, Pathan, Punjabi, Sindhi, etc.) in the country. The party robustly supports Urdu as the national language of Pakistan as another ‘common factor’ in ethnically-divided Pakistan. Islam is the strongest unifying force in the country which brings together people of different ethnicities, and this aspect of the JI’s ideology is patriotic in nature, as well as realistic to call the masses for action against disintegrating forces, internal or external. The JI played a crucial role in favour of the central government in 1988 against ethnic forces in Baluchistan, the NWFP and Sindh.¹⁹³ The PPP identifies itself as a national party, but with the Sindhi label and significant support from the Sindhis, and the same is the case with the PML, with the party’s prominent Punjabi identity.

The party also appears as a movement steeped in patriotism, as the JI thoughtfully chooses venues for its events, and organizes them at places having great significance for the people of Pakistan, such as the Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore. The minaret was built to commemorate the Lahore Resolution of 23 March 1940, when for the first time the Muslim League demanded the creation of a homeland for Muslims, Pakistan. Moreover, the JI never hesitates to talk of extreme outcomes of certain policies adopted by a particular government in Pakistan, such as that the federation is breaking apart, or that enemies are on the verge of attacking and destroying Pakistan. In October 2008, JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad asserted that the Pakistan Army was succeeding in ‘disintegrating’ the country to achieve the US agenda.¹⁹⁴

With and without the kindness of certain regimes in Pakistan, the JI ‘has built a coherent ideological case for global Islamic revivalism—a revivalism that includes the defence of violent jihad, but without identifying Jamaat-e-Islami clearly with struggle’.¹⁹⁵ This ideology and approach of the JI has helped in a way to reach out to similar Islamic segments in different parts of the world. Maududi’s scholarship has influenced revivalist thinkers, for example Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood of Sudan, Iranian revolutionary activists, and similar groups in Afghanistan, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Syria, Tunisia

and Turkey. Most recently, the JI ideology and organizational philosophy has influenced the budding Tajikistan's Nihzat-i-Islami (Islamic Movement).¹⁹⁶

To gain religious credibility, the party seeks references from the Koran and Hadith, such as the following verse of the Koran which is available on the party website so as to verify the very notion of an Islamic party's existence.

There must be a community among you to invite (people) to the good and to command what is proper and to forbid what is improper. They it is who are the prosperous ones (Koraan, 111:104).¹⁹⁷

Maududi and the JI vehemently criticized Sufism (mysticism), which has a huge following in India and Pakistan. The criticism of Sufism was due to its emphasis on religious harmony and universal brotherhood irrespective of religious faiths. The JI, on the contrary, presents a radical version of Islam as defined by its founder. Maududi held Sufism responsible for the decline of Islam by misleading Mughal rulers like Akbar and his son Dara Shikoh towards experimenting on amalgamation of religions. Maududi moved on to say that Sufis persuaded these Mughals to accommodate Hindus, which is evident through Akbar's *Din-e-Elahi* (Religion of God) and Shikoh's book, *Majma'ul-Bahrain* (Collection of the Two Seas). Moreover, Maududi went on linking this with the dream of an Islamic subcontinent, and said that due to Sufis' interventions, the Mughals lost a golden opportunity of converting India to Islam. The JI and Maududi had to change their anti-Sufism point of view as it was significant to the Deobandis and Barelvis in Pakistan. Therefore, the present JI leadership considers Sufism as a parallel movement to the party's pan-Islamic one.¹⁹⁸ It was not the only ideological clash Maududi had with fellow ulema in Pakistan. In 1951, he declared India as *dar-al-kufr* (land of unbelief), and that Pakistanis were forbidden to marry anyone from India or to accept inheritances from there. On this statement, Maududi was criticized strongly by some renowned ulema in Pakistan.¹⁹⁹

To promote its ideology, the party knows the significance of

the mosque as an important institution, therefore, the JI believes in revolution stemming out of mosques. For this very reason, the JI leadership is active in delivering sermons on the occasion of Eid (a Muslim religious festival) and Friday prayers, and such public speeches certainly have an impact considering the presence of large numbers of Muslims in mosques. Such sermons are mostly filled with the JI's ideological viewpoints on domestic and foreign affairs, and, therefore, centre on the Pakistani central government as well as the US, Israel and India. On one occasion, while delivering a Friday sermon at Mansoorah mosque, the JI Amir Qazi reiterated that, 'jihad is the sacred worship, and the means of establishing justice in the world and ending cruelty and oppression, but the western media and secular elements in the country are bent upon declaring it terrorism'.²⁰⁰ The JI approaches people from all walks of life through mosques, talking about the party's ideological issues with references from history and contemporary times.

On many occasions, statements coming from the JI leadership were not less than those from the Taliban in Afghanistan when they demolished the Buddha statues in Bamiyan. Many critics in Pakistan believed that the umma or *Ikwan-ul Muslimeen* ideology of the JI has brought Pakistan into the clutches of the brutal Taliban in Swat, and some even said that to curb Talibanization from Pakistan, the government first has to deal with the JI, because the party has trained the youth of Pakistan for well over 60 years towards extremist religious interpretations. The party has been criticized for victimizing people on the communist-style orientation of the JI. The party is entirely opposed to secular democracy. Criticism against the JI became furious when JI leader Syed Munawar Hasan, rather than condemning the act of flogging a young girl in Swat by the local Taliban, actually indirectly supported the atrocious implementation of the sharia by diverting attention from the core issue in the following statement:

hundreds of people had been killed in the drone attacks and hundreds of thousands were displaced but the civil society and NGOs, working for US interests, did not say a single word on the issue. They remained

silent spectators when innocent children were martyred in the Lal Masjid operation.²⁰¹

LITERATURE

A considerable share of the JI publications is written by Maududi, with his powerful expressions, and these books are not considered less than a sacred scripture by the JI members and affiliates. Most of the JI literature is available in Urdu at affordable prices in the range of US\$1–2 from outlets stretched across Pakistan. A significant portion of JI publications is devoted to the orientation of newcomers into the party, and some of the related books are:

- *Rudaad-e-Jamaat-e-Islami* (Proceedings of Jamaat-e-Islami);
- *Rah-e-Amal* (Path of Action);
- *Hidayaat* (Instructions);
- *Tahreek aur Karkun* (The Movement and Members); and
- *Tahreek-e-Islami ka Aainda lah-e-Amal* (Future Course of Action of the Islamic Movement).

The above-mentioned and hundreds of other books are aimed at providing a solid foundation to the JI by bringing in members and affiliates ‘intellectually’ at the same level with the JI leadership. Essentially, the JI publications aim at facilitating the process of networking among its members, and for that function there is another book with the title of *Karkunon ke Bahimi Talukaat*, or relationships among the members. It is a unique feature of the JI, contrary to other political parties in Pakistan, which is that everyone in the party knows about the aims and objectives as well as the future directions and action plans of the party.

Considering the wide spectrum of the JI, the party encourages deliberations on domestic as well as international issues. The party produces some regular publications. These publications are aimed at presenting the party’s point of views on present-day issues so as to initiate dialogues in the party circles across the country as well as in other parts of the world. The following are regular publications of the JI:

- *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* (Urdu monthly);²⁰²

- *Asia* (Urdu weekly);²⁰³ and
- *Al-Mansoorah* (Arabic).

The party literature is available in twenty-six languages, and the leading ones are Arabic, Malay, Persian, Spanish, Swahili, Japanese and Malayalam.²⁰⁴ However, there are selected articles on the JI website translated into English from *Tarjuman-ul-Quran* during the period 2003–6. Publications in different languages are to cater to needs of different target groups. The JI is publishing extensively in Urdu because the party perceives herself as the national party aiming to promote harmony in Pakistan. In addition, military establishments in Pakistan have used the JI's influence through the Urdu press to destabilize the PPP Government in the late 1970s.²⁰⁵ The party publishes in Arabic, probably because the JI receives moral as well as financial support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Arabic is also the language of the Koran.

FOREIGN POLICY

For the record, the JI strives for mutual understanding and peace, cooperation with the global community on the foundation of ideological identity and national interests, but with a strong stance for sovereignty of Kashmir and unity of the Islamic world. In relation to the global war against terror, the JI promotes the resolution of conflicts by dialogue and supports the ideological standpoint of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The JI ideology is to promote the real facet of religion (Islam) and its message of global harmony with other religions and considers the international war against terror as a war against Islam. The JI started formulating its own foreign-policy issues after 1970, and then began to concentrate on articulating the party policies on issues of concern to Pakistan, such as relations with Afghanistan, the Gulf countries, Western powers, defence policy, international economic relations, as well as Pakistan's place in regional and international affairs.²⁰⁶

The JI's leaders follow the international media, and, therefore, are up-to-date and thus promptly react to issues of concern to the party and to Pakistan. For example, the JI reacted strongly against

President Musharraf's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at a hotel in Paris. The JI strongly opposed interaction of Musharraf with Ehud Barak because the party strongly supports the cause of Muslims in the Middle East, and also that Pakistan has not accepted Israel as an independent state.

From 1989, the JI has been actively supporting the freedom struggle in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir with full authority to be given to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan Armed Forces. During this time, several jihadi groups were created by the JI, including the most destructive Hizbul Mujahideen (Party of Holy Warriors).²⁰⁷ In 2000, Qazi Hussain Ahmed was stunned to find out that the militant group associated with the JI, Hizbul Mujahideen, agreed to a ceasefire agreement with India without consulting the party. Therefore, Qazi relinquished the JI's links with Hizbul Mujahideen. However, he reiterated that the party would continue to support the United Jihad Council in Jammu & Kashmir.²⁰⁸

During the period of high tension between India and Pakistan from 1999 to 2002, there was a serious threat of war between the two neighbours. On the Pakistani side, the JI predicted that India was about to wage war against Pakistan, therefore Qazi Hussain Ahmad proposed national consent on the Kashmir dispute. The JI amir also accused India of destabilizing Pakistan by exacerbating the sectarian violence in the country.²⁰⁹ During this period of about three years, the Indian side refused to share any platform with the mastermind of the Kargil war, then President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The JI condemned Musharraf strongly when he walked up to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the 2002 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Summit and shook hands with him. After this, both countries decided to institute a forum for dialogue to sort out contentious issues between the two neighbours, but the hopes were not actualized until the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad that both countries agreed to de-escalate the tension following the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001.

In 2003, a group of Indian parliamentarians visited Pakistan.

In contradiction to the JI's traditional standpoint on relations with India, the dignitaries were welcomed warmly by the JI's top leadership by hosting a reception. At the reception, JI leader Ghafoor Ahmed said that the JI welcomed Indian guests in Pakistan: 'we want friendship with India and we are in favour of meaningful dialogue to resolve all issues including Kashmir'.²¹⁰ It was probably the first time that the JI leadership showed such a positive attitude towards the peace process between India and Pakistan, and a part of reason could be the JI's alliance with the pro-peace Musharraf regime. Not to forget that it was a time when the political parties' alliance, MMA, was all for Musharraf, and, therefore, was blindly following footsteps of Musharraf, even at the cost of the parties' long-standing Kashmir policy. However, advocating for Kashmir's sovereignty and ultimately becoming a part of Pakistan has been a constant agenda of the JI. This is obvious considering the party's strong ties with the Muslim leadership in Jammu & Kashmir, and the pan-Islamic orientation of the JI. The party's *Naib* Amir Professor Khurshid Ahmad talked about the Indo-Pak relations in an interview and stated that:

We have always supported friendly relations with India. We would like to have good relations, if India tries to solve the Kashmir issue as per the UN resolution and the wishes of the Kashmiri people. I am for practical relations with India. We stand for cooperation.²¹¹

The leadership in Pakistan has to be careful in making any statements on the Kashmir issue because the JI is in strong support of the cause of freedom fighters in Indian-administered Kashmir. President Asif Ali Zardari labelled Kashmiri freedom fighters on one occasion as 'terrorists'. In response, the JI was furious because their Kashmiri friend, Hurriyat Conference leader Syed Ali Gilani, strongly condemned the statement by Zardari.²¹² The JI has a clear policy on the Kashmir issue, and considers Kashmir a part of Pakistan and openly claims that in the party's policy by saying that it strives 'to get back every inch of land that belongs to Pakistan'.²¹³

THE GLOBALIZED JAMAAT

The JI ideology and operations were universal in nature since it was founded, as Maududi established a bureau in the very beginning to get his work translated into Arabic, Persian and Turkish. The concept of the umma was embedded in the party's ideology and is reflected in the JI's mission.²¹⁴

In 1947, the party got divided into autonomous chapters in India and Pakistan, and in 1971 with another faction in Bangladesh, and the JI still keeps close ties with these factions. The JI also claims to have ideological as well as practical contacts with the Akhwan-al-Muslimeen in the Arab World; the movements working in the north African countries; Rifah in Turkey; Hamas in Palestine; Hizb-e-Nehdat-e-Islami in Tajikistan; Ma'Shoomi in Indonesia; the Muslim Youth Movement and the Islamic Party of Malaysia; al To'iah-al Islamia of Kuwait and Qatar; and Al-Jamaat-e-Islamia of Lebanon. In addition, the party has chapters with the name of the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation in Europe and the Muslim Students' Association in the US/Canada. The JI is thinking of approaching Muslims in future in Latin America, Africa, France and Japan.²¹⁵ It has established links with overseas Pakistanis in Denmark, Norway, Germany and Italy.

