RCSS Policy Studies 6 : Chapter 4

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The South Asian subcontinent achieved independence from the colonial power without resorting to large-scale organized violence in their liberation struggles. The attainment of independent statehood was accompanied by the partition of the subcontinent, the consequences of which were violence perpetrated by Hindus and Muslims against each other. The violence that accompanied the birth of the two states of Pakistan and India, was to become a part of political life and civil society of all thestates in the subcontinent.

There was relative absence of violence for the first two decades after independence. Though there was instability, regional dissidence, communal riots, etc, all throughout, but these manifestations of certain grievances did not pose a serious threat to either the state structure or the ruling classes. By the late-sixties, however, it seemed as if the whole subcontinent was about to be engulfed by waves of violence, threatening both the states and the regimes. 

The emergence of various conflicts and the incapacity of thestates to deal with them signified the failure of the nation-building project and the process of economic development. These two processes were not independent but converged and their effects led to the marginalization and alienation of certain ethnic groups. Further, under the process of modernization, the changing patterns of agrarian and production relations sharpened class inequalities and mobilized social groups like the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie. The marginalization of minority ethnic groups and other deprived social classes in the power structure and the uneven distribution of economic resources between groups and classes gave rise to protracted ethnic conflicts on one hand, and class conflicts on the other. Some conflicts were contained, some withered away and some intensified with an increasing use of violence in their articulation of demands.

Before going into an exploration into the causes of violence, it would be pertinent to lay out the patterns of conflict and the way violence has been manifested in them. In this study, we are taking into consideration only two categories of political violence in South Asia — ethnic/tribal or primordial violence and revolutionary or ideological violence.

Ethnic/Tribal or Primordial Violence

All the four states of South Asia under consideration in this study are confronted with ethnic and primordial violence. Ethnic/tribal and primordial violence can be further sub-divided into secessionist and separatist violence.

Ethnic/Tribal and Secessionist Violence

A high intensity of ethnic violence in South Asia is due to secessionist goals or movements. India, the largest state in the region is confronted with the largest number of secessionist movements. 

North-East India

The north-eastern region of India was to be in ferment since the mid-sixties. The Nagas were the first to revolt followed by the Mizos in 1966, the Tripuris in 1978 and the Assamese in 1979. The genesis of ethnic violence in Tripura, a tribal majority territory, lies in the massive influx of settlers from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh as well as other parts of India, thus, upsetting the socio-economic pattern in the state and increasing pressure on land. Due to the demographic transition arising out of the partition of the subcontinent millions of Bengali Hindus migrated from East Pakistan to Tripura reducing the indigenous tribes to minorities. Migration allowed the Bengali Hindus socio-economic dominance. The influx of Bengalis from East Pakistan had been on such a large scale so as to turn Tripura, a tribal majority territory into one in which the tribal population had been reduced to a minority. This resulted in a sharp decline in the tribal population of the state and large areas of cultivable land were passed on to the refugees. The disturbance in the demographic equilibrium, land alienation supplemented by economic exploitation, and a strong tribal identity led to militancy in Tripura. The severe eruption of violence in 1980 was due to the resulting sense of deprivation, political and economic and the realization by tribals, as the years passed that no redress could be had for their deep-seated grievances by lawful means. The violence unleashed by the Tripuris primarily targeted the Bengali settlers and selective killings of non-tribals were designed to trigger off an exodus, a form of ethnic cleansing.

Even though Assam was faced with a similar set of grievances, secessionist demands took a long time to emerge. The initial problem in Assam revolved around a set of deeply perceived disadvantages. It was a concern that persisting underdevelopment was due to the intrusion of outsiders and the unresponsiveness of the central authority. The migrants who settled in Assam monopolized or dominated virtually all new opportunities for resource exploitation or for jobs in the modern sectors of the economy and in government service.¹  The migrations were so large as to threaten to transform the indigenous Assamese Hindu population into a minority.² 

These grievances were mobilized by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). The AASU and the AGP also signed an accord known as the Assam accord with the central government in regard to deportation of refugees.³  It was the failure of the AGP and the central government to implement the Assam accord and revise the electoral rolls that resulted in the emergence of a group called the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in 1979. The ULFA expressed its loss of faith in both the AGP and the central government by demanding secession from India and launching a violent movement to achieve its aim. By 1990, the ULFA was at the peak of its power and had a highly effective system of levying taxes and also organized community work, at times by coercing people.⁴  The Indian government’s military action was able to immobilize ULFA by early 1992. Simultaneously, a section of the leadership decided to hold talks with the government. This resulted in a split in the organization and while some of its cadres have been rehabilitated, its hardcore members have managed to take shelter in Bangladesh.

Punjab

The roots of the ethnic violence in Punjab can be traced to a moderate movement for greater autonomy spearheaded by the Akali Dal under the Anandpur Sahib resolution of 1973. This resolution called for the devolution of power to the states and the implementation of a proper federal structure in which the power of the central government would be restricted to such items as defence, foreign policy, currency and communications. Later, the Akali Dal entered into an alliance with the Janata party and Communist Party of India (Marxist), and emerged as the dominant party in the 1977 assembly and general elections. The Congress used Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a militant and communally inclined Sikh leader to undermine the moderate Akali leadership. In 1978, an organization called the Dal Khalsa was formed under the leadership of Bhindranwale.⁵  The Dal Khalsa along with a student organization called the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), were believed to be behind large-scale violence against Hindus which started by the end of 1983. By this time, the Sikhs demand for autonomy had taken secessionist overtones and a violent form. The Anandpur Sahib resolution also talked of Sikh nationhood and this was interpreted by the armed militants and some Akali groups as justification for an independent state of Khalistan. Bhindranwale’s followers acquired sophisticated weapons from abroad and launched a violent campaign.

