The
contradictions generated by the development process in South Asia has engendered
violence. But in a mutually interacting fashion violence, on the other
hand, is dysfunctional in the development process itself. Generally, the
effect of violence is more noticeable on the economy but the impact of
violence on political institutions and society can also have its own dynamism,
in the sense in the way in which state and society react and cope with
it. One of the primary concerns when one looks at state and violence is
whether states have the capacity to sustain democratic institutions and
processes while coping with conflict and violence.
In
the context of South Asia, states have been largely able to preserve the
democratic order but have built mechanisms within the democratic space,
or in some cases they have evolved themselves, to deal with violence. The
consequences of violence are, in fact overwhelming, and states and societies
have been wanting in their responses. On one side violence tends to make
the state react and sensitizes it but on the other it also strengthens
the coercive apparatus of the state. States can justify this strengthening
on the basis of the need of the state to exercise control and dominance
over society.
Economic
Costs of Violence
The
consequences of violence on development efforts is much more perceptible
in its economic aspects. There is little doubt that violence retards the
pace of economic growth. It can slow economic growth by destroying physical
infrastructure; also by the loss of mandays, output and tax revenue; motivating
talented individuals to migrate; scaring away foreign investments; extra
expenditure due to managing the conflict and the rehabilitation of displaced
persons. All the above consequences may not be operative simultaneously
or at the same time as a consequence of violence. To what extent they would
all become operative would depend on the nature and intensity of violence.
A detailed and accurate estimation of economic losses suffered due to violence
would be very difficult to make, it is possible to make a broad assessment
on the basis of secondary sources data.1 But what is important
is to know the ways in which violence can affect the economy.
The
violence in Kashmir has affected its development and people. It has particularly
severely affected the main sector of the economy — the tourist industry.
In 1988, 722,000 people visited Kashmir injecting $ 200 million into the
local economy, in 1992 only 10,400 visited. Related to the tourism industry,
the hotel industry has also suffered. Incomes derived from tourists by
taxi-drivers, bus companies and the handicrafts trade have declined accordingly.
A large number of houseboat owners have left to seek other forms of activity.
The cottage industry has also been seriously effected, specifically the
daily wage earners.2
In
Sri Lanka, estimates of physical destruction in the north-east for the
period from 1983 to July 1987 was about Rs. 23.5 billion (US $ 712 million).
By 1987, the government had spent Rs. 586 million on rehabilitation of
refugees. The loss from the tourism sector from 1983 to 1988 was about
Rs. 17.3 billion (US $ 523 million). Foreign investments dropped from US
$ 66 million in 1982 to $ 22 million in 1986.3 The Institute
of Policy Studies report estimates that the total annual cost of the ethnic
conflict is around US $ 2.2 billion, which is about 22 per cent of Sri
Lanka’s GDP. The north east region which is rich in resources such as agriculture
and fisheries, have not contributed to the economy since the outbreak of
the conflict in 1983. And if the conflict continues and escalates, it may
rise to 25 per cent.4 However, assessment by other experts
put the loss in the violent conflict as five per cent of the GDP. If the
violence can be contained, Sri Lanka could add three per cent to its GDP.5
Karachi,
which is the hub of the Pakistani economy has been effected terribly by
the violence. A major aspect of this is the flight of capital to other
industrial centres in Punjab.6 A study commissioned by
the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) concluded that a working
day lost by strike in Karachi costs Rs. 1.3 billion ($ 38 million) and
in 1995 a total of 34 working days were lost as a result of strikes called
by the MQM.7
Economy
and Violent Strategies
Economic
growth and development are crucial for state support. And that is why militants
and insurgents adopt a deliberate strategy of economic disruption. This
strategy involves damaging state and private property, disrupting the public
sector economy, and disorganizing public transport and other essential
services and militarily targeting development projects which might erode
the support base of the insurgents. The consequence of this is that affected
states are compelled to divert their limited resources to counter the challenge
posed by the insurgents.