During the JI's heyday during the era of Gen. Zia when the party was showered with a lot of money and privileges, it managed to build an extensive infrastructure, including madrassas, business and charitable projects with the help of public and private support from the Gulf States. The JI acted as a host for many mujahideen (holy warriors) coming from the Arab world to participate in the Afghan war against the Soviets. By the time the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the JI had established strong ties with Islamists across the world. The JI also facilitated military training for groups from Chechnya, Bosnia and the southern Philippines and sent its younger members to participate in jihad at places across the world.²¹⁶ The party even asserts this in its website profile by saying that 'the most prominent contribution of the JI outside Pakistan has been its support to the freedom movements in

Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya'.²¹⁷

The JI was not in cooperation with certain Pakistani regimes towards achieving the country's foreign-policy objectives. On occasion, Iran and Saudi Arabia also approached the JI for furthering their foreign-policy interests. The Saudi Kingdom, since the 1960s in particular, has found the JI to be an important international non-state actor to implement its policies in relation to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and also to some extent in the Arab world. Luckily for the JI, the Kingdom also involved the party in its international agencies such as the Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League), and this way the party was showered with funds from Saudi Arabia.²¹⁸

In addition to participation in the World Muslim League, the JI was also active in the Tehrik-e-Islami (Islamic Movement) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). However, the JI has remained silent on Pakistan's participation in multilateral forums, such as SAARC and the now-defunct Turkey–Iran–Pakistan bloc known as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).²¹⁹

In March 2003, senior Al-Qaida member Khalid Sheikh, the mastermind of the 9/11, was arrested in Rawalpindi in the neighbourhood of Islamabad. It was considered the biggest achievement in the war against terrorism. The news came with an accusation on the JI that Khalid Sheikh was captured from the house of a JI woman member, and that there are established links between the party and the Al-Qaida. However, JI Amir Qazi denied any link of his party's friends in any such illegal activities. On another occasion, Qazi was questioned in relation to one of the JI leader's declaring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida as heroes. In defence of his party member, Qazi reiterated that:

Osama bin Laden has become the symbol of anti-Americanism because of the anti-American sentiments prevailing throughout the world. As long as these sentiments are present, Osama bin Laden will be considered a hero by people around the world, irrespective of whether we agree with him or not.²²⁰

During the same interview for *Newsline*, he stated that the

JI had no information about the Al-Qaida, and that he also had suspicions concerning the reality of any such organization. Qazi also highlighted that the fantasy of Al-Qaida is to press forward hidden motives of some countries,²²¹ which for him are mostly the US and Israel. However, in contradiction, on another occasion Qazi disclosed the fact that on numerous occasions he had met Osama bin Laden, who visited him at the JI headquarters.²²²

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Islamic parties including the JI have been taking part actively in the democratic process in Pakistan. Islamic parties view democracy as a means of gaining power so as to execute the sharia.²²³

Islamic parties in Pakistan have not yet achieved significant success in the country's elections. The biggest success was in the 2002 general elections with 12.28 per cent of the popular vote with a total of 59 seats in the parliament,²²⁴ including quota seats for women. The reason could be that the Islamic parties are not headed by a charismatic personality capable of attracting voters from across the country.²²⁵

Looking into the electoral performance of the JI, it is clear that the party has been faced with ups and downs in its political development. In the 1970 general elections, the party won only four seats. In the 1970s, opposition politics shifted in favour of the Islamists. First, the Islamic parties got a fantastic opening of becoming political stakeholders, which was advancement from being merely a pressure group. Second, the Islamists formed coalition governments in two provinces and thus had a say in policy making. Last, in the aftermath of an upsetting defeat of the PML in the 1970 elections, the attention of the media and public forums got diverted to Islamic parties, particularly the JI. The Islamists continued to criticize Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for his un-Islamic 'socialist' policies and even labelled him an 'infidel'.²²⁶

In 1988, the JI joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) or Islamic Democratic Alliance. The IJI was created by the military establishment to counter the PPP in the 1988 general elections.

This political alliance comprised nine political parties, with the PML, National Peoples Party and the JI in leading roles. However, approximately 80 per cent of the IJI candidates belonged to the PML. The IJI won 54 seats in the 1988 and 106 in the 1990 general elections in Pakistan.²²⁷

Due to participation in the Afghan–Soviet war, the Islamic parties could not focus much on their political strength and lost their electoral strength. Jointly, the Islamists' vote declined severely from 21.5 per cent in 1970 to 6.7 per cent in 1993. In 1997, all Islamic parties won only 2 seats out of 207 in the National Assembly of Pakistan.²²⁸ The party's political presence improved in the 2002 elections, when it won 18 seats in the National Assembly. Why this sudden increase of popularity in Pakistan? Robert G. Wirsing answers this and says that in Pakistan, 'political Islam has clearly flourished most in periods of direct military rule; conversely, it has performed most dismally in periods of democratic rule'.²²⁹ Fig. 4 clearly depicts that the JI managed to win 10 or more seats during the elections under the authoritarian rules of Gen. Zia and Gen. Musharraf.




Fig. 4 Jamaat-e-Islami Seats in National Assembly (1970–2002)

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad²³⁰

There was a time when the people of Pakistan were really fed up with mainstream political parties. Between 1988 and 1993, successive governments of the PPP and PML lost credibility due to bad governance and corruption charges. The JI took this opportunity seriously and pragmatically, pushing forward the schema of Islamization with anti-American campaigns. The party competed in the 1993 elections with 103 candidates for the National Assembly and 237 for provincial assemblies. With a religiously-oriented movement and support of several important candidates, one would expect a party to win some seats. Unfortunately, it was not the case with the JI, as the party managed to win only 3 seats, with 3.9 per cent of the popular vote.²³¹ It was a massive blow to extensive campaigning of the party for the 1993 elections.

Pakistan's religious parties were nourished and strengthened by Gen. Zia in the 1980s, but their electoral success remained inadequate until the 2002 general elections.²³² For the 2002 parliamentary elections in Pakistan, the JI participated under the umbrella of the Muttahhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and became the largest component of the coalition. The formation of the MMA was a major development for the religious parties in Pakistan. The MMA comprised the following political parties: the JI, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Jama'at Ulema-e-Islam, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Jama'at Ahle Hadith. The MMA became the ruling party in the NWFP after the 2002 elections with 48 seats in the NWFP provincial Assembly. It was historical, as the religious parties managed to acquire a reasonable representation for the first time, as the MMA won 53 seats in the National Assembly.

It is a popular conception that Musharraf and the military strongly supported the religious parties' alliance, the MMA, in the 2002 general elections to send a strong message to the West that in the aftermath of 9/11 the Islamist forces in Pakistan were gaining considerable public support. Basically, this was Musharraf's elucidation to gain more support from the US by telling them that if they did not support him, then religious extremists would take control of Pakistan.²³³ Mohammad Waseem says that in the aftermath of 9/11, the anti-American sentiment also provided

incredible support to the Islamic parties in gaining a noteworthy electoral presence in the 2002 elections.²³⁴

In the parliament, the MMA was speaking against the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The MMA, by nature of its religious affiliation, aimed at establishing a theocracy, which is different from the Western concepts and practices of democracy. In the February 2008 general elections in Pakistan, the MMA got reduced to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) as the other religious parties boycotted the elections. In solidarity with sacked Chief Justice Iftikhar M. Chaudhry, the JI boycotted the 2008 elections. As a result, the MMA was left by the JI, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan and Jamiat Ahle Hadith, and the coalition of religious parties competed in the 2008 general elections with Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F). The MMA's vote bank declined hugely to 2.2 per cent with 772,798 votes and the so-called coalition managing only 7 seats.²³⁵ The people were really fed up with the MMA, which won 59 seats in the National Assembly in the 2002 General Elections of Pakistan, but couldn't fulfil people's expectations and its own promises.²³⁶ This poor electoral performance was also a result of the MMA's poor performance during their time in the policy making from 2002 to 2008, due to which people strongly supported the nationalists, the ANP.

The JI's future in Pakistani politics depends on the party's journey outside the parliament after boycotting the 2008 elections. However, some in the intelligentsia and political scientists are concerned about this phase of the JI, though there were similar occasions in the past when the party was either forbidden or restricted from participating in elections. Nevertheless, while sitting in the parliament the party was right-wing with an intellect and respectable scholarship. The party:

used to represent one side of the table in the debates that sharpened the knives and minds of Pakistan's current intellectual elite. With the Jama'at, none of the 'anti-mullah' doyens that shape present public opinion would exist. Today, there is no challenge to aspiring

intellectuals, leaving a new generation of so-called 'progressive' without much gravitas.²³⁷

It is a great concern, because developing and struggling states like Pakistan need such political minds in the right wing to challenge leading policy makers to promote an intellectual environment in the political sphere.

CHALLENGES

Through his speeches and books Maududi urged the party members to stop any form of vulgarity in society, and in this regard he specifically said that vulgarity could be in any of following forms: cafes, pubs, publicity of cinemas, nudity through pictures on signboards and shops, touring and theatrical companies, co-education, vulgar pictures in newspapers and advertisements, improper songs on radio, recording of immodest songs at homes and shops, gambling places, dance functions, vulgar literature and pictures, pornographic magazines, arts and cultural activities promoting indecency, modernization of women by not observing purdah.^{238,239} Pakistan has modernized more so in the past two decades or so with the media revolution contributing to bringing in influences on the country's social atmosphere. Since the early 1980s, there are many more non-government organizations (both local and international) in Pakistan working towards people's awareness on democracy, pluralism and human rights (women's and minority rights). All this combined with the rising literacy rate in the country and globalization have contributed to a significant degree of modernization, and this poses a challenge to the JI which has failed to evolve vis-à-vis transformation in the country.

Min-Hua Huang proves in his paper that modernization emerging out of economic development, secularization and changes in the value system leads to social trust and gender equality.²⁴⁰ Considering this thesis, the JI has an uphill task in relation to the way the country has progressed under secular rules, even though the country has an Islamic constitution. Islamists are questioned

by feminists and human rights activists on their philosophies of women's rights, as gender equality is entirely different to Islamists than the Western phenomenon. Ali R. Abootalebi has the following recommendation for Islamists finding their way up the ladder of political success through democratic processes: 'To play the democratic game, religious leaders will have to better organize themselves, to propose alternative plans for socio-economic and political issues facing the country. This in turn can help them maintain legitimacy and popular support, facilitating their struggle for political power.'²⁴¹ In this regard, another test for religious parties in Pakistan is to remain organized by finding a mutual solution out of their ideological and political differences. The 'ideal' of implementing the sharia in Pakistan seems falling apart, with differences within the community of Islamic parties, and under such circumstances it looks an uphill task to see a consensus.²⁴² The MMA coalition broke in 2008 due to political differences among the partnering Islamic parties.

The results of the 2008 general elections depicted that most votes were cast in respect of the ethnic split in Pakistan, and this was evident by the significant success of the PPP and MQM in Sindh, the PML (Nawaz and Quaid) in Punjab, and the ANP in the NWFP. And a challenge for the JI could be that the party is not headed by any spiritual leader (*pir*), feudal or landlords, nor does it belong to any specific ethnic group or caste. In Pakistan, people are divided on ethnic lines, and this dichotomy poses a grave challenge to the success of the JI. Moreover, the JI couldn't flourish in the presence of the two mainstream political parties in Pakistan, the PML and the PPP, and the party has to think of ways of competing with the major political parties.

Being a dominant Islamist party in Pakistan, the JI has failed to achieve a notable victory in the country of approximately 97 per cent Muslims. The major reason is that the JI's vote bank is scattered in different constituencies and not concentrated in a particular region. Nonetheless, the future of the Islamic movement in Pakistan depends on the progress of the JI being the leading and the oldest Islamic party.

In a way the party is similar to other Islamic parties in Pakistan with limited or no presence in rural Pakistan, because in the rural areas the vote bank is monopolized by the feudals and landlords. Therefore, the success of the traditionalists depends on their ability to break into the traditional political spheres of rural Pakistan. It is definitely challenging, but possible if the JI and other Islamists are able to bring about the desired economic and political reforms in the country, and for the party to attain these goals, the JI leadership has to sustain at least some sort of presence in the parliament as well as in the bureaucracy.²⁴³ In the early 1990s, the party struggled due to the famine of the Saudi riyals, and to uphold its current level of activism, the JI needs to ensure a continuous flow of funds from internal and external sources. The insecurity of funds poses a serious threat to the party's sustainability and dominance in Pakistan.

Another major test for the JI is competition with other Islamic parties, such as the Jami'at-i-Ulama-i-Islam and the Jami'at-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan. Although the JI was the first one to pursue Islamic injunctions in the constitutions of Pakistan and worked hard to promote theo-democracy, unfortunately, now the party's Islamic vote bank is divided due to rivalry with other Islamists.²⁴⁴

Another uphill task for the JI is to revive its pro-democracy ideology, which got distorted at the time when the party's founder Maududi was openly supporting Gen. Zia's Islamization in his philosophy and teachings. Therefore, the party is now faced with fierce criticism from democratic rivals, specifically the PML. On one occasion, Pir of Pagaro Shah Mardan Shah II labelled the JI as the 'Martial Law B-Team', which continues to have serious psychological impacts on the party.²⁴⁵ Since 2008, the JI is not in the parliament, and this is perhaps a good opportunity for the party to seriously evaluate its own long-term policy in relation to its role in politics. While doing this, the JI also has to ensure that the party is not misrepresented by semi-autonomous wings, such as the IJT (students' wing) which is known for its violent activism.

The party also failed to voice the demands of the masses and lost its credibility by repeating what other politicians have been doing in the NWFP, specially after coming into power in the

province in 2002, which was to make the provincial Assembly merely a talking platform. Thus, there was a lack of respect for the party's promises that it made to the people of the NWFP, a reason for critics like Mosharraf Zaidi to think that the JI is unrealistic, 'predictable, boring, jingoistic, and anchored neither in religion, nor in science'.²⁴⁶ Such criticism could be true, since the party's organizational structure is not suitable enough to attain its goal of Islamic revivalism through political means. The JI has a rigid hierarchical composition with power in the hands of party workers or members. The party envisions tackling the concerns of the masses, such as poverty and unemployment, but, rather unrealistically, the party methodology is based on a top-down elitist approach. This is what the founder, Maududi, wanted: a non-violent revolution and stronger relations with the authorities.²⁴⁷ Nevertheless, a revolution is hard to come by if the JI continues to look for reforms in the central government, and then those changes translating into benefiting people at the grass-roots level. The party's ideology and actions have to take into consideration the people's power vis-à-vis revolution, which is essential to bring Islamic revivalism. Otherwise, the party's ideology contradicts its own actions. Moreover, the JI restricts its membership to people fulfilling the criteria, and also prefers Urdu as a medium of communication, which has much less following left in Pakistan. Since the mid-1990s, the party leadership has been discussing certain intra-party reforms to address these challenges, but to date there has been no agreement on the reforms demanded.²⁴⁸ Until intra-party ideological reforms are achieved, the party's political standing will remain limited because it is in competition with strong rivals and needs to acquire popular support of the people to bring about drastic changes in the socio-political scene of Pakistan.

The party also has to emphasize now more on domestic issues so as to gain popular support, which at the moment looks hard to come by in the presence of the PPP and the PML. In the past also, the party's involvement and interest in international affairs has deteriorated its political grounding at home. It will be an uphill task for the JI to operate during democratic times in Pakistan, as the

party was quite addicted to benefiting from authoritarian regimes. What will be the future of the JI in a democratic Pakistan? Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr replies to this question.