Finally in June 1984, the central government launched an assault on the Golden Temple where Sikh extremists had sought sanctuary. Anti-Sikh riots in different parts of the country following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, further fuelled violence in Punjab. Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi signed an accord with Sant Longowal in 1985 to resolve some of the outstanding issues, but it failed to end violence in the state.⁶  The government managed to restore the political process in March 1992 and thereafter by strong counter-insurgency measures was able to contain violence by early 1993.

Kashmir

After Kashmir’s accession to India, it was given a special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The determination of Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of the National Conference (NC), was instrumental in an understanding being reached on the issue of Kashmir’s accession to India despite existent aspirations for a separate state at that time. But his imprisonment in 1953 and later his demise in 1982 completely changed the political course in Kashmir. 

Over the past five decades, New Delhi has progressively curtailed the powers and scope of Article 370 by extending most of the provisions of the Indian constitution to that state. Successive Congress governments in New Delhi, right from Jawaharlal Nehru to P.V. Narasimha Rao, have been inclined to go along with a diluted Article 370, as long as the state governments in Jammu and Kashmir were loyal to the Indian Union and did not question the legitimacy of its accession to India. Often the centre adopted both fair and foul methods to this end, including the rigging of elections, dismissal of duly elected governments and appointing state governors of its own choice, even against the wishes of the state government. These lapses on the part of the central leadership, along with corruption and dismal employment prospects for the Kashmiri youth, led to their growing alienation and disenchantment with the policies of New Delhi.

It was against this background, that Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah had arrived at an electoral agreement in 1986, whereby an alliance of National Conference and Congress-I was formed to fight the 1987 elections. This agreement was instrumental in discrediting Farooq Abdullah in the eyes of the Kashmiris. Further, allegations of rigging of the 1987 elections is believed to be the turning point because for the first time, a newly constituted Muslim United Front (MUF), an umbrella organization of several fundamentalist groups and parties, had made a serious bid to capture power through popular vote.⁷  The election was not only rigged before the eyes of the MUF polling agents, but they were even harassed and beaten.⁸  Having lost faith in the democratic political process, the disgruntled elements soon took to the path of militancy. Later, it was found by the intelligence agencies that quite a few militants were those young men who were guarding ballot boxes for the MUF candidates during the 1987 elections.⁹ 

Following the installation of the National Conference government, violent protests over the issue of unemployment and power shortages took place throughout 1988-89. Central government assistance for the development of the state had been misappropriated by the bureaucrats and political leaders. The failure of the state government to create employment opportunities severely affected the unemployed and the underemployed among the newly educated youth. Due to lack of satisfactory life chances and political opportunities to express their dissatisfactions, coupled with the corrupt behaviour of the state politicians, the Kashmiri youth took up arms.¹⁰ 

By end-1989 and early 1990, the militants were holding sway in the valley and the politicians were getting marginalized. The Kashmiri militants came into limelight through the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, himself a Kashmiri Muslim, in December 1989 by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Prime Minister V.P. Singh gave in to the JKLF’s demands for the release of five militants. The victory of the militants was widely celebrated in the valley. The National Front government sent Jagmohan as the Governor to bring the deteriorating situation under control. Farooq Abdullah resigned in protest and President’s rule was imposed. This unleashed a wave of militant violence in the valley and the government responded with strong retaliatory measures by deploying para-military forces.

East Pakistan

Even though the Bengalis of East Pakistan decided to go with Pakistan because of a common religion — Islam, the assertion of a separate Bengali identity started taking shape in February 1952 with the launching of an agitation for adoption of Bengali as a national language. By late 1960s, the demand for regional autonomy had taken strong roots and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, leader of the Awami League, presented a Six Point Demand in 1966 at an All-Party Convention in Lahore. A significant demand was for a truly federal form of government, wherein the central government should only control defence and foreign affairs, and separate currencies to be instituted for both wings. This was considered as being too radical by the ruling regime in Pakistan and as a threat to its nationhood. By March 1969, the Bengali agitation had gained momentum and in the national elections held on 7 December 1970, the Awami League won with an absolute majority. The Yahya Khan regime not only took measures to inhibit Mujib from forming a government but also launched a massive crackdown on the Bengali civilian population in March 1971. Soon an armed resistance built up that was jointly organized by the Bengali military, para-military and police personnel. On 4 April 1971, the Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla force, was set up in order to ensure more effective resistance to the Pakistan army and to mobilize political support. The guerrilla resistance held on till 7 December 1971, when India intervened militarily and the defeat of Pakistan in the ensuing war culminated in the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan.

Baluchistan

The Baluch tribes had revolted against the Pakistan state when they were forcibly incorporated on 27 March 1948.¹¹  Though the movement in Baluchistan had died down after the initial armed revolt, however, resistance continued from significant pockets. Throughout the 1960s the Baluch mountains were the scene of considerable guerrilla activity. In 1967-68, Bugti guerrillas and the Pakistan army engaged in a series of bloody skirmishes. In May 1968, Nawab Akbar Bugti was sentenced to death under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. Although Bugti was later pardoned, around 200 Baluch leaders were kept imprisoned in Quetta, Kalat and Karachi on rebellion charges, between 1962 and 1969.

