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There is an intrinsic linkage between political
violence and development. The propensity to violence is inherent in the process
of development itself. Since the principal political contest in every society
involves a polarization of social groups around distributional issues, the
process of development invariably results in the continuous disturbance of
the prevailing social balance, in the emergence of new social classes that
threaten the existing distribution of power. The pace, content and dynamics
of development, therefore, acquire a pervasive character of instability, disequilibrium
and conflict. This often results in the use of force and violence as one of
the available modes of political action in the pursuit of promoting socio-economic
and political change or for reducing instability, establishing order, and
suppressing conflict. Sometimes violence is also adopted as one of the necessary
instruments directed at the radical transformation of the system.
The Connotations of Development
Development is a normative concept eluding a single accepted
definition. It is a multidimensional process which may be interpreted as change
from a less to a more desirable state. Accordingly, the concerns with development
were essentially a concern with a programme of social, political and economic
transformation. But the question still remains whether development should
be relative to time, place and circumstance or may be reduced to one universally
applicable formula?
The project of development was inspired
by a naive image of a successful transition — institutional and ideological
— from tradition to modernity, eventually mirroring the western experience.
The early stages of theory-building associated with development was unduly
optimistic about the prospects for spreading capitalism and western democracy.1 The agenda of the project was the creation of stable pro-western
political systems in the new states of the third world or developing societies.
This was replaced in the mid-sixties, due to a tense international situation
and challenges to the state even in the west, by a more pessimistic account,
which turned from a concern with constitutional democracy to a concern with
order and stability. Therefore, it was not surprising that Samuel P. Huntington’s
classic Political Order in Changing Societies had expressed a normative
preference for order and stability.
The connotations attributed to development
can be extensive and diverse. Even within the discipline of political science
there has been a tendency to take an all-encompassing view of political development.
Lucian Pye has elaborated on atleast ten ways in which political development
can be understood. These are: (i) Political Development as the Political Requisite
of Economic Development; (ii) Political Development as the Politics Typical
of Industrial Societies; (iii) Political Development as Political Modernization;
(iv) Political Development as the Operation of a Nation-State; (v) Political
Development as Administrative and Legal Development; (vi) Political Development
as Mass Mobilization and Participation; (vii) Political Development as the
Building of Democracy; (viii) Political Development as Stability and Orderly
Change; (ix) Political Development as Mobilization and Power, and (x) Political
Development as one Aspect of Multi-Dimensional Process of Social Change.2
Pye’s elaborations are so wide-ranging
that they, in fact, demarcate the boundaries of the concept of development
itself. And if one were look for the connotations of development then one
has to go no further but look into Pye’s elaborations which encompass social,
economic and political development in onego. But it also points to the difficulties
in conceptualizing the concept of development. The essence of the concept
of development revolves around political modernization, economic development
and social change but the normative priorities of the concept seem to stress
stability.
Development involves change in the
structure of society and in its capacity to respond effectively to stress
imposed upon the system. The central thesis of the concept of development
is that social and political change occurs according to a pre-established
pattern, the logic and direction of which are known.3 It is a unilinear movement from the
traditional to the modern. It involves the shift from a predominantly rural,
agricultural society to an increasingly urban industrial society, characterized
by a cash and market economy, economic growth, high literacy, greater social
and occupational differentiation and mobility. The ascription determination
of status by birth is supposed to give way to achievement orientations. The
direction of development, it is assumed, is away from the primordial (biological
criteria of affinity) towards attachment to the larger territory, the form
of development is away from weak, non-intrusive centres to active, dominant
centres, the substance of development is towards a civil society marked by
modern values and procedures.4 Participation in the political
process increases with demands by new groups seeking access to the political
system. Thus, along with the development-promoting potential, development
also has a change-inducing role.
Development and Change
Development viewed the process of change
in the new states as problematic from the beginning — it was overwhelmingly
concerned with the dislocations it produced. The dynamics of change creates
serious disruptions in the process of development and by its very nature breeds
instability.5 The character and direction of change
is a product of a dialectical interaction between tradition and modernity,
each transforming the other.6 The relationship between tradition
and modernity — the degree to which tradition is accommodated in the process
of change, the way it responds to the challenge of modernization — is a critical
determinant of stability and development. In the increasing conflict between
the traditional and the modern elements in society, primordial loyalties and
proximate identities come to the forefront.