Operating in the political process, especially in democracy, will require the party associated with the rise of contemporary Islamic revivalism and which has viewed itself as the 'vanguard of the Islamic revolution' to embark upon changes that will inevitably diminish its commitment to its original ideology if it is to succeed.²⁴⁹

DIFFERENT FACETS OF EXTREMISM: THE SHIV SENA AND JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI

This section is aimed not just at comparing the Shiv Sena and the JI, the two right-wing parties in India and Pakistan respectively, but to showcase that they represent different facets of right-wing extremism in the region. They have their similarities, which are evident in their beliefs on extreme approaches, like violence and rhetoric, to achieve what they want, along with their apparent disgust for anything that is termed 'Western'. This includes the JI student wing's protest against cafeterias and public platforms shared by men and women, along with the Sena's opposition to Valentine's Day celebrations. This section rather argues that these two political parties represent different approaches to right-wing politics, or in other words, different ways of representing the rhetoric and mixing it up with violent action whenever necessary. It is important to represent these two as following separate approaches to right-wing extremism, essentially to understand that there cannot be a singular way of defining right-wing extremism, therefore, there really cannot be a blanket strategy for dealing with such groups or parties.

While the JI was rooted ideologically and organizationally right from its inception as a party that worked for creating Muslim solidarity, for the Shiv Sena, the Hindu cause became a part of their politics much later, at a stage when the Sena was clearly looking for an opportunity to revive itself. The Shiv Sena displays immediate violent action from the lowest *shakha* level to the highest levels of power. The JI's association with violence is not so straightforward and

direct. The JI mediates most direct action through its student body, which is relatively autonomous, and, interestingly, under Maududi, the JI began as a non-violent movement. In the case of the Shiv Sena, while the upper strata of leaders voice the rhetoric, most of the direct violent action takes place at the level of the *shakhas*. But even at the upper levels of power, there is a clear indication of the acceptance of violent tactics in the Sena, where violence is organized at the *shakha* level and given voice by the upper echelons through rhetorical speeches and sometimes even by direct participation.

Both the Shiv Sena and the JI provide a complex set of realities. The Shiv Sena case suggests how a political party which initially began as a movement manoeuvres certain aspects of democratic politics to come to power by following just the bare minimum standards that are compulsory to occupy legitimate power in a democracy. Also, for the Sena, more than their ideology, it becomes important to deliver during elections. Even while following the minimum democratic norms and functioning in a democratic set-up, the Shiv Sena applies every mechanism to weaken the same principles which provide the space to occupy power. The Sena's position on minorities and minority rights is a telling example of this paradox. The JI characterizes another complex reality. Clearly, in a system which has a dominant history of military regimes and is struggling as a democracy, as far as its inner party democracy is concerned, the JI is more democratic than the Shiv Sena—and for that matter any other political party within its country that claims to respect democratic principles.

But this should not be misinterpreted as a case where democratic principles are valued while negotiating at the domestic level. Like the Shiv Sena, the JI is also not an advocate of minority rights but, surprisingly, the JI has never attacked a single minority institution. The Jamaat takes the ideological stand that the minorities in Pakistan have to abide by the principles of the majority religion. The JI has specific agencies like its students' wing through which it mediates extremist politics. Through its active support for militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the JI gives a militant expression which has wide repercussions for the regional politics

of South Asia. The Shiv Sena, on the other hand, has its sphere of influence only in and around Maharashtra, and while it gives rhetorical support to the creation of a Hindu suicide squad, it is difficult to gauge the possibility of the Sena actually realizing the creation of such a squad.

The circumstances in Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the required environment for the JI to give active support to militant groups for the realization of an Islamic state. The JI clearly capitalized on this factor, and this was possible for it because of its extant global linkages. The same cannot be said of the Sena, which, though being dangerously violent when it comes to local-level politics, does not have a clear vision and objective like the JI. The Shiv Sena's extremist politics are reactions to particular situations (the Sena activists threat to the defence lawyer of the captured terrorist Ajmal Kasab and its vandalizing of the cricket pitch in Ferozeshah Kotla being cases in example). The JI's strategy involves long-term planning and agenda that have serious implications not just within Pakistan, but for the entire South Asian region and other Islamic countries as well. In this sense, the JI's extremist and militant policies have a global impact, which is not true of the Shiv Sena. This is not to suggest that the Shiv Sena is in any way a less extremist outfit. On the contrary, the argument being made is that these are separate levels of right-wing extremism that exist which need to be tackled differently. The JI has both a fundamentalist and an extremist militant side to it, along with a more moderate element that was represented at one point by people like Maududi. The Sena, on the other hand, does not base its politics only on religion, but also on ethnic divisions which it polarizes to instigate violence. Even when the Sena speaks of religion and religious communities, it acquires a very militant form, and more than a vision of a Hindu nation (which the BJP and its sister organizations stand for), the Sena believes in the politics of negativity.

The case of the JI involves another set of complex webs because of its linkages with the Armed Forces in Pakistan that represent a significant part of power politics in the country. This relationship,

and the support that the JI receives from the Army at different periods of time, have further strengthened the position of the party both ideologically and in the extremist-militant form.

While the Shiv Sena represents a blatant version of right-wing extremism, the JI can be said to symbolize a type of extremism which is certainly far right, but one that emanates from fundamentalist politics. This leads to the question of how these two different versions of right-wing extremism can be tackled. Is democracy and consolidation of the same in Pakistan an answer to the extremist politics of the JI? It is clear from the case of the Shiv Sena that extremist political parties manoeuvre around democratic principles in a certain way to legitimize their extremist stand. Given the scope and space that democracy provides for such outfits to thrive on the one hand, and the challenges that it poses for extremist outfits to survive within a democratic setting on the other, there is a need to introspect on the different ways in which extremism can be tackled in both countries. In the context of how governance and security get shaped in the presence of extremist right-wing parties, the subsequent chapters would analyse the different options of tackling extremism in India and Pakistan separately, and also as part of multi-track diplomacy.

Right-Wing Extremism, Governance and Security: The Linkages

After a detailed discussion of the activities, ideology, political motivations and growth of the Shiv Sena and JI, it becomes important to understand their impact and influence in both the countries. Since both the parties have directly or indirectly entered and remained in the corridors of power in their respective countries, the emphasis in this section would be to understand their influence on issues related to governance. Moreover, a discussion on right-wing extremist parties cannot be complete without exploring the various security challenges and debates that they have opened as a result of their extremist ideology and activities in India and Pakistan. Here, the chapter seeks to understand the different concepts of security that could be brought into the fold while discussing the challenges that emerge due to the existence of right-wing extremist parties. An understanding of ways to overcome the challenge of right-wing extremism has to stem from a discussion of the impact that extremist political parties have on governance and security. This chapter would also reflect on how right-wing extremism could impose different challenges for a democratic political system, and for a military-dominated system.

The concept of 'security' has been constantly evolving with approaches at different levels, such as local, regional and global. Security as a concept and approach has also been broadened in relation to international security threats to any state, therefore, there are emerging debates on non-traditional security. Such security debates are not restricted to the protection of the borders of any specific country or region. However, in military terms, security is to secure the borders from external enemies. Conversely, the notions of human security and non-traditional security demand attention towards internal security challenges to the state and the people living there. 'Without human security, territorial security becomes

ineffective and, ultimately, self-defeating.²⁵⁰ Non-traditional security is an extension of human security theories and it talks of security threats to human beings and states, such as climate change; energy and security; environmental security; gender and security; health security; irregular migration; political transition; poverty and economic insecurity; and transnational crimes. Non-traditional security is comprehensive in the sense that it brings into light the importance of security communities as well as individuals, and the basic logic is that there are much more severe internal security threats as well. Therefore, this chapter will explore and analyse the right-wing extremism in India and Pakistan in relation to governance and security in the respective countries. Extremists' parties, such as the Shiv Sena and the JI with their operations pose a serious threat to secular and inclusive democracies in both countries, because such extremists with their ideologies bring insecurities among certain groups, such as religious minorities and women.

GOVERNANCE, SECURITY AND THE SHIV SENA

The impact of extremist political parties like the Shiv Sena on governance and security in a democracy is different from the challenges that are posed from political terrorism or violent insurrection. The Shiv Sena's occupation of power through the electoral process makes it an integral part of the political institution, whose principles the party has undermined time and again. The Shiv Sena is a typical example of a political party where the leaders of the party sit in Parliament and influence the decision-making process while the rank and file commit violent acts on the streets.²⁵¹

Therefore, to understand the impact that the Sena has on governance and security, it is important to assess some of the policies of the party both when in government and in opposition. This assessment would help understand the influence that its policies have on the political, social and economic structures in Maharashtra.

The Shiv Sena was elected to form the government in Maharashtra in 1995 along with its coalition partner, the BJP. One

of the reasons for which the Sena was preferred was because of a certain belief among the electorate that this party was perhaps less corrupt than most others, specially when comparisons were drawn with its main political rival, the Congress. The Shiv Sena campaign for beautifying Mumbai and making it a city which would have all the necessary infrastructure of a metropolitan lifestyle caught the eyes of the voters, and with the Sena's coming to power, the expectations were that the standards of life would improve for the common people. In this context, it would be interesting to understand the impact that the Shiv Sena had on standards of governance and security. It is significant to dwell on the Shiv Sena rule in Maharashtra, because this extremist political party is known to have defied the law over the years and resorted to violence both at the grass-roots and leadership levels. As an opposition party, the Sena has propagated xenophobic, parochial and communal ideas in an intimidating manner. But it would be worth exploring where governance and security stand when the same political party is given the baton to protect these two important functions of a State.

For some observers, the Sena's rule of five years in Mumbai meant development in the form of construction of flyovers, the completion of the Mumbai–Pune highway and the progress on the Krishna Water Project which the Congress Government could never work on.²⁵² Even before the Sena was elected, its chief ministerial candidate, Manohar Joshi, promised radical measures to encourage development, to eliminate shanty towns (this primarily included the Dharavi area of Mumbai, the largest slum in Asia), and, interestingly, to combat 'poverty, criminality and violence'.²⁵³ The infrastructure in Mumbai improved and the Shiv Sena–BJP Government invested more in the city of Mumbai than any other previous government. Keeping its promise of beautifying Mumbai, the Shiv Sena and its ministry came up with a series of infrastructure projects to modernize Mumbai's strained and congested traffic problems. More than 50 major projects were proposed of constructing flyovers, underground metro railway system, and new expressways. In 1996, a Special Road Development Corporation was formed to boost the construction of new roads in Mumbai and other places in Maharashtra.²⁵⁴ Similarly,

an ambitious solution for wiping out the slums of Mumbai was planned where new buildings would be constructed in the place of slums for the dwellers in these areas, financed by construction companies which were requested to file tenders to get these projects.

The expressways and flyovers solved the problem of congested traffic in Mumbai temporarily, but could not address the issue permanently. Moreover, due to the ambitious way in which the Sena Government started the work by beginning 50 projects simultaneously, it could not finish all of them and in some cases certain projects did not even take off. The inexperience and lack of information in managing the affairs of the state was apparent from the policies of the Shiv Sena Government and its ministers handling different portfolios.²⁵⁵ The results of the slum-dwellers project was quite disastrous, and two years after the project was started, only one building was completed and there was general approval from the Shiv Sena that the practical difficulties in accomplishing a project on such a vast scale were not considered.²⁵⁶ Credible democratic governance does not just encompass infrastructural development, and as would be apparent from the discussion below, the Shiv Sena, given its extremist background and its belief in using violence and extra-constitutional means, was not able to shed this image when it was given the responsibility to manage the affairs of the state.

The other facet of the Shiv Sena's rule in Maharashtra suggests that, within a year of coming to power, it was apparent that the Shiv Sena-BJP Government was going to propagate extremism through its policies. Even while making a list of promises for developing Mumbai, the Sena had pinned down the responsibility for the current problems of the city on the illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and the Muslim community.²⁵⁷ The government systematically axed the minorities' commission, the hajj committee, the Urdu academy and finally the Srikrishna Commission investigating the 1992-93 riots.²⁵⁸ On 31 March 1995, a few months after the Shiv Sena-BJP came to power, the Maharashtra State Minorities Commission (an advisory body which evaluated complaints and recommendations brought forward by minority communities) reached the end of its term and Chief Minister Manohar Joshi did not extend its

term, suggesting that it was appointed by the previous Congress Government to appease the minorities.²⁵⁹

The Sena–BJP Government did not stop there, and in 1996 decided to scrap the Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry which was the independent commission appointed by the previous government to inquire into the 1992–93 Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai.²⁶⁰ The alleged role played by the Shiv Sena in instigating the Hindu majority to indulge in violence was an acknowledged factor in different circles, but there was no official investigative report backed by evidence to prove this allegation. The Srikrishna Commission's inquiry was headed towards the conclusion that the Shiv Sena was the political party responsible for this, but the Shiv Sena Government decided to scrap it before it could arrive at this conclusion and make its findings public.²⁶¹ That the Shiv Sena was not able to get away with it and eventually had to reappoint the inquiry commission because of insistence from the union government was an important factor to show that within a democratic framework, the Shiv Sena's authoritative and arbitrary decision would not be encouraged.

Another vital aspect which witnessed deterioration during the Shiv Sena's tenure was law and order. The Shiv Sena central leadership was responsible for this to a large extent. The Sena was no longer able to control the grass-roots level activists of the party who slowly turned Mumbai into a primary of hub extortions. Extortions and the culture of donations have always been a part of Mumbai's culture, and right from a police constable to a powerful goon are involved in the act of extortion and is a thriving business in the city. The extortion business was given a certain legitimacy with the Shiv Sena's entrance into active politics and the involvement of its activists in collecting money. What started as a means of acquiring funds for the party activities soon became a part and parcel of the Sena, something from which its lower-level activists were unable to dissociate themselves, more so when the party came to power. The young members of the Sena suddenly realized the power that they wielded once the Shiv Sena managed to acquire power.²⁶² The Mantralaya offices became the site where young activists would assemble and enjoy their day by misusing power through extortion.

