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Let
me briefly place in perspective what I have attempted to achieve thus far
in the preceding chapters. In the first chapter I attempted to iron out
certain theoretical and conceptual difficulties such as the use and abuse
of the word fundamentalism, and the overlap in the use of the words fundamentalism
and evangelism. In addition, in that chapter I also reviewed pertinent
literature that would shed light on issues and types of conversion, conversion
narratives, and in general set the context for the remainder of the analysis.
In chapter two, I attempted to trace the emergence of evangelical groups
in South Asia in recent times by tracing the roots of some of the groups
to the revival of evangelism/fundamentalism in the United States from where
many groups operating in South Asia originate.In this chapter I also briefly
discussed the spectacular expansion of evangelical Christianity in Asia
focussing on the situation in South Korea and the Philippines. To a lesser
extent, I also outlined the dynamics of evangelical Christianity in South
India, particularly focussing on the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. In
the third and fourth chapters, I outlined historical contexts of Christianity
in Sri Lanka and Nepal, the emergence of new Christian evangelism in those
two countries, its expansion, politics and the legal framework in relation
to religious freedom.In this concluding chapter I would attempt to pose
and answer the question whether the activities of evangelical groups in
South Asia could lead to the emergence of conflict and violence. I believe
that the material presented in the last two chapters have, to a certain
extent already provided certain provincial answers to this question. In
any case, this analysis will be framed within the framework of the descriptions
and analyses presented in the previous four chapters.
Samuel
Huntington has recently warned about the disruptive role religion can possibly
play in global politics in the context of what he perceives as an impending
“clash of civilizations” (quoted in Brouwer et al. 1996: 9).According
to Huntington, the “renewal of religion provides a basis for identity and
commitment that transcend national boundaries, and unites civilizations
(quoted in Brouwer et al. 1996: 9). In these comments, Huntington
was clearly concerned about the expansion and the militant reach of Islamic
revival, which in his view was likely to threaten theorderly hegemony and
continuity of the world capitalist system. But as Brouwer
et. al
have pointed out, Huntington has completely missed the possibility that:
“Christian fundamentalism,
not Islam may have the potential to create more conflict internationally,
for it can avail itself of all the advantages and power generated by a
western-dominated economic system and its invasive message of consumption”
(Brouwer et al. 1996: 9).
As
Brouwer et. al
have argued, the concerns Huntington has expressed
are equally, if not more applicable to the global activism of Christian
evangelization, or in their own words, “fundamentalism” (Brouwer et
al. 1996: 9). Comparing Islamic radicalism and global Christian fundamentalism
(or evangelism), Brouwer
et. al observe that “the new Christian
fundamentalism, a form that rivals Islamic radicalism in its global scope
and is very likely more potent in its cultural influence” (Brouwer et.
al 1996: 2). For them, the reason for that overarching cultural influence
is due to the fact that “Christianity is a core element of ‘Western civilization’”
(Brouwer et. al 1996: 2). In general, what is meant by ‘western
civilization’ here is the socio-political and economic clout of North America
and Western Europe. Further explaining their position, Brouwer et. al
note that “Christianity has been, historically, the modernizing and Westernizing
religion that has spread over the globe in concert with the mercantile
and industrial expansion of capitalism and the establishment of colonial
empires” (Brouwer et. al 1996: 2). They further note that:
“Today Christian countries
(with Japan being the single exception) overwhelmingly control the world’s
productive resources, and manufacturing, banking, and commercial institutions,
as well as the dissemination of culture generated by scientific, academic,
and commercial sources” (Bouwer
et. al 1996: 2).
It
seems to me that this socio-economic hegemony of the countries or regions
from where many evangelical groups originate, play a significant role in
the organization and expansion of such groups in the countries of the Third
World (eg., Nepal and Sri Lanka) where they choose to operate.The political
power of these groups does not merely emanate from their financial resources
and the networks of contacts linking individuals and groups sharing similar
ideological positions. As pointed out by Soper, it also means that they
are willing “to use those resources for political purposes” (Soper 1994:
162).It is in this context that, in the United States “evangelicals have
established themselves as an important wing of the Republican Party” (Soper
1994: 163). The extensive networks of cooperation and contact between the
Republican Party and the evangelical movement in the US are such, that
one could even pose the question whether the Republicans constitute a wing
of the collective evangelical movement in the United States. These advantages
in real terms translate into the ability of evangelical groups to operate
from a position of power. As we have seen in the last two chapters, the
ground reality in Sri Lanka and Nepal symbolizes this fact.
The
other question one has to pose at this point is whether the entire notion
that conflict may emerge due to the activities of evangelical groups, is
merely a defensive rhetorical response constructed by conservative and
nationalist elements representing established religions in countries such
as Sri Lanka and Nepal who feel threatened by the expansion of these new
groups and their collective spheres of influence. That expansion is directly
correlated to the real or perceived decrease in the spheres of influence
of established religions. After all, both in Nepal and Sri Lanka, the most
vocal in opposition to the activities of the evangelical movements are
predominantly middle class individuals based in principle cities, particularly
in Colombo and Kathmandu. Yet, the reality is that despite the religious
tensions generally experienced in South Asia, particularly with regard
to the politicization of Islam and Hinduism in the Indian sub-continent,
and the problematic utilization of Buddhism in Sri Lankan politics, there
are no visibly destructive processes of conflict or violence emanating
from the competitiveness between new evangelical religions on one hand,
and Hinduism, Buddhism or more established Christianities on the other.Here,
I stress the term visibly destructive. This situation of apparent
lack of violence has emerged irrespective of the existing and continuing
expansion of religious pluralism in the region, and in particular in Sri
Lanka and Nepal. On the other hand, the mere non existence of relative
violence does not simultaneously mean the non existence of conflict, which
can lead in the direction of violence in times to come. As I have already
discussed in the chapters dealing with Sri Lanka and Nepal, rumblings and
complaints of evangelical activity and counter-complaints of harassment
have been a part of local and national politics for some time. The fact
that such complaints have not transformed into open conflict and violence
is a separate issue.