The political consequences of change
often involve higher levels of disruption, conflict and violence. And therefore,
one of the primary goals of development has been political stability. There
are two important elements in political stability — order and continuity.
Order involves relative absence of violence, force, coercion and disruption
from the political system. Continuity means a relative absence of change in
the critical components of the political system, a lack of discontinuity in
political evolution, the absence from the society of significant social forces
and political movements that wish to bring about fundamental changes in the
political system. The evidence of political stability is infrequent changes
in political institutions and political actors and a relative lack of, or
significantly low levels of political violence.
Nature of Conflicts
The development process results in not only dislocations and
disorder but also various kinds of conflicts. Most of these conflicts occur
over the distribution of scarce resources, most notably power. Inequality
remains the ultimate source of conflicts. There are various perspectives on
conflict — the functional and the dialectical perspective. Both the functional
and dialectical perspective on conflict point to the significance of violence.
Within the functional perspective, Lewis Coser’s definition remains one of
the most comprehensive. Conflicts arise when the deprived members of a system
withdraw legitimacy from the system. He regards conflicts as a struggle over
values, entailing behaviour that is initiated with the intent of inflicting
harm, damage or injury on the other party.7 However, the functional theorists
focussed on less severe and violent conflicts and their consequences for promoting
integration within and between the conflicting parties and for increasing
overall system adaptability and flexibility.
The dialectical theory of conflict
emerged out of a concern to end capitalism and change society. The dynamics
of change was explained by Marx’s concept of dialectics — the inherent contradictions
in social relations generate their transformation. These contradictions make
conflict inevitable and the economic organization of the society and consequent
class formation resulting from ownership and non-ownership of property leads
to a revolutionary class conflict. Dialectical conflict or class conflict,
envisaged severe and violent conflicts causing redistribution of resources
into a new pattern of inequality which, in turn, will cause a new wave of
conflict and resource distribution.
This conception of conflict was not
only narrow but also teleological as it essentially arose from Marx’s desire
to not only interpret the social world but also how to change it. However,
conflicts are rarely bipolarized across an entire society as the process of
class formation has not taken the course that Marx had predicted. Also, class
conflict was supposed to have been more acute in capitalist societies in which
the major classes are much more clearly differentiated. On the contrary, in
transitional societies polarization has taken place across a whole range of
primordial identities resulting in multiple levels of conflict. They are plagued
by ethnic, religious, communal, tribal as well as class conflicts.
Though Marxism visualized the need
for conflict to change the world, it saw violence in instrumental terms. However,
after the second world war the communist world had largely bifurcated with
regard to the theoretical need for violence to achieve goals. While the Soviet
contention was that there are many roads to socialism, the Chinese still felt
the necessity for violence. Thus, immediately after the second world war,
communists in most new states in Asia, influenced by Maoism enunciated the
doctrine of wars of liberation and sought to gain power through armed insurrections.8 This conflict between the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology
and liberal democracy became a concern for development theorists.
Nation-building and State-formation
Decolonization in the wake of the second world war, had led
to the emergence of a large number of states in the global system. These states
were faced with the problems of nation-building and state-formation. The structural
transformation of these societies was conflict-ridden. These conflicts concern
the long-term processes of nation-building and state-formation.
Most of these developing states are
of a multi-ethnic character, consisting of several nations. Their national
boundaries were drawn by the departing colonial power, without any regard
to the ethno-linguistic or cultural composition of the population. The state
had to take the initiative in nation-building. Deriving from the European
nation-building experience, even elites in these developing societies felt
that the nation and state should be congruent.9 This resulted in the attempt to bring
about cultural homogenization. This process of nation-building10
was a major factor in the emergence of conflicts based on ethnicity.