A political party which itself never accepted the boundaries of the law within which it was expected to operate, was unable to improve the situation after forming the government. Though the Shiv Sena portrayed itself as the saviour and Chief Minister Manohar Joshi suggested, 'Our regime would bring back the rule that existed during the time of Shivaji Raje',²⁶³ it was unable to protect the people from everyday acts of violence which most often were carried out by its own activists.²⁶⁴

Throughout its tenure, the Shiv Sena witnessed a tussle from within, where, on the one hand, it wanted to maintain its image of being an extremist political party whose policies and decisions were in the hands of its chief, Bal Thackeray, and on the other hand of a party which was expected to perform within the standards of democratic principles. In this tussle, there was constant friction between Bal Thackeray and several Sena ministers, including the chief minister, Manohar Joshi, as Thackeray would interfere in their work and most often embarrass them by his public dismissals of their policies. This was not surprising, considering Thackeray's previous loathing for institutions of the State and his rejection of the judiciary as the facilitator of justice in the country. He did not appear before the Srikrishna Commission, even after being summoned, when all other Sena leaders had appeared before it. Considering the views Thackeray had on democratic institutions, it was logical that he wanted the government to perform arbitrarily and make decisions and not abide by the principles of democracy, but, instead, on the basis of the objectives he set for the government. This can be inferred from Manohar Joshi's comment that he had no problems in working under the shadow of Bal Thackeray even while running the government and no chief minister could consider himself equal to the stature Thackeray enjoyed in Mumbai and Maharashtra. In short, the Sena's rule in Maharashtra undermined the vital aspect of sovereignty, essential for any government to make independent and neutral decisions.

Another significant aspect of the Shiv Sena's rule in Maharashtra was related to the job of moral policing that the party and its leaders took upon themselves. There were certain disturbing aspects

of the Sena's moral policing. The first was related to the fact that the Sena's moral policing was based on a limited understanding of Indian culture, which it claimed to be protecting. Based on this limited understanding of culture, the Sena differentiated between those initiatives in art which it thought represented obscenity and were against Indian culture, from those which it believed did not harm the sanctity and sentiments of Indian traditions in any way. The second problem was the *way* in which the Sena Government went about the task of moral policing. There were occasions when freedom of expression of artists was curbed just because the Sena activists believed that it did not suit their requirements to fit into the realm of Indian tradition and culture.

One such example of this was when the Shiv Sena decided to protest against the film *Fire* directed by Deepa Mehta, released in 1996. The film depicted the relationship between two women and had some scenes dealing with lesbianism. The Sena objected to this, suggesting that the film was a deliberate attempt to hurt the sentiments of Hindus as the names of the two female characters in the movie were from the Indian epic, the Ramayan, and since the role was played by actress Shabana Azmi who was Muslim, the Sena had every reason to believe this. In an attempt to stop the film from being screened, Sena activists attacked cinema halls and the campaign in Mumbai was led by the Mahila Agadi, the women's wing of the Shiv Sena. This violent campaign of the Shiv Sena received the complete approval of Chief Minister Mahohar Joshi and he said that culture was more important than the glorification of art and he was personally against such forms of art.²⁶⁵

A similar explanation was provided when the Sena decided to unleash a campaign against the celebration of Valentine's Day. The Shiv Sena chief asked people through an article in *Saamna* to shun the Western-inspired Valentine's Day and its public admission of love as it was 'alien to the Indian culture' and a 'plot' by multinationals to 'corrupt' young minds.²⁶⁶ The Shiv Sena activists went on a rampage to stop couples from celebrating Valentine's Day and the Maharashtra government, in the name protecting Indian culture, decided not to stop these activists, but, in fact, praised them for

their action.²⁶⁷ It is ironic that while the Shiv Sena activists restrict common people from celebrating Valentine's Day because of the instructions that they receive from their chief, some of them do celebrate the occasion in private.²⁶⁸ Therefore, violent displays of extremist views are often displayed in public though not necessarily endorsed by Sena members in private.

The definition that the Sena provides for decency and indecency is not without problems either. The Shiv Sainiks or their leadership would not have any problems with the portrayal of excessive violence, corruption or the way in which State institutions are disregarded or mocked in films. The projection of women in advertisements and movies should, according to the Shiv Sena, be within the boundaries of Indian culture. The concern for protecting the dignity of Indian women is very selective and conforms to the image of an Indian, or more precisely, Hindu women. The Sena wants to impose this image on everyone, which has more to do with control than with liberation and empowerment.²⁶⁹

The Shiv Sena's culture minister introduced a number of regulations which he defended as being meant to discipline Mumbai's public culture and to weed out immoral practices. For example, he ordered discos and rock concerts in Mumbai to close down early, banned public kissing on the stage among musicians and artists, ordered bars to close early and not to hire female dancers as soon as the Shiv Sena came to power in Maharashtra in 1995. This, according to Navalkar, was in line with parents' concerns about the new youth culture and what it might do to morality and the chastity of their daughters.²⁷⁰

The impact of the Shiv Sena Government on the various aspects of governance cannot be dissociated from the right-wing extremist image that the party has carried over the years. Certainly, when a party with right-wing orientations and which believes in the constant use of violence, comes to power and forms the government, it is bound to shake the basic principles on which democratic government is expected to function. This was clearly evident of the Shiv Sena rule in Maharashtra, whether it was with the dismissing of an independent commission of inquiry, moral

policing, or undermining the rights of the minorities. What was also witnessed during the Shiv Sena tenure was a constant tussle between the government and the political party where decisions came from Bal Thackeray, who time and again ensured that the government did not defy the party, but, rather, provided support to the party members in carrying out their extremist violent activities. Governance under the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra lacked sovereign decision-making authority, the prerogative of the elected government in any democracy. As a result, the government was not able to come out of the fold of a political party which stood for its extreme views on issues related to migration or minority rights. The policies of the government were reflective of the fact that it did not believe in safeguarding the rights of all its citizens.

The security implications of the Shiv Sena reign require a broader framework of security within which they could be studied. While the Shiv Sena and its activities threaten the internal security (which is primarily related to questions of law and order in a number of ways), the other aspect is the sense of insecurity that the Sena rule and policies bring among certain sections of the minorities. The Shiv Sena, as has been discussed throughout this work, does not believe in functioning within the boundaries of law and order and has applied extra-constitutional means to achieve its ends. This approach of the Shiv Sena has certainly undermined the credibility and legitimacy which is attached to public institutions and the State. But, more than threatening and questioning the basic principles of a democratic State and its institutions, the Shiv Sena has built an environment where individual security comes under severe threat. Drawing from the definition of the perspective of human security, which defines security as safeguarding the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment, the argument here would be that the activities and the policies of the Shiv Sena Government brought a number of insecurities, including fear, and questioned the dignity and rights of minorities, some of the vital aspects which form the core of human survival.²⁷¹ In other words, the Sena Government, through its policies of scrapping the minority commission, rejecting

the report of the Srikrishna Commission on Mumbai riots, and openly declaring that the government was against migrants (particularly those from Bangladesh), further accentuated the fear among minorities of surviving under constant threat to their lives and properties.

Human security takes the individual as the focus of its concern, and suggests that security be viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily life—food, shelter, employment, health, public safety, and a definition of security that emanates from the people and moves to the State and not vice versa.²⁷² Most Indian states are unable to provide for the basic needs of people, resulting in a constant state of insecurity under which a number of people constantly live. Some of the policies of the Shiv Sena Government exacerbated the situation in Maharashtra, resulting in questioning the basic citizenship rights of people belonging to the minority community, e.g. the minorities, particularly Muslims, were required to produce ration cards not only to access many of the public and private services, but to prove their identity and nationality. The violent drive of the Shiv Sena to rid Mumbai of ‘illegal’ migrants from Bangladesh resulted in the need for Muslim slum dwellers in particular to have a ration card, as they were required to prove their nationalist and not just municipal residency, and the ration card became the standard means of doing it, though this was also often considered insufficient.²⁷³ Ration cards for Muslims became not just a means for food security, but also one of physical security. The violent means that the Shiv Sena employs to target particular communities and individuals in the name of protecting the nation has resulted in these communities living in a constant state of fear which got accentuated during the Shiv Sena’s rule during 1995–99. The Shiv Sena’s understanding of nationalism and culture did not just mean exclusion of certain communities, but brought a sense of insecurity for them where it became a struggle to acquire basic needs over which they had a rightful claim.

Both as a political party and as part of the government, the Shiv Sena threatens the basic values and principles which form the core of democracy. At one level, the Shiv Sena engages in violent politics on the streets to propagate its extremist agenda, and at another level,

through formal institutions of power, the party has attempted to shape and legitimize right-wing extremism. The challenges posed by the right-wing extremism of the Shiv Sena require an understanding of how the State has responded to it. The preventive mechanisms that the State and civil society engage in to protect themselves from the extremist agenda of the Shiv Sena become an important part of this study. The subsequent chapter would make an attempt to understand the responses to right-wing extremism both from the State and civil society.

THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAM: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN PAKISTAN AND BEYOND

The Jamaat-e-Islami's real opportunity in Pakistan lay in working with the new state's elite, gradually expanding the Islamic agenda while providing the theological rationale for the Pakistani elite's plans for nation building on the basis of religion. Jamaat-e-Islami's cadres among students, trade unions and professional organizations, as well as its focus on building its own media, made it a natural ally for those within the government who thought that Pakistan's survival as a state required a religious anchor.²⁷⁴

Both democratic and military regimes in Pakistan were instrumentalizing Islam to propagate decisive policies at both domestic and foreign-policy levels.²⁷⁵ There are several reasons for the mushrooming of political Islam in Pakistan. First, it was Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (1924–88) who rooted his legitimacy in Islamic parties, particularly in the JI. There has been a significant influence from Saudi Arabia to strengthen the growth of political Islam in Pakistan, and Islamists in the country were also greatly boosted by the Islamic Revolution right next door in Iran. The JI sided with the Pakistan Army to restrain the freedom struggle in East Pakistan in also early 1970s. Afterwards, in the period from 1979 to 1989, mujahideen from Pakistan were trained and facilitated by Islamic parties to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1989, militants from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control to fuel the rising unrest in Indian-

administered Kashmir.²⁷⁶ Overall, such Islamic parties and the JI were lucky to come across vital local, regional and international political developments to further their cause, and also penetrate the corridors of power.

To Maududi's disappointment, he couldn't find good Muslims in the ruling Muslim League, the party which managed to create a separate homeland for Muslims with the name of Pakistan. Maududi envisioned a Muslim state headed by what he perceived as good Muslims. Due to this very fact, after Partition, Maududi and the JI could not support the ruling Muslim League. It was not merely an ideological conflict, because in late 1947 Maududi maintained his standpoint that he didn't believe in Pakistan, and, therefore, would not fight for the country. 'He expected that the Jamaat would inherit Pakistan once the people who had been moved by Islam to create a country would hear and understand his ideas. As a result, the Jamaat remained anti-state.'²⁷⁷

In 1948, although there was a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, the latter continued to support the insurgents in Kashmir. Then the Government of Pakistan attempted to persuade Maududi on his verdict that the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen and the Army was jihad. In response, Maududi stood firm on his earlier testimonial that the invasion of Kashmir was un-Islamic, and claimed that either the government should declare war against India, or abide by the terms defined in the ceasefire agreement. This annoyed the central government in Pakistan and the JI was accused of being pro-Indian.²⁷⁸ In October 1948, Maududi was arrested for issuing anti-state statements and remained in jail until mid-1950. There has been a drastic shift in the JI's policy in connection with Maududi's stance on Pakistan supporting non-state actors. During the 1999 Kargil war, the party strongly backed Pakistan's decision to send militants into Kargil in Kashmir. Later, the JI was annoyed when the Government of Pakistan decided to withdraw militants from Kargil.²⁷⁹

In 1953, the anti-Ahmadiya agitation resurfaced and Islamists (including the JI) demanded dismissal of Zafarullah Khan, Pakistan's Ahmadi foreign minister. At the same time, when anti-Ahmadiya

sentiment was prevailing, Maududi published a pamphlet, *The Qadiani Problem*. In it, Maududi called Ahmadiyas 'a cancer eating up and gradually consuming the Muslim Society'.²⁸⁰ Considering the impact of Maududi's scholarship, there should be no doubt that the particular publication might have increased the tension on the Ahmadiyas's issue. After the bloody anti-Ahmadiya riots, Maududi was imprisoned for a second time. This further deteriorated the JI's position. The party was even perceived as the 'Public Enemy No. 1', and the JI's downfall became much worse with most members losing their public jobs and government employees also being prohibited from attending the JI meetings. This was also the time when the JI was restricted to collecting animal skins to raise funds during Eid ul-Adha.²⁸¹ Maududi was released in 1955, and put behind bars in 1964 again for a short time. The military dictatorship of Gen. Yahya Khan (25 March 1969–20 December 1971) obtained Maududi's support to crush the liberation movement in East Pakistan, which further heightened anti-centre (Pakistan) feelings in the eastern part.²⁸² At that time, Maududi ordered his followers to fight to save united Pakistan along with the Armed Forces. However, as expected, Islamic parties, including the JI, played their role in declaring war against Bengalis as 'jihad'. Many radical scholars in West Pakistan considered the East Pakistanis as infidels on the basis of cultural similarities with Hindus.