In
South Asia probably no other group has successfully pursued this strategy
than the JVP. In three days of rioting from 29 to 31 July 1987, as a reaction
to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, the JVP attacked and burnt
government offices and property. The government estimated the total property
damage to be around Rs. 4 billion. The Ceylon Transport Board buses were
the hardest hit, 453 of which were destroyed.8
The
JVP’s strategy of hitting the key sectors in the economy badly hit the
tea gardens in the Uva and Badulla areas and coconut and rubber estates
in the south. Over 2,09,000 kilograms of tea were destroyed by the JVP
in the central provinces. Tea exports is one of the main foreign exchange
earners of the country, which earned Rs. 12.29 billion in 1988.9
Both the state?owned and private tea gardens were affected by the JVP.
They were able to paralyze various sectors of the economy like transport,
telecommunications, business, industry, banks, etc.10
By the extensive use of violence, the JVP destroyed public property worth
Rs. 95,000 million.11
The
Tamil militants, especially the LTTE, have also been selectively targeting
physical infrastructure and hitting at key sectors which would hurt the
Sri Lankan economy. By November 1985, due to several attacks the railways
had lost Rs.90 million.12 In May 1986, an entire train
was set on fire causing damages worth Rs.100 million.13
The state owned Air Lanka has lost two planes due to terrorist attacks
by Tamil militants. More recently, the Central Bank and Oil tanks have
been bombed by the LTTE causing enormous losses.
The
Shanti Bahini in Bangladesh, has also attempted a strategy of economic
disruption, albeit at a low level.14 Its terrorist attacks
were primarily targeted at developmental activity. It carried terrorist
activities against the members of foreign oil companies15
or other developmental agencies working in the vicinity. This was primarily
intended to discourage all kinds of developmental works in the region from
which the government could reap benefits. As mentioned earlier, it also
attacked government-sponsored settlements in the CHT.
Security
Expenditures
It
is very difficult to make categorical statements about how much states
spend on internal security, in preserving order, in containing violence.
Such expenditures are cleverly hidden under various heads. Even unofficial
estimates that are available may not be very accurate and availability
of data may be selective. But the idea here is only to get some estimates
if not the actual costs so as to get a perspective on the impact of domestic
violence.
In
the case of India and Pakistan, it is more difficult to come across data
on internal security expenditures as they are subsumed under general defence
expenditures. One cannot make a direct linkage between allocation for the
defence budget and expenditures on internal security. Some assessments,
nevertheless are available. In 1992, Punjab’s annual security budget had
gone up from Rs. 150 million to Rs. 3 billion — an increase of almost 2000
per cent.16 By 1994, the government of India was spending
about Rs. 2 crore everyday on the maintenance of security forces in Kashmir.17
In Pakistan, the budget of the police and the paramilitary forces have
been going up. In 1996, the budget of the police was Rs. 2,744 million
and the Rangers Rs. 1,809 million. An expenditure of Rs. 20 million per
day.18
In
small countries like Sri Lanka, it is much more easy to link the rising
defence expenditures and internal policing or war as one may view it. Between
1978 and 1982, there was a two fold increase in the military expenditure
from Rs. 560 million to Rs. 1118 million but in the next five years there
was a 700 per cent increase in the defence expenditure rising to Rs. 11.4
billion.19 As a share of the total expenditure, defence
expenditure had risen from 3.5 per cent in 1978 to 15.5 per cent in 1987.
The defence spending in Sri Lanka has been overshooting the budget in the
last two years. In 1996 the budgeted figure of Rs. 38 billion ($ 701 million)
was increased by Rs. 10 billion.20 A Sri Lankan minister
disclosed in 1996 that the Sri Lankan government was spending Rs.110 million
a day on containing violence in the north east.21
The
Bangladesh government spends huge sums of money in the CHT in the deployment
of security forces and in the effort to erode the support base of the insurgents.
About Taka 1.5 crore is spent everyday in the CHT by the army.22
The defence budget for 1996 was Taka 20.7 billion ($ 503 million).23
Militarization
of State and Civil Society
The
impact of violence on the state structure is that it increases militarization
of both state and civil society. It forces the already strained states
to build military and paramilitary forces at the expense of other sectors.
