::: Regional Center for Strategic Studies :::

This leads us to a fundamental question — why have those movements which have become violent, did or could take recourse to violence? Where does the explanation lie? Some explanation may be found not only in an analyses of the underlying causes but also in an examination of the subjective and objective conditions of the actors involved in the movements. Thus in the following section we examine the reasons for violence in South Asiaby using some of the variables discussed earlier like internal colonization, relative deprivation and resource mobilization and also introduce some variables in the form of conditions which enhances the propensity for violence. Keeping in view the myriad expressions of violent conflict in South Asia, an effort is made here to understand them within certain conceptual categories and thus it is not possible to go into the specificities.

The Operationalization Processes of Colonization

Even after the demise of colonialism certain processes of colonization are still in operation. The classical colonizers have been replaced by a new set of colonizers — not necessarily linked to the state. The reason why colonization evokes strong reaction is because of the feeling that the ‘other’ is developing at one’s expense and thus colonization is associated with underdevelopment or lack of development. Perception of being colonized by the state gets aggravated if the state is an ethnically centralized state. This then leads to defining one’s status in the states system and how much stakes one has in it. Alienation from the state then can lead to a redefinition or reassertion of a separate identity and demands for separation. The processes of colonization can operate in various ways.

Amongst all the conflicts in South Asia, probably it is least problematic to explain the violence in the liberation war in East Pakistan. The objective conditions played a significant role in motivating the Bengali Muslims to resort to an armed struggle. It was not a perception of deprivation but actual deprivation and exploitation of the Bengalis that led to the aggressive assertion of a separate identity. This was further strengthened by the denial of a legitimate share in political power.

There were two contradictions in the relationship between the East wing and West wing of Pakistan. First, it was a relationship of a colony and a colonizer. This process of exploitation could actually be felt by the economic indicators of both the wings despite substantial wealth being generated in the East wing. Even though East Pakistan had inherited some industrial base in comparison to the weak industrial base in West Pakistan as a consequence of the partition, it was nevertheless the West wing that projected better growth rates from the beginning itself. Over the years this disparity kept on increasing. When Ayub Khan seized state power, per capita income in East Pakistan was only 30 per cent less than that of West Pakistan. By the time he stepped down from office in 1969 the differential was as much as 61 per cent.¹ During the much vaunted decade of development, during Ayub’s period, the per capita gross domestic product of East Pakistan grew by only 17 per cent at 1959-60 constant prices compared to 42 per cent in West Pakistan.²

During the course of its twenty-four years of existence as part of Pakistan, the Eastern wing constituting about 55 per cent of the population, was under the complete political and economic dominance of West Pakistan. Various methods were employed for exploiting the Eastern wing for the benefit of the Western wing. For instance, with regard to the export income and resource allocation between 1958 and 1968, the West wing earned 41 per cent of total foreign exchange income of the country, but used up as much as 70 per cent, whereas the Eastern wing earned 59 per cent of total foreign exchange but was allocated only 30 per cent. It is estimated that during the twenty-four years, resources to the tune of 3,000 million British pounds were transferred from the East wing to the West wing.³ Moreover, the Bengalis share in the national elites was negligible. In 1955, their representation in the military elite was less than five per cent and in the civil bureaucracy about 30 per cent.⁴

The realization of being used as a colony, where resources generated in the East wing were being appropriated by the ruling classes in the West wing led to the perception of the West Pakistanis as colonizers. Secondly, this pattern of economic development did not lead to the growth of a bourgeoisie amongst the Bengalis. There was only the rise of a service class. Thus the deepening of the regional inequality was further augmented by class inequalities as well. Due to this fact the Awami League could create a class coalition of the intermediate classes with the peasantry to launch a combined struggle against the West Pakistani military-bureaucratic-industrial establishment so as to extricate themselves from the clutches of the ruling classes. The economic conditions “lent a material foundation to their otherwise vague ideological and political demands, and helped mobilize the support of the various strata of Bengali society behind their cause.”⁵ The ruling establishment only helped in pushing the Bengalis towards violence by starting a crackdown.

There is no other example of a similar experience in South Asia, though at times references are made to the north-east region in India, Baluchistan in Pakistan, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh as being internal colonies. This comparison is a little far-fetched, and the processes of colonization in operation in these regions has a different dynamics. Though there is no doubt that all the regions have been economically neglected by their respective states and economically exploited by outsiders — a problem to which the respective states have not shown much sensitivity.

Unlike in the context of the north-east region of India or Baluchistan, the land colonization in the CHT is partly state-sponsored. Land colonization in the CHT is partly due to the land-hunger of the Bengali peasantry. The second objective seems to be to change the demographic profile in the CHT by undertaking settlement programmes. These measures known as resettlement schemes had already started during the Pakistan era. The objective of these measures was to convert the CHT into a Bengali-Muslim majority area. Over four decades the tribal population has declined from 91 to 51 percent.⁶ Table I shows the progression of this decline:

Source: Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in S. D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (eds.), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p.131.