Since 1947, constitutional debates in Pakistan were gaining momentum and Islamists were involved in such deliberations under the leadership of Maududi, who was framing key questions with regard to the role of Islam in the state. Fortunately for the JI, in 1955, Maududi's close friend Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1905–80) became the PM of Pakistan and he involved Maududi in framing Pakistan's Constitution of 1956. Ali accommodated Islamists in the framing of the constitution even with opposition from the secular president, Gen. Sikandar Mirza. Maududi persuaded other ulema to accept the Constitution of 1956 as Islamic, and to push for the Islamization of state institutions.²⁸³

The ideological victory of the Islamists was short-lived, as Gen. Ayub Khan (1907–74) assumed power in 1958. He opposed the

involvement of religion in politics, and also limited the scope of the JI and the party's activism by using his authority. This was another dark era for the JI, as the party offices were closed, funds were seized and its activities, publications, networks and operations blocked. Maududi was imprisoned twice in 1964 and 1967 during the Ayub era. It was a time when religious parties decided to launch a campaign against Ayub Khan's regime. The JI joined a coalition of secular parties and supported the anti-Ayub Khan candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah in the presidential elections of 1965. Supporting Fatimah Jinnah was contrary to Maududi's views on the role of women in Islam. Soon came the war between India and Pakistan in 1965, when Gen. Ayub Khan was heard publicly appealing to Maududi for support by declaring the war as jihad.²⁸⁴ However, the anti-Ayub movement of political parties' alliance is similar to the one against Gen. Musharraf with the name of All-Parties Democratic Movement (APDM). The JI was a part of the APDM under the umbrella of the MMA, and as an individual entity as well after breaking from the MMA coalition.²⁸⁵

Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917–80), successor of Gen. Ayub Khan, who was Pakistan's president from 1969 to 1971, formed a partnership with the JI to curtail secessionism in East Pakistan. It was the JI's first professional affiliation with the Pakistan Army, as then the JI militant groups Al-Badr and Al-Shams were trained by the Pakistan Army to crush the East Pakistani nationalism.²⁸⁶

The organized jihadi movement that has also been militarily active since the anti-Soviet Afghan war is classified by Hussain Haqqani into the following three factions: (1) jihadis (holy warriors) group of the JI Pakistan, (2) the Deobandi movement initiated by the Deoband madrassa of northern India, and (3) the Wahabi group strongly supported by Saudi Arabia.²⁸⁷ However, it was the JI which was at the forefront in promoting the Islamists' agenda under the government of Gen. Zia and the party confidently grabbed the opportunity to support Pakistan's involvement in the anti-communist/anti-Soviet war. It was easier for the JI to stick with Zia, who explicitly talked of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (Order of the Prophet),

and, therefore, there was ideological conformity. Subsequently, the JI cooperated devotedly for jihad in solidarity with Muslims in Afghanistan.²⁸⁸ In the decade from 1980 to 1990, approximately 72 pro-JI students lost their lives while fighting in Afghanistan, some of them sons of high-ranking party officials.²⁸⁹

With US support, Gen. Zia channelled funds to Afghanistan with the help of the JI. In particular, Gen. Zia recruited prominent JI members in the Ministry of Education as Arabic teachers and favoured several party members with promotions in the military, police and bureaucracy. It was also the time when the JI explored ideological and financial possibilities and shifted from domestic politics into the state's foreign affairs.²⁹⁰ Qazi Hussain Ahmad, then the superior JI member, was also consulted by Gen. Zia on policy issues relating to Afghanistan and Kashmir. This open support for a dictator earned the JI the sobriquet of the 'Martial Law's B-Team'.²⁹¹

The state of human rights, particularly women's and minority rights was dismal during the Zia era, and somehow all was defended by the JI. At that time the Women's Action Forum (WAF) opposed aspects of Islamization limiting women's rights. In response, the JI spoke on behalf of the ruler, criticized the WAF and emphasized the notion that Muslims have their own ideals of human rights, so are different from Western notions of human rights. Subsequently, in reaction to such concerns on violations of the rights of Christians and muhajirs²⁹² in the country, the JI defended it by saying that it was the right of the state and majority Muslims to guard their particular interests.

Gen. Zia was affiliated closely with the JI leadership so he enforced a strict version of the sharia in 1977 with strict punishments for theft and adultery, and criminals were often punished at public places. He also implemented a strict law on a so-called proper dress code for government employees and women in general. These JI-directed reforms were to bring Pakistani society similar to that of Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's (1902–89) Iran.²⁹³ Actually, Zia was in agreement with the JI's ideological position, due to the fact that he and then the party's Amir Mian Tufail Mohammad from 1972 to 1987 belonged to the same Arayan caste or *biradri*

[brotherhood] with their ancestral roots in *Jullundur* (now Jalandhar) in East Punjab (India).²⁹⁴ This association between the head of the state and the JI amir further helped the party in pushing its agenda by exploiting the authoritarian rule.

The Islamic movement in Afghanistan was instigated by Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masoud, and their teacher at the University of Kabul, Burhanuddin Rabbani. All three took part actively in the movement to oust the monarchy of King Zahir Shah to revive an Islamic revolution. These radical leaders were influenced by the Muslim brotherhood of Egypt and the writings of the JI's founder, Maududi. Hekmatyar kept strong ties with the JI even after he moved to Iran in the late 1980s.²⁹⁵ The JI was also openly involved in supporting the Afghan mujahideen and maintained close friendships with Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami (Islamic Party) and Burhanuddin's Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society). As the leaders of both parties in Afghanistan were influenced strongly by Maududi, they also adopted the ideological principles of the JI Pakistan.²⁹⁶

There was a relationship of respect between Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N and Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI due to the fact that both were closely associated during the time of Gen. Zia when Sharif was the chief minister of Punjab. This bond was strengthened by Sharif when he honoured Qazi with the status of prime ministerial adviser. In addition, Qazi was given almost a free hand to formulate the Afghan and Kashmir policies. In 1992, there was a disagreement between the two over the issue of Qazi and the JI supporting President Saddam Hussain. This created tremendous difficulties for Sharif being the prime minister of Pakistan with regard to relations with Saudi Arabia. From then onwards the paths of the two diverged and the JI started opposing Sharif. Criticism of Sharif was intensified by the JI after the visit of Indian PM A. B. Vajpayee to Lahore in February 1999 and afterwards when Sharif directed the end of the Kargil war (May–July 1999).²⁹⁷

Religiously-motivated campaigns in Pakistan have been showing their strength by shaking the corridors of power and finally in getting their demands fulfilled. In promoting Islamism, the name of the JI comes at the front in Pakistan. In 1953, the Maududi-led

Jl initiated a campaign against the Ahmadiya community to get them constitutionally declared as non-Muslims. The Jl and Sunni group Majlis-i-Khatm-i-Nabuwwat together mobilized people for street protests against the central government which caused a lot of chaos and violence causing deaths of thousands of Ahmadiyas in the province of Punjab. Overall, the anti-Qadiani/Ahmadiya movement was supported by all mainstream Islamic parties in the country, and Islamists continued to oppose the Ahmadiya faith through public rallies and persecution.²⁹⁸ The turmoil created by violent protests eventually led to martial law and then Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the federal cabinet.²⁹⁹ The security forces were successful in controlling the situation by arresting protestors from mosques across the country, including 597 from the Wazir Khan mosque in Lahore. In addition, three men who led the movement, including Maududi, were sentenced to death by a military court. However, later, under pressure from some Muslim countries, the death sentence was converted to life imprisonment.³⁰⁰ Martial law forced the anti-Ahmadiya faction to go underground, but the movement resurfaced in the mid-1970s. This time, during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he eventually declared Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims.

The party has practised various tactics to destabilize certain regimes in Pakistan, and democratic governments in particular were victimized by the Jl. In 1989, furious and violent demonstrations were led by the Jl to exploit the issue of Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*. Apparently, the protests were anti-British and anti-American, but the hidden motive was to weaken the government of Benazir Bhutto at the centre.³⁰¹ Whatsoever the case was, the Jl managed to muster Muslims in the UK, Saudi Arabia and South Asia to condemn Rushdie's work through massive protests, and this fierce reaction made Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran to take notice of the blasphemous *Satanic Verses*.³⁰²

In 1998, there was huge internal pressure on the Nawaz Sharif Government to conduct nuclear tests in response to the Indian move, and the Jl was at the forefront in pushing the government to test its nuclear capability. "The party so strongly urged the government

in this regard that many in Pakistan joked that perhaps Pakistan's nuclear weapons were kept at Jama'at headquarters in Lahore.³⁰³ Since 1998, the party has resisted the government's signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For the JI, the support for the country's nuclear programme is to strengthen its credibility before the ruling elite.³⁰⁴

The JI has been organizing anti-US, anti-Israel and anti-India protests over the course of more than five decades. In early 2009, the JI organized an anti-Israel rally in Karachi to condemn the Israeli violation of human rights in Gaza and the loss of innocent lives. At the protest, people carried banners against Israel and in favour of Hamas. Protestors burnt the US and Israeli flags. In addition, party leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad strongly denounced what he called the 'Israeli genocide' of Palestinians with biological and chemical weapons. In the same statement, Qazi emphasized on the 'criminal silence of Arab and Muslim countries over the worst kind of bombing on unarmed Palestinians...Israel has literally turned Gaza into an open air jail with the help of Egypt'.³⁰⁵ At the protest rally, the president of the JI Baluchistan chapter, Maulana Abdul Haq Hashimi, said that the JI was the only party in Pakistan having the courage to stand against the policies of Israel, the US and India. Maulana also emphasized that the above-mentioned three countries were actively engaged in efforts to eradicate Islam.³⁰⁶

After the 2002 elections, it was an ideal situation for the Islamic parties in Pakistan to implement what they had been preaching and wishing for: Islamic codes of conduct in the country. Therefore, the coalition of Islamic parties, the MMA, made possible attempts to either promote the sharia or restrict any alterations in existing Islamic laws. The MMA once even threatened to resign from the national and provincial assemblies in protest at Pakistani parliament transferring rape cases from its sharia courts to civil courts. Previously, sharia courts in Pakistan used to deal with rape cases under the notorious Hudood Ordinance of 1979. The civil society and major political parties in the Musharraf regime criticized the Hudood Ordinance because some of its clauses were irrational. For instance, as per the Hudood Ordinance, the rape victim (woman)

could face adultery charges if she failed to produce four male (Muslim) witnesses of good character. The Musharraf Government, after facing huge pressure from the international community and the local civil society finally passed the Women's Protection Bill in the National Assembly in November 2006 to replace the Hudood Ordinance. A positive feature of the Bill brings rape cases under the Pakistan Penal Code and not under the sharia law. However, the Women's Protection Bill was strongly opposed by the MMA and more so by members of the JI, including Samia Raheel Qazi. The JI declared the Bill as un-Islamic and against Articles 2a and 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

While rejecting the Hudood Bill which was initially discussed in the parliament, JI Secretary General Syed Munawar Hasan pointed out that certain loopholes mentioned in the Bill did not relate to flaws in the Hudood Ordinance, and that the misuse of the Hudood Ordinance was a result of Anglo-Saxon laws in the legal system of Pakistan. Hasan also said that those who opposed the Hudood Ordinance did so because of the severe punishments prescribed in it, and they had forgotten the philosophy, which was to 'prevent the perpetrator from committing the same sin and deter the others to have recourse [to] such crime'.³⁰⁷ The JI also criticized the 'enlightened moderation' of Musharraf, who started various operations to curb extremism coming out of the local madrassas. The JI has been openly favouring madrassas because the party also runs madrassas in the country. In support of Islamic schools, the amir of JI Karachi, Dr Meraj ul Huda Siddiqui, said that, 'Madrassas are the biggest NGOs working in Pakistan... The madrassas have played a pivotal role in eradicating illiteracy'.³⁰⁸

The MMA also tried to implement controversial legislations in the NWFP. First, the MMA managed to approve the Sharia Act in 2003. With that, the MMA provincial government brought back a government similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. With sharia, laws have been enforced on banning the examination of women patients by male doctors and forbidding men coaching women athletes. Civil servants in the province were ordered to pray five times a day and strictly follow the Islamic code of conduct.

In addition, the MMA Government banned the sale of music and videos, all in the name of protecting Islamic values. The head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Afrasiab Khattak, strongly condemned the imposition of sharia in the NWFP and stated that 'the move is pushing Pakistani society towards religious totalitarianism'.³⁰⁹ Later, the MMA proposed the Hisbah Bill, which was aimed at overseeing the execution of sharia in the NWFP. The Bill was challenged by the attorney general of Pakistan on behalf of Musharraf and it was declared unconstitutional by then Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

In 2005, when the JI was still in partnership with other Islamic parties and a secular PML-Q was ruling the NWFP and Baluchistan as well as was having a significant representation in the National Assembly, the issue of blasphemous cartoons came up. The controversial cartoons were initially published by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* on 30 September 2005 with depictions of Prophet Muhammad, which, according to Islamic law, is a punishable act. The incident further escalated the Islam vs. West conflict, with demonstrations across the Muslim world, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Middle East. Protests in Pakistan lasted for over two weeks. In the provincial capital of NWFP, Peshawar, there were well over 70,000 people gathered to force the Pakistani government to take strong action against the Danish government. In addition, the agitators burnt theatres, a KFC restaurant and a bus terminal of South Korea's Sammi Corporation. There were also attacks on offices of the Norwegian mobile company Telenor, McDonald's and Citibank in Lahore. In areas like Tank in NWFP, rallies were organized and CDs and DVDs were set on fire, because these were seen as symbols of Westernization.

The JI amir in 2002 had blamed the West for exporting 'bad' parts of its culture to Pakistan.³¹⁰ During the course of the above-mentioned protests, though the local police was on high alert, there were incidents of casualties and injuries. On the whole, the normal daily routine was disturbed in Pakistani metros as most shops, public transport and businesses were closed.³¹¹ The JI and affiliated bodies such the IJT started awareness campaigns to ban Danish goods in

particular and generally products of the Scandinavian countries in Pakistan. Shah Nawaz Farooqui, writing for the Jamaat Women's Wing website, traces the issue of the blasphemous cartoons from the 'clash of civilizations' thesis of Samuel P. Huntington, and crusades against the Muslims initiated by Pope Urban II. Farooqui further explains her arguments by saying that the West had imposed a clash of civilizations on Islam and Muslims through decades.³¹²

The Western media were irresponsible at another juncture for causing riots in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia. This time, it was an American magazine *Newsweek* presenting the fact that US interrogators at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba might have destroyed and humiliated prisoners' copies of the Koran. Later, the *Newsweek* editor apologized and retracted the original story: however, the MMA in Pakistan rejected the publisher's withdrawal.³¹³ The JI organized protests in different parts of Pakistan, including Islamabad. Then leader of the MMA and JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad said the incident was a 'crude attempt, both by the weekly magazine and the American authorities to defuse the anger of the Muslims across the world'.³¹⁴

On several occasions, education reforms in Pakistan were constrained by the JI and other religious parties. During the concluding session of the Jihad-e-Kabir Conference at the party headquarters, the JI criticized the Western agenda behind educational reforms in Pakistan strongly through the auspices of the Aga Khan University Education Board (AKUEB). Then party Amir Qazi said that the AKUEB 'is used as a tool to promote Westernization in the country'.³¹⁵ It is also reported that Qazi warned the Ismailis that his party would launch a movement against them similar to the one against Ahmadiyahs to pronounce the latter as non-Muslims.³¹⁶ Similar threats were issued by JI branches across Pakistan to the Aga Khan Foundation in connection with the AKUEB controversy. Due to this strong opposition from the JI, an executive order of the Pakistani government did not allow the AKUEB to provide the British system of education in the country at an affordable price. Presently, private schools allow only elite kids to benefit from the British education due to the high cost of study.