The Baluch tribal leaders were unable to forge unity to assert provincial autonomy for a fairly long period of time. Baluch nationalism, however, later found expression through the National Awami Party (NAP), formed in 1957 under the leadership of Wali Khan, and was pledged to the principle of provincial autonomy. In the elections of 1970, the NAP along with the Jamaat-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) scored an impressive victory and formed a NAP-JUI coalition government with two Baluch nationalists, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo and Ataullah Khan Mengal being installed as Governor and Chief Minister respectively. The provincial government’s demand for a greater share in the national resources of the province and allocation of industries led to friction with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-dominated centre.¹²  Consequently, the provincial government was dissolved in 1973, the NAP leaders arrested and the party banned for anti-national activities.¹³ 

While the NAP was banned and its leadership in jail, the militant sections got an upperhand and led by the Baluch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) and Baluch Students Organization (BSO) at a later stage, they carried out an insurgency for the next four years, from 1973-77. The BPLF, after its formation in 1976, declared liberation of all nationalities in Pakistan as its prime objective. Subsequently, it stressed on an independent Baluchistan and by 1980, it was demanding for a ‘Greater Baluchistan’, comprising the areas in Iran and Afghanistan inhabited by the Baluchis.¹⁴ 

Since the 1980s, Baluch separatism has tempered down to demands for greater provincial autonomy. This has also been partly due to a realization that success over a far superior Pakistan army through guerrilla struggle in Baluchistan seems a remote possibility. The tiny population of about five per cent of Pakistan is not large and well equipped to succeed against a huge modern army. The subdued nature of the Baluch movement is also due to certain external and internal developments. The Afghan crisis and the toppling of the Shah of Iran have enhanced the geo-political significance of Baluchistan. The refugee influx due to the Afghan crisis has also had a severe impact on Baluchistan. The province has the highest number of refugees mostly Pushtuns, which has altered the ethnic balance in the Province. During the 1990s, the support for an independent Baluchistan has been further eroded by the demands of Pathans settled there, for the division of Baluchistan along ethnic lines.

Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka

The origins of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka may be traced to the historical perceptions of the Sinhala and Tamil communities vis-a-vis each other. The conflict got exacerbated after independence due to the state’s intransigence in accommodating Tamil aspirations. Government policies over the issues of language, land colonization, standardization policy leading to inadequate access for Tamils to university admissions and consequent shrinking in employment prospects, constitutional guarantees to Buddhism and preservation of the unitary constitution in 1972, created a feeling of alienation among the Tamils. By mid-1970s, the demands for affirmative discrimination and autonomy had taken the form of a demand for secession, due to the reluctance of the state to concede to the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils. While the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil party, was demanding a separate state and using parliamentary methods towards achieving this objective, the militant groups took up arms for this cause. It was the failure of the moderate Tamil leadership to get concessions from the Sinhala leadership and the clandestine support and backing they received from India in the initial years,¹⁵  due to which the Tamil militants have occupied the political space in the ethnic conflict since the late 1970s till today. Armed skirmishes between the militant groups and the security forces continued till 1983, when it flared up due to the killing of 13 soldiers in the north by the LTTE. This was followed by the ethnic riots of July 1983, which only strengthened the resolve of the militants.

The United National Party (UNP) did initiate some steps to evolve a consensus on a solution acceptable to all groups, but it did not make much headway. In 1984, at an All Parties Conference, a consensus on the principle of devolution emerged but there was no common understanding about the form and substance of devolution. By this time, the militants had started operating from Indian soil. With the help of India’s mediatory efforts, the government evolved a set of proposals for Provincial Councils in December 1986, which was rejected by the Tamil militants. The LTTE threatened to take over the civil administration in the north-east on 1 January 1987. Subsequently, Indian mediation between the militants and President Jayewardene’s government in Colombo resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on 28 July 1987, which stipulated the acceptance of Provincial Councils and the Tamil militants laying down arms to an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Though most of the militant groups laid down their arms, the LTTE was not willing to either give up their arms or their secessionist goal and soon rejected the accord. In October 1987, the LTTE and IPKF came into direct confrontation over the issue of capture of seventeen LTTE cadres by the Sri Lankan army and their subsequent death by committing suicide. The confrontation between the LTTE and the IPKF continued till March 1990, when the latter was withdrawn by the Indian government in response to President Premadasa’s demand. The LTTE and Premadasa government resumed negotiations but once again, it broke down. 

There was renewed hope with the coming to power of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in August 1994. She announced a devolution package in August 1995. Though the devolution package proposes a fair amount of autonomy to the Tamils, it has not been acceptable to the LTTE. Substantial discussions have not taken place on the proposals and the government in its counter-offensive have significantly weakened the LTTE militarily. It no longer retains control over Jaffna and has shifted base to the Eastern provinces.

Ethnic/Tribal and Separatist Violence

The Muhajirs

The Muhajirs who had formed the backbone in the struggle for the creation of Pakistan had traditionally supported the Jamaat-i-islami after the decline of the Muslim League. The emergence of an organization to represent Muhajir interests came about in a leadership vacuum after the Jamaat had closely aligned with the ruling establishment dominated by Punjabis and Pathans during General Zia’s period.

The origins of the Muhajir Quami Mahaj (MQM) is traced to a student organization called the All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) formed in June 1978 by some lower middle class Muhajir student activists. One of the main demands of the APMSO was for a revision of a federal quota which had seriously restricted the job prospects of urban Sindhis, i.e. primarily Muhajirs. In 1984, General Zia banned student organizations because of which the APMSO had to take a new appearance. Altaf Hussain founded the MQM out of this Muhajir student movement in March 1984. 

The rise and growth of the MQM has taken place in an atmosphere of ethnic riots and violence. Organizationally the party remained small till severe ethnic rioting took place in 1985-86. The first Muhajir Pathan riot took place in May 1985 following a minivan accident in which a Muhajir girl was killed. In the second instance, in November-December 1986 Muhajirs were targeted by Pathans following a raid by the army on Sohrab Goth to smash a heroin processing and distribution centre allegedly run by the Pathans. The rioting which followed spread to Hyderabad as well. These incidents were instrumental in the rise of the popularity of the MQM.

