It is a reality that over the years South Asian politics has been characterized by an increasing level of violence. The initial years after independence did see the emergence of some conflicts arising from the assertion of ethnic identities. However, it was only in the late 1960s that some of these conflicts intensified. And since then there has been an increasing use of violence in the articulation of demands, political bargaining and even attempts to capture state power. Increasingly, armed struggle has become a dominant mode of political action. As the South Asian states have grown and modernized, the societies have progressively moved towards a violent socio-political order.

The politics of violence in South Asia can be linked to the contradictions generated by the development process underway in South Asia. The model of development that was adopted by the South Asian states was based on the urge to emulate and catch up with the developed countries. This was based on an erroneous assumption that rapid economic development would reduce the potential for violent conflict in the heterogeneous South Asian societies. It was believed that the processes of economic development would erode and break down proximate identities. In reality, however, the reverse process is underway with the assertion of various linguistic, religious and ethnic identities.

The nature and the political economy of the state was instrumental in the emergence of most of these conflicts which have gradually became violent. The South Asian states are not neutral apparatuses but function in the interest of a coalition of classes and ethnic groups or a military-bureaucratic oligarchy. Those groups or classes exercising power within the state apparatus bear upon the development policies adopted by the state. Thus, the nature and political economy of the state in South Asia is an important component in the understanding of the problem of distribution of resources. In Pakistan, the dominance of the much larger nationalities of Punjabis and Pashtuns in the military bureaucratic oligarchy enabled them to corner a larger share of the resources and opportunities in comparison to the Baluchis and the Muhajirs. Bengali Muslim domination in Bangladesh and Sinhala majoritarianism in Sri Lanka also skewed the pattern of resource allocation against the Chakmas and the Tamils respectively. In the case of India, the nature of the state and its policies heightened conflicts in those cases where ethno-national or ethno-religious contradictions and rivalries historically persisted.

The development process was to produce a structure of opportunities that was inequitable. The emphasis on capital accumulation for rapid industrialization, resulted in the uneven distribution of resources to the detriment of some regions and the poor classes. And this pattern was not only in regard to the resources that were at the disposal of the state but also of the resources that originally belonged to the people or to which they had free and easy access. Initially, it was thought that these inequalities and disparities — between classes and regions — were transitory, largely due to the inevitable lag between capital accumulation and redistribution, and would dissipate with further economic growth.

The pace, content and dynamics of the uneven development patterns in South Asia, rather than so much the lack of development, that has been the predominant cause of violence in South Asia. The development process resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases and relatively faster development in some cases. Both conditions have offered the grounds for the growth of violent movements. The levels of violence among the groups that have been economically neglected has not been very high. The levels of violence amongst groups that have had a perception of relative deprivation have been very high. Thus, while the violence associated with the Chakmas in Bangladesh, the Baluch movement in Pakistan, the Naxalites and some insurgent groups in North-east India has not been very intense and enduring, but the violent movements of the Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, Muhajirs in Pakistan and the Tamils and JVP in Sri Lanka has been very intense. 

The reasons why these groups have been able to sustain a high level of violence is either because of the rise of a young petty bourgeois class which has been successful in articulating their demands or because of a generational shift in the leadership which has brought forward a young petty bourgeois class to the forefront in some struggles. It is ironic that it was due to the welfare measures of the states that has resulted in the emergence of such a class. Most of the South Asian states are today subjected to so much of violence because of the incapacity of the states to fulfill the aspirations of this class.

The successful mobilization in support of violence that some of these groups have made is due to their command over normative and coercive resources. Groups that have been able to sustain high levels of violence have been aided bysome variable conditions like geographical location and extent of external support. These have been strong determining factors in the capacity of these groups to continue their violent campaign and stand up to counter-violence. States have been finding it difficult to respond to violence and the contestation between state and opposition groups essentially seems to be a comparison between who has a better command over normative and coercive resources. So far, with the exception of the case of the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan, South Asian states seem to have a better hold over normative and coercive resources. There is very little indication that the violent strategies of the insurgent groups would succeed in their goals, at best it would be able to make the state a little more responsive.

The overall consequences or impact of violence on state and society is overwhelming. Violence as one of the available modes of political action in the pursuit of socio-economic and political change does result in some amount of redistribution of resources. This may be viewed as positive, even though it may be against our normative cognizance, in balancing out the structural inequalities inherent or created in societies. The experience in South Asia is that the ruling classes, do in fact, succumb to the idiom of violence even while devising means and methods to cope with violence.

The positive aspect is that the South Asian states have shown the capacity to sustain democratic processes and preserve democratic institutions while coping with violence. As the levels of violence have increased, so also has there been a simultaneous strengthening of the coercive state apparatus. The negative trend and probably of much more serious concern has been the ability of most of the South Asian states to make use of intangible, unformalized, extra-constitutional and extra-legal agencies of state violence in their counter-violence strategies so that the questions of legality and accountability can be side-stepped.

There is a mutuality in the interaction between the politics of development and the politics of violence. The uneven development process engenders violence, and in turn violence is highly disruptive in the developmental process. It is a major factor in distracting the state from the developmental agenda. Scarce resources are consumed and lost in the containment of violence. There is little doubt that tremendous amount of developmental potential is lost in the violence-ridden societies of South Asia. Resources lost in meeting the costs of violence can be saved and invested in the growing costs of modernization. Peace and stability are preconditions to bring what is known as peace-dividends in violence-ridden societies like South Asia’s. There is no doubt that rapid economic growth is necessary for development but it is not sufficient to promote economic equity. For that, it is important to devise a set of institutions and self-regulatory mechanisms that will ensure equitable distribution.

Previous