Ethnicity as a category in conflicts
not only exists at the level of consciousness, but it is also a reflection
in consciousness of very real, concrete and material circumstances. Some view
ethnic conflict as inherent in the capitalist model of development as it is
competitive. The capitalist form of development is uneven and accentuates
exploitation as some ethnic groups benefit disproportionately and others lose
disproportionately.11
The way ethnic conflict or ethnic movements
relate to development is highly complex. One of the outcomes of the development
process has been an expression of ethnic violence. In all ethnic conflict
there is an economic factor of varying importance but there is no uniform
economic cause. The range of economic factors that may influence ethnic relations
can be diverse — struggle for scarce resources, regional imbalances, infrastructural
investments with a great impact on the local economic systems, labour market
conflict, distributional conflicts, etc. Conflict over natural resources can
be exemplified by the way in which forest wealth is used by jungle tribes
on the one hand, and urban middle class populations on the other. For the
former the forest represents a way of life, for the latter it means building
materials or paper for the newspaper industry. Thus, growth and modernization
can go against what is known as ethnodevelopment — a development process appropriate
for a particular ethnic group.12
Due to the multi-ethnic character of
the developing societies, the regime in power invariably lacks the support
of some significant component of the population. The process of nation-building
renders many ethnic groups devoid of power or influence. The relationship
between the core community or the dominant ethnic group and the peripheral
communities in a state is quite often characterized by exploitation. This
is in some senses structural. The core community acquires an advantage over
the outlying communities in the period of state-building or during the early
periods of modernization, and then uses political and economic power to maintain
and enhance its superior position. Despite the formal withdrawal of the colonial
power, forms of oppression which could be described as colonial, have continued
in these countries. In this relationship between the centre and the periphery,
ethnic conflict is an outcome of real or a perceived sense of internal colonialism.13 Long years of nation-building have not resolved some of these
conflicts. In some cases, modernization and development have only resulted
in the intensification of conflicts and an increasing use of violence in the
articulation of demands.
Political Violence
Political violence, in contradistinction to other forms of
violence in general, is not random. It is the use of force for the resolution
of conflicts in society that mainly originate from sociopolitical, economic,
ethnic, and cultural causes and that find expression in various forms of collective
action. Political violence as opposed to other forms of violence is a group
phenomenon and that it must be carried out with the intent of having an impact
on the political system. The expression of political violence need not always
be overt physical armed violence. Violence may be inbuilt into the structure
— characterized as structural violence — violence that is implicit in the
structures of domination and inequality in a society. This violence is exerted
by situations, institutions, social, political and economic structures. These
structures are legitimized by the prevailing juridical order, and sociopolitical
and economic institutions.14
One of the most comprehensive definitions
of political violence has been provided by H.L. Nieburg. According to him,
political violence is “acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose,
choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or
effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour
of others in a bargaining situation, that has consequences for the social
system”.15 Ted Robert Gurr provides a more precise definition that political
violence is “the use or threat of violence by any party or institution to
attain ends within or outside the political order”.16
Political violence emerges within a
certain socio-political and economic context. Though political violence is
disorderly but it is designated for a reordering purpose, i.e., to overthrow
a tyrannical regime, to redefine and realize justice and equity, to achieve
independence or territorial autonomy, to impose one’s religious and doctrinal
beliefs.17 Under certain circumstances it can become self-legitimizing,
specifically when it is an expression of the natural desire for freedom and
liberty when directed against autocracies. But in democratic societies, political
violence suggests institutional weaknesses, or normative insufficiencies,
injustices or inequities. In this context David Apter has said that “political
violence, although a fluctuating phenomenon within democracy, has at every
step accompanied its evolution, and with... the whole improving results. Which
is why we have argued that in some respects democracy is violence-driven.”18
Nation-State Building and Violence
Political violence in the context of
the third world is largely an outcome of the nation-state building process.
Therefore, conflicts and instability in developing societies can be interpreted
as signs of an ongoing process of development.19 The developing societies are fragmented
with too many ethnic, religious and linguistic differences. Due to the extended
period of colonial rule political, economic and social structures are weak,
divisive and often inflexible. However, in contrast to the industrialization
of the older advanced western states, even in the developing world, development
is expected to take place before the unity of the nation is really underway.
European States took several centuries for the completion of the state-making
enterprise, whereas the post-colonial states are expected to replicate the
same process within a short time-frame. Along with this, the demand for political
participation, welfare and a more equitable distribution of economic resources
by the general populace complicates the process of state-making in the post-colonial
societies, leading to conflicts. The degree of violence is probably explained
by the task of achieving the nation-state building in a drastically curtailed
time frame.20
Charles Tilly also adheres to the view
that state-building is a violent process. Violence in new states is a process
of primitive accumulation of power.21 However, the process of development
and state-formation need not necessarily and permanently be of a violent nature.