Evangelical
Activity and Prospects for Conflict
With
the idea of conflict in mind, let me place in perspective the logic of
evangelical activity in Sri Lanka and Nepal, as well as the region in general.
I would suggest that the following ideas of Samuel presented in a paper
at a recently held conference in Bangalore would help us formulate what
may be some of the parameters of conflict formation.He identified the need
to engage in evangelism as one of five key challenges what he calls the
Asian Church must meet in the 21st century:
“There are many people
who have not had the opportunity to hear and understand the message of
the gospel of Jesus Christ.This must continue to be a significant activity
of the church in mission.It is the church’s great resource and must be
shared in Asia with sensitivity but unapologetically” (Samuel 1998: 8).
As
these ideas clearly articulate, evangelical activities -- includingconversions
and church planting -- would be a significant preoccupation of evangelical
groups active in the region.As a Sri Lankan pastor observed in an interview
in February 1998:
“We hope to significantly
increase the Christian population in this country by the middle of the
21st century. As men of God and as members of mission, that is our duty.We
cannot allow people to live as sinners, when they can be saved by the word
of God”
The
ideas presented above, are unapologetic as suggested by Samuel earlier,
as are they not particularly sensitive. For the young Sinhala pastor whose
ideas I have quoted above, anyone who does not belong to his particular
congregation are sinners. He also included Catholics, and others he called
“liberal” members of the mainstream Methodist church in the category of
sinners.For him, they “were all lost souls, whose leaders have led them
astray, away from the word of God.” Similar ideas are shared by activists
in Nepal. On the other hand, there are a number of wide-ranging initiatives
to achieve such an end.For instance, I have already referred to “Joshua
Project 2000,” a website in the Internet featuring what its creators have
called “Unreached People Profiles.” It attempts to profile peoples on the
basis of ethnic, tribal and religious groups identities in countries such
as India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, who are in need of being converted to some
version of evangelical Christianity. This particular website is an information
source for those interested in identifying target groups for evangelical
activity.It offers information such a population figures, availability
of Bibles and films of Jesus in the area, rates of success in church
planting etc.“Joshua Project 2000” is represented both in Sri Lanka and
Nepal.It seems to me that some of the thinking in evangelical quarters,
such as the need for visibility, and expectations of rapid expansion has
certainly increased the potential for conflict. I would document some of
these cases later in this discussion.
At
this point, in order to facilitate this discussion, I would like to place
in perspective some of the ideas that have emerged in recent times about
notions of religious pluralism within Christian circles, but particularly
within groups interested in evangelism.I would suggest that, the manner
in which the idea of religious pluralism is defined and perceived would
have much to do with the possibility of conflict or lack thereof.In the
second chapter, I briefly noted that the revival of evangelical Christianity
in the United States had also marked a growing lack of sympathy towards
ideas of multiculturalism and pluralism in religion.Those conservative
ideas, which are very much part of overall evangelical politics in the
United States and Western Europe have also found their way to Asia -- not
merely to South Asia.The infusion of those ideas to the region has not
simply been the work of foreign missionaries coming from the United States
or Western Europe or South Korea, but also due to the sympathetic manner
in which some of those ideas have been received by Asian theologians, pastors,
missionaries and other church workers, many of whom belong to evangelical
religious formations.Talking about religious cooperation as a challenge
to Asian Christianity in the 21st century, Samuel has suggested that:
“The Church must continue
to develop a practical approach for religious cooperation while enabling
each religion to retain its integrity regarding its own sense of uniqueness
and commitment to its mission.Any religious pluralist ideology will be
seen as shallow and unworkable in practice ---” (Samuel 1998: 8)
While
talking about the need for religious cooperation, Samuel also suggests
that any religious pluralist ideology would be seen as shallow.The problem
here is that the idea of pluralism is being used with different meanings,
and with different degrees of emotional attachment byevangelical writers
and social scientists. It seems to me that what is being questioned above,
is the entertainment of religious pluralism within a single tradition,
such as Christianity. In other words, these writers are challenging the
possibility of having more than one truth claim within a single tradition,
which could pose serious challenges to the integrity, and thus the continuity
of that tradition. It is also in this same spirit that Weng has argued
that “pluralism offers a religious faith that is too dilute to meet religious
needs” (Weng 1998: 1). He further argues that pluralism defined in this
manner also leads to the possible abandonment of “central beliefs that
historically define Christian identity” (Weng 1998: 1).
This
conservative backlash is partly the result of writings of liberal thinkers
within the overall Christian religious establishment such as John Hick,
Paul Knitter, and in South Asia Aloysius Pieris as well as the emerging
reality of multicultural, and particularly multi-religious societies in
Europe and North America.But the issue of pluralism is not merely a theological
issue, that would challenge the integrity of Christianity. It would seem
reasonable to argue that divergence from the truth claims which make Christianity
what it is, would lead to a situation in which Christianity would no longer
seem to be Christianity.