Land is the main source of livelihood of the Chakmas and there has been a gradual appropriation of this resource through other processes as well. Inappropriate development projects have not only led to the loss of their land but opened the roads for their commercial exploitation. This process had started even before Bangladesh became independent. The construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam and the Karnafuli reservoir in 1962 submerged 54,000 acres of settled cultivable land affecting about 100,000 people, about ninety per cent of whom were Chakmas. The economic infrastructure and employment opportunities which came about due to the development project has not benefitted the tribals significantly.⁷ The development project in fact opened the CHT for commercial exploitation as cheap power and labour were available in plentiful. New navigational facilities expanded opportunities for exploitation of CHT’s forest and fishery resources. But all the schemes had no place for the tribals. All this was to benefit the settlers. In some ways, the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam helped in the ‘resource appropriation’ from the CHT for the larger benefits of the growing industrial economy of the country.⁸

Even in Sri Lanka, the Tamils had been critical of the Sinhala leadership for pursuing a policy of land colonization. A large number of Sinhalese peasants have been resettled in the Tamil areas, through state-sponsored colonization schemes. The Tamils believe that this is a deliberate policy to undermine the contiguity of the Tamil majority districts of Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticalao, and Trincomalee where they form the largest ethnic group. These measures were instrumental in altering the demographic composition of the districts of Amparai, Batticalao, Mannar, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. Though the Sinhalese constituted only 20.6 per cent of the population of Trincomalee in 1946. Over the years, it has been gradually increasing and by 1971 it was 28.8 per cent and in 1981 it was 33 per cent. In Amparai district, in only a decades time from 1971 to 1981, the increase in the Sinhalese population has been as high as 78 per cent.⁹ These policies, the Tamils believe and fear, have been progressively making them minorities in the land to which they make claims as their homeland.

The complexities in the North-eastern region of India arose as a result of the colonial pattern of economic development introduced by the British after its annexation of Assam in 1826, which had led to an influx of immigrant labour, resulting in significant demographic changes. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 resulted in migrations due to the restructuring of state boundaries. This process has continued with a massive influx during the Liberation war in East Pakistan. Subsequently, a large number of Bengali Muslims infiltrated Assam to escape economic hardships in Bangladesh. This uncontrolled migration particularly into Assam and Tripura, has marginalized the indigenous people.

The migrants who have settled in Assam have monopolized or dominated virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or for jobs in the modern sectors of the economy and in government service. Land alienation among the poor tribal peasantry and demographic changes has engendered a feeling among the indigenous people that the ‘outsiders’ have robbed them of their economic opportunities. The creation of the Assamese into a minority in their own state and their uneven share in the process of uneven national economic development and its consequently persisting underdevelopment has led to a perception that it is due to the intrusion of outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the central authority.

Therefore, initially the movement that emerged due to these grievances sought to control Assam’s resources and to make sure that the management of those resources remained with Assamese themselves. The demands also included sharing political and administrative control, revenues generated in the state, employment and other opportunities. State incapacities in responding to the problems of the Assamese, resulted in the emergence of the ULFA, eventually leading to the demand for independence.

From all the above instances one can see a pattern that the question of right over land has generated considerable amount of violence. Whether it is in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Chakmas in Bangladesh or the Assamese Hindus in Assam or the tribals in North-east India. While the conflict is against the state, settlers have also become targets of violence. The primary reason behind it is that where the state shows an incapacity to intervene on behalf of the indigenous people, the only way to get back one’s land is by physical eviction of the settlers. Where settlement is supported by the state, such violent action can be justified much more easily.

The LTTE in Sri Lanka is known to have been attacking peasants in colonized lands. The Chakmas have also attacked the state sponsored settlement schemes in the CHT. The AASU and the AGP have occasionally used violent tactics to expel the foreigners. The pattern of extensive mass violence witnessed in 1983 during the movement to detect and deport Bengali Muslim nationals of Bangladesh origin was due to attempts to foil the February 1983 election, which was being conducted without revising the rolls. This resulted in an unprecedented wave of violence and destruction.

Peripheral societies are those societies where state penetration is weak — physically as well as institutionally. Physically it may be the outlying regions of the state which may not have been integrated strongly within the state apparatus. Institutionally, the idea of the state may not have captured the allegiance of the people inhabiting these areas. These people retain a certain independence and tactical mobility when it comes to their incorporation within the modern state.

In the context of South Asia, it is a colonial inheritance that institutional structures had not penetrated the outlying tribal dominated North-eastern area in India and the North-western area and Baluchistan in Pakistan. All these regions have a high potential for violence. In all these regions state penetration is weak — both physically as well as institutionally. Institutionally people from these regions identify weakly with the idea of the state and as such the resistance to being incorporated within the postcolonial state. Physically, their geographical location in the peripheries or the outlying regions of the state’s geographical boundaries creates the gulf between the centre and periphery. Lack of state penetration also leads to lack of development. these peripheral societies lag behind in their development achievements in comparison to the core societies. This gulf or the notion of distance and the lack of development is not helpful in attracting the allegiance of resistant groups to the central state apparatus. A perception of being out of the effective reach of the coercive apparatus of the state emboldens certain groups to resort to violence. The Baluch guerrillas could take on the might of the Pakistani army because of the above reasons. The same is the case with the numerous insurgencies carried out by the tribal people in the North-eastern region in India and the Chakmas in Bangladesh.