In early 1987, Altaf Hussain issued a charter of resolutions. It is believed that it was here that Hussain introduced the idea that the Muhajirs be treated as a fifth nationality. The MQM first tested its electoral strength in the local body elections in 1987 in Karachi and Hyderabad and won majorities. In November 1988, in the general elections the MQM won 13 seats in the national assembly and 24 in the provincial out of 100, dominating all the Urban Sindh seats. Since then the MQM has followed a strategy of helping minority parties to form governments in return for concessions. After the 1988 elections, the MQM reached an agreement with the PPP to help it form the government and signed a declaration with it. This understanding was shortlived. In October 1989 the MQM abrogated the accord. Relations between the Sindhis and Muhajirs deteriorated and in 1990 hundreds of people were killed in clashes between the students wing of the MQM and the PPP. In the October 1990 general elections, the MQM came to an understanding with the IJI and following a seat sharing arrangement dominated the urban areas. In the provincial assembly it won 28 seats and in the national assembly 15. By 1991, the MQM had established a virtual monopoly over representation of the Urdu-speaking community in urban Sindh.

The understanding with the IJI also did not last long. In June 1992 the army launched what is known as a Operation Cleanup against dacoits and criminal elements in rural Sindh but apparently the target was also the MQM.¹⁶  This led to a prolonged confrontation in which an urban guerrilla warfare was fought in the streets and lanes of Karachi. The military operation ended their parliamentary phase and the MQM parted ways with the IJI in June 1992. A split within the MQM was engineered in 1992 and another group claiming to be the real MQM came into existence called the MQM (Haqqiqi). Since then severe armed clashes have taken place between these two groups.

In 1993, the MQM boycotted the national elections but in the provincial assembly it won 26 seats. In the February 1997 elections it repeated its performance in urban Sindh, and won 12 seats in the national assembly and 28 seats in the provincial assembly, and reached a secret agreement with the PML (N) to form a coalition government.¹⁷ 

Chakmas

Bangladesh, one of the most homogeneous states in the region, is also confronted with ethnic violence and separatism. The Chakma’s, residing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), demand for autonomy and subsequent resort to armed struggle was largely due to policies followed since the 1950s, when Bangladesh was still part of Pakistan, due to which the tribal people were affected by government initiated internal migration and development projects. The autonomy of the CHT region was eroded by the Pakistan government since 1955, and increasingly the administration of the region earlier managed by the tribals themselves came under the control of the non-tribals.¹⁸  In 1964, as a result of a constitutional amendment, the CHT also lost its status as an excluded area.

The alienation and disenchantment of the tribal people was further exacerbated after the emergence of Bangladesh as a new state. On 15 February 1972, a delegation led by Manabendra Narayan Larma, an independent Member of Parliament (MP) at that time, met Mujib to put forward four demands of the CHT people. These were: (1) autonomy of the CHT with its own legislature; (2) retention of the 1900 regulations in the Bangladesh constitution; (3) continuation of the Tribal Chiefs office, and (4) constitutional provisions restricting the amendment of the regulation and imposition of a ban on the influx of non-tribal people.

Sheikh Mujib agreed that the region was backward and needed development to bring it upto the level of the other areas of Bangladesh. But he refused to recognize the distinct ethnic identity of the CHT people and ruled out any form of provincial autonomy as that would run counter to his idea of a unitary political system for Bangladesh. In fact, he felt that these kinds of demands would encourage ethnic feelings. Mujib’s advocacy of Bengali nationalism and his cultural assimilationist policies were an alienating factor for the Chakmas. Though M.N Larma was only demanding that the CHT should be made an autonomous region, this was, however, interpreted as secessionist and challenging Bengali nationalism. Hence, the demands were not only outrightly rejected, but also massive military deployment took place in the CHT. A few days after M.N Larma met Mujib, the police and army attacked villages in the tribal areas and the Air Force using jet aircraft carried strafing raids on tribals.¹⁹ 

After the meeting with Sheikh Mujib in February 1972, M.N Larma and his younger brother Jyotindra Bodhipriya Larma²⁰  established the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS - Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s Party) as a broad-based mass organization. It also had an armed wing called the Shanti Bahini (SB). The SB was able to develop into a powerful guerrilla force without any initial foreign support. The first signs of an impending insurgency were to emerge soon after Bangladesh switched over to a one party presidential form of government in January 1975. M.N Larma who was an M.P at that time, went underground. After Sheikh Mujib’s assassination M.N Larma along with most of the top-ranking leaders shifted to India and launched sporadic attacks.

The Chakmas still maintained contact with the government and the two most important demands of the Chakmas among other demands, placed before Ziaur Rahman in 1976, was self-determination with a separate legislature and a total ban on further settlements, dismantling of existing ones, and transfer of land ownership to the tribal people. The government of Ziaur Rahman rejected the demand for a separate legislature which almost amounted to a demand for a separate state. However, it tried to win over the CHT people by accelerating the process of economic development in their areas and by reserving seats for tribal students in Universities and other educational institutions.²¹ 

Ziaur Rahman was willing to look into the developmental needs of the tribals, but at the same time he was not averse to the idea of using force. He also followed a policy of colonization which was called a mass rehabilitation programme. This policy encouraged the people from the overcrowded centre of Bangladesh from Comilla, Kaokhali and Mymensingh districts to move into the hill tracts areas granting them land and agricultural inputs.²²  Such policies gave the feeling to the tribals that the government was deliberately inclined to marginalize them in their own land.

There were differences within the PCJSS on the goals and the course of action to be followed in the struggle. One faction wanted to declare independence and launch an all out attack on Bangladeshi forces. M.N Larma’s more limited goal was to force Dhaka into negotiations leading to a settlement that protected tribal interests. The PCJSS was thus divided along the lines of the autonomist-vs-secessionist.

The demands of the PCJSS have been modified which includes regional autonomy for the CHT with its own regional council guaranteed by the Bangladesh constitution, restoration of land rights of the ethnic hill people over the entire territorial area of the CHT, ban on settlement of people from the plains, withdrawal of all Bangladesh armed forces from the CHT, constitutional recognition of the hill people’s ethnic identity, and withdrawal of settlers of the plains land from the CHT since August 1947.²³  The Chakma leadership has found it difficult to make the Bangladesh government listen to even these demands.