However,
the resistance to pluralist ideologies within Christianity has not merely
ended there. In some sites of evangelical activity where different religious
traditions are located, the resistance to plurality seem to have translated
into problematic actions by selected evangelical groups where the sanctity
of religious holy spaces have been violated.It was in this context that
theologian Archie Lee observed that the over-dependence on Christian texts
alone would lead to the denouncing of “all other truth claims in human
religious traditions” and would be hostile to all “non Christian cultures
that are considered basically pagan and therefore perverted ---” (Quoted
in Yu 1998: 4).Writers such as Yu on the other hand suggest that the observations
of Lee are over-statements, and that it is unlikely that “theologians who
take the biblical text as authoritative, would denounce all truth claims
in human religions” (Yu 1998: 4).
But
in practice, in countries such as India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the issue
is not about religious pluralism within evangelical Christianity in the
sense of a theological debate within Christianity.The issues in these societies
in the context of contemporary religious dynamics can be framed more clearly
within the ideas and concerns outlined by Lee.Let me further illustrate
this point with some examples from South India. As writers such as Caplan
and Bayly have argued, Christianity in places such as South India has undergone
certain processes of indigenization (Bayly 1994, Caplan 1995). Moreover,
through syncretic traditions, people have also adopted practices from other
belief systems into their routine religiosity (Bayly 1994, Caplan 1995).Thus,
despite centuries of missionary influence and efforts, South Indian Protestant
Christians continued to have regular contact with a number of non-Christian
religious specialists such as sooth-sayers, fortune tellers and ‘god-dancers’
(Caplan 1995: 95).But it is precisely these practices that were critiqued
by evangelists in South India on the basis that such practices marked a
corruption of God’s word.Another complaint of evangelicals in South India
has been based upon their interpretation of established church’s admissions
of doubt, accommodation of alternate traditions, and ecumenism (Caplan
1995: 106).It seems to me that this is also a clear indication of the lack
of tolerance of difference, including multiculturalism within the evangelical
fold.This brings me back to the very nature of evangelism as it is practised
globally. That is, due to its insistence on an absolute truth, evangelists
are convinced that their version of the truth is complete, and absolute,
and unqualified by partial understanding or error (Caplan 1995: 93). As
Ostow has pointed out, this rigidity makes them “reluctant to tolerate
doubt, uncretainty and ambiguity” (quoted in Caplan 1995: 93).
Coming
back to the specific situations in Nepal and Sri Lanka, what is important
from a conflict perspective is, the manner in which religious and cultural
pluralism or heterogeneity in society are perceived by evangelical activists.It
is in the politics of religion in sites of ethno-cultutral and religious
pluralism, that conflicts and violence could emerge, if the nature of that
plurality and its cleavages are not understood by religious and cultural
activists.There is also a historical dimension to this issue.That is, one
has to understand that the current dynamics of religion in general and
evangelical activity in particular, are not merely perceived by most individuals
in terms of today’s considerations alone, but also on the basis of historical
memory of the society in which an activist or a group operates. For instance,
as I have already noted in Chapter 3, in Sri Lanka, many Buddhists and
Hindus evaluate the activities of evangelical groups in the context of
historical memory of their relationships with European missionaries in
the colonial period.In that manner, their perception of evangelical activity,
irrespective of their conflict potential or lack thereof, would be pre-judged
to a considerable extent, which is another reason why undue aggression
and visibility ideally should be avoided by evangelical groups.
Let
me at this point refer to two cases of local conflict and tension which
specifically arose as a result of the activities of evangelical groups,
one in Kathmandu, and the other in Mihintale in the North CentralProvince
in Sri Lanka. In both cases, the ideological positions and the power and
authority of evangelical groups, which I have already referred to, must
be a context of analysis. In both cases, the tension resulted from the
failure of the groups concerned to understand the historical sensitivities
and memory within which their activities would have been evaluated, as
well as due to the problematic climate of visibility and aggression the
two groups concerned created.
The
first incident I would like to present occurred a couple of years ago during
a well-attended festival in the Pasupathinath Temple in Kathmandu when
a group of rather zealous evangelists, including foreigners, wearing crosses
descended upon the crowds armed with the word of God and began to distribute
Bible
tracts and other literature. The temple of course is a much revered religious
site of the city’s Hindus. While the incident involved a clear case of
violating sacred space in a rather aggressive manner, no immediate violent
incidents took place, even though it touched a raw nerve in many individuals.
Thus the incident remains part of the memory of many individuals I talked
to irrespective of their religious background. Thus it was related to me
by Hindus as well as Catholics and Buddhists.
Yet
at another level, the information on the incident in Kathmandu, while being
descriptive in general terms, lacks specifics. For instance, many people
in general conversations about evangelical activities refer to the incident.
But they could not be specific about the date on which it occurred or which
group was allegedly involved. For the Hindus andBuddhists who narrated
the story, the culprits were clear enough: “Christians.” For the Catholics
too, it was clear enough: “those fundamentalists, not us.” The general
term “Christians” used by the majority of Hindus and Buddhists interviewed,
symbolized the manner in which people perceive Christians in general. That
is, at the level of popular perception there is no clear conceptual difference
between different varieties of Christians in Nepal. Christians are simply
Christians, irrespective of the fact that in theological and ideological
terms they may differ as Catholics or as members of Nava Jeevan Church,
Children of God etc.
Such
a lack of conceptual differentiation itself becomes a problem in conflict
formation, as we would see later.For instance, of the many Nepalis who
recounted the story to me who included Hindu Brahmins, Buddhists and Catholics,
no one was able to tell me which specific evangelical group was involved.At
that level of perception, where cold and supposedly rational analysis need
not take place, such a differentiation was not necessary. They were merely
Christians or fundamentalists. But the incident was marked in all of their
memories as something unpleasant, and something to worry about. In the
realities of their minds the incident took place, and that was all that
mattered.All of them presented the incident as an example of Christian
aggression (Hindus and Buddhists), fundamentalist extremism (Catholics,
Hindus), a threat to the stability of Nepal and the religious harmony in
the country (Hindus, Buddhists, and Catholics).On the other hand, there
were a number of individuals representing evangelical groups who were also
quite upset about the incident, even though their voices were generally
not heard in public.