To a certain extent, even though the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Kashmiris and the Sikhs cannot be considered as peripheral societies, the fact that they come from outlying regions or border states, enhances their capacity for violence. These regions are peripheral only to the extent that the policing functions of the states are weak in these regions and they lack control over the borders through which move men and material for training and augmenting coercive resources. Thus, insurgent movements from these regions retain a tactical mobility in their confrontation with the state.

Our notions of peripheral societies invariably associate with outlying tribal regions — which is more of a physical association. Societies may be peripheral even if they are located physically in the heart of a state. One such region is in Central India where the borders of the four states of Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra meet. The authority of the state does not extend to these areas. The rural oligarchy in this region is engaged in a feudal mode of appropriation of surplus value and perpetuates an exploitative production relations.¹⁰ The state machinery in some of these areas, particularly Bihar, comprises of a non-official apparatus of landlords and their private armies.¹¹ Whatever maybe the reflection of class forces in the state, in these peripheral societies the landlords are the ruling classes. They are not independent of the state but only an extension of the state.¹²

To maintain existing patterns of agrarian relations the rural oligarchy is opposed to rural class struggle and is willing to use force towards that end. Resentment by the poor peasants, let alone revolt, brings in severe retribution not only against individuals but against members of an entire caste, at times even against entire villages. The violence unleashed by the landlords through their private armies has allowed the space for the mobilization of the peasants, low castes and the landless harijans by the Naxalites. The Naxalites are descendants of the parent Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) founded in 1969 with the aim of organizing the peasantry and seizing power through armed struggle. The Naxalite movement which was an ideological movement now finds space to mobilize on the basis of social oppression.

The Naxalites main demands and mobilization centres around tribal autonomy and land reform. The peasants and tribals have suffered loss of land, loss of access to forest resources. Landlords have made use of the judiciary in staying the land ceiling laws, thus enabling them to defeat its purpose through benami transfers. In their pursuit of a more equitable land redistribution the People’s War Group (PWG), in Andhra Pradesh has taken over land and distributed it among landless labourers of its choice through the judgements of its ‘people’s courts’.¹³ These land?grab campaigns have threatened the power structure in the rural areas and hence landlords have become increasingly repressive.

A large number of violent movements in South Asia have been motivated by a feeling of relative deprivation. These groups have a perception that there is a mismatch between what they are capable of and what they actually get. They hold the system responsible for it. The desire to correct this imbalance has manifested in violence against the state. The JVP phenomena in Sri Lanka was a reflection of the feeling of relative deprivation amongst the youth and unemployed, which was successfully channelled into capturing state power itself. The transformation of movements from demands of autonomy to secession and the capacity and willingness of some of these movements to use violence is a simultaneous development with the rise of a petty-bourgeois class which due to the development policies of the state have also suffered from a feeling of relative deprivation. Such a class is identifiable in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, amongst the Assamese, Sikhs and Kashmiris in India, amongst the Muhajirs and to a certain extent among the Baluchis in Pakistan.

The processes from which such a feeling arises is largely linked to the educational policies. Education has been an important channel for social mobility in traditional societies. However, the state’s incapacity to create a balance between human capital and physical capital,¹⁴ i.e., education and employment has resulted in a feeling of relative deprivation amongst the petty-bourgeoisie. State incapacities, unresponsiveness and ethnic discrimination has radicalized this social class which is willing to use violence in its mobilization strategies against the state in which it does not have much stakes.

The rise of the JVP in the late 60s was largely due to the educational policies. In the context of Sri Lanka, it was not only the cultural values associated with education but also the failure of agricultural activity to generate livelihood, that compelled the younger generation of the peasantry to get educated. There was hope in the possibility that education would provide employment and consequently a better livelihood and social mobility. The youth who completed their education before 1971 expected to step into clerical or administrative posts because similar education had previously been a stepping stone to white?collar office employment. But when the number of educated youth soared dramatically in the1960s, education ceased to provide an assurance of secure and remunerative white?collar office employment. As a result, the educated rural youth were often compelled to return to their agricultural fields.¹⁵

The heightened aspirations and expectations engendered among youth by enhanced educational opportunities, and crushing of these aspirations under rising unemployment, produced a sense ofalienation, deprivation and disillusionment. For the employed too, the kind of jobs held by them fell far short of their aspirations and reasonable expectations. This, in turn, heightened the potential for political violence.¹⁶

The reemergence of the JVP around 1986 was largely due to the post-1977 economic policies. The economic policies adopted by the UNP since it took office in 1977 had a tremendous impact on the socio-economic development of the country. These market oriented policies were successful to some extent with regard to growth and employment generation, till the early years of 1980s. At a macro-level, however, they contributed to the worsening of conditions of inequality in terms of income distribution and regional development. Withdrawal of food subsidies and reduction in resource allocation on education resulted in a growing incidence of mal-nutrition and worsening levels of educational attainment among vulnerable sections of the society.¹⁷

Education, which was generally free till 1977 was opened up to the private sector and a decline in state funding reduced educational opportunities for the poor and lower middle classes. While the schools in the metropolitan areas managed to raise resources, those in remote rural areas were largely neglected. Consequently, those from the poor and lower middle classes who depended on education, which has traditionally been the primary avenue of social advancement, suffered.¹⁸