Various rounds of peace talks have been held so far since 1992, when a ceasefire was declared by the insurgents²⁴  and which still holds till today, but the Bangladesh government has not yielded to any of the core demands. The negotiation process is still on with the Awami League government showing a greater willingness to talk with the insurgents. But there has been no let down in the violence and the Shanti Bahini still carries on with its guerrilla activities.

Revolutionary or Ideological Violence

The two major anti-systemic movements in South Asia — the Naxalites or the Maoists in India and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka — apart from their ideological persuasions also had strong underlying economic causes. The Naxalite insurgency was a result of disadvantageous land tenure policies which had affected the peasantry seriously and due to land alienation among the tribals. The JVP insurgency in Sri Lanka can be explained in terms of relative deprivation — as a revolution of rising expectations. The sense of deprivation and grievances of the youth, unemployed and underemployed was mobilized against the Sri Lankan state.

Naxalites

In India, the Naxalite insurgency began in May 1967 with a peasant revolt in Naxalbari, West Bengal. The revolt was led by local Communist cadres, who subsequently broke away or were expelled from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1969. These communists who came together to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal, were dissatisfied with the CPI(M). They believed that the CPI(M) had lost its revolutionary fervour and had aligned with bourgeois forces while adopting the line of parliamentary struggle.

Ideologically, the CPI(ML) believed that the Chinese model of guerrilla warfare and liberated zones would work in India as well. Their concept of armed struggle was primarily based on a premise that as soon as they organize and start an armed struggle, the people of India would rise up in revolt. This was to be done by the annihilation of the class enemy. The primary objective of the annihilation campaign was to smash the feudal authority in the villages and to replace it with the authority of the peasants.²⁵ 

The tribals and students formed the backbone of the Naxalite cadres. The students from Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi played an important role in the Naxalite movement in Bihar and Punjab. The annihilation strategy was applied in Calcutta in July 1970. But by adopting this tactic, the movement lost its support among the peasants and acted more like an urban terrorist movement by concentrating on annihilating police, moneylenders, businessmen and political enemies in the CPI(M).²⁶ 

Subsequently, the annihilation theory raised a controversy within the organization on the question of the same tactics being applied to all parts of India. This debate led to a split in the organization in the summer of 1971. A break-away group, led by Ashim Chatterjee, favoured a return to mass struggles to distribute land and crops, and to fight police and paramilitary forces in the countryside. Though the Naxalbari uprising was crushed by mid-1969, groups of Naxalites were organized in at least eight Indian states.

But since Charu Mazumdar’s death in July 1972, the movement has faced a series of splits. At present, there are at least forty Naxalite factions. Among these, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar and the People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, formed in 1975 by Kondapalli Seetharamaih, still adhere to the concept of annihilation of class enemies though they have combined armed struggle with mass front activities as well.²⁷ 

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

The JVP as a movement emerged due to the socio-economic crisis of the 1960s and the political weakness of the established left parties.²⁸  It originated as a result of a split in the pro-Chinese Communist party of Sri Lanka. As the established left parties were absorbed completely in the parliamentary process and power sharing, their appeal as revolutionary parties to the radical youth waned. The dissatisfaction with the traditional left was due to various reasons. The significant among them were - their support base was limited only to the urban working class and the peasantry was largely neglected by the left parties.²⁹  Rohana Wijeweera, founder-leader of the JVP, was able to take a sizeable section of the youth with him when he left the Communist party.

In April 1971, in a swift attempt to takeover the state apparatus, it launched an insurrection. The government of Ms. Srimavo Bandaranaike was, however, able to suppress this attempt with considerable support from external sources including India. The JVP was proscribed and most of the insurgents incarcerated. With a change of government in 1977, the new President Jayewardene of the UNP offered amnesty to most of the insurgents including its chief Wijeweera. In 1977, Wijeweera gave an assurance to the President that they would function within the parliamentary framework. He also professed that theJVP would not use violence in its future course of actions. In 1983, following the anti-Tamil riots the JVP was again proscribed on trumped-up charges of complicity in the riots. Soon there were stray and sporadic acts of subversion. After the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord these were to become more widespread and organized. The strategy now seem to have changed from the earlier one and a protracted guerrilla warfare was waged for almost two years. With the capture and elimination of Wijeweera and some of the other leaders, the efforts of the JVP came to a standstill.

Integrating Violence into a Strategy

In the case of all the above mentioned conflicts, violence of a high degree has been employed as a part of a strategy at some point of time or at the initial stages itself. The use of violence, or the felt need to use violence, of course, has differed according to the objectives of the movements — the objectives being demands for autonomy or secession or capture of state power itself. While in the case of the Naxalites and the JVP, violence was integrated into their ideologies, the same has not been the case with the ethnic conflicts, most of which have evolved from autonomist to secessionist movements. Some autonomy movements like the Chakmas and the MQM have made a predominant use of violence as an essential ingredient of the bargaining process with their respective states.

But the question that needs to be addressed is to what extent have all these movements been able to integrate violence into their strategies? Because violence without a carefully thought out strategy cannot bring success in achieving any objectives. In order to be successful, violence has to be effectively and systematically integrated into a strategy. Surprisingly, few of the movements in South Asia have displayed any understanding of the effective use of violence in their strategy to either secede or capture the state by means of an armed struggle. Atleast, the tactics of the autonomist movements, which have employed violence seem to have been more effective. All the secessionists movements seem to be based on a premise that once violence is introduced into a conflict situation and if the movement has the capacity to sustain and intensify the levels of violence, the states would inevitably capitulate. Ironically, the states seem to be also following this premise in wearing out most of the secessionist insurgencies and ruthlessly suppressing the anti-systemic insurgencies. 