In an article on culture and education, the JI blames NGOs for the swift cultural shift in Pakistan, which transformed the country in the name of Westernization and modernization. The article specifically talks about the presence of bars, pornographic material, Western food chains, gambling and shopping centres in the big cities of Pakistan. The article talks about the future Pakistani generation of private schools with limited or no knowledge of local languages as well as culture.³¹⁷ It is important to point out that the JI respects the leaders of the nation, such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Iqbal, who had studied abroad and were Westernized in many ways after obtaining education in the West.

The JI has been active in promoting sectarian harmony in Pakistan, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad talks about the 'divide and rule' kind of plan of the US in relation to the Sunni-Shia dichotomy. In his article 'A Dangerous Plan Against the Muslim World', Qazi says that:

one strategy being adopted by the US against Islam, Muslims and Muslim culture is to weaken them by dividing them and making them fight each other. The US has already begun to work on this plan, by classifying Muslims as Shias and Sunnis, and thus the Shias and Sunnis are being encouraged to kill each other. This is a US conspiracy, which they want to extend to the Middle East, Iran and Pakistan.³¹⁸

The JI has strongly opposed the US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan, due to the party's historical roots in Afghanistan. Earlier, in 2002, JI Amir Qazi was imprisoned due to his vigorous resistance to Pakistan's partnership with the US on the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.³¹⁹ The JI as well as MMA leaders have written articles saying that Al-Qaida was not involved in the 9/11 episode, and that it was solely a Jewish conspiracy. The writers also talk of the fact that on the day of the event (9/11), the Jews were given a day off, which provides evidence of their involvement in the act.³²⁰ The party leaders have also been opposing the war against terrorism in Pakistani tribal areas and in this regard JI's *Naib* Amir Prof. Khurshid Ahmad presented his party's point of view by stating that, 'We oppose it. You can't have state terrorism in the name of

fighting terrorism. You cannot justify the disappearance of people, extra-judicial killings in the name of war on terror.³²¹

During his rule, Gen. Musharraf wielded his authority fully, and to gain more influence, made several controversial constitutional amendments, including the creation of a military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) in 2001. Musharraf himself became the chairman of the NSC and was authorized to supervise the country's security policies. However, there was strong opposition to this, even from coalition partner MMA, which led to a deadlock in political negotiations. Specifically, the dispute was between Musharraf and the Islamic parties' bloc, the MMA, and forced him to pledge to resign from his military position by the end of 2004, which he actually did not. However, the MMA was successful in making Musharraf move the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2003 on creation of the NSC through a legislative process. However, Islamic parties continued to oppose the NSC, considering that it undermined the parliament's authority, and Opposition leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman resiled from the first meeting of the NSC in June 2004.³²²

The media in Pakistan evolved hugely during the Musharraf era from 1999 to 2008. The electronic media, particularly the domestic TV channels, even became weapons against the dictatorship of Gen. Musharraf. However, this positive media revolution was not predicted by the JI in the beginning. In January 2005, the JI Shura passed a resolution to disclose that the Pakistani government was patronizing the West against Islamic values of decency and modesty, and that the people were being victimized by the Western and Indian culture through official and private media outlets. The JI Shura also demanded that the Western NGOs be restricted from promoting their culture of mixed gatherings of men and women in Pakistan.³²³

The JI is playing its traditional role of not letting the government make any so-called un-Islamic reforms or reforms which would lead to deterioration of Islamism and patriotism in Pakistan. In January 2009, the JI Shura passed a resolution showing concern at the ruling class depriving Urdu, the national language, of its due constitutional

status in Pakistan. The Shura also demanded an immediate ban of screening of Indian movies in local cinemas, flights of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and public transport. In addition, the resolution specifically demanded the removal of the less religious chairman and members of the Council of Islamic Ideology, and recruitment of well-known and respectable Islamic scholars.³²⁴

After the MMA won a significant number of seats in the 2002 general elections in Pakistan, there was a wave of concern in the West regarding Islamists taking over Pakistan; specifically, militants taking control of the country's nuclear installations. The speculation kept on since 2002, with many Western countries framing their policies on Pakistan in the light of such fears. During the course of the past six decades or so, the Islamic parties, mainly the JI, have been exploited by the Pakistan Army to fulfil its agendas at home and abroad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. There have been ups and downs in the way of the JI due to its uncertain and unstable performance in the general elections.

This is the case with all Islamic parties, as they managed to capture more than 10 per cent of votes only in 1988 and 2002 with respectively 12 per cent and 11.1 per cent votes.³²⁵ On both occasions, the JI participated in partnership with other parties under the umbrella of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in 1988 and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal in 2002. The JI's track record shows that there are times when the party is pro-dictator by being in opposition of a particular democratic regime, and then there will be times when the party suddenly decides to go against the same dictator and become pro-democracy. In brief, the JI's friend could be an enemy at later stages. Ironically, when democracy returns to power in Pakistan, the JI is back to street-marching for certain reforms, if not objecting in the parliament. It is to sustain some sort of influence in policy making by showing that the party has the capability of mobilizing the masses. Previously, the JI has shown this power by destabilizing governments in Pakistan.

After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai the UN Security Council banned certain charity organizations, including the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The JI objected strongly to this in the parliament and the

Senate and labelled this the government's diplomatic failure at the UN. While condemning the UN, the JI amir said that the UN was establishing US and Western control over weaker nations of the world.³²⁶ In November 2008, the Mumbai tragedy led to India–Pakistan tension with deployment of security forces along the border on both sides. At this, the JI initially demanded the political parties to shun their political differences and support the newly-elected PPP Government against the Indian aggression. However, the JI was disappointed by the PPP Government's response to accusations from the Indian side after the Mumbai terror attacks, therefore, JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that Pakistan was no longer a sovereign country. He further criticized the government for supporting the US and labelled the newly-elected government as a 'US colony'.³²⁷ While addressing a group of overseas Pakistanis at the JI headquarters, Qazi said that the Mumbai incident was being used to justify an Indian attack on Pakistan similar to the 9/11 terrorism in New York which was used to attack Afghanistan. He also said that India was a 'hotbed' of terrorism with over one hundred militant organizations, and was a home of extremist Hindus who had been burning churches, mosques and gurdwaras, besides killing non-Hindus.³²⁸ On another occasion, Qazi stated that 26 Indian consulates in Afghanistan were sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan.³²⁹ The JI does this quite often, which is the practice of linking less intense events with extreme outcomes, to gain the attention of the masses.

The head of the JI's NWFP chapter has been active in protesting against the Pakistani security forces' operations in the country's tribal areas because of the party's strong roots in the province. The JI also launched protests against the demolition of the house of local party leader Haji Najibullah in military operations in the Khyber Agency. Najibullah has been active in running the party campaign against the US operations in Afghanistan and in tribal areas of Pakistan. On 1 January 2009, the JI Shura passed the resolution to specifically highlight that protesting against the supply of arms and other essentials to the US and NATO forces ('infidels' forces) was not an illegal act, as this right was provided by the Constitution of

Pakistan.³³⁰ In his Friday sermon, JI Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad told the masses to block the US supply vehicles bearing black flags in a democratic and peaceful manner. He said that the US had made Afghanistan a home of conspiracies against Muslims in Pakistan.³³¹

Long marches in March are becoming a trend of the political culture in Pakistan. In March 2009, lawyers came out on streets from across the country marching towards Islamabad. The movement was supported strongly by the JI and the PML (N). JI *Naib* Amir Prof. Gafoor Ahmed said on this occasion, 'Despite all its powers the government will not be able to stop the people.'³³² The PPP Government was criticized strongly by Qazi in his Friday sermon when the JI amir said that the Zardari–Gillani–Hoti Government had joined the US against the people of Pakistan.³³³ The PPP Government elected in 2008 was challenged by the lawyers' movement to reinstate deposed judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The movement was supported strongly by the PML (N) and the JI, specially the IJT (the Jamaat students' wing). The nearly two-year-long lawyers' movement was backed strongly by the JI. The threat of instability in the country convinced PM Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani to negotiate with President Asif Ali Zardari to restore Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry as the chief justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court on 16 March 2009. It is an important achievement of the people's power and non-violence, and this day will be remembered in the judicial and the political history of Pakistan.

Islamist groups, particularly the JI, have had a significant influence on the state's governance and security, and this they have achieved by pushing governments for certain reforms. Whenever required, Islamists in Pakistan lobby to fulfil their demands. In 1962, the power of the Islamists made Gen. Ayub Khan change the country's name from the Republic of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In 1969, the party was at the forefront in the Democratic Action Committee to eliminate the authoritarian regime of Gen. Ayub Khan.³³⁴ In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto couldn't resist the demands of the Islamists and declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims, and, thus, a religious minority. However, the JI made a U-turn on Bhutto, and in 1977 acted as the main force in

the Pakistan National Alliance against the secular government of Bhutto.³³⁵ In 1981, Gen. Zia exempted the Shia community from compulsory zakat payment. In the 1990s, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif made unsuccessful attempts to audit the finances of madrassas. In 2000, Gen. Pervez Musharraf had to withdraw his proposal of reforming the procedures of the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan after a threat of street agitation from Islamic parties.³³⁶ Islamists in Pakistan have been pragmatic and well-organized to achieve the above-mentioned successes, and it seems they will continue to sustain their influence in the state which is constitutionally an Islamic republic. Therefore, it is very likely that in Pakistan the Islamic parties, including the JI, will manage to gather hundreds and thousands to show their street power, which helps in pushing regimes for certain reforms.

Islamic organizations or movements similar to the JI are not only regional but global in nature, and, therefore, are in the position to be heard and taken into consideration in the security debates at regional and global levels. In this regard, Mohammad Waseem postulates that, 'regional instability and non-resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and in the world at large are the leading determinants of the nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan'.³³⁷ This is evident from the global reach of a mainstream Islamic party in Pakistan, the JI, which is strongly connected with similar movements across and world, so has the capability of playing a role in escalating or resolving conflicts involving Muslims.

Models for Combating Right-Wing Extremism

This chapter suggests that the initiative for tackling the complexities of right-wing extremism should move away from being State-centric to those initiated by civil society for a sustained approach to maintain a pluralistic vision, and one in which the narrow understanding of nationalism by right-wing extremist parties is rejected. The chapter begins with a discussion of the response that Indian democracy has given to the Shiv Sena, and then moves to a similar endeavour to understand the Pakistani case. The discourse to tackle right-wing extremism in South Asia is largely dominated by a nationalist perspective. There is a discussion on the legislative and legal means to tackle the problems posed by right-wing extremist parties and groups. While such an approach is useful, other such attempts which do not always involve the State are equally important, particularly at the level of civil society, and these have not yet caught the attention of many who have written on the subject. In the end, this work suggests that both India and Pakistan could situate the problem of right-wing extremism in a framework of multi-track diplomacy. The attempt in this chapter would be to understand the possibility of making multi-track diplomacy part of the existing tools for tackling the problem of right-wing extremism.

DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM: INDIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE SHIV SENA

Democracy, by its very nature, allows space and opens the gate for the emergence of different political ideologies. Among the different political ideologies that emerge in a democracy some are

aimed at enhancing the principles of democracy, while others exploit the same freedom for challenging the existing political order.³³⁸ The emergence of right-wing extremist parties in a democracy is a challenge not only due to the impact that these parties have over questions of governance and security, but also because of the dilemma that a democracy faces in responding to these parties. The question is whether the problem of right-wing extremism should be solved by the application of brute force, or in accordance with the democratic spirit where such parties are allowed to operate freely.

This is an important question that all democracies have to answer in deciding the course of their response to right-wing extremism. A heavy-handed approach to any form of extremism could lead to the erosion of the foundation and principles of democracy upon which it is built.³³⁹ Should a democracy be 'tolerant towards the intolerant', or should it forsake democratic norms and crush the extremist agenda? A number of democracies have struggled in their responses. How is it that a democracy seeks to address the challenge of right-wing extremism? What should encompass a democratic government's policy to restrict the growth of right-wing extremism? Should the policy be directed at the agent of right-wing extremism, or at the infrastructure which serves as the breeding ground for right-wing extremism? Answers to these questions have largely depended on which route a democracy takes. Before discussing the mechanisms and methods adopted by the Indian democracy to restrict the growth of the Shiv Sena, it would be useful to understand the available methods that democracies in other countries have adopted to withstand the challenge.

The strategies of democratic regimes, which include both formal provisions and political strategies aimed explicitly at protecting the system from the threat of its internal opponents has been broadly defined under the concept of 'defence of democracy'.³⁴⁰ As discussed above, in this concept, a democratic regime can take various routes to meet the extremist challenge, and these could be both or either short- and/or long-term strategies. A democracy faces different kinds of extremist challenges, which could be in the form of violent insurgencies, political terrorism, external threats and civil war

situations, and it employs various mechanisms to overcome such challenges. This work is particularly concerned about the right-wing extremist challenge, in which a particular extremist party has played the democratic game, and has used the rights and guarantees of democracy to undermine its principles. The concern in this chapter would be to understand the various models available to restrict the growth of such extremist forces.

The struggle against extreme political parties and movements could be based primarily on two models: the criminal justice model, and the 'war model'.³⁴¹ The criminal justice model includes those actions of states against extremist forces which are within the boundaries of the law. In the war model, a democracy can adopt any method, including the use of the Armed Forces to curb the activities of extremist organizations, when even the administrative barriers imposed by a government against an extremist organization need not be bound by the rules of law.³⁴² For example, a democratic regime decides to exclude a political party from participating in elections. Though such steps are rare in responses democratic regimes to extremist political parties, there are examples of administrative barriers imposed on extreme political parties from participating in the democratic process. A democracy which takes the path of the war model does not cater to democratic principles while responding to the extremist challenge, whether responding through administrative barriers, or militarily by adopting violent means to overcome the extremist challenge. Democracies that have adopted the war model with an uncompromising struggle against the extremist forces are called 'militant democracies'.