The contraction in the state sector also had a severe impact on employment opportunities. Educated youth from rural areas depended primarily on the state for various kinds of white collar employment which declined after 1977. Further, employment in private sector firms was restricted due to the lack of fluency in spoken english.¹⁹ While a student from a private school in Colombo with a GCE(A) level qualification could get a plush executive post in a private firm, the same was not available to the rural educated youth even with a university degree. The jobs that were mostly available were in the service sector which had expanded after 1977 while the production sectors had declined. These included jobs as bus conductors, lottery ticket sellers, tourist guides, housemaids and the like.²⁰ Thus, the new economic regime placed serious limitations on opportunities for social upward mobility for educated rural youth.

The post-1977 economic changes did not alter the sense of deprivation and alienation which prevailed among the rural youth before 1971, but only compounded it further. There is no doubt that even in the late 1980s, alienation arising out of lack of educational opportunities, unemployment and the nature of employment was fairly widespread. This was brought out in the Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, instituted on 19 October 1989 to enquire into youth unrest in the country. According to the Report:

There are some indications that the unrest of the Eighties also involved youth with relatively high educational attainment... If the profile of the insurgent is indeed identical or similar [to those who participated in the 1971 insurrection], then the findings will constitute a telling indictment of our social and economic system and, in particular, its failure to respond to the needs and aspirations of young men from predominantly rural areas, with access to at least secondary level education.²¹

Some of the figures presented in the Report are revealing. The rate of unemployment for GCE(O) level qualifiers was 37.5 per cent, GCE(A) level 44.1 per cent and 23.2 per cent for university degree holders.²² A vast majority of the 55.4per cent unemployed belonged to the age group of 20 to 29.²³ Region wise, the percentage of unemployment was higher in 1981 as compared to 1971 in seven districts in the Sinhala heartland. This is reflected in Table II:

Source: Sri Lanka, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, Sessional Paper No. 1, 1990 (Colombo, 1990), p.110.

The two districts of Matara and Hambantota, in particular, experienced a significant rise in unemployment. The levels of violence in these two districts was also very high due to JVP activity.

The Tamils in Sri Lanka have had a better access to employment in the state sector due to historical reasons. Morever, they also dominated in enrollment in higher education, particularly in technical and science subjects. Over the years this was eroded by certain discriminatory policies of the Sri Lankan state. The Sinhala only legislation of 1956 had a serious economic impact on the Tamils as it required a knowledge of Sinhala as a necessary qualification for various jobs. The Tamils as such had to learn Sinhala within three years, failing which they were faced with the prospect of losing their jobs. This policy had the potential to shut out the Tamils from government employment.²⁴

Further, in 1970, the state had introduced a standardization system of selection for admission to higher education according to which Tamils had to secure more marks than their Sinhalese counterparts in order to be admitted to higher seats of learning. In 1978 this system was scrapped but introduced with some modifications.²⁵ The standardization method introduced in 1970 gradually saw the decline of the Tamils in University admissions. Due to this, they had a feeling that they were being systematically squeezed out of higher education. Between 1970 to 1975 there was a drastic drop in the number of Tamils entering University education. Table III illustrates this:

Source: V. Nithiyanandan, “An Analysis of Economic Factors Behind the Origin and Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka,” in Charles Abeysekera and Newton Gunasinghe (eds.), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1987), p.127.

There was a rise in unemployment and a lack of commensurate employment amongst the Tamils as well. The major part of this unemployed group were the offspring of the Tamil lower-middle class, who unlike the higher strata of Tamilian society, did not have alternative means of securing suitable employment. Most of these unemployed and underemployed were channeled into the militant movement which had started emerging by the early seventies.

In the case of the Sikhs in India the sense of relative deprivation was not only felt by the youth but also by the rich farmers. The demand for more autonomy by the Akali Dal, representing farmers interest, was linked to this feeling and had hoped that more autonomy would correct the imbalance in the Sikh farmers capability to generate more wealth. The peculiar social division of capital in Punjab was instrumental in the feeling of insecurity amongst the Sikhs. In Punjab, Sikhs are concentrated more in the villages and rural settlements while Hindus predominate in the towns and the cities. Punjab was never considered good for setting up heavy industry. However, it had a sampling of agro-industry but most of these and the service sectors were owned and controlled by the Hindus. The green revolution was to result in the rise of a rich class of prosperous modern farmers. By 1978 the so-called Green revolution had reached a plateau. But when the Sikh farmer wanted to invest their surplus capital in the other sectors of the economy they found avenues for reinvestment blocked, as the Hindus controlled industry and the service sector.²⁶

The Sikhs also realized that they also did not have any control over agricultural pricing and industialization policies, as these were determined by the central government at New Delhi. Excessive prosperity of the big landowners and capitalist landlords not only encouraged but necessitated greater political power,²⁷ so that Sikh farmers could decide and direct economic policies and free the industrial sector from the Hindus. One of the peculiar economic demands in the Anandpur Sahib resolution was that all key industries should be brought under the public sector. This was in contradiction to the principles of state autonomy but ostensibly, these demands reflected the interest of the landowning upper crust of Sikh society.