Therefore, most secessionist insurgencies in South Asia have not succeeded. All the secessionist insurgencies have relied predominantly on guerrilla warfare and use this method both in jungles and urban areas depending upon the terrain they are operating from. Generally, their strategy includes hit and run tactics with the intention of weakening the resolve of the administration. This is carried out by attacking security personnel and assassinating political leaders and high level government officials opposed to the movement. The hilly terrain in Baluchistan, Kashmir, the CHT and the jungles in north-eastern India and Sri Lanka provide ideal conditions for waging guerrilla warfare.

The insurgents in north-east India, because of its hilly and jungle terrain, have relied on classical guerrilla warfare methods. But since the induction of the army in 1956, it has not been very effective. However, reasons for its sustenance are inaccessibility of their jungle hideouts and the local support they enjoy. None of the insurgent groups have been able to create liberated zones. The ULFA, to certain extent, was able to challenge the administration by being able to levy and collect taxes. But strong counter-insurgency measures have undermined this network, even though there are some signs of revival.

The Sikh militants have been the weakest in terms of a strategy. First, they did not enjoy enough local support, as the population in Punjab is almost equally divided between Sikhs and Hindus. Therefore, they relied on subversion and planned acts of terrorism. By these methods, they were fairly successful in carrying out assassinations and sabotage and undermining the political process.³⁰ 

The Kashmiri militants predominantly use urban guerrilla warfare because of the support they enjoy among the local population. This support not only provides them with operational flexibility but they have also used it tactically. There were some efforts to create liberated areas in the rural areas like Kupwara, Baramulla and Badgam. Perhaps their strategy was to draw the army out to larger areas where they might be vulnerable. However, all through out the insurgency, the security forces have continued to maintain a military edge over the militants in the valley.

The Shanti Bahini followed the essential principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare by conducting hit-and-run raids against the security forces, always choosing the ground of battle and avoiding confrontation if the time and terrain of the battle were unfavourable.³¹  Initially, the insurgent activities of the Shanti Bahini gained ground. The hills, valleys and dense vegetation of the tropical rainforests offer ideal terrain for low-to-medium intensity guerrilla warfare.The ability of the guerrillas to fight on the hilly, jungle terrain on their own terms was much higher than the security forces. Their ambushes were well planned and executed with a high level of efficiency. The guerrillas morale was also much higher than that of the security forces. And for a while it was able to create a parallel administration in the district.³²  Since January 1994 there has been a realization by the Shanti Bahini that an armed struggle with the Bangladesh government would prove futile.³³ 

The most successful among the secessionist groups have been the Tamil militants in Sri Lanka. By using guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts they have posed a tough challenge to the Sri Lankan security forces. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan forces gradually lost control over the Jaffna peninsula and with the collapse of the civil administration, the militants were able to create liberated zones and run a parallel administration.³⁴  By 1986, the LTTE controlled the entire Jaffna peninsula and parts of Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and Mannar districts. In order to contest the authority of the state and create a parallel administration, they also carried out certain symbolic acts such as recruiting police personnel to man traffic,³⁵  open a bank,³⁶  etc.

The strategy of the LTTE in its confrontation with the IPKF had two aspects. One was to wear down the IPKF militarily, psychologically and morally.³⁷  It followed the principle of least resistance, withdrawing most of the time and trading space for time. By making innovative use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), it was able to inflict massive casualties on the IPKF. The nature of these explosives was a major factor in bringing down the morale of the soldiers. In urban warfare, like the Kashmiri militants, they used the civilians as a protective shield to fire at the IPKF and then, disappear into the crowds. By these methods, it was able to contain the IPKF militarily for about one and a half years. At the political level, its strategy was to prevent the restoration of the political and electoral process.³⁸  Even after the elections had taken place, it tried hard to undermine the same both through military strikes, as well as by holding negotiations with President Premadasa. 

Since 1989, the LTTE’s strategy had been to hold on to the Jaffna peninsula and run its own civil administration. It defended the peninsula by conventional means³⁹  as well as guerrilla warfare. By effective use of landmines and boobytraps, the LTTE managed to keep the security forces confined to the camps. Occasionally, it made lightening attacks against the army camps and inflicted massive casualties, as in the case of the Pooneryn camp in the later part of 1993. At present, it is considerably weakened having lost control over the Jaffna peninsula since the end of 1995. It seems highly unlikely, inspite of the motivation and resolve, that the LTTE would be able to achieve its goal of a separate state by means of violence.

Secession of East Pakistan in 1971 was the only exception which came about due to a very different set of factors. The insurgency in East Pakistan was a combination of conventional military strategy and guerrilla warfare. In the early stages of the insurgency, conventional warfare failed and that is why in May 1971, the operational strategy was changed from regular to guerrilla warfare. However, the core of the guerrilla army still comprised professional military personnel, who were also responsible for raising a ‘people’s militia’ drawn from the peasantry. Besides the regular armed forces, many civilians, on their own initiative, organized guerrilla resistance groups. All such groups were based locally and on most occasions, acted in isolation, with little coordination with the Mukti Bahini. By hit and run operations, elimination of collaborators, destroying the enemy’s communication links, the insurgents succeeded in undermining the morale of the Pakistan army. Gradually, by June-July 1971, the guerrilla resistance was operating from four sectors. By this method, it forced the Pakistani troops to deploy over a large area. Thus, when the Indian army intervened, it managed to override the Pakistan army in a short and swift action.⁴⁰ 