Structurally,
the incident which nearly took place in Mihintale in Sri Lanka is similar
to what is described above. The difference is that what was planned, did
not eventually take place due to reasons beyond the control of the group
which planned it.Mihintale is a town which is sacred to the country’s Buddhists
who believe that the first Buddhist missionaries preached the message of
the Buddha to the local king in the vicinity of the town in ca. 250 BC.Due
to the religious and historical significance of this site, it occupies
an important place in the mytho-historical memory and consciousness of
Buddhists. Annual celebrations are organized in grand scale to mark the
event in the town.At a government sponsored exhibition in Mihintale to
mark the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka, a group calling itself
the Evangelical Library had planned to distribute Bibles and Bible
tracts to those who came to the exhibition (Perera 1995: 21-22).Earlier,
in 1993, the Evangelical Library had written to Christian leaders in the
country, including those in the main-stream churches complaining that they
were not adequately helping them to “reach the 4000 Buddhist monks in the
vicinity” who were seen as ripe for conversion.The Evangelical Library
was not merely interested in converting Buddhists, but in converting Buddhist
monks, which is a much more sensitive issue, where potential for conflict
and violence would be enormous.The appeals by the established church leaders
to abandon the project were not heeded, and the planned activity ultimately
did not materialize only because the exhibition was cancelled by the government
(Perera 1995: 21-22).As already noted, like in Nepal, in Sri Lanka also
at the level of popular perception there is no conscious differentiation
between different kinds of Christianities.
The
planned activity in Mihintale, also indicates the inability or the lack
of interest of some evangelical groups to learn from history.It is also
symptomatic of their inability to pay attention to how religious competitions
may be perceived by people on the basis of historical memory and issues
such as sacred space. For one thing, Mihintale has enormous cultural and
religious significance to local Buddhists, and is a site highly charged
with emotional and religious sentiments.In such a place, the attempt to
engage in evangelical activity, particularly targeting monks, was not only
dangerous and provocative, but generally counter-productive in so far as
the entire evangelical project was concerned.In a sense, the planned activity
would have been similar to distributing Buddhist tracts within a Christian
holy site. The point is, had the event actually taken place, and ended
up in violence, it would not have been a mere incident involving this particular
group. It would have had serious repercussions on the ability of other
evangelical groups to operate in the country, along with possibilities
of violence as well.
Here
it is important to note that from the British colonial period onwards,
Sri Lanka has had a history of violence in situations where sacred space,
or what is perceived as sacred space by one religious group has been violated
by members of another group.Most often in the past, suchviolence has involved
Buddhist and Catholic interests. For instance, the Kotahena riots in Colombo
in 1883 involved the perceived violation of Catholic sacred space by Buddhists
in the context of a Buddhist procession parading the streets in the vicinity
of a Catholic church (Somaratne 1991, Roberts 1993). Similarly, in 1904
the Catholic Church built in the midst of the Buddhist sacred city of Anuradhapura
(only a few kilometers away from Mihintale) was burnt down by Buddhist
mobs, and the church was later re-built outside the sacred city limits.
Over the years, the established Christian groups (except for zealots within
such groups) have worked out mechanisms for co-existing with Buddhists
and other groups such as Hindus, without inciting unnecessary conflict
or violence. But many evangelical groups such as Evangelical Library, have
paid no attention to such useful lessons learnt from hard and bitter history
(Perera 1995).
Taken
together, these two localized incidents, which took place or nearly took
place represent two clear instances where activities undertaken in the
name of Christianity violated or planned to violate sacred spacesirrespective
of the consequences. In both instances, the activities were undertaken
or planned by two new evangelical groups.In both instances, the action
was not associated with mainstream and more established Christianities
in the two countries.These are of course, merely two out of many such incidents.
Many other incidents recorded in both countries have become components
of anti-conversion narratives.Often they are not spectacular incidents,
but small activities such as distributing leaflets in a predominantly Hindu
or Buddhist village. The point is, it does not appear that the possible
consequences of these kinds of activities are clearly thought out by those
involved.Often, what is needed for a minor incident to flare up into a
violent conflict is very little.
But
taken together, what do such incidents represent?I would suggest that the
anti-pluralist ideology which has gained currency within Christianity --
but more clearly within evangelical or fundamentalist groups -- have in
some cases, seeped over into the religious politics they engage in societies
such as Sri Lanka and Nepal. This, I would suggest indicates the fact that
at least in Nepal and Sri Lanka, dynamics between new evangelical groups,
and established religions have come to a stage where conflict can easily
translate into violence in specific local contexts. This is particularly
the case, if the umbrella organizations under which some of these groups
operate, cannot exert control over the problematic activities of some groups
within their fold. At this point, I would like to stress upon an issue,
which I have already brought out a number of times before.That is, the
need of many evangelical groups to expand their groups and activities rapidly,
and the need for visibility. Of course, this trend is not something unique
to Nepal and Sri Lanka.On the contrary, it is a hallmark feature of evangelical
activity around the world, which is simply replicated in these two countries
as well. This sense of urgency is partly to do with the approach of AD
2000 “in preparation for the miraculous end of history, and the beginning
of Christ’s millenium” (Brouwer et. al 1996: 1). In some cases,
this sense of urgency has also created a situation of aggression, which
is seen as a sign of a person’s faith and devotion to the aims of mission.