While amongst the rich farmers it was this feeling of not being able to generate more wealth from surplus capital that had resulted in their feeling of relative deprivation, however, their moderate movement for more autonomy was hijacked by the rise of a petty-bourgeoisie.

Even in the case of the Kashmiris, although political grievances and Islamic revivalism predominate, but economic factors have also been an important dimension of the problem. There has been a dramatic improvement in the standard of living in the state of Jammu and Kashmir between 1977 and 1984. During 1977-78, 33.4 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line. By 1983-84 it had declined to a mere 16.3 per cent.²⁸ There were only four states — Manipur, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Haryana in that order which had better poverty figures for the same period. The per capita income in the state in 1971-72 was Rs. 588 and by 1986-87 it had gone upto Rs. 3344, which was overall sixth highest in the country after Delhi, Goa, Punjab, Haryana, and Maharashtra during the same period.²⁹

While average standards of living have gone up in Jammu and Kashmir, it has not benefitted the Muslims in real terms. Free education upto the level of the Universities introduced by Sheikh Abdullah resulted in a large number of the poor students who could aspire for social mobility to get educated. The pressures of educated unemployed youth was to soon strain the system. The number of unemployed matriculates rose from 6,875 in 1971 to 14,374 by 1981 and to 26,559 by 1986. The number of unemployed graduates rose from 1,228 in 1971 to 6,368 in 1981, while that of postgraduates increased from 409 in 1971 to 1,177 in 1981 to 2,866 in 1985. Number of unemployed engineering graduates increased from 166 in 1961 to 443 in 1988. It has been observed that the higher the educational qualification, the higher the growth and incidence of unemployment in that category.³⁰

The main sources of employment for educated Kashmiri Muslims were the government services and public corporations. In the state government their representation in the non-gazetted and clerical services was fairly high but when it came to the gazetted posts representation of Hindus was far ahead of Muslims. In 1987, Hindus held 51 per cent gazetted posts in comparison to only 42 per cent amongst Muslims. However, in the central government jobs, Hindus monopolized almost 83 per cent of the gazetted posts while Muslims held only 7 per cent. And in the clerical non-gazetted central government jobs Hindus held ashigh as 79 per cent in comparison to only 13 per cent amongst Muslims.³¹ From 1986-87 to 1989 there was an increase of 200 per cent in unemployed educated youth from 100,000 to 300,000.³² Under these circumstances it was not difficult to mobilize the educated and underemployed youth. The processes of modernization had also produced a sizeable intelligentsia who could mobilize them.

In the case of the Muhajirs, in the initial years after independence, they along with the Punjabis were dominant in Pakistan’s state structure. By the end of the 1950s with the rising power of the military, an institution dominated by the Punjabis and the Pathans, the Muhajirs were marginalized. Muhajirs trace the origins of this marginalization to General Ayub’s decision to shift the capital from Karachi to Islamabad.

During the 1960-80 period, the Muhajirs experienced a slow relative decline in their economic and political status. There was a perception of their eroding representation among the national elites — the civil bureaucracy, the military and the business elite.³³ State policies after 1971, with the rise of Bhutto, a Sindhi, to power has hurt the interest of the Muhajirs. In 1972, Sindhi language was restored as the official language of the Sindh province. Muhajirs protested as they felt their interests in the provincial government were threatened. Bhutto had also introduced in 1971 a regional quota system for recruitment to the federal bureaucracy. The quota allocated 50 per cent to Punjabis, 11.5 per cent to the NWFP, 11.4 per cent to rural Sindh, 7.6 per cent to urban Sindh, and 3.5 per cent to Baluchistan and 10 per cent to be filled on the basis of merit at the national level.³⁴ This quota system was designed to increase the representation of the Sindhis in the federal bureaucracy as the higher percentage intake from rural Sindh envisaged an increase in Sindhi recruitment.

Further, Bhutto’s policy of nationalization carried out from 1972-76, still shrunk the prospects of employment in the private sector as the public sector recruitment were regulated by the quota system. General Zia further curtailed prospects for employment in the state sector by introducing in 1982 a quota of 10 per cent in the federal secretariat for retired military personnel.³⁵ Bhutto’s and Zia’s policy put together eroded the Muhajir domination of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy and public sector business elite, while increasing the representation of Punjabis and Sindhis.

Though there has not been an absolute decline in the Muhajir share of jobs and admissions, their share has dropped relative to that of the Punjabis, Pathans and Sindhis. It is the middle and lower middle class Muhajir youth who have felt the constraints of the quota system more. The Muhajir underclass (mostly Biharis from Bangladesh) is also faced with severe competition for scarce jobs with a large influx of Pathan immigrants to the city of Karachi in the 1980s. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the MQM’s leadership and support comes largely from the lower middle class and working class segments of the Muhajir population.

In all the above cases of violent movements it was the emergence of an educated, lower middle class youth, in some instances also from the working class and peasant families that has pushed all the movements towards violence. In the South Asian context, except for the Naxalite movement in India, the onset of violence in all other movements has coincided with the rise of the petty-bourgeoisie. One may illustrate this by looking at the social bases of some of the movements.