It would be wrong to assume that democratic regimes drift away from democratic acceptability only while following the war model route. Democracies, particularly in the West, have, in fact, drifted away from democratically-accepted practices while responding to extremist challenges more often when they followed the criminal justice model. Therefore, within the criminal justice model, one can distinguish between those which follow extended means from the ones that follow narrow means while responding to extremism. Democracies that follow the extended model do not want to adopt

the war model, but in their response to extremist organizations and their activities, they end up not being able to distinguish the activities of these organizations from those of ordinary criminal groups. The response under such circumstances is similar to the way in which a democracy would have responded to an organized criminal group. Special legislations are adopted under this model for responding against organizations and individuals, which manifest extreme views or violent acts. The narrow criminal justice model is adopted by those democracies which believe that the criminal justice system is the only means through which a democratic regime can cope with activities of extremist parties or groups. Democracies that have used the criminal justice model, whether in its extended or narrow form, have come to be known as 'defending democracies'.³⁴³

Having provided a short theoretical framework on democratic responses to extremist activities and violence, this section now shifts the focus to the way Indian democracy has responded to the Shiv Sena's extremism, and whether it fits into the categorizations of the various models mentioned above. The Shiv Sena's activities (as briefly discussed in Ch. II) have, over the years, been both benefited and restrained by operating within a democratic system. The advantages stemming from coalition politics where one political party is pitted against another was a major factor for the rise of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai, and later in spreading its base outside the city. Democratic regimes in Maharashtra were accommodating in accepting the Shiv Sena within the political spectrum, particularly once the party decided to contest elections and convert itself into a political party from a social movement.

The government in Maharashtra (which was run by the Congress Party in the 1960s) not only turned a blind eye to the extremist and violent activities of the Shiv Sena, but also supported its cause through various means like providing both tacit and financial support. The main reason for this support for the Shiv Sena was particularly related to the Sena's anti-communist stance which the Government of Maharashtra found a useful strategy to reduce the activities of communist groups and parties. As would be seen, the response of successive governments in Maharashtra—and

to some extent this can be said of the union government as well—to the extremist activities of the Shiv Sena has primarily been governed by vote bank politics or compulsions of a coalition government to survive in power. The response of the government to the activities of the Shiv Sena during the Mumbai riots in 1992–93, and later after the report of the judicial commission of inquiry into the riots was submitted, suggests that much is desired at the level of the administration to curb the activities of extremist political parties like the Shiv Sena. During the riots in Mumbai in which the Shiv Sena activists are alleged to have participated in instigating the mobs to violence, the government and the police completely turned a blind eye to the Sena's activities.³⁴⁴

Most governments in Maharashtra have chosen not to meddle with the activities of the Sena, for electoral reasons, and also because the Sena has in the past been known for removing its political rivals by indulging in violence. In 1999, when the cricket pitch at the Ferozeshah Kotla stadium was dug up by Shiv Sena activists in Delhi prior to an India–Pakistan cricket match, the BJP Government decided to remain silent over the issue, and some of the leaders of the party endorsed the step taken by the Sena. This was not surprising, considering the fact that the Sena was a major coalition partner of the BJP and its support was vital for the union government to remain in power.³⁴⁵ The response of governments to the extremist activities of the Shiv Sena does not mean that there is a dearth of laws according to which the governments and administration can act and curb the extremist agenda of the party. But the assistance of laws related to hate speeches, processions, mechanisms to control communal riots and measures to be taken against a political party which indulges both in everyday and mass planned violence is taken only at a procedural level. For reasons indicated above, governments and subsequent administrations have not made substantial efforts to implement these laws. For example, there are rules according to which the police and government are supposed to act during religious processions, but most often these regulations are only on paper and not followed. In all police training colleges the trainees are told about the main festivals of Hindus and Muslims, and then

about what precautions have to be taken to maintain peace, but there has been a general failure to regulate these processions.³⁴⁶

There has been a similar response to the processions organized by the Shiv Sena. The participation of Shiv Sena leaders in these processions is viewed as a certain recognition from the electorate for such symbolic gestures, and the government in power often avoids regulating these processions in the name of not wanting to hurt the sentiments of the people.³⁴⁷ Similarly, whenever a situation of communal violence emerges in any city or town there are different precautionary measures that all administrations—and particularly the police—are expected to take according to the rules under the ‘Guidelines for Controlling Communal Disturbances’. Under these guidelines, one of the measures to be taken is to arrest those who make inflammatory speeches which could instigate a mob to indulge in violence. But such measures were not taken after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and in the next few days after the demolition there were inflammatory speeches made by the leaders of the Shiv Sena, and the writings in *Saamna* had the distinct aim of instigating communal violence.³⁴⁸ One could suggest that, irrespective of the administrative and legislative options present before democratic regimes, when it comes to implementation, not much has been done to curb the extremist propaganda and activities of the Sena.

There have been a few occasions when the Shiv Sena and its leader Bal Thackeray have had to remain silent and accept the authority and rules on the basis of which a democratic State functions. One was when Bal Thackeray, after a lot of tussle, was disenfranchised in July 1999 for two years by the President of India on advice from the Election Commission because of his repeated violation of the election rules and misusing religion to spread communal enmity during election campaigns.³⁴⁹ There are very few occasions when the state and governments managing its affairs have been able to restrict the activities of the Shiv Sena, whether it relates to physical violence or verbal attacks, particularly against the minorities. Most often, the Shiv Sena has managed to get away with its activities, primarily because of the use of ‘extra-constitutional power’.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Ch. II, democracy in itself is perhaps

the main restrictive force for the Shiv Sena as the party has become a victim of factionalism, vote back politics and power struggles over a period of time that most parties experience while functioning in a democracy. Also, though political parties have not been able to restrict the activities of the Shiv Sena when in government, they have provided stiff competition to the party on the electoral front. The Shiv Sena, because of this competitive politics and functioning in a multiparty system, realizes that it would not be able to form a government only on the basis of its right-wing extremist policies where violence is the key factor to achieve its ends. Perhaps it is this contradictory and paradoxical character of a democracy where, on the one hand it provides space for extremist political parties like the Shiv Sena to function, and on the other forces such parties to enter the vicious circle of working under democratic compulsions, reducing their ability to indulge in extremism, which has served as a deterrent against right-wing extremism.

A certain legitimacy was provided to the Shiv Sena by providing this party the space to indulge in democratic politics, but such a response was perhaps best suited, given the fact that most democratic regimes when confronted with an extremist challenge prefer to follow the path where they function within a set of principles which does not undermine democracy in any way. Therefore, governments in Maharashtra could not have justified their actions against the Shiv Sena had they followed the war model while responding to the emergence of this extremist political party. At the same time, what is clearly visible is that governments have found it difficult to restrict the activities of the Shiv Sena through administrative, legislative and even judicial means. In other words, though on paper governments seem to follow the criminal justice model, they have, for the reasons stated above, not been able to implement them at the ground level.

The focus, therefore, needs to be shifted from the level of the State to the level of civil society to understand the ways in which civil society could respond to extremism, and how far this has worked effectively in Maharashtra while dealing with the Shiv Sena. The inclusion of civil society in providing a restraint to extremism is

based on the idea that it is not just enough to focus on the agent of extremism, whether a political party or an organized group, but the need is to *focus on the infrastructure which acts as the breeding ground exploited by extremist forces* to flourish. In many European countries, while dealing with right-wing extremism, civil-society initiatives are dominated by approaches that target young adults and adolescents. This is justified by the fact that a large number of violent crimes with a xenophobic or extremist agenda are committed by young (male) members of the society.³⁵⁰ As part of this exercise, effort is made to educate and sensitize the youth to counter right-wing extremism at a very early stage.

In Europe, preventive measures towards right-wing extremism are country-specific and often depended on the historical past, infrastructural development, and their specific experiences with right-wing extremism.³⁵¹ There are successful non-violent strategies as well which are applied at the level of civil society to overcome the challenge of right-wing extremism. For example, in Norway, 4,000 people attended a public meeting at which a prominent right-wing extremist leader was to give an inflammatory speech. When he started to speak, everyone silently turned their backs without saying a word. This demonstration was planned carefully and followed by a 'mouth-to-mouth' mobilization campaign in the community.³⁵² Most experiences in Europe would suggest that the civil society initiatives have included the structures of the State as well in their attempt to address the problem. In fact, the police, municipal administrators and political leaders are integral parts of the problem-solving techniques for right-wing extremism. Simultaneous efforts are made which include educational programmes for the youth, non-violent demonstrations, and preventive policing, and a combination of these factors have helped in addressing the problem.

In the next few paragraphs, the attempt would be to understand the way civil society has responded to the extremist agenda of the Shiv Sena, and whether there exists a systematic approach to address the problem at this level, which would be worth exploring. While a section of the civil society supported the agenda and activities of the Sena has over the years, there is another section of the same civil

society which has consistently served as a restraint to the violent and sectarian policies of the Sena. The media, in particular, have been a strong deterrent to not only the xenophobic agenda of the Sena, its criticism of the Sena's activities has forced the government to initiate action against the Sena's members. The civil society's response to the Shiv Sena's involvement in the 1992 Mumbai riots is one such example.

Voluntary citizens' organizations were formed which not only provided relief to the victims, but also initiated dialogue between the two communities to fight against the language of violence which the Shiv Sena was spreading.³⁵³ The Citizens' Awareness Group was formed by a group of professionals in Mumbai and it appealed for an end to the sectarian violence in advertisements placed in 79 newspapers in five different languages as well as in a short film broadcast on Doordarshan TV. The media published several articles and reports which were critical not only of the role played by the Shiv Sena during the riots, but particularly of the police and the Congress Government which was in power during the time of riots. The collection of essays published by the *Times of India* after the riots is an example of the media's response to activities of the Sena and the government's inept handling of the riots.³⁵⁴

The Shiv Sena has faced constant resistance from the civil society both as a party in opposition and when it was in power along with the BJP. Because of this resistance, on several occasions the Sena was forced to change its decisions on the state-appointed judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the Mumbai riots.³⁵⁵ The Shiv Sena-BJP Government had dissolved the commission in 1996 soon after it came to power, but this was challenged by the Bombay Bar Association and several human rights organizations in a court of law and the government was forced to give an explanation for the same. This was one of the reasons for reconstitution of the inquiry commission.³⁵⁶

A similar reaction from the civil society was witnessed when a demand was raised for judicial action against the Shiv Sena leaders who were charged by the Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry for instigating the mob during the Mumbai riots. A citizens' campaign

for justice to victims of riots, Justice for All, was launched to demand action against the culprits. One of the demands made by the citizens' campaign was for police action against the Shiv Sena's newspaper *Saamna* for its inflammatory reports during the Mumbai riots.³⁵⁷ This includes the demand by human rights organizations for judicial action against the Sena members who had participated in instigating the 1992–93 Mumbai riots.

The vernacular media are an important agency of the Shiv Sena through which it propagates extremist views and objectives and the Sena magazine *Marmik* and newspaper *Saamna* are the two most vital expressions of the same. But there is another section of the media which has constantly denounced the violent activities of the Shiv Sena and in the process come under physical attack from its activists. The press was always a problem for the Sena, and even in the initial years, the party was criticized by newspapers like *Maratha* and the Shiv Sena activists answered the criticism by beating up its editor, P. K. Atre, which eventually resulted in his death. Over the years, newspapers like *Dinaank*, *Mahanagar* and *Aaj Dinaank* along with the English press have constantly attacked the Sena in their writings.³⁵⁸

The response of the civil society to the violent activities of the Shiv Sena is primarily in the form of well-institutionalized interest groups including the media addressing the legislature and judiciary for action against the activities of the Shiv Sena. The civil society's initiatives in Mumbai have clearly been marked with efforts where they have tried influencing the decisions of the government or judiciary to take action against the members of the Shiv Sena. There are organizations like Youth for Peace addressing the problem of communal violence by focusing on the youth through experimental projects like Salokha. As part of this project, this organization brings together young individuals from different communities and provides them a space to understand each other's culture and accept the diversity which exists in Maharashtra.³⁵⁹ Though organizations like Salokha have not directly targeted the Shiv Sena's activities in Mumbai, they have tried to address one of the core issues, inter-community relations, which the Shiv Sena has exploited over the

past few years to instigate communal riots. Since the Sena has targeted young people from mainly the majority community for carrying forward its violent activities, the work of organizations like Youth for Peace have countered this by focusing on young people and engaging them in inter-community activities.

The problem with the civil society's approach has been that it is not a systematic and planned way of challenging right-wing extremism of the Shiv Sena. The initiatives from civil society have emerged when there were violent attacks or riots. There is no systematic attempt where the civil society decides to incorporate the agencies of the State as well in trying to address this problem. There have been demands from civil society for the state to initiate policy measures, administrative changes and facilitate justice for those who have been victims of extremist attacks, but these demands do not deal with comprehensive and long-term issues to meet the challenge of right-wing extremism. For a democracy to meet this challenge, it is significant that both the agencies of the State and civil society collaboratively approach the problem by targeting the agents and infrastructures of extremism.

DEMOCRACY: A RESPONSE TO RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, to control right-wing extremism and its involvement in the country's domestic and foreign affairs, it is important for democratic regimes to restrict the Army to its constitutional role. Military regimes were exploiting the JI and other extremists to achieve certain objectives. Alliance with the Army drastically changed the approach of the JI from fundamentalist to extremist with involvement in jihad in East Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. Looking at the history of the JI, it is clear that the party has been using its 'street power' to promote fundamentalism and to establish an 'Islamic Order' (based on its own ideology) in Pakistan. Some of the democratic governments in Pakistan have tried to control the right-wing extremism, and democracy is the way for Pakistan to restrict it so as to establish

peace at home and with other countries.