The kind of aggressive behavior I have outlined above has to be located
in this context.Let me at this point, refer to another example of aggression
in evangelical activity in Nepal, which I would suggest further illustrate
my argument.A Nepali pastor identifying himself as Bharat Bhattrai, writing
to the Nepali evangelical newsletter The Good News of Nepal made
the following observations:
“Three years ago when
I came to pioneer a church in Banasthali, which is an area of Kathmandu,
I came across a tree which was being worshipped by the local people. This
challenged me to proclaim that Jesus is lord of all the earth.Every time
I walked by that tree, I would say, “Jesus is Lord” and I would then pray
in tongues. In four months time about 15 people were converted to Christ.
Together, we began cursing the tree in Jesus’ name.Gradually, we noticed
that the tree was beginning to die and the people stopped worshipping it.Now
that the tree is completely withered, people are saying that the Christians
did it. No; Christians did not do it but Jesus did it in response to our
prayers” (Good News of Nepal, ND: 7).
When
this particular story was shown to a Nepali Buddhist, his response was
“why would Jesus want to destroy a tree?”Environmental considerations apart,
this example raises a number of important issues.For one, the fact that
it was reported in an evangelical newsletter under the name of a pastor
with a photograph of a withered tree clearly suggest that it is considered
an important item to be talked about.But what is submerged in the rhetoric
of evangelical religiosity here is that the incident is an aggressive assault
upon the religious beliefs of a community (eg., the public cursing of a
tree that was a religious symbol) without paying any considerations to
possible consequences.There was after all, a very real possibility that
this activity could have led to violence.A similar incident reported from
the southern Sri Lankan town of Bentota, is such a case.There, a Buddhist
man who had recently converted to a form of evangelical Christianity had
attempted to cut down a bo tree worshipped by local Buddhists.In
this case, while there were no indications of organized attempts on the
part of this particular evangelical group to engage in this activity, it
did lead to a violent confrontation between this man and the rest of the
village.In fact, the example from Nepal also illustrates a similar tendency
even though the man involved in that case was a pastor in charge of a church.To
a certain extent, this also shows the dangers of individual zealotry.In
the end, it does not matter whether religious aggression is a result of
institutional demand or individual motivation.The end result is the same
--- the possibility of conflict.
I
would suggest that the ideological basis for this kind of aggression come
from a number of interrelated sources, in addition to individual action.For
one, the authority and power under which the evangelical movement operates,
can lead to such behavior. That is, the power of large financial resources
and the access to international networks of support gives acertain sense
of invincibility.On the other hand, the expectation of rapid expansion
and the need for visibility, can also lead to such incidents. That is,
considerations of rapid expansion overrides considerations of common sense,
and lessons from history, which I would suggest can be seen in all of the
examples sited above.More importantly however, the fact that there seems
to be a tacit approval of such actions as ‘heroic’(as indicative of the
language used in the Nepali example above, and the very fact that it was
written about in the first place) also encourage individuals and organizations
to engage in such activity. These activities become a measurement of faith
and commitment to the evangelical cause. Thus for example, when an American
evangelical worker active in Nepal was asked about the incident involving
the tree reported above, he observed: “It was a situation of a man leading
by example. Particularly because he is Nepali, he can do it with authority.”
For him and many others like him, there were no problems related to this
incident. It was merely a proclamation of faith. At the same time these
actions, irrespective of their consequences, are also a result of the lack
of tolerance and the anti-pluralist bias of the overall evangelical ideology
that Ihave already referred to.
Total
Conversion and Alienation
It
is also within this context outlined above that some evangelical groups
demand total conversion from their followers. As Marsden has pointed out,
in large scale evangelism winning of converts is seen as a science, and
in that context global evangelism has developed increasingly sophisticated
techniques of persuasion (quoted in Caplan 1995: 98).This is not merely
a matter of transformation of religious beliefs, but also a radical transformation
in general cultural practices as well. In other words, they promote a complete
break with not merely the past of an individual linked to a particular
religion, but to a past, present and future associated with a particular
system of life within a specific cultural sphere. I noted in the introduction
that such expectations and demands of total conversion can be seen as a
methodology used to ensure the cohesion of the group as well as to guarantee
its long term survival, and control external influences. But often, such
preoccupations of ‘purity’ of the group lead to an institutionalization
of intolerance. It is precisely due to such lack of tolerance and accommodation
that many evangelical groups -- even the ones that do not engage in or
encourage such puritanical practices -- are perceived as foreign and anti
national by many people who oppose their activities. They are perceived
of by opponents, and often behave in a fashion that tend to formulate such
groups as separate cultural spheres, alienated from the society in which
they operate. This sentiment was very clearly expressed by many Nepalis
and Sri Lankans opposed to evangelical activity.
At
one level, this sense of cultural alienation is rooted in the history and
the manner in which evangelical groups operate. That is, whenevangelical
groups operating out of the United States or pats of Europe come to South
Asia, they bring with them some cultural baggage in addition to the message
of God.This is particularly visible in the case of US or US funded groups.It
is in this context that Bouwer et. al argue that “while the leaders
of the new Christian faith come from various nations, the message is predominantly
American (Bouwer et. al 1996: 2).It is also in this context that
Nepali Christian leader Kali Bahdur Rokaya observes, “outsiders don’t only
bring the Gospel, they bring it wrapped in their own culture” (Harriet
1994: 17). In this regard, some of the ideas of Nancy Ammerman would further
contextualize this discussion.Talking about the expansion of evangelical
or fundamentalist Christianity in South America through the activities
of US based groups, she observes that:
“As a result, the doctrines
and life styles of North American fundamentalists were being transported
into new cultures, becoming intertwined with the cultures and politics
of those societies in controversial new ways” (Ammerman 1994: 14).