The relationship between violence and development can thus be characterized
as curvilinear, violence will decrease only once a certain level of development
has been reached. It is not yet clear, however, what this level is or whether
economic (in the form of more equity) and political development (in the form
of more democracy) are sufficient in themselves to prevent conflict and violence.22
Manifestations of Political Violence
Political violence can manifest itself
in various forms like civil war, guerilla warfare, insurrection, revolution,
terrorism and also state violence. Fred R. Von Der Mehden creates a typology
of five basic types of political violence. These are: (i) Primordial (such
as religious or racial); (ii) Separatist or secessionist; (ii) Revolutionary
and counter-revolutionary; (iv) Coup oriented, and (v) Political issues or
personality oriented.23
These categories may not be totally
comprehensive and do in fact overlap. Primordial encompasses acts of violence
related to cultural — primarily racial, ethnic or religious conflict. Often
it is difficult to separate the political element in these events from personal
or group antagonisms. Separatist conflict is a particular form of primordial
violence related to efforts by groups to achieve independence or autonomy.
Such events are usually tied to religious and ethnic divisions. They differ
from events associated with what is called primordial violence, however, in
that they are aimed at removing the aggrieved group from the sphere of influence
of the group that dominates the central government. Primordial violence refers
to situations in which a group attempts to improve its situation by changing
or altering conditions or even taking control of the central government, whereas
the term secessionist violence refers to a situation in which a primordial
fission runs so deep that efforts are directed at seceding from the sociopolitical
context rather than at altering it. Revolutionary violence takes place during
the effort to overthrow a regime and to establish a state molded upon a significantly
different economic and political model. Coup violence is attendant to efforts
by organized groups to overthrow the regime in power without intending to
establish fundamentally different economic and political systems. Most coups
and coup attempts result in comparatively low levels of violence as either
the military moves in quickly to take power or the effort is nipped in the
bud. The last category is primarily oriented towards a particular issue or
set of issues, individuals or groups. Some of the violence may be student
violence, strikes for government reforms, land reforms, etc.24
In systemic terms, political violence
can be categorized into anti-systemic and extra-systemic. The objective of
anti-systemic violence is a revolutionary transformation in the social and
political order. Extra-systemic violence is unleashed by secessionist insurgencies
by ethnic, religious or ethno-religious minorities which affirm their right
of self-determination and question the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the state.
Analyzing the Causes of Violence: Some Theoretical
Propositions
Most analyses of political violence
explain the causes of violence as a product of repression and unresponsive
governments. The reality, however, is that political violence is attendant
even in those states which are not repressive. And therefore, instead of making
a normative treatment of violence it will be instructive to seek explanations
in the socio-political and material bases of society.
Various theories have tried to explain
the causes of political violence. Samuel P. Huntington has given primacy to
political and institutional factors and emphasized disequilibrium within the
political sector as the primary cause for violence. He argues that if a country’s
institutional procedures for political participation are inadequate in comparison
to the people’s expectations for participation, this could lead to unrest
and anti-regime activity. As a result of mobilization, new social forces enter
the political arena, but the political structure does not provide channels
for their participation in politics, thereby leading to civil strife.25 Violence and instability were “in large part the product of
rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics
coupled with the slow development of political institutions,” and the primary
problem of politics was “the lag in the development of political institutions
behind social and economic change.”26
Amongst other theories on violence,
the relative deprivation theory and the resource mobilization theory are the
most influential. Ted Gurr is most influential within the relative deprivation
school of thought. According to him, when people perceive a discrepancy between
their value expectations or what they believe they are entitled to and value
capabilities or what they are able to get and keep, then this leads to alienation,
deprivation and disillusionment. If members of a collectivity experience this
relative deprivation simultaneously, the potential for political violence
increases.27 The feeling of relative deprivation may be conditioned by
an increase in expectations or a decline in the rewards. Violence is likely
when aspirations and capabilities are changing and when the gap between them
is increasing. This is precisely what takes place during the process of socioeconomic
modernization. Socioeconomic modernization also has effects on the forms of
political violence and instability. In traditional societies such violence
is likely to involve a limited number of actors with limited goals. As modernization
proceeds, however, more groups, become socially mobilized and participant
in politics. As a result the forms of violence and instability diversify and
become broader in scope. This opposition to the government turning violent
would depend on “the scope and intensity of the disposition among members
of collectivity to take violent action against others”.28
The attacks against the political regime may take the form of guerrilla wars,
coup d’etat, rebellion and riots.29
Collective discontent tends to be politicized
and then expressed in violent action against political objects and actors.