Strong military forces then have the potential to threaten democratic institutions
and civil society. South Asian states have abundant experience of this
process.
The
security forces have time and again unquestioningly followed the decision
of the political leaders to get involved in domestic peacekeeping. Its
only recently that in India the army has publicly expressed some amount
of resentment against its being used in essentially firefighting in internal
conflict situations. The army gets deployed despite a massive expansion
in the strength of the paramilitary forces and the creation of specialized
units to tackle insurgency. The National Security Guards (NSG) patterned
on the German GSG-9 and the Rashtriya (National) Rifles drawn from
the army have been created specifically so as obviate the need for the
regular army to be deployed in partisan disputes. The growth in the size
of the paramilitary forces has been phenomenal. The Border Security Force
(BSF) which had 25 battalions when it was set up in 1965, by 1994 had 140
battalions. At present it has 149 battalions. The Central Reserve police
Force (CRPF) has grown from 80 battalions in 1986 to 119 in 1994.The growth
in the CRPF between 1981-91 was 55 per cent. The BSF had a growth of 35
per cent between 1986 and 1991. The Assam rifles nearly doubled from 20
to 39 between 1986 and 1991. Between 1986 and 1994, the budget of the paramilitary
forces had doubled to be around Rs. 30 billion per year.24
The growth in all these units can be correlated to the escalating levels
of violence in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir.
In
Bangladesh, since 1976 there has been a massive increase in military personnel
in the CHT district. Some 30,000 regulars as well as para military forces
had been massed by 1980 and a naval unit had been established on the Kaptai
lake. The number of police stations had more than doubled since 1976 from
12 to 28.25 Two-thirds troops of the Bangladesh army are
believed to be in the CHT.26 In 1992 about 50,000 military
personnel were deployed in the CHT, stationed in about 400 camps.27
According to some estimates — there is atleast one member of the
security forces for every ten person.28 By the end of
1995, there were five brigades of the army deployed in the CHT besides
the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and the Ansars.29
In
1976, the government had formed a CHT Development Board (CHTDB) to implement
different multi-sectoral special development projects. The programmes of
the CHTDB were implemented outside the normal annual development programmes.
The Commissioner of the Chittagong Division was originally the Chairman
of the Board and the District Commissioner of CHT its Vice-Chairman. In
March 1982, when Martial Law was imposed in the country the General Officer
Commanding (GOC) of the Chittagong division took over as the Chairman of
the board. The situation has remained unchanged despite a civilian government
being in power since 1991. The powers of the Chairman are quite extensive.
He assigns tasks to the Board officials and is responsible for their appointments
and promotions. He controls and allocates all development funds and appoints
members of the consultative committee.30 From 1979 to
May 1995, the government implemented 11 special projects at a cost of 1.49
billion Takas. The government also undertakes development programmes to
alleviate grievances of the tribals. Under a special five year plan (1984-85
to 1990-91), the government spent 2.8 billion Takas to implement various
development programmes including road communication, telecom service, electrification,
water supply, infrastructure for Jhumia rehabilitation, etc.
Since
the rise in violence in the ethnic conflict in only eight years the strength
of the Sri Lankan armed forces increased by 500 per cent. It went up from
16,000 to 82,000.31 At present it is about 115,000.32
Weaponization
of Societies
The
proliferation or diffusion of small arms and light weapons in large parts
of the developing societies is a post-cold war reality. The demise of the
cold war and the mushrooming and intensification of domestic conflicts
in developing societies has resulted in what one may call the “weaponization
of societies.” It is a state where a large quantity of weapons, that too
automatic weapons, is in the possession of private individuals and groups.
It is not very difficult nowadays for insurgent groups to acquire sophisticated
weapons from the private arms market. This is a dynamic process, but states
can also be held responsible in the way they have contributed in weaponizing
their own societies — by promoting and arming private groups in their counter-violence
programmes.