The
transportation of an anti-pluralist religious ideology with an exclusionist
political agenda to a new site such as Nepal or Sri Lanka where religious
pluralism at the popular level has been taken for granted (i.e, the ability
of a number of religions to operate without serious conflict) obviously
can pose a series of problems. This is particularly so when the implementation
of these new religious doctrines becomes involved in local politics. Thus
for example, the expectation of evangelists in Sri Lanka and Nepal to convert
large numbers of locals, and to distribute Bibles to each household
in the two countries by year 2000 directly gets involved with politics
of religion both at the local and national levels.As we have seen, this
has already happened in both countries, where the collective activities
of the evangelical movement is now a significant political issue. I would
suggest that this lack of accommodation of some of the basic cultural practices
in the places where these groups operate constitutes one of the most fertile
sites of potential conflict as well as violence.In a sense, this is what
Ammerman describes as fundamentalist groups attempting to “remake the institutional
and cultural world beyond its own subcultural borders” (Ammerman 1994:
15).The point is that, in the event of conversion, when evangelical groups
also demand from converts that they abandon cultural practices of thecommunity
that may have been in use for generations, the converts’ sense of alienation
from the community is further entrenched.This in turn creates space for
suspicions and fears to take root, since the cultural links to the society
are now effectively severed. In its place, something completely new and
different will be in operation, which binds the converts together but not
those immediately exterior to the group. Of course the reason for such
demands on the part of evangelical groups is to ensure that they create
a clearly identifiable community of believers, not linked to their previous
religious beliefs and ways of life in general.Such severance is demanded
due to the fear that in those cultural practices the embers of re-conversion
(back to the old faith) may be embedded.
Let
me place these concerns in perspective on the basis of someethnographic
details.In a critique of some of these practices, Kali Bahadur Rokaya,
a Nepali Christian leader offers the following thoughts:
“And I have listened
to the outside critiques of the church.Mainly they have said: 1. Christians
are bought with money, 2. It is a western culture and religion, 3. The
church has no concern for our society or our country, and 4. Christians
are foreigners in our own country.Now, I find myself siding with the critics”
(Stanley 1994: 16).
It
seems to me that Rokaya is also articulating the problems of alienating
individuals from their cultural practices in the process of conversion.
It is in this situation that he supports the idea of “contextualization”
(Stanley 1994: 17), by which he means that the process of becoming a Christian
must be rooted within the specific socio-cultural context in which anindividual
lives. According to him, in Nepal, the present tendency “is to urge converts
to leave all traditions behind and to become western” (Stanley 1994: 17).
Rokaya believes that foreign evangelists come to Nepal not only with the
Gospel, but that they bring it wrapped in their own culture (Stanley 1994:
17).In a sense, what Rokaya is attempting to articulate, applies to many,
but by no means all, evangelical groups operating in Nepal and Sri Lanka.
As he explains further:
“A Nepali who becomes
a Christian literally starts a new life.He or she will no longer celebrate
local festivals, will start wearing western clothes, and will adapt a western
life style ---He or she will no longer be involved in politics and will
hardly be part of society.That is what worries non-Christians, and it should”
(Rokaya 1996: 30).
Some
of Rokaya’s words above are somewhat exaggerated. For instance, it is quite
unlikely that every convert would necessarily wear ‘western’ clothes or
would adopt a ‘western’ life-style consequent to conversion, particularly
in the remote interior areas of Nepal. Nevertheless, the other issues he
outlines deserved attention. His reference to the lack of involvement in
politics and alienation from society, is typical in the aftermath of radical
or complete conversion. Often such withdrawal is demanded by the group
involved. Such withdrawal also means the engagement with another kind of
politics removed from the routine activities and politics of the immediate
community. But it would appear that in a stressful situation such as conversion,
some of the links to the outer society, and its cultural practices would
in fact be beneficial as a coping mechanism, and they would also lessen
the extent of alienation between society and converts. One of the constant
complaints I have heard from Sinhala converts in Sri Lanka is the demand
made from them that they do not celebrate festivals such as the Sinhala
New Year. A similar situation prevails in Nepal.Rokaya has pointed out
that converts are discouraged to take part in traditional festivities:
“During Dasin, Tihar
and national holidays churches organize events, in order to prevent people
from going home, and being tempted
or forced to participate in the rituals” (Rokaya 1996: 31)
It
seems to me that a more successful and less conflictual strategy would
have been to incorporate these traditional beliefs and practices within
the ritual and social practices of the new groups. That would have made
the transition from one religious belief to a new one much more easier
and less stressful, which in the final analysis would have also helped
these groups expand further, but less obtrusively. Besides, such an emphasis
also would have allowed the new evangelical groups to evolve within a local
cultural paradigm. As I documented in the second chapter, one of the successes
of the spectacular evangelical (and in general Christian) expansion in
South Korea has been the amalgamation of traditionalKorean beliefs and
religious motifs with new evangelical practices.As such, almost from the
beginning these churches and their ritual practices looked more Korean
than anything else despite the fact that many of the early institutional
structures and the original missionaries came from the United States (Choi
1986, Brouwer et. al. 1996).Similarly in Sri Lanka, particularly
in the 1960s and 1970s, the Catholic Church consciously embarked upon a
process of indeginization after Vatican II, which in the long run played
an important rolein establishing the church as traditional Sri Lankan religion.
This was particularly so in areas with predominantly Sinhala or Tamil speaking
congregations. But it would appear now, that even with regard to the Catholic
Church, the long term influence of Vatican II as once perceived, no longer
seem applicable as reflected in the conservative attitudes of sections
of its hierarchy and influential sections of the laity with regards to
issues such as indeginization. For them, indeginization is akin to a process
of undermining the ‘true’ tradition. In general, the collective evangelical
movement in both Nepal and Sri Lanka does not seem to have learned from
such lessons. Part of the problem, I would suggest is the rather narrowly
defined anti-pluralist attitude, which I have already referred to earlier.