While the anti-systemic insurgencies like the Naxalites and the JVP have failed, they were able to notionally develop a model of insurgent strategy. Strategically, the Naxalites followed the Chinese line on armed struggle, during the initial stages. It was to be based on the peasants establishing base areas in the countryside, promoting a country-wide guerrilla campaign and then using the countryside to encircle the cities. Where it significantly differed from Mao’s strategy was on its tactics of annihilation of the class enemy. While Mao had stressed mass mobilization before any guerrilla action, the Naxalite leaders believed that mass mobilization could follow once the feudal authority in the villages was smashed.⁴¹  The government machinery in these areas did not function and the peasants along with the CPI(ML) cadres ran the administration. They arbitrated in disputes and took over land and redistributed it among the poor landless peasants.⁴² 

The undoing of this strategy came about when it was extended to the urban areas in July 1970.⁴³  While in the villages it was the annihilation of the feudal landlords, in the urban areas this campaign was to target policemen, military personnel, big capitalists and black marketeers. This did not create the power vacuum it was supposed to have done. After the collapse of the Srikakulum movement, the influence of the Naxalites remained only in Calcutta city. The party was in complete disarray and began splintering due to its tactical line.

The JVP was the only organization that had probably imaginatively and innovatively integrated violence in their strategy to capture power, It was convinced that power could not be captured without a successful armed revolution. The path a revolution takes place in a country under certain conditions was bound to differ from another country. Though Wijeweera said that violence is not essential, it was unavoidable in a revolution. Revolution could not be brought about by a democratic process or by peaceful means.⁴⁴ 

The JVP developed a thesis that a swift and short armed insurrection, and not guerrillawarfare, was the appropriate form of revolutionary struggle in Sri Lanka in its formative stages. This developed partly from an analysis of thegeographical and demographic structure of the island — asmall densely populated area with a relatively weak security force.⁴⁵  Therefore, in Sri Lanka, the revolution should start both in the city and villages simultaneously, aiming at the seizure of power through a sudden and very short sharp attack throughout the country. He was convinced that due to the small size of the island, it was possible to capture power in “a single blow”.⁴⁶  Wijeweera’s plan was that at an opportune moment, the JVP would rise on the same day and at every place where it had a following. It was a plan to be executed with lightning speed, and all institutions of state power captured before the state could take effective counter?measures. In line with this strategy, in April 1971, in a swift attempt to takeover the state apparatus, it launched an insurrection. The government of Ms. Srimavo Bandaranaike was, however, able to suppress this attempt with considerable support from external sources. 

In its second attempt to capture power, the strategy of the JVP seems to have been much more complex, probably taking into consideration the altered ground situation. The strategy adopted during the 1971 insurrection was a straight forward strategy of trying to capture the state in a single blow. The strategy during the latter period was a protracted long drawn?out affair. In the short?term, the effort was to weaken the civil administration, cripple the economy and enforce hardship on the common man. This model may be conceptualized as a model of ‘sectoral paralysis’, whereby the economy and civil administration were paralyzed sector-wise, prior to the final takeover of state power. In the long term, it was hoped to generate sufficient public support, and as a result of the above factors, the people were expected to rise in a mass uprising against the state and bring about a systemic change. In this approach, the JVP had considered using a coalition of the parliamentary opposition as a popular front to ride to power.⁴⁷  This projection, however, never worked out.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic conflict in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp.94-95.

2. Myron Weiner estimates that more than six and a half million migrants entered and settled in Assam. Refer, ibid., pp.80-81.

3. Under the terms of the accord, migrants who had come to the state between 1966 and 1971 were to be disenfranchised and those who had come after 1971 from Bangladesh were to be deported. For details see, P.S. Datta, Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1995), pp.34-40.

4. The ULFA was successful in carrying out these activities because of its widespread support among villagers, the urban middle class and Assamese students. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p.175.

5. For a detailed analysis about how Bhindranwale was promoted to keep the Akali Dal in check and also used in the internal rivalries within the Congress Party, see, Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), pp.167-219.

6. For details of the accord see, Datta, Op. Cit., pp.190-193.

7. Within the valley, the Congress and the National Conference were totally discredited and in all probability, elections were rigged to prevent the MUF from demonstrating its strength. See, Paul Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.221. On the other hand, it is suggested that notwithstanding its mobilization and consolidation in ranks, MUF could not win more than five seats and consequently it alleged mass rigging by the alliance. The allegations were so forceful that it managed to convince the public at large that the alliance had resorted to rigging. See, Riyaz Punjabi, “Kashmir: The Bruised Identity,” in Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.148. But there is unanimous consensus of opinion that this election was the turning point in the rise of militancy in the valley. See, M.K. Tikku, “Kashmir: Genesis of the Problem”, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 August 1991.

8. Anuradha Dutt, “Can Jagmohan Save Kashmir,” Illustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 4-10 February 1990, p.15.

9. Shekhar Gupta, “Kashmir Valley: Militant Siege”, India Today, 31 January 1990, p.28. Some researchers have also confirmed this fact on the basis of their field studies. Ashutosh Varshney writes, “Some of those candidates (MUF candidates who were beaten up) crossed the ever porous Indo-Pak border and joined the extremist groups. The leadership of the insurgency two years later, would come from some of these contestants”. He adds that “Some have become area commanders of the various militant groups. Their names are widely known but for reasons of safety can not be revealed....” See his article, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem,” in Raju Thomas, Op. Cit, pp.220, 233.

10. The former Governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan believes that it was due to these factors that “fundamentalists, pro-Pakistan elements and terrorists”, aided and abetted by Pakistan came to hold sway over the minds of Kashmiris. See, Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1991), pp. 13 and 112.

11. S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (London: Zed Books, 1993), p.137.

12. The insecurity engendered by theevents of 1971 that led to Pakistan’s dismemberment were at the heart of the events that followed. Ibid., p.143.

13. Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1978), pp.157-215. Tensions between the Baluch government and the centre had exploded on 12 February 1973 over the discovery of a cache of arms from the residence of the Iraqi military attache in Islamabad that were allegedly meant for Baluch separatists. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p.35.