Collective violence usually has a political object in mind. Political violence
is in the greatest magnitude if both a regime and those who oppose it exercise
approximately the same degrees of political control and command similar high
levels of institutional support in society. Applying Gurr’s notion of similar
degrees of political control and levels of institutional support in society
to separatist struggles, it can be asserted that in a situation where a separatist
movement is well-equipped militarily, enjoys some amount of popular support
and can also employ political clout regionally and internationally, it will
be able to mount and sustain a separatist challenge against the state more
forcefully. The modern state is normally well equipped to crush internal challenges
but rather ineffective in controlling external sources of support to such
movements.
This theory, however, provides only
a partial explanation. It does not explain why in similar socio?economic and
political conditions, some groups resort to violence while others do not.
Relative deprivation may, in fact, exist and yet the situation may not turn
explosive. Sometimes groups which are economically worse off do not revolt.
To make up for this gap in the understanding of political violence it may
be supplemented by the resource mobilization theory.
The resource mobilizationschool is
based on theories of collective action and it emphasizes organizations and
mobilization. Conflict and violence is a product of a leader’s capability
to manipulate resources of power, to organize, to recruit members by providing
incentives or coercion that motivates participation.30 Charles Tilly argued that if a conflict
arose between a regime and its opponents, whether that conflict would become
violent depends on who fares better in terms of comparison over available
options/abilities.
The outcome between the government
and contenders of power and the probability of a popular protest occurring
would depend on how the resources available to the latter compares to that
of the incumbents. The ability of groups to achieve power would be determined
by the extent to which they are in control of: (a) normative resources by
which Tilly meant, commitment of members to the group itself and its ideals;
(b) coercive resources or means of inflicting punishment on opponents, and
(c) utilitarian resources which basically meant rewards.31
If the group was to be effective in
collective action against its contenders, acquiring these resources was necessary.
This collective action led to violence when members of one group mobilized
to attack its opponent’s resources, which would further lead to violence —
groups which had lost their resources, responded to reclaim them.32 According to Tilly, only mobilized
sections of the population were involved in this violence. Thus, conflict
and violence is more a consequence of organized activity unlike the view of
the relative deprivation school where it arises from feelings of anomie.
Gurr, subsequently, has tried to incorporate
his relative deprivation theory with Tilly’s resource mobilization theory.
The basic premise of this theory is that political action is motivated by
people’s deep-seated grievances, in combination with the capability of the
group leaders to articulate these grievances. If grievances regarding differential
treatment and a sense of group identity are strong, then it can be organized
and articulated by group leaders.33
The role of the regime and the nature
of state in fostering violence have been critical factors in the expression
of political violence. Centralization of administration, especially where
it threatens regional and cultural autonomy, can intensify the discontent
of an aggrieved group and deepen the conflict. Further, when ends are moderate
(for greater autonomy) and means non?violent, the regime may not deal with
the problem. This often leads to the exacerbation of the crisis and soon the
movement may turn violent.34 In the process of state building, sometimes, rapid social
change leads to dislocation and demands the repudiation of the old and the
forging of new institutions and relationships. When a ruling class resists
fundamental reforms (which means reduction, if not liquidation of its power
and privileges), a confrontation between the new political forces and those
who wish to retain status quo becomes inevitable and violent.35
The Mutuality of Violence and
Development
The uprooting nature of the development process, results in
the emergence of conflicts in developing societies. Violent conflict can further
be highly disruptive for development prospects. The costs in human potential,
social and productive capital and physical infrastructure can be very high,
and tremendous amount of development effort can be lost. This obviously has
very serious destabilizing effects. Peace and political stability are thus
preconditions for development. Violence can be a major factor in distracting
the state from the developmental agenda.
Violence is, therefore, considered
to be dysfunctional in the development processes of the civil society. But
if it is against the structural inequalities inherent in the existing socio-political
and economic framework, in which a certain group has continued to be disadvantaged,
then should it be viewed as mobilization efforts on the part of such groups
for distributive justice and thereby functional in the developmental process?
Our normative concerns do not allow us to accept that even in democratic states,
ethnic and social groups should resort to violence to extract concessions
from the ruling classes. However, the reality seems to be that ruling classes
do in fact succumb to such pressures, even while suppressing violent conflicts.