The support base of the JVP was essentially among the petty bourgeoisie, including the youth and unemployed, and some sections of the low castes. Evidently, it had a limited social base for it to carry the people behind it. During the second attempt in 1987-89 period, the JVP’s support base was largely the same but it also seemed to enjoy the support of some professional classes.³⁶

The shifts in the Tamil demands from regional autonomy to a federal system in the mid-50s to a separate state in the 70s has been accompanied by the rise of the petty-bourgeois to the Tamil leadership and a change in the form of the political struggle. The new leadership was less westernized than the earlier leadership and had a regional base in the northern and eastern provinces. The Tamil insurgents are mainly from non-propertied, lower middle class background in the age group of 18 to 35.³⁷ In lot of respects they are a mirror image of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie which spearheaded the JVP movement in the south.³⁸ The earlier leadership had been from the Tamil bourgeoisie.³⁹

Among the Sikhs also, though the Akali agitation with separatist overtones emerged due to the feeling of relative deprivation of the rich Sikh farmers, it was however hijacked by the emergence of a petty-bourgeoisie. In fact, Bhindranwale was opposed to the upper class Sikh landed classes organized in the Akali Dal. His support base was the educated unemployed, subordinate non-agricultural castes, rural jats, youth from small peasant families, most of them with a few years of schooling.⁴⁰

The social base of the MQM is also primarily among the lower middle class petty-bourgeoisie.⁴¹ Though the social base of the Baluch leaders was primarily within the traditional tribes. But the formation of the Baluch Students Organization in 1967 signified the emergence of an educated middle class, though very small. This class also did not find any share in the power structure. Their representation in the army and bureaucracy is abysmally low.⁴²

Increasingly, it is evident that this petty-bourgeois class can sustain high levels of violence. As a social group this class has weak material and social ties unlike the bourgeoisie or the peasantry. And due to the age group, it is also not strongly attached to family ties.

In most of the developing states, the economic base is underdeveloped and the superstructure is overdeveloped. This imbalance could be corrected by capturing the superstructure. The students and youth perceived that the only way their living conditions could be changed was by capturing the state apparatus. But the manifestations of this perception has been varied depending on the nature of mobilization. Thus, while on the one hand the JVP tries to capture state power, on the other the petty-bourgeoisie within the minority ethnic groups think in terms of secession and a new state. This is not to the say that entire ethnic groups are not supportive of independence movements. The difference is in just the methods. The petty-bourgeoisie would introduce and be capable of sustaining the violence.

The petty bourgeoisie, when it comes to articulation of demands has never articulated narrow group interests. It has always asserted the interests of a distinctive cultural identity as it is the most effective means of mobilizing support across a wide range of social groups. At times cultural symbols are used in mobilizing. It may be, therefore, argued that ethnic demands do not emerge out of essentialist notions of inherent identities. That there are no inherent identities has nowhere been exemplified better than in South Asia. Social identities in South Asia have been forged and refashioned, largely as a response, reaction and resistance to state structures and political economies. State directed political and economic processes, rather than cultural diversity and ethnic plurality are the base of the expressions of violence. The manifestations of which in the superstructure are in the form of ethnic, class or caste violence.

How culture and a proximate identity can be a potent force in mobilization was demonstrated by the JVP in Sri Lanka. Though ideologically it stood for class struggle, nevertheless a Sinhala nationalist position dominated the Marxist elements in JVP’s doctrine even in 1971. It was fairly successful in carrying out a broad based mass mobilization over the issue of the presence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka by presenting itself as a patriotic movement uniting the Sinhalese masses and the Buddhist Sangha in a common struggle against a corrupt puppet regime of India — the UNP and the cliques within this regime.⁴³ The JVP succeeded in gaining popular sympathy by presenting itself as the only patriotic organization opposed to Indian intervention and the collaboration of a corrupt, illegitimate and anti-national government. Thus, it was able to cut across all divisions in Sinhala society to stand for the entire Sinhala population on the basis of its patriotism.⁴⁴

In the case of the Sikh militants, a key mobilizing tenet was that the Sikh panth (religion) was in danger. Bhindranwale used religious revivalism and fundamentalism by selecting only the militant sikh tradition in the ultimate objective of Khalistan.⁴⁵

Though the problem in Kashmir is a political and economic problem requiring a political solution, a large number of militant groups particularly aligned to the Jamaat-e-Islami call their struggle a jihad, which is only a way of mobilizing not only Kashmiri muslims but also Indian muslims.⁴⁶ Contrary to popular belief, religion is not the motivating factor for the Kashmiri militants. According to a psychoanalytical study of 400 captured militants, only 10 per cent said they were fighting for religion, 45 per cent admitted the reason was economic deprivation and alienation.⁴⁷

In Pakistan it was first the Bengalis who asserted their Bengali identity before Islam. Now the Muhajirs are doing a similar thing. It is an example of a case of successful ethnic mobilization.⁴⁸ The Muhajirs who were instrumental in the creation of Pakistan, had shunned a particularistic ethnicity in favour of a broader Islamic identity, when faced with competition for power and jobs from the Punjabis and Pakhtuns, now claim to constitute a fifth nationality in Pakistan. The MQM addressed the sense of relative deprivation of the Muhajirs effectively and has become successful in mobilization of their ethnic loyalties. It has also put forward demands for the creation of a Muhajir Suba including Karachi and Hyderabad.