After the 9/11 incident the Musharraf Government made a U-turn on madrassas and on relations with Afghanistan with curbs on hundreds of madrassas in Pakistan as a policy of war against terrorism. It is crucial that the democratic government in Pakistan continues to closely monitor the activities of madrassas in the country, specially those in the hands of extremist elements. Organizations like the JI receive money from foreign elements to promote their agendas in Pakistan. As this is happening in Pakistan through a local organization, the government should monitor the domestic and international activities of such organizations which could be done through financial audits. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Nawaz Sharif Government also demanded the JI to account for the annual grant of Rs. 100 million that it received from the government for over a decade in connection with supporting the Kashmir cause.³⁶⁰

Formerly, in the early years of Pakistan, there were attempts by Liaqat Ali Khan and Gen. Ayub Khan to crush the JI by challenging the party's religious position. The JI being very well-organized nevertheless survived through the difficult times and at present is perhaps the only Islamic geopolitical organization in South Asia 'which has survived effectively beyond the life span of its founder'.³⁶¹

The JI's presence in the right wing is crucial to inculcate intellectual debate in political circles, specially the parliament, on a range of issues from politics to religion and economy. There are several interesting features of the party, such as its organization, intra-party harmony and democracy, which could be adapted by its political rivals. The party has a potential to reform to sustain itself and grow politically, but needs to be more realistic in response to the wishes and needs of the people. Nevertheless, the people of Pakistan are sick of fundamentalism and extremism, because the majority is marginalized and want food, shelter and jobs, and even more, security. The challenge for the JI is to contain its violent activism through its students' wing. However, since the JI's political strength in the form of street power and agitations comes from its

students' wing, the IJT, it is very likely that the party will continue to benefit from the IJT. If so, then the IJT, if not often, then on occasion will resort to violence to support the JI's standpoint on certain issues, at home or abroad. In the recent past, the IJT was supporting militants in Pakistani areas of Swat and Waziristan, and was active as well in sending pro-JI students with military training for jihad in the Afghan–Soviet war. Democratic governments have to carefully watch the activities of the students' organizations like the IJT, and crush such bodies if they continue to be violent. Such initiatives are encouraged to be done by legal measures or through dialogue with the respective political parties.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, the Pakistani government was forced to take certain measures to prove its commitment towards regional peace. In response, the government of Pakistan shut down the political wing of the country's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This was responsible for spying on domestic politics in Pakistan, and benefiting the political motives of erstwhile dictators in the country. However, there are apprehensions whether this move will restrict the ISI elements from having links with Islamic militants in any way. The ISI was involved in creating the IJI, which was comprised of the right-of-centre and Islamic parties such as the JI. The IJI was created by the military to counter the PPP after Zia's death in 1988. Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI 'opposed joining the IJI until he was approached by the Inter-Services Intelligence; then with no counteroffers forthcoming from the People's Party he capitulated'.³⁶²

In the aftermath of attacks in Mumbai, the Government of Pakistan also launched a crackdown on the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, or Army of the Pure), an act which was strongly opposed by the JI. The LeT is known as one of the largest militant organizations in South Asia, mainly operating in Indian-administered Kashmir to liberate Kashmiri Muslims. After the crackdown on the LeT, JI Amir Qazi condemned the act of the government as a 'coward[ly]' action and he also pointed to the Kashmir issue by saying that, 'India has illegally occupied Kashmir where its army is involved in organized genocide of Muslim population.'³⁶³ Considering the JI's standpoint on the

Kashmir issue and its support for militant organizations like the LeT, it is important to contain the party's involvement in international and regional affairs so as not to disturb Pakistan's foreign relations. The new government is seeking peaceful relations with India and is committed to investigating the Mumbai terror attacks of 26–29 November 2008. This message of the Government of Pakistan was delivered by Pakistani High Commissioner to India Shahid Malik.³⁶⁴

There have been some ongoing security discussions through platforms such as the National Security Council in Pakistan, where democratic regimes hold the authority. Such forums could comprehensively discuss and explore possibilities to deal with extremist factors in the country.

During Musharraf's time in power he initiated the media revolution in Pakistan without foreseeing that it would be used against him during his last years in power. The electronic media in particular played an influential role in bringing debates on democracy and authoritarianism into the limelight, and also in projecting the people's struggle in the form of the lawyers' movement in Pakistan. Credit goes to the prominent TV channels, such as Geo and Aaj TV for promoting intellectual and constitutional debates on the country's socio-political and judicial matters through live talk shows. Musharraf and Asif Zardari both tried to control the power of the mainstream TV channels but could not, as TV channels are backed by the civil society. Considering the media's influence in Pakistan, it is of significance to persuade TV channels such as Geo and Aaj TV to promote intellectual debates on right-wing extremism in Pakistan vis-à-vis Pakistan's domestic and foreign affairs. It is important because the electronic media in particular have the power to influence policy makers.

In February 2009, the Pakistani government, troubled by with numerous domestic and international issues, reached a ceasefire agreement with the chief of the Tehrik-i-Nifaaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) to establish peace in the turbulent Swat valley. The TNSM is a movement for the implementation of the sharia and was initiated by Sufi Muhammad in the early 1990s to execute the sharia in Swat. For well over a decade, the TNSM was

penetrating Pakistani areas with the help of the local Taliban and its anti-secular education operations destroyed around 300 schools in the region, primarily girls' schools. Since October 2007, violent clashes became more severe in Swat between the Pakistani security forces and approximately 3,000 militants.³⁶⁵ However, after all this, the secular government ruling at the centre, the PPP, and the secular provincial government of the ANP reached an agreement to allow the local Taliban and the TNSM to implement the sharia in Swat and the neighbouring region. This explanation is to come to a conclusion that at times defensive democracies are exploited by extremists, as was the case of militants in Swat. Democratic governments couldn't bypass the parliament, and the parliament unanimously passed a resolution to support President Zardari to sign the peace deal, irrespective of concerns on human rights abuses in Swat under militants' rule.

Even though democracy is the way for Pakistan to address many of its internal and external challenges, there is no doubt that democracy does provide a channel to right-wing extremists to promote their agenda, as the JI did during the era of Zulfikar Bhutto to declare Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims. Secular Bhutto accommodated religious parties as a practice of 'defence of democracy'. Also, parties like the MQM get a chance to gain bargaining power to negotiate certain demands. A dictator backed the MQM, which was supreme in Karachi on 12 May 2007, and its workers created violent chaos to block the lawyers' movement on Musharraf's order. After coming into power, the PPP Government decided to lift the ban on students' organizations, which is as per democratic norms in most countries, but in Pakistan this might lead to some serious consequences in the presence of violent students' groups such as the IJT and the APMSO. There will be grave consequences if Pakistan's secular democracy becomes a prey to parties like the JI, because they will completely ignore the existing religious diversity in the country as well the rights of many, particularly women. A democratic system in this context has to have certain checks and balances to ensure that the rights of people are equally provided and the lives of people are equally protected.

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY AND APPROACHES FOR
ADDRESSING RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

This section would focus on multi-track diplomacy and approaches within this framework to address right-wing extremism in India and Pakistan. Today, multi-track diplomacy has an established presence where the attempt is to approach peace-building embracing a large network of organizations, disciplines, methodologies and venues for working toward the prevention and resolution of violent conflict around the world. Multi-track diplomacy has now become an important part of India–Pakistan peace initiatives where the focus has shifted from issues to building relationships.³⁶⁶ Nine tracks, which include governments, professional conflict resolution, business, private citizens, research, training and education, activism, religious, funding and public opinion have been recognized within the framework of multi-track diplomacy.³⁶⁷ As part of peace-building, there are several initiatives between India and Pakistan that have been taken in each of these tracks. These include youth workshops facilitated by several South Asian organizations like WISCOMP and RCSS, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry India–Pakistan desk, citizen exchange programmes, special interest groups, and several funding agencies.³⁶⁸ There are also South Asian–level initiatives, such as that of the South Asian Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) based in Nepal, working in partnership with human rights organizations in Pakistan and India. SAFHR organizes an annual peace studies course for young professionals from South Asia. Journalists working in India and Pakistan are connected professionally, and the media could also promote a bilateral debate on right-wing extremism in the Indo-Pak context. In this regard, the advent of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) is a positive move, as SAFMA has been organizing dialogues on the Indo-Pak conflict and regional cooperation. The SAFMA initiative could be uplifted with the collaboration of the South Asian Journalists Association (SAJA).

This section would reflect upon similar initiatives taken between the two countries to address the problem of right-wing extremism

and their contribution to the larger goal of peace-building. This section would also suggest the different options which can be explored as part of the available tracks of multi-track diplomacy for a comprehensive response to right-wing extremism.

At the civil society level, there are several relevant initiatives to address the right-wing extremism, not only in India and Pakistan but also the South Asian level. These are mainly people who have worked at the grass-roots level and have seen various manifestations of communal violence in the name of ethnic and religious differences in the region. A prominent one is the Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD), which has been organizing annual conventions since 1994 to provide platforms to common people from the two countries to raise their voices in relation to peace and democracy in India and Pakistan. There is also the South Asian Diaspora, which is well aware of the situation and is concerned for their region, and have come up with initiatives like the Alliance for Secular and Democratic South Asia in the US, and the South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy in Canada. It is evident that there are various initiatives debating democracy and secularism in the South Asian context, and such forums have to be expanded to tackle right-wing extremism which could be done with the help of a consortium of these initiatives. Perhaps it is time for the PIPFPD to devote a special convention to address right-wing extremism in India and Pakistan.

While right-wing extremism has been an important concern in the discussions featuring at different levels of diplomacy between India and Pakistan, these initiatives have restricted themselves to addressing issues related to terrorism. The problems and threats posed by extremist political parties and the prejudices these parties encourage against the ‘other’ country have not featured in a serious manner. The non-official dialogue between retired government officials or between eminent members of civil society from both countries has contributed to initiatives to address terrorism in Kashmir and insurgency, being a vital aspect of such initiatives. For instance, the Neemrana initiative between the two countries was a way to test some of the official issues at a non-official level, the vantage

point of these discussions being those which remained unresolved at the official dialogues.³⁶⁹ These were important diplomatic ventures which served the problem of initiating some dialogue where there seemed to be no paths being made between India and Pakistan. But these forums could not become the platform for discussions on political extremism and the initiatives to address the problems posed by them in both the countries.

Considering available lessons of democracy in India and pitfalls in Pakistan, there is possibly a need to initiate a bilateral Track Two forum to discuss how democracy can possibly deal with extremist elements in both countries, specially when right-wing extremists do influence foreign policies in both countries. In this regard, the Indo-Pak People's Forum for Peace is encouraged to initiate such bilateral projects.

Conclusion

This study suggests that given the complex characteristics of parties like the Shiv Sena and the JI, extremism in South Asia cannot have singular definitions. The case of the Shiv Sena in India and the JI in Pakistan brings to the fore two completely different variants of right-wing extremism in the South Asian region. There are several ways in which the politics of these two political parties have been described and studied earlier. This work has argued that another way to understand the politics of the Shiv Sena and JI is by looking at the embodiment of right-wing extremist characteristics in them. The Shiv Sena, virtually confined to the Maharashtra region, has made inroads into the democratic process and yet is indicative of a political party that has very little patience for democratic values and sentiments. The JI, with its widespread global network, has been able to survive because of its strong organizational roots and on the basis of the covert and overt support that it has received from military regimes in Pakistan. Ironically, while democracy has allowed the space for an extremist political party like the Shiv Sena to gain legitimacy at a regional level, the same democracy could perhaps be a solution to keep the extremist politics of the JI at bay in Pakistan.

The ability of democracy (as mentioned in the earlier chapters) both in providing space for all kinds of ideological groups to survive and also in restraining some of the extremist groups from completely abandoning the democratic path is perhaps why the system is viewed suitable as a means of combating right-wing extremism in both countries. This is not to suggest that just the presence of democratically elected regimes can address the problems that emerge from the existence of parties like the Shiv Sena and the JI. Instead, the argument being made is for a sustained functioning

of a system where more than the procedural democratic principles, the substantive principles of protecting the rights of all the sections are valued.

The security concerns—or rather the insecurities—that emerge from the tactics of these parties in South Asia have to be seen beyond the paradigm of law-and-order concerns. This perhaps comes out more starkly from the discussion on civil-society initiatives to combat the challenge of right-wing extremism in South Asia. The role of the civil society acquires particular significance when right-wing extremist parties obtain power and legitimacy through democratic processes. The key recommendation which emanates from this study is the idea of India and Pakistan engaging at the level of multi-track diplomacy to address the concerns that emerge from right-wing extremist parties in both countries.

An approach needs to be developed where initiatives include both civil society and the different structures of the State as part of the problem-solving technique for right-wing extremism. Therefore, combating right-wing extremism is not workable at one level but at several levels and structures. The media, particularly in the case of Pakistan, have emerged as strong weapons writing against the tactics of extremist parties like the JI. Even when an extremist party like the Shiv Sena is not making electoral gains, it manages to draw attention by reviving the cause of the Maharashtrians or the majority religion and while doing so, violence becomes a possible means of attracting immediate attention. The future of the Shiv Sena is secure, given the nature of politics based on identity which has taken a prominent character in India. However, the JI in Pakistan has to work hard to find its way through the dominant ethnic politics in the country, which is apparently in a way stronger than religious politics. Ethnic-, religious- and caste-based issues have acquired centre stage in the political continuum, therefore, it becomes easier for these parties in such an environment to thrive on the basis of their extremist ideology. The way to address right-wing extremism is not in removing them, but in persuading, forcing and directing them towards rational policies which are inclusive rather than exclusive to certain groups.

While this study has given an understanding of some of the aspects of right-wing extremism in the region, the scope of this study can be expanded by bringing in other political parties like the MQM in Pakistan within the study of right-wing extremist parties. The Shiv Sena's politics are similar to those of the MQM, as both have a strong regional base and try to weave their politics around ethnic issues. The MQM also emerged as a movement of muhajirs in Karachi. In addition, both the Sena and MQM have strong regional roots in two of the biggest metropolises and financial capitals of South Asia, namely, Mumbai and Karachi. Moreover, to further explore the pan-Islamic movements in South Asia, specially in connection with JI factions, this study provides enough foundation for a comparative study of the pan-Islamism in Pakistan, India, Indian-administered Kashmir, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The JI in Pakistan maintains cordial relations with JI (pan-Islamic) movements in other parts of South Asia, due to the fact they were all initiated as a single movement in the pre-Partition era, and all subscribe to the philosophy and ideology of Maududi. It will be an interesting study to compare these various movements striving for the same objective of the umma, though working under different socio-economic and political spheres. Collaborative studies should be further encouraged to compressively explore non-traditional security issues that emerge from the politics of right-wing extremism in South Asia, which will pave the way for regional initiatives to address these challenges that are similar to most of the countries in the region.

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²⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader*, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007, p. 3.

²¹ This is evident in the writings of most of the leaders of Hindu nationalism, who include Savarkar, Golwalkar, the first President of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya and Balraj Madhok.

²² Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalism*, p. 13.

²³ Craig Baxter, *The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969, p. 31.

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³⁸ S. V. R. Nasr, *International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2000, p. 9.

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⁶² Dionne Bunsha, 'Trouble in the Air', *Frontline*, vol. 19, no. 22, 26 October–8 November 2002.

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⁶⁴ Based on the interview of a Shiv Sena activist from Ambarnath on 1 May 2006.

⁶⁵ Based on the interview of a Shiv Sena pramukh (leader) at Bandra, Mumbai on 10 May 2006.

⁶⁶ *Gata, Vibha* and *Upshakhas* are levels of the hierarchy within the Shiv Sena, each level coming above the previous one, with the Shiv Sena *Pramukh* being at the top of this hierarchy.

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