If developmental prospects improve
will there be a decline in the degree of political violence? The inability
to create a bottomline on developmental needs, as referred to earlier, would
suggest that even if developmental prospects improve political violence will
not necessarily subside. But what one can be sure of is that if developmental
growth produces negative consequences, it is virtually certain that political
violence will endure and probably escalate. A much better sensitivity to peoples’s
need — social, cultural and economic — by the ruling classes, may probably
ensure lesser levels of violence. But it will be no guarantee against violence
as long as violence can be justified ideologically.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. This is reflected in the early works
of Gabriel Almond. See G. Almond, “Introduction: A Functional Approach to
Comparative Politics,” in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.), The Politics
of the Developing Areas (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1960);
and G. Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach
(Boston: Little Brown, 1966). Also see, Paul Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy
in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development (London: Leicester
University Press, 1997).
2. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political
Development (New Delhi: Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1972), pp.33-45.
3. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Dilemmas
of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative
Method,” Development and Change, vol.22, no.1, January 1991, p.6.
4. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies
and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.10-41.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
6. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber
Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p.3.
7. Lewis A. Coser, The Functions
of Social Conflict (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1956).
8. Development theorists had noted that
the problem of insurgency was closely related to the transitional societies,
and that the highly complex industrial societies had relative immunity to
them. See Pye, Op. Cit., p.136.
9. Theory of nationalism proposed by
Ernest Gellner states that industrialization has the inbuilt logic of bringing
nation and state into congruence. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983).
10. Actually called nation-destroying
by Walker Connor. See, Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?”
World Politics, vol.24, April 1972, pp.319-55.
11. See Asghar Ali Engineer, “Capitalist
Development and Ethnic and Communal Conflict,” in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Capitalist
Development: Critical Essays (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1990), pp.370-73.
12. This development strategy is suggested
by Rodolfo Stavenhagen. As opposed to the conventional notion of development
which is state-centric, ethnodevelopment follows principles that bring out
the potential of different ethnic groups rather than bringing them into conflict.
See Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (Essex: Longman
Scientific and Technical, 1990), pp.190-2.
13. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism:
The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1975), pp.8-9. The operation of the concept of internal colonialism
is brought out powerfully by Rajni Kothari in this passage:
Emphasis on economic development through
the historicist model of industrial growth and urbanization produces an elite
(economic, bureaucratic, and technocratic) that is intimately tied to the
metropolitan areas of the world and treats the vast rural hinterlands in its
own country as colonies that provide cheap food, raw materials and surplus
labour (and markets for inferior industrial products). It, no doubt, produces
impressive increases in the national GNPs (and hence also in the aggregate
per capita incomes) without really benefiting anyone except a small
fragment of the large humanity huddled in the ‘countryside’.
Quoted from Rajni Kothari, State
Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications,
1988), p.121.
14. The reduction of structural violence
should also be addressed as a very important part of development. For this
view see Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development
and Civilization (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p.157.
15. H.L. Nieburg, Political Violence:
The Behavioural Process (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), p. 13.
16. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.4.
17. David E. Apter, “Political Violence
in Analytical Perspective,” in David E. Apter (ed), The Legitimization
of Violence(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p.5.
18. ibid., p.26.
19. For this view see, Mohammad Ayoob,
“The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State-Making
in a Comparative Perspective,” in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma:
National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
20. ibid., p.69.
21. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital
and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
22. “Introduction to the Themes,” in
Luc Van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (eds.), Between Development
and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p.10.
23. Fred Von Der Mehden, Comparative
Political Violence (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973), p.7.
24. ibid., pp.7-17.
25. Huntington, Op. Cit., pp.274-75.
26. ibid., pp.4-5.
27. See, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men
Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.24-30.
28. ibid., p.29.
29. ibid., pp.3-4.
30. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization
to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), pp.69-70.
31. ibid., pp.69-70.
32. ibid., pp.216-19.
33. See, Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities
at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington: United
States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp.123-124.
34. Invariably, there is a pattern to
the use of political violence. On a continuous scale, the intensity of violence
moves from a conflict with no violence or force, to stages in which minor
or major violence is used by atleast one party. This in turn leads to retaliatory
violence and escalation in the levels of violence.
35. Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974), p.115.
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