It
is very difficult to assess how much of these weapons are in the possession
of the insurgent groups. But one thing is clear they are increasing in
numbers and becoming more sophisticated. During the Operation cleanup,
the MQM said that the army believed there were 81,000 Kalashnikov series
of rifles in Karachi alone, and not even 81 were recovered.33
However, authorities have said that about 12,948 weapons were recovered.34
Unofficial estimates of weapons in Karachi is around 2,00,000.35
The Sri Lankan army has also distributed weapons among the settlers in
the north and the east. The Bangladesh government has also trained and
armed settlers in the CHT. A core group of the settlers are believed to
be made up of ex-servicemen and the rest given arms and training.36
In this way vigilante groups armed by the government were among the new
settlers in the area.37 Further, divisions within the
tribals have been created to weaken the Shanti Bahini. For instance, a
tribal group called the `Hill Council for Resisting Terrorism’ has been
floated to resist the Shanti Bahini,38 which probably
has the government’s support.
Armed
Might, Hegemony and Lack of Political Alternatives
It
is not very difficult to visualize the linkages between armed might, hegemony
and lack of political alternatives. Capacity of insurgent groups to sustain
violence for a fairly long period, challenging the monopoly of the state
over violence is reflective of hegemony in society, at times leading to
a situation where there does not seem to be any other alternative to the
resolution of a conflict. This is the situation that Sri Lanka seems to
be facing today.
Earlier,
it was the JVP that had been able to create this hegemony, even though
for a very brief period of time, due to its armed might. This has been
done both by the JVP and the LTTE in the course of their political action
by unleashing violence not only against the state but also against political
rivals. And by the use of violence, they did try to create a situation
where there was no alternative to them. The assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga,
the popular leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP), and
the subsequent attacks on the SLMP leadership may be interpreted as the
JVP’s tactics of eliminating any other force which was gaining support
within their social base — the youth. The LTTE has been far more successful
in liquidating individuals and organizations which it considered as its
potential enemies in its insane drive for political hegemony. Both the
TELO and PLOTE were wiped out because of their dominance in terms of arms
and men.39
The
Invisible and not so-Invisible Structures of the Coercive State Apparatus
While
the deployment of security forces in the maintenance of internal security
is tangible, but what is fearful and a matter of serious concern is they
have been “paralleled, supplemented and subsumed by a host of extra-constitutional
and extra-legal organs of state power — death squads and vigilante groups.”40
A development of frightful intensity that was witnessed during the counter-violence
against the JVP. While against the tangible agencies of state violence,
these are the intangible “`un-formalized’ agencies of state violence throughwhich
questions of legality, constitutionality and accountability of a variety
of state practices can be circumvented.”41 These developments
just go to prove that even democratic states can devise ways and means
to put extra teeth to their repressive state apparatus without compromising
on their democratic credentials. Even democratic states can manipulate
processes and institutions to expand their capacity to use coercive power.
For instance in the case of India, the vast coercive apparatus of the state
has been built up by laws.
As
against these invisible structures, there are these not so-invisible structures
about which the states are not in the least shy. The Pakistan army split
the MQM and created the Haqiqi faction. That this faction has no popular
support is evident from the fact that it has not won a single seat in Karachi
even when the MQM has boycotted elections. A large number of deaths in
Karachi city are reprisal killings or extra-judicial killings.42
No one seems to know who is behind these. However, there are a large number
of pointing fingers. While some Pakistan Muslim League (N) members are
accusing the MQM, the MQM is openly blaming the intelligence agencies for
these.43 A large number of deaths result from the clashes
between the Haqiqi faction and the MQM.
In
Kashmir, the not so-invisible structures are former militants, armed and
supported by the army, BSF or the Rashtriya Rifles. They are in fact small
armies of surrendered militants who are fighting against the Pakistan trained
and supported militants.44 But the fear always remain
that some of them may rejoin the militant outfits again.45
Social
Consequences of Violence
The
social consequences of violence are much more severe and has a deeper impact
than the economic and political consequences. While the economic consequences
are temporary and transient, they can be built up and regenerated, but
the same may not be the case with the impact on individual and mass psyche.