14. Harrison, ibid., pp.72-87.

15.M.R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1984), pp.97, 174.

16. The operation lasted till November 1994.

17. For excerpts from the secret agreement see, Herald, March 1997, p.42. Some of the demands of the MQM are investigating into extra-judicial killings, compensations, withdrawal of the rangers, a census by December 1997, upward revision of urban Sindh’s federal quota from 7.5 to 11.5 per cent and repatriation of the stranded Biharis from Bangladesh.

18. The autonomy of the CHT was continued by the Pakistanis possibly to deny the Bengalis power at the centre. The special status of the CHT was continued both to delink the region from East Pakistan and at the same time to allow the Federal government a direct control over the province. See S. Gowher Rizvi, “Bangladesh: Insurgency in the Hills,” Roundtable, no.305, January 1988, p.41.

19. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking Publishers, 1994), p.278; also see Ali, Op. Cit., p.183.

20. Popularly known as Shantu Larma.

21. Talukder Maniruzzaman, “The Future of Bangladesh,” in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1992), p.270

22. According to some news reports Ziaur Rahman had a plan to settle 20,000 families from each district on the fertile land along the Karnafuli river. The plan was sought to be put into effect in 1978. See, “Tribal Influx to Wreck Indo-Bangla Accord,” Times of India, 1 October 1981.

23. “Tribal Stir not Guided by India: Shantu Larma,” Public Opinion Trends (POT), vol.19, no.163, 20 July 1994, p.650.

24. Its not clear why the Shanti Bahini declared the unilateral ceasefire in 1992 and for what reasons it has continued for five years? While the PCJSS contends that it is essentially to prove its desire to negotiate, government and military officials believe it is a tactical move to reorganize. Personal interviews, Dhaka, December 1996.

25. Biplab Dasgupta, “Naxalite Armed Struggles and The Annihilation Campaign in Rural Areas,” in V. Grover (ed.), Political System in India: Politics of Influence, Violence and Pressure Groups (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1989), pp.233-238.

26. “Urban Guerrillas in Calcutta,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol.6, no.28, 10 July 1971, pp.1379-1382.

27. For details on PWG’s activities, see, R.J.R Prasad, “Naxalite Challenge: The Spreading Violence in Andhra Pradesh,” Frontline (Madras), 3 January 1992; B. Kesava Rao, “On Home Ground: Karimnagar District Run by Naxalites,” Frontline, 3 January 1992; Amarnath K. Menon, “People’s War Group: On the Warpath,” India Today (New Delhi), 28 February 1993; T. Lakshmipathi, “Fear Again: Naxalite Violence in Andhra Pradesh,” Frontline, 17 December 1993; R.J.R. Prasad, “End of the Run: The Arrest of Kondapalli Seetharamaih,” Frontline, 23 April 1993; and M.O. Farook, “Farewell to Arms,” Pioneer (New Delhi), 10 April 1994.

28. J. Uyangoda, “Socio-Economic Roots of Revolt”, Lanka Guardian, vol. 4, no. 3, 15 May 1981, p.17.

29. Politicus,”The April Revolt in Ceylon”, Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 3, March 1972, p.265.

30. In this regard, one significant tactic of the Sikh insurgents may be noted. During the Legislative Assembly elections of 20 June 1991, the Sikh insurgents made serious attempts to eliminate at least one candidate from as many constituencies as possible. Thus, it was able to ensure the postponement of elections in these constituencies. Before the elections, they were able to eliminate twenty-three candidates for the Vidhan Sabha. See, Paul Brass, Op., cit., p.197. 

31. Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Cross-Fire: North-East India (New Delhi: Lancer Publisher, 1996), p.275.

32. D. C. Burman, “Regionalism in Bangladesh: The Study of the Chittagong hill Tracts,” in Ramakant (ed.), Regionalism in South Asia (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1983), pp.125-127.

33. “Pact on Chakmas: Triumph for Bangla,” Telegraph, 25 January 1994.

34. S.H. Venkatramani, “Jaffna: Bearing the Blockade,” India Today, 15 February 1987, p.80-83.

35. The LTTE also opened a school to train motorists in traffic rules. Earlier, the EPRLF had issued postage stamps and postcards. See, Swamy, Op. Cit., pp.209, 225.

36. The LTTE, apparently, had set up a bank in Jaffna. See, “LTTE Opens Bank in Jaffna,” Pioneer, 31 May 1994.

37. S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), p.31.

38. Shankar Bhaduri and Afsir Karim, The Sri Lankan Crisis (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1990), p.127.

39. While the LTTE’s strategy against the IPKF was predominantly guerrilla warfare, after the latter’s departure, the LTTE surprised the Sri Lankan forces by adopting conventional military tactics by defending itself with anti-aircraft guns during the course of the Operation Balavegaya. See, Rohan Gunasekera, “A Backward Glance at the Elephant Pass,” The Island (Colombo), 4 August 1991.

40. For details, see, Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Books, 1979), pp.31-88; Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), pp.111-115; and K.M. Saifullah, Bangladesh at War (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1989).

41. Mohan Ram, Maoism in India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1971), p.113.

42. ibid., p.117.

43. ibid., p.156. It is likely that the annihilation campaign was extended to the cities after they suffered setbacks in the countryside. By July 1970, the Naxalites in Srikakulum had been smashed. See, Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p.139.

44. Swaroop Rani Dubey, One-Day Revolution in Sri Lanka: Anatomy of 1971 Insurrection (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1988), p.62.

45. Fred Halliday, “The Ceylonese Insurrection”, New Left Review, no.69, September-October 1971, p.77. 

46. James Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p.30.

47. For a detailed analysis of the strategy and tactics of the JVP, refer, Ajay Darshan Behera, Insurgency in South Asia: A Study of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in Sri Lanka (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, School of International Studies, 1995), pp.164-203.

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