Another
issue that emanates from the expansion of evangelicalChristianity in Nepal
and Sri Lanka is linked to the manner in which these groups are structurally
organized.Partly as a result of the organizational structures these groups
have inherited from their parent organizations, and partly because many
groups as small organizations operate in a real or perceived climate of
relative hostility, many of these groups have hierarchical organizational
and command structures.Within such structures, there is a heavy concentration
of power at the level of local or regional leadership.On the other hand,
given the nature of global evangelism, there is no one central religious
authority as the Pope is to the catholic church. Thus within Protestant
evangelism today, there is immense space for individuals to become leaders,
establish churches, break away from other churches, amalgamate with other
organizations, remain autonomous and exert total control over local congregations.In
a sense, this state of affairs can create a space for authoritarian tendencies
to develop within these church structures. Thus, in both Nepal and Sri
Lanka, within local contexts, pastors have considerable power and authority
over their congregations.In essence they can, and often want to, decide
how these individuals should live. This need to control also translates
into an emphasis on total conversion, and a break from society, inclusive
of its cultural ties. Let me place this notion of control in the context
of the following observations of a Sinhala Buddhist man in his mid 30s
who became a member of an evangelical group in Colombo (which he did not
want to be identified in writing):
“I became a member of
the --- because I felt quite lost at the time. I had no employment, the
home environment was not good, and Buddhism had not particularly helped.So
I went for some of the services and experienced a certain sense of comradeship
in the congregation --- But, the pastor wanted to change my life completely.
He blamed me in front of the others in a prayer meeting when he heard that
I had celebrated the Sinhala New Year. He called me a heathen who had disobeyed
the word of God. I could not argue or say anything in defense. New Year
was not really a religious celebration. All I did was to worship my parents
as we have always done, and exchange some foods with my neighbors.It helps
to keep in touch.”
After
this particular incident, this individual strayed away from the group,
and currently remain unattached to any group. His conversion, created personal
problems for him in his family, even though such problems did not emerge
from within the community since the issue of his conversion was not widely
known at the time. The participation in the Sinhala New Year celebration,
which is essentially a secular celebration, allowed him an opportunity
to mend some of the ruptures that had emerged in his relationships with
his family. But instead of seeing this situation in this socio-psychological
context, the pastor of this group and many of the members of the congregation
perceived this as a sign of re-conversion and a threat to the cohesion
of the group. Part of the problem, as I noted earlier, is in the collective
mind frame of the average evangelical group, which believes that it is
operating in a situation of hostility. But such hostility would often emanate
from this kind of socio-cultural alienation from society and community
as demanded by many groups.The ideas of Rokaya who explains the situation
in Nepal, on the basis of his personal experience, indicate a structurally
similar situation as to what is described above:
“At the same time I
became conscious of the fact that I actually was given very little freedom.The
church provides the guidelines in almost every field of life. At the same
time I wouldn’t even think of buying a newspaper or to watch TV. Everything
had to be Christian, from the pictures on the wall to the books on the shelves.
I realized I was sitting in a prison, ---” (Rokaya 1996: 30).
With
regard to Nepal, Rokaya further notes that, “Our churches have inherited
a colonial type of leadership. Pastors are regarded to be God’s representatives
and their words are not challenged” (Rokaya 1996: 30). It seems to me that
this kind of hierarchical organizational structures and leadership roles,
and the inability to question the decisions of the leadership or the agenda
of the sponsors tend to create anti-democratic tendencies within such groups.
This happens at a time when the democratic institutions and practices in
the wider society are already under serious stress.These organizations
tend to facilitate that general decline further, rather than attempting
to create a political awareness of it.But given the relatively conservative
political agenda of the collective evangelical movement a democratization
of its leadership roles and practices would be difficult to expect. But
this situation can lead to conflict situations too often in times to come.
I would stress that many of the cases I have presented above point to the
fact that leadership played a role in initiating or aggravating matters.
Some
of the issues I have discussed above can also be anthropologically interpreted
somewhat differently. One could argue that part of theproblems linked to
exclusive truth claims or lack of tolerance of difference is linked to
the nature of different religions. In fact, it is conceivable that structurally
speaking, there is very little room for difference or divergence in monotheistic
traditions such as Christianity in general.That space tends to get even
slimmer when the interpretation of the perceived truth is exclusively based
on the inerrancy of a particular text such as the Bible, as is the
case with evangelists.But in ploytheistic traditions such as Buddhism and
Hinduism, there is a greater degree of tolerance at the level of popular
religiosity since individuals are used to the idea of following or having
preferences towards particular gods, deities or ritual traditions. This
is also an important consideration to bear in mind when attempting to understand
how the activities of evangelists may be judged in countries such as Nepal
and Sri Lanka where there have been long entrenched traditions of polytheism.
Stated
differently, this is also a situation where there is a certain absence
of clarity as to where religion ends (where difference may not be allowed)
and where culture begins (where at least some degree of difference is allowed).Taken
in this sense, and in the context of the all embracing stances of most
evangelical groups, it is very difficult to allow a relatively autonomous
sphere of culture in their traditions.Evangelical groups often see culture,
religion and life in general as parts of a closely inter-related whole,
within which separation of components is not possible. Thus, worshiping
parents during Sinhala New Year ortaking part in local festivals in Nepal
by convertsmay be seen by evangelists as diluting the true tradition.This
is particularly the case with regard to issues such as worshiping parents.In
the Christian tradition, particularly as interpreted by evangelists, only
God can be worshiped.Any other kind of worship can easily be seen as heresy
or a return to heathen ways of life.
