Persistence and Patterns of Ending Wars
Various strategies of governments explained in the foregoing pages raise
a critical question regarding their outcomes. How have they served the aim
and purpose of the governments in South Asia and could they restore order
in war-torn societies? A plausible answer to this question needs a critical
analysis of South Asia’s wars in an international comparative perspective.
The insights generated by several systematic scholarly studies (Stedman
1991; Kaufmann 1997; Licklider 1993, 1995) on internal/civil wars are both
illuminating and intriguing when we apply them to the South Asian context.
First, contrary to the conventional wisdom that internal wars do not end,
it is revealed in a number of studies (Small and Singer 1982; Stedman 1991;
Pillar 1983; Licklider 1995) that they do follow the dictum that Ikle (1971)
prophetically used as a title of his book Every War Must End. But, at the
same time, the causes that triggered off wars may not end soon; instead
they linger on in the thinking and memories, if not actions, of the vanquished
without perhaps getting articulated in any manner. This is more relevant
to ethnic internal wars in which identity-related issues develop deep commitments
of the people for the cause for which they have fought, thereby resisting
any compromise settlement that would have an enduring effect. Both findings
have relevance for South Asia, where the non-conclusion of internal wars
is not uncommon. And, since they are rooted in ethnicity, identity-related
grievances are not entirely forgotten or ignored even after the end of wars.
Second, the global data on internal/civil wars show that they have very
limited longevity. Small and Singer (1982: 244–45) found that of 103 wars,
more than half ended in 1 year, 28 lasted less than 4 years, 12 wars took
4 to 8 years, and only 7 wars continued for 8 to 16 years. Licklider (1995:
684), by and large, shares the same findings. Out of 84 wars that he studied,
27 per cent ended during the same year in which they broke out: he called
them abortive civil wars. Over half lasted 5 years, and by 10 years, the
number became almost two-thirds. Only 18 wars (21 per cent) became protracted
ones (which lasted more than 10 years). Comparatively, South Asian wars
have lasted longer than wars in other regions.1 Of the 8 wars, only one
war (East Pakistan) ended in the same calendar year (April–December 1971),
and another (Baluch) lasted 4 years (1973–77). The number of wars which
lasted more than 5 years but less than 10 years is one (Khalistan, 1984–92).
Five wars (the CHT, 1976–97; Mizo, 1966–86; Naga, continuing since 1955;
Eelam, continuing since 1983; Assam, continuing since 1990) continued over
10 years, of which one (Naga) is going on for over 45 years to qualify itself
as one of the longest wars in the world. It means that 63 per cent of the
wars in South Asia belong to the category of protracted wars: this is three
times higher than the global average (21 per cent) given in Licklider’s
study. As regards ongoing protracted wars, South Asia has 38 per cent (i.e.
three wars–Eelam, Assam and Naga), that is twice the global average (17
per cent) enumerated by Licklider. Such a huge disparity in the lengths
of wars shows that South Asia is a hotbed of many protracted internal wars.
Third, when we say that internal wars do end, the crucial question is: How?
Licklider (1995: 684) finds two ways of ending wars: the military victory
of one side, and negotiated settlement. In the ethnic war context, however,
Kaufmann (1997: 268) suggests three broad outcomes: the complete military
victory of one party, temporary suppression of the conflict by third-party
military occupation, and self-governance of separate communities. There
is general agreement among scholars that internal/civil wars are more likely
to end by military victory than by negotiated settlement. The latter is
defined as “an end to the violence reached while both sides had significant
military capabilities remaining and therefore presumably could have decided
not to stop fighting if the terms were unacceptable” (Licklider 1995: 684).
Pillar (1983: 25) found that only one-third of civil wars ended by negotiations.
Using a modified version of Pillar’s data, Stedman (1991: 9) found that
about 15 per cent of civil wars ended by negotiations. Kaufmann (1997: 288–89),
on the other hand, suggested that out of 27 ethnic civil wars, 12 were ended
by complete victory of one side, 5 by de jure or de facto partition, and
2 have been suppressed by military victory by a third party. Only 8 wars
have ended through a negotiated agreement. Licklider’s (1995: 684) data
reveals that of the 57 civil wars that have ended, one-quarter (14) ended
by negotiation, while the remaining 43 ended in military victory.