A significant factor often used or does help in mobilizing in support of violence is the external dimension. It is fairly well known that all insurgent movements seek external support whether it be moral support, material aid or sanctuary for their effectiveness and sustenance. In the South Asian context, it has been observed that mobilization has been done on the assurance of forthcoming external support as in the case of the JVP during the 1971 insurrection. JVP cadres were made to believe that armed assistance from sympathetic foreign powers would arrive at the appropriate time.⁴⁹ One does not know on what evidence these assumptions were based. Or if actually external assistance was available at the crucial time, would it have made a significant difference in the balance of forces? In all likelihood, the question of external support was used as a psychological ruse by the JVP leadership to boost mobilization.

In the case of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, it was only after the Indian government’s decision to train the Tamil militants, that there was a spurt in the recruitment to the various Tamil groups, when LTTE was just one of the groups.⁵⁰ Though the Indian objective of training and arming the Tamil insurgents was to enhance their bargaining power and put pressure on Jayewardene to negotiate,⁵¹ but simultaneously this was used by the militant leaders to mobilize more and more youth.

In the case of the Kashmiri militants it was able to attract a large number of youth due to two external factors. First, some of the Kashmiri youth’s experience in fighting a jihad along with the Afghan Mujahideen’s against the erstwhile Soviet-backed Marxist government in Kabul. A lot of these youth came back with a ‘militant consciousness’ to challenge the Indian state.⁵² The second was a belief that Pakistan would actually intervene militarily on their behalf and therefore on this basis a large number of youth could be mobilized because they felt they had a chance of winning.⁵³ The present frustration of a large number of militants is this incapacity or unwillingness of Pakistan to intervene directly on their behalf.

The conceptualizations attempted above do give us some conceptual understanding of the causes of violence and some conditions in which they have manifested. It would be too ambitious to attempt a singular framework that can address the causes of violence in South Asia, as the manifestations of violence are too complex to be explained by any single framework. A singular approach also cannot suffice in explaining the unfolding of a process — some of which have taken decades under changing socio-economic conditions before maturing into a stage when violence has been introduced into conflict situations. But atleast from the above conceptualizations, one could arrive at a holistic view of the causes and the conditions in which mobilization in support of violence has been successful.

As stated earlier, the underlying causes of violence in South Asia is predominantly linked to development reasons where right over land and access to education and jobs are some of the important issues. The uneven development patterns in South Asia have resulted in unusual backwardness in some cases like that of East Pakistan, Baluchistan, Assam, parts of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and relatively faster development as in the case of Punjab. Both conditions have offered the grounds for the growth of violent movements. The strongest impetus towards violence, however, is provided by a sense of relative deprivation, rather than deprivation itself.

Successful mobilization in support of violence has taken place in conditions where some of the variables discussed above have coalesced. Just as way of illustration, in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the concept of relative deprivation may be one of the explanations, but this in conjunction with the processes of land colonization, the geographical location of the Tamils and the external support explains why high levels of violence have sustained in the ethnic conflict. Similarly, in all the other cases in South Asia the levels of violence can be explained by the conjunction of some of the variables discussed above.

1. Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85 (London: KPI, 1988), p.41.

2. Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.57.

3. See, K.P. Misra, “Intra-State Imperialism as a Factor in Conflicts Within and Between States,” International Studies (New Delhi), vol.14, no.1, January 1975, pp.45-52. For a detailed study on the discrepancies, see, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994).

6. Imtiaz Ahmed, “Refugees and Security: The Experience of Bangladesh,” in S. D. Muni and Lok Raj Baral (eds.), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p.131.

8. M. Q. Zaman, “Crisis in CHT: Ethnicity and Integration,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.17, no.3, 16 January 1982, p.77.

9. Cited in V. Suryanarayan, “Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,” in Urmila Phadnis and others (eds.), Domestic conflicts in South Asia vol. II (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 1986), p.140.

10. Pradhan H. Prasad, “Agrarian Violence in Bihar,” in Pradhan H. Prasad, Lopsided Growth: Political Economy of Indian Development (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.75.

11. Landlords have formed private armies mostly along caste lines and a few under individual leadership. Some of these are the Brahmarishi Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Satyendra Sena and the like. See, “Behind the Killings in Bihar: A Report on Patna, Gaya, and Singhbhum”, People’s Union for Democratic Rights, pp. 29, 45-47.

12. Dev Nathan, “Agricultural labour and the Poor Peasant Movement in Bihar,” in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), Class Formation and Political Transformation in Post-Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.165.

13. Venu Menon, “Lure of the Lal Salaam”, Times of India, 15 December 1991.

14. Godfrey Gunatilleke, Neelan Tiruchelvam and Radhika Coomaraswamy, “Violence and Development in Sri Lanka: Conceptual Issues,” in Godfrey Gunatilleke and others (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas of Development in Asia (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p.143.