At
this point, it seems to me that I have demonstrated the potential for conflict
in South Asia in the context of the activities of evangelical groups as
reflected in the ground realities in Nepal and Sri Lanka. It should be
clear that the problem here is not a matter of religious freedom or lack
thereof.It has to do with strategy. The argument here is not to ban the
operation of evangelical groups. That, in itself would be an anti democratic
practice. The issue is how to identify potential conflict situations, and
find the means to resolve them, before they can lead to violence, and later
to the institutionalization of that violence.It should be clear that both
in Nepal and Sri Lanka, some of the services offered by evangelical groups
do benefit the people. But the problem here is that, in terms of the mind
frame of the average evangelist, the service to people is a secondary issue.What
is needed more urgently is conversion and expansion of evangelism and its
church structures.
At
this point one can pose the following legitimate question, which I have
already raised in the chapters specifically dealing with Sri Lanka and
Nepal: is it possible to make such a clear differentiation between service
and proselytizing? Where does service end, and proselytizingbegin?In a
sense, ‘good work’ is very much a part of the Christian tradition, which
can also be placed in the context of strong biblical backing.Some of these
biblical contexts, as perceived and interpreted by evangelists, have been
outlined in chapter 4. The difficulty in making the distinction between
service and conversion is epitomized in the belief that “to work is to
pray.”Similarly, one could also argue that the crucial role of the body
and bodily resurrection of Christ in Christian thought, makes healthcare
an obvious sphere of Christian activity, and is quite redolent with spiritual
significance in itself.But despite these problems in demarcating service
and proselytizing in the realm of abstract thinking, I would suggest that
such separations have been attempted by evangelists themselves.For instance,
consider the following observations by Samuel:
“Effectiveness of mission
was measured by individuals converting to believers and the number of churches
planted.Mission activity also included meeting human needs of education,
health care, emergency relief etc., but often this was to demonstrate concern
for the people and gain their confidence to share the gospel which was
the main objective” (Samuel 1998: 6).
It
seems to me that at ground level where evangelists actually do their work,
the ability and the need to recognize and conceptualize the differences
between service and proselytizing, is an essential part of theirstrategy
and reality.Samuel’s observations quoted above clearly place in context
that reality.I would also suggest that the ground situation in Nepal and
Sri Lanka as outlined chapters 3 and 4 points to the same scenario. In
this context, a question one can raise at this point is whether evangelists
would want to operate in a given location if proselytizing and church expansion
in any form is completely banned, but the services they can provide are
not?If the situation in South Asia is any indication, it seems to me as
quite unlikely that evangelical organizations would be willing to operate
in such conditions.In general, they have been most active in areas in Asia,
Latin America, and Africa where conditions for proselytizing have been
relatively open and easy.
I
would argue that if the general strategy of operation of the collective
evangelical movement as currently practiced, is reversed, the conflict
potential that it entails now would also diminish considerably.That is,
the focus should be on service and not on conversion and church expansion.In
such a context, if people do convert, it would more likely be due to conviction
and faith rather than due to economic necessity. A faith built on such
a foundation is also likely to take root locally in a more substantial
manner.One may assume that it was perhaps due to the understanding of this
kind of position that the World Council of Churches made the following
observation in 1997:
“We decry the practices
of those who carry out their endeavours in mission and evangelism in ways
which destroy the unity of the body of Christ, human dignity and the very
lives and cultures of those being ‘evangelized’; we call on them to confess
their participation in and to renounce proselytism” (WCC 1997: 11).
But
closer examination of the document Towards Common Witness (1997)
brings out something different.The concern of the WCC has to do with the
competitiveness among various Christian denominations such as what is going
on today between evangelical groups and more established Christian denominations
in Sri Lanka, or competitiveness among evangelical groups themselves.The
WCC defines proselytizing in the following words:
“--- the encouragement
of Christians who belong to a church to change their denominational allegiance
, through ways and means that ‘contradict the spirit of love, violate the
freedom of the human person and diminish trust in the Christian witness
of the church” (WCC 1997: 7).
Thus,
even the WCC is concerned with the appearance of inter-denominational rivalries
and conflicts that may emerge from that, rather than from situations of
proselytizing among non-Christian groups as is the case in Sri Lanka and
Nepal.If this is the case, then there is a central problem linked to the
idea of proselytizing or conversion as a fundamental principle of not simply
evangelical groups but Christianity in general. The difference of course
is that these general principles change somewhat in specific local contexts
when conventional Christian denominations and institutional religions such
as Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lanka and Nepal find them on one side of
the battle line in opposing evangelical groups when their respective spheres
of influence are threatened by evangelicals.
In
the context of the preceding discussion, one would have to conclude that
given the premises and general principles upon which contemporary evangelism
in South Asia is based, the possibility of conflict is quite real.In fact
we have already seen the emergence of such conflict in specific local contexts.For
such conflicts to evolve into violence it may take more time.But then,
such processes are never predictable unilineal processes.They often happen
as a result of a single incident.What is dangerous is that the hierarchical
organization of evangelical groups, the power emanating from their resources
and networks, their interest in church expansion and proselytizing, and
the close correlation between service and religion has assured that evangelism
has now become a contentious political issue in both Nepal and Sri Lanka.
If this scenario is typical of South Asia in general, and if avenues are
not explored to difuse the tensions and find alternate means of experiencing
religious freedom, then the alternatives would be the addition of yet another
conflict dynamic into the realm of inter-religious and inter-group dynamics
in the region.
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