Two main reasons can be advanced for the difficulty in reaching a negotiated
settlement of internal war. The most convincing argument lies in Zartman’s
(1989 and 1993: 24) theory of “ripeness”. It suggests that in order to evolve
a condition favourable to conflict resolution, there must essentially be
a “basic power equivalence of the parties themselves even if their sources
of power differ”. This is important to create a situation marked by a “mutually
hurting stalemate”, where “the countervailing power of each side, though
insufficient to make the other side lose, prevents it from winning”. But
this is less likely to occur often in internal wars because of asymmetry
of power relations between the government forces and the insurgents.
The question now is what the conditions are under which a mutually hurting
stalemate is produced. Walter (1994) and Mason (1996) argue that the longer
the duration of wars, the more likely the combatants are to seek a negotiated
settlement out of their realization that military victory would be unattainable
and the cost of pursuing it almost unbearable. In other words, the high
expectations and determination of each party to win a war against the other
reduces the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Also, it is said that
a military stalemate does not always encourage negotiated settlement of
wars (Walter 1994). Another reason for this is related to the stakes and
commitments of parties. Licklider (1995: 684) argues that adversaries seek
military victory because their stakes are high in political negotiations,
and there are also no trusted institutions to enforce peace agreements.
If negotiated settlements are difficult to arrive at, they are also less
likely to endure than the results of military victories. It means that they
tend to be more likely to break down than military victories owing to an
internal balance of power situation. Wagner (1993) convincingly argues that
since peace agreements ensures the survival of both adversaries, a modicum
of a balance of power between the two is also consequently restored. This
creates an environment of pressure on the process of implementing agreements,
because each side will seek to interpret them according to its interest
and to impose its own conditions. This is more likely to happen because
peace settlements are based on the principle of compromise and each side
will always like to gain, in course of time, what it has lost in the process
of entering into a political deal. On the contrary, military victory will
tend to destroy the entire organizational structure, including the military
power base of one side, making it difficult to resume the war later. Licklider’s
(1995: 685) study testified to Wagner’s thesis. Only 15 per cent of wars
that ended in military victories were resumed, as against 50 per cent in
the case of wars ended by negotiated settlements. Breakdown is more in ethnic
internal wars than in wars of a politico-economic nature, even though the
ratio of settlement in both is not so unequal. About 79 per cent of ethnic
wars that ended in military victory were not followed by violence, as compared
to only 33 per cent of ethnic wars that ended in negotiated settlements
(Licklider 1995: 686).
Against this background, we answer the following questions: How and why
do internal wars in South Asia end? What is the ratio of military victory
to negotiated settlement? Are military victories more enduring than negotiated
settlements? Why do some wars continue without any end?
Of the 8 wars in South Asia, 3 (38 per cent–East Pakistan, Baluch and Khalistan)
ended in military victory and 2 (25 per cent–CHT and Mizo) ended by negotiated
settlement. Three wars (37 per cent–Naga, Eelam and Assam) continue as protracted
military events, even though the first two have witnessed peace processes
resulting in at least one negotiated agreement in each case, which ultimately
failed to restore peace.
Outright Military Victory
The conventional wisdom based on
empirical evidence is that if an internal war ends in military victory,
it is generally in favour of the government which enjoys an “asymmetry of
power”, even though the insurgents “compensate with an asymmetry of commitment”
(Zartman 1993: 25). This assumption is challenged by the experience in South
Asia where the rebels achieved an outright military victory against the
government in a triangular military contest involving both of them and an
external patron in support of the weaker combatant, the rebels. This happened
in East Pakistan, resulting in the creation of Bangladesh, a goal for which
the Mukti Bahini under the AL’s political tutelage fought a bitter internal
war that eventually became an interstate war between India and Pakistan.
This is a unique case in contemporary history, and definitely in any analysis
of internal war ending in the post-World War era. Two other wars–Baluch
and Khalistan–ended in favour of the governments of Pakistan and India respectively.
The difference is that whereas the government struck a peace deal with the
moderate Sikh leadership to end the Khalistan war, the same did not happen
in the Baluch war. But, in the end, both wars had a similar result: the
Punjab accord became inconsequential for ending the war, and the Baluch
war ended the same way even without a peace accord.
How did this total victory for one side come about? We advance five reasons.
First, the calculated and firm use of a “war-for-peace strategy” became
an effective instrument to set the result on the battleground for the dominant
adversary. Let us first take the Baluch and Khalistan wars. Sustained use
of the military against the rebels in these cases with the clear motive
of defeating them led to the total collapse of the entire edifice of the
militant movement. This was relatively more swift in the Baluch war than
in the Khalistan war. Apart from large-scale killing of cadres who were
crucial for sustaining the war process, what made their defeat imminent
was the systematic targeting of their leaders with the aim of either alienating
or eliminating them. This happened in both the wars. The militant Baluch
leadership was pushed out to the hills or to Afghanistan, whereas the top
militant Sikh leadership was eliminated one by one under the “bullet-for-bullet
strategy” and “bounty hunting system”. As a result, total structural disarray
of the militant groups completely incapacitated them to carry on the war.