15. W.H. Wriggins and C.H.S. Jayewardene, “Youth Protest in Sri Lanka,” in W. H. Wriggins and James Guyot (eds.), Population Politics and the Future of Southern Asia (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1973), p.331.

16. Robert Kearney, “Educational Expansion and Political Volatility in Sri Lanka: The 1971 Insurrection,” Asian Survey, vol.15, no.9, September 1975, p.741

17. W.D. Lakshman, “The Macro-Economic Framework and Its Policy Implications for Youth Unrest,” in S.T. Hettige (ed.), Unrest or Revolt: Some Aspects of Youth Unrest in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Goethe Institute, 1992), pp.93-94.

19. S. Hettige, “Fighting Youth Revolts,” Lanka Guardian, vol.16, no.19, 1 February 1994, p.16.

20. These were the underclass of the suburban areas who joined the JVP. The emergence of a lumpen social class after 1977 provided the JVP with its urban support and contributed significantly to its violent nature. See, Victor Ivan, “The Political Legacy of Wijeweera,” The Island (Colombo), 4 February 1990.

21. Sri Lanka, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, Sessional Paper No. 1, 1990 (Colombo: Government Publication Bureau, 1990), p.31.

24. C. R. de Silva, “The Sinhalese-Tamil Rift in Sri Lanka,” in A.J. Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of national Integration (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1982), p.165.

25. For details see Sunil Bastian, “University Admission and the National Question,” in Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1984), pp.166-78.

26. Harish K. Puri, “The Akali Agitation: An Analysis of Socio-Economic Bases of Protest,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.28, no.4, 22 January, 1983, pp.116-17.

27. Sikhs were aspiring for more power than is possible within Indian federalism. See Zoya Hasan, “Introduction: State and Identity in Modern India,” in Z. Hasan and others (eds.), The State, Political Processes, and Identity: Reflections on Modern India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), pp.22-23.

28. Statistical Outline of India, 1989-90, Bombay, Tata Services Limited, July 1989, p.27.

30. All figures are from M. L. Mishri and M. S. Bhat, Poverty, Planning and Economic Change in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994), p.39.

31. See “Appendix III,” especially pp.263-66 in Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.), Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991).

32. “Uprising in Indian-Held Jammu & Kashmir,” Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad), vol.10, nos.3 & 4, March-April 1991, p.50.

33. By the early 1970s, a large number of initial bureaucrats retired. Presumably a large proportion of these were Muhajirs. After twenty-five years of Pakistan’s independence, the Muhajirs were feeling squeezed not only at the top but also at the bottom of state sector employment. I am thankful to Dr. Mubashir Hasan for making this point. Interview, Lahore, May 1997.

34. Charles H. Kennedy,Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.181-208.

36. For detailed studies of the JVP see, Gananath Obeyesekere, “Some Comments on the Social Background of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol.33, no.3, May 1974, pp.367-84; and Ajay Darshan Behera, “The Social Background of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka,” in S. D. Muni (ed.), Understanding South Asia (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1994), pp.128-44.

37. Newton Gunasinghe, “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Perceptions and Solutions,” in Charles Abeysekera and Newton Gunasinghe (eds.), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1987), p.70.

38. Sunil Bastian, “Political Economy of Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka,” in Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.292-93.

39. V. Nithiyanandam, “An Analysis of Economic Factors Behind the Origin and Development of Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka,” in Abeyesekera and Gunasinghe (eds.), Op.Cit., p. 136.

40. Robin Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India: Punjab, Ethnic Conflict and the Test for Federalism (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1994), pp.175-79.

41. S. Akbar Zaidi, “Sindhi vs Muhajir: Contradiction, Conflict and Compromise,” in S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), p.340.

42. Tahir Amin, Ethno National Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad: Institute for Policy Studies, 1988).

43. In most cases, the ideology that has attracted mass following has been a combination of nationalism and Marxism. These types of struggles have occurred in China, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Vietnam. See, Lawrence Stone, “Theories of Revolution,” in Sam S. Sarkesian (ed.), Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishers, 1975), p.31.

44. See, S. Leelananda, “JVP Learning from Vietnam,” Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.18, no.19, 1 February 1990, pp.18-19.

45. Paul Wallace, “Religious and Ethnic Politics: Political Mobilization in Punjab,” in M.S.A. Rao and Francine R. Frankel (eds.), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, Vol.II (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.465-75.

46. Sultan Shahin, “Mindless Violence, Not Jihad,’ Hindustan Times, 15 March 1997.

47. Arjun Ray, Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1987), p.12.

48. Farhat Haq, “Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization,” Asian Survey, vol.35, no.11, November 1995, p.990.

49. A. J. Wilson, “Ceylon: The Peoples Liberation Front and the Revolution that Failed,” Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol.3, no.2, January 1972, p.367. After their capture, some of the JVP cadres said that they had been assured that help would be coming from China and North Korea. See, M. Van der Kroef, “The Sri Lanka Insurgency of April 1971: Its Development and Meaning,” Asia Quarterly (Brussels), no.2, 1973, p.125.

50. M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1994)

51. S.D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1993), pp.168-169.

52. See “Kashmir: Training the Fighters,” Viewpoint, 10 October 1991, pp.23-24