It will take a considerable longer period of time to get out of a mental
frame and change attitudes in regard to experiences of violence — both
as a perpetrator and as a victim. The social consequences of violence can
manifest both at the material as well as the psychological level.
Human
Costs
According
to the SIPRI Yearbook till 1995, 37,000 people had been killed in only
the Sikh and Kashmir conflict in India. In Bangladesh so far 3,000 to 3,500
men have lost their lives. And in Sri Lanka 32,000 men.46
The LTTE has said that since the outbreak of the violence it has lost 9,301
men including 94 of its Black Tigers. During 1996, it claimed that it had
killed 3,651 government soldiers.47 Possibly more than
50,000 people have already been killed in the ensuing violent conflict.
Social
Acceptance of Violence
Increasingly
civil society is coming to terms with political violence as an acceptable
mode of political behaviour whether by the state or anti-state forces.
This mass legitimization of political violence is symptomatic of the present
incapacity of the society to produce indigenous arguments for non-violence.
One disturbing aspect of the social acceptance of political violence is
that it dehumanizes society and prepares social space for long term processes
of militarization at various levels. Militarization suggests more than
the strengthening of militaristic institutions directly engaged in violent
conflicts. It also means the social acceptance of militarism as the legitimate
and correct form of political practice in cases of crises, in resolving
conflicts.
Social
Harmony
Once
societies have undergone the experience of violence, it will be fundamentally
difficult to restore the previous (pre-violent stage) social harmony. Violence
introduces a certain discourse in political bargaining, that it becomes
the easiest resort in case of any differences, tensions and conflicts.
There is a certain process that individuals and social groups also have
to undergo that is disturbing — for instance, the loss of innocence of
simple hill tribes.
There
are certain other social consequences of violence like the criminalization
of political movements. Criminal elements who take advantage of violent
political conflicts are not desirous of social harmony and are interested
in maintaining conflict situations.
State
Responses
Though
violence is an outcome of the nature of state structures and political
economy, but states have a problem in accepting this argument. “Few governments
can accept the view that it was their own policy deficiencies which drove
people to violence. Governments more frequently prefer to picture insurrections
as caused by misguided people lured on by some false prophet or evil conspiracy.
Such a characterization has the virtue of making officials appear to be
on the side of reason and their enemies essentially fools.”48
Because
of such a perception, therefore, it is difficult to find a coherent response
to violence. Invariably, though with certain exceptions, the attempt is
to explain violence as not emanating from within one’s respective societies
but something that is induced from outside by enemy states or neighbouring
countries that wish them to be unstable. Even though this is not an honest
analysis but nevertheless, not being entirely untrue has only strengthened
the resolve of the states in their justification to use force and augment
and strengthen their coercive resources.
None
of the South Asian states have had a policy framework to respond to violence.
If there has been any policy framework at all, it has been of a reactive
character. States have shown a remarkable incapacity in assessing conflict
situations and intervening before the onset of violence. The interventions
have generally followed agitations or insurgency situations. Very rarely
has there been a policy which has contained or de-escalated the levels
of violence by a political response.
Sometimes,
the problems have been compounded by administratively manipulated solutions
which reduced the scope of negotiations. Like in Assam, Congress leaders
used the immigrants support as a crucial vote bank for their electoral
and mobilizational success. In India, the lack of responsiveness in general
at the centre after 1980 contributed to thedesperation of some of the insurgent
groups.
The
role of personalities has also played an important part in the kind of
interventions that the state has made in various situations. Indira Gandhi’s
response to the Sikh agitation and J.R. Jayewardene’s response to Tamil
militancy in Sri Lanka are examples of the way in which political leaders
have displayed an insensitivity in adopting a hardline approach right from
the beginning in responding to emerging militancy.
Increasingly,
there has been a realization that without addressing the development needs
of the people or sharing power there cannot be a proper response to violence.
In India the Mizo National Front (MNF) was weaned back to the parliamentary
process by giving substantial concessions in terms of political power.