Conversely, adoption of the same war-for-peace strategy produced a different
set of results in East Pakistan. There, the Mukti Bahini put up great resistance
to the strategic mission of the Pakistani forces to defeat it. Its survivability
in the face of mounting military pressure advanced the cause for which it
took up arms. Two contradictory results that the war-for-peace strategy
produced in South Asia raise another question: How could the East Pakistanis
sustain their militant movement to achieve their goal, whereas the Sikhs
and Baluch failed miserably? The answer lies in a set of factors that facilitated
the outbreak and progression of these wars.
This takes us to the task of identifying the second reason related to the
process of mobilization for war. We have already highlighted (Chapter 2)
the importance of a high level of mobilization for the success of any internal
war. It is achieved if the process follows the mass-led-cum-elite-led pattern
and both, the political and military mobilization processes, are successful.
Of the three wars which ended in military victory, only the East Pakistan
war had a successful mobilization to the extent that it was characterized
as a liberation movement. It followed the mass-led-cum-elite-led pattern,
and the process of military mobilization started after the completion of
political mobilization. In the end, both processes mobilized the entire
spectrum of East Bengalis under a strong leadership, the AL. Apart from
filling the rank and file of the Mukti Bahini, it helped in creating a solid
support base for sustaining the war until the goal was achieved. As a result,
the AL and the Mukti Bahini could compensate for their military weakness
vis-à-vis the Pakistan government with their commitment to the cause. This
was missing in both the Baluch and Khalistan wars. They merely followed
the elite-led pattern. In the former, both the political and military processes
went on simultaneously under two different leaderships, indicating the cleavage
in the society itself. In Punjab, both the processes occurred at different
points in time, but the military mobilization covering only one section
of the Sikh society (Jats) started even before the complete success of political
mobilization. As a result, the wars did not have the broad-based support
of the people so necessary to sustain them in the face of the mounting military
pressure of the government forces, if not to defeat the adversaries.
In this context, it is pertinent to note the behaviour of the Sikh militants,
which not only hampered the mobilization of people but also led to their
demobilization. Initially, the Sikhs who extended their open and clandestine
support to the militants believed that they were freedom fighters and the
liberation of Khalistan was their just cause. But while demanding sacrifices
from the people, the leaders never treated them with honour and dignity.
Instead, they were subjected to harassment, intimidation and violence by
the same forces to which they gave critical support in the war. By the late
1980s, it became clear to the Sikhs that most of the militants were a bunch
of criminals who resorted to rape, extortion and killing of the innocent.
The rural women, who became outraged and bitter after Operation Bluestar
and supported the movement strongly, were the prime victims of the militancy.
They realized that they had created monsters which now exploited them ruthlessly.
This, in retrospect, was the beginning of the end, “since this process not
only alienated those who sheltered the terrorists, whose daughters and daughters-in-law
were raped, but also the women themselves, who had been the ideological
cutting edge of the movement” (Joshi 1993: 18–19). The sudhar lahar [wave
of social reform] movement launched by the militants (backed by the gun)
to win back the support of the people backfired at them.2 In the process,
the militants created enemies from their own community. They turned against
them by supplying information for the operations of the security forces
against them. The militants were thoroughly alienated from the society that
they, in the end, were afraid of the people who had earlier harboured them.
This loss of support formed an important factor in the Indian government’s
total success in the war.
If mobilization and demobilization determined the strength and weakness
of groups, so was external patron support. This remains the third major
reason for the outright military victory of one side. It is evident that
winning an internal war needs the critical support of a trusted patron whom
governments, therefore, always seek to win away from its client. Pakistan
was successful in winning Afghanistan away from the Baluch and the end of
its patron support made their defeat imminent. Likewise, in the Khalistan
war, although India’s diplomatic pressure could not make Pakistan commit
itself to end its support to the Sikh militants, a gradual decline in Islamabad’s
proactive patron role in the war (due to fencing and patrolling of the borders)
changed the strategic fortunes of the militants.