The same was the case with the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) who also
accepted a compromise instead of their demand for a ‘Free Tripura’. This
approach was also employed in tackling the ULFA insurgency. While some
leaders and cadres were weaned and rehabilitated,49 the
hardcore have not relented.
Similarly,
in the case of the Baluch movement, the moderate leaders were weaned by
President Zia-ul-Haq and he tried a more persuasive method to tackle the
problem of underdevelopment by allocating massive funds for the development
of Baluchistan. The fifth five year plan (1977-1982) increased expenditure
in the province fivefold.
A
mix of persuasive and coercive methods have characterized the policy of
the Bangladesh government towards the violence by the tribal people in
the CHT. On one hand, it is continuing peace talks with the leaders of
the Shanti Bahini to find a political solution. At various points of time,
it has declared a general amnesty to encourage the tribal insurgents to
surrender on the assurance that they would be helped in rehabilitating
themselves. On the other hand, the government also persists with a sophisticated
counter insurgency programme.
NOTES
AND REFERENCES
1.
Some studies have tried to evolve a methodology to study the economic costs
of violence. Specifically in regard to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,
see, John M. Richardson, Jr and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Measuring
the Economic Dimensions of Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict,” in S. W. R. D.
Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict:
International Perspectives (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp.194-223.
The Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, is also conducting a study to
measure the economic costs of the conflict. The report is as yet not finalized
but one may refer to the preliminary draft of this report. See Saman Kelegama
and others, The Economic Cost of the North-East Conflict in Sri Lanka,
Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, September 1995.
Richardson
and Samarasinghe’s study tries to break down the consequences into three
categories — primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary costs are direct
consequences like destruction of physical infrastructure, security expenditures
due to containing the violence, resources spent in rehabilitation, etc.
Secondary costs are indirect costs — the effects of which are known only
in the long run. These are due to the loss of production, investment and
capital flight, etc. Tertiary costs are the medium to long term economic
impacts resulting from instability, uncertainty, etc.
2.
Nils Bhinda, “The Kashmir Conflict (1990-),” in Michael Cranna (ed.), The
True Cost of Conflict (New York: The New Press, 1994).
3.
Richardson and Samarasinghe, Op. Cit., pp.199-203.
4.
Saman Kelegama and others, Op. Cit.
5.
Interview of Dr. Lal Jayewardene, Economic Adviser to the President of
Sri Lanka, Colombo, February 1997. Also see, “An Economy Affected by War,”
Tamil
Times, 15 May 1996, p.7.
6.
Azhar Abbas, “Trading Places,” Herald, July 1995, pp.45-46.
7.
Cited from Moonis Ahmar, “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi
Crisis,” Asian Survey, vol.36, no.10, October 1996, p.1035.
8.
Since the announcement of the accord on 23 July 1987, there was general
unrest and a campaign against the accord by certain nationalist forces
and even opposition political parties. See Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka:
A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy: Institute of
Fundamental Studies, 1990), pp.233?235.
9.
Seema Guha, “No JVP Indication About Cease-fire,”
Times of India,
25 September 1989.
10.
Gamini Navaratne, “JVP’s Firm Hold over Sri Lanka,” Times of India,
1 August 1989.
11.
Daily
News
(Colombo), 9 May 1991.
12.
S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, “Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development
in Sri Lanka,” in Paul Groves (ed.), Economic Development and Social
Change in Sri Lanka: A Spatial And Social Analysis (New Delhi: Manohar
Publishers, 1996), p.278.
13.
ibid.
14.
Public
Opinion and Trends Analyses (POT), Bangladesh Series (New Delhi), vol.18,
no.259, 16 November 1993, p.1427.
15.
In January 1984, the Shanti Bahini kidnapped five Shell employees. Shell
stuck a deal with the Shanti Bahini to release their employees but soon
after, closed its operations in Bangladesh.
16.
Paul Wallace,”Political Violence and Terrorism in India,” in Martha Crenshaw
(ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995), p.403
17.
P. S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, (New
Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994), p.100.
18.
Syed Sikander Mehdi, “Pakistan: Social Development as an Imperative of
National Security,” National Development and Security (Rawalpindi),
vol.5, no.2, November 1996, p.55.
19.
Srikant Mohapatra, “Sri Lanka: Threat Perception and Defence Build-Up,”
Strategic
Analysis, vol.15, no.3, June 1992, p.254.
20.
“War Burden Puts Lankan Economy in the Red,” Pioneer, 18 August
1996.
21.
“Rs. 110 m Spent Daily on War,” Daily Observer (Colombo), 13 March
1996.
22.
Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996.
23.
Military
Balance, 1996/97, The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, p.158.
24.
All the above figures on the paramilitary forces have been cited from Shekhar
Gupta, “India Redefines its Role: An Analysis of India’s Changing Internal
Dynamics and their Impact on Foreign Relations,” Adelphi Paper,
no.293, pp.34-35.
25.
The
Chittagong Hill Tracts: Militarization, Oppression and the Hill Tribes,
Anti-Slavery Society, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series, Report
No.2, 1984, p.57.
26.
Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996.
27.
“Repatriation of Refugees: Centre asked to Persuade Dhaka,” Statesman,
3 October 1992.
28.
See, Syed Anwar Hussain, “Ethnicity and Security of Bangladesh,” in Iftekharuzzam
(ed.), South Asia’s Security: Primacy of Internal Dimension (Dhaka:
Academic Publishers, 1994), p.183.
29.
“Chakma Insurgency Costs Government Taka 4 billion Per Year,” POT, Bangladesh
Series, vol.20, no.272, 9 December 1995, p.1138.
30.
Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, New Hall College,
Cambridge, 1995, p.131
31.
Mohapatra, Op.Cit., p.250.
32.
Military
Balance, 1996/97, Op.Cit., p.166.
33.
What
Next in Sindh? What the People Say, Report by the HRCP Fact-Finding
Mission, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, June 1994, p.10.
34.
ibid., p.46.
35.
Personal interviews, Karachi, May 1997.
36.
Partho Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar,
1989), p.77.
37.
Shelton U. Kodikara, “Bangladesh”, in Shelton U. Kodikara (ed.), External
Compulsions of South Asian Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1993),
p.143.
38.
“New Tribal Group to Oppose Shanti Bahini,” POT, Bangladesh Series,
vol.19, no.81, 8 April 1994, p.323.
39.
M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New
Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994), pp. 143, 193.
40.
Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Militarization, Violent State, Violent Society: Sri
Lanka,” in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (eds.), Internal Conflicts
in South Asia (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1996), p.119.
41.
ibid.
42.
In the month of June 1997 there were 300 killings in Karachi alone and
the authorities were not able to hold anyone responsible for it. See, Idrees
Bakhtiar, “Return of the Death Squads,” Herald, July 1997, pp.25-31.
43.
See interview of Farooq Sattar, Senior Minister from the MQM, “When We
Say Agencies, We Mean the Federal Intelligence Agencies,” Herald,
July 1997, pp.31-33.
44.
See, Harinder Baweja, “Kashmir: Propping Up the Enemy’s Enemy,” India
Today, 15 December 1995, pp.58-61; Harinder Baweja and Ramesh Vinayak,
“Jammu and Kashmir: A Dangerous Liaision,” India Today, 15 March
1996, pp.76-79; “J&K Governor Defends Pro-Govt Militant Groups,” Telegraph
(Calcutta), 5 September 1996.
45.
“Pro-Govt Militants `Disappear’ in J&K: May have Rejoined Secessionist
Ranks,” Pioneer, 3 November 1996.
46.
SIPRI
Yearbook, 1996, pp.26-27.
47.
“LTTE Says it Lost 9,301 Men in Conflict,” Times of India, 4 January
1997.
48.
Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (New Delhi: Amerind
Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1972), p.139.
49.
The government is believed to have spent Rs.1.10 billion to rehabilitate
ULFA cadres. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and
Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994),
p.230.
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