In no other war was the importance of a patron’s role as vividly demonstrated
as in the East Pakistan war. The Pakistan government’s failure to win India
away from the East Bengalis, by diplomatic or military pressure, was crucial
to the Mukti Bahini in securing victory in the war. India’s direct intervention
brought about a clear shift in the power position of the combatants and
the defeat of the Pakistan Army was unavoidable when the internal war became
an interstate war. In this context, it must be noted that India’s role was
possible because favourable conditions created by the AL and the Mukti Bahini
existed on the ground for the success of India’s intervention. A partial
explanation for this can be found in the total success of mobilization in
East Pakistan.
Another consequence of failure of mobilization was that it left the door
partially open for the government to infiltrate into its adversary’s environment
for weakening it further. We have seen (Chapter 3) how the Zia regime in
Pakistan and the Congress government in India successfully used the divide-and-rule
strategy against the Baluch and the Sikhs respectively to enhance their
strategic advantage in their wars. At the same time, the same strategy totally
failed in the East Pakistan war. The differences between the two cases was
reflected in their outcomes. While the Mukti Bahini benefited from the cohesion
of the East Bengalis to win the war, the militants in Punjab and Baluchistan
had gradually lost their ground in their respective societies to finally
get defeated by the government forces. It is in this context that we should
see the working of the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people.
It worked well to the government’s advantage in Baluchistan, achieved a
moderate level of success in Punjab, and completely failed in East Pakistan.
In Baluchistan, economic and infrastructure development, specially in the
education sector, created a strong middle class, which opposed the war to
secure its economic interests. Similarly, in Punjab, the educated middle
class decried the war, thereby providing a strong base for the government
to mobilize the people against militancy. Thus, one cannot ignore the outcome
of the strategy of winning hearts and minds in determining the results of
wars in East Pakistan, Baluchistan and Punjab.
Connected with the issue of mobilization and cleavage is the problem of
the political links of militants. It is argued that for achieving a success,
the militant movement needs to institutionalize itself into the normal political
process by forging a permanent link with a legitimate political organization
(Chima 1997: 1–25). The idea behind it is to legitimize their movement,
set its goal with the concurrence of the entire society and involve a wide
section of people in the war through mobilization carried out by the moderate
and militant leaderships. Apart from being placed well in engaging the government
in the bargaining processes, the moderate leaders can also judiciously and
realistically assess the strengths and weaknesses of the movement and decide
their action and strategy accordingly. The underlying assumption is that
the moderate leadership functions in a manner so as to avoid a complete
failure of its movement by prejudging its outcome. The lack of such institutional
linkages between the Sikh militants and the Akali Dal in the Khalistan war,
and between the Baluch militants and the NAP in the Baluch war could be
considered as a factor that contributed to the militants’ defeat. At the
same time, the Mukti Bahini had the advantage of being guided by a strong
political organization, the AL, which played such a dominant role in the
preparation and execution of the entire strategy that the war ultimately
ended in its favour.
Negotiated Settlement
The wars in the CHT and Mizoram ended in political settlements resulting
from protracted negotiation processes. A number of reasons can be attributed
to this pattern of ending. First, contrary to expectations, the war-for-peace
strategy of the combatants did not fully advance their strategic interests.
Instead, it created a partial, if not total, hurting stalemate in the war
processes. For the Bangladesh security forces, which backed and facilitated
the peace process fully, the long-drawn-out war seemed a no-win affair as
the rebels had enough strength to deny them an outright victory. At the
same time, the PCJSS did not have any illusions of defeating the government
forces. It just wanted to use its limited military potential to strengthen
its bargaining position to win political concessions. Neither could the
rebel leadership nor successive governments in Dhaka ignore this strategic
reality while deciding their war and peace strategy. Similarly, although
the MNA was not a match to India’s security forces, it continued to deny
an outright military victory to the government by making strategic use of
the terrain. It was a stalemate that was hurting the rebels more than the
government, but the latter’s interest lay in serious negotiations borne
out of its desire to disengage from the war, since the former believed in
negotiated peace, and restore order in the Mizo hills.
Second, serious negotiations in both wars were possible because the parties
were prepared to compromise on their original goals and accommodate each
other’s interests in a political framework. It means that the goals were
not non-negotiable and the scope for a compromise was increased by military
factors like a hurting stalemate. It happened easily in the CHT war since
the issue in contention was autonomy and the recomposition of the state
was not in question. But one could have thought that given the secessionist
nature of the Mizo war, a negotiated settlement would be difficult to arrive
at between the combatants. Although it took 20 years for the war to end,
an accord that brought permanent peace in Mizoram was possible because the
MNF–unlike the LTTE or the NSCN (I-M)–was willing to compromise on its original
goal. It showed that the goal setting for the war lacked a strong historical
or political base and consensus in the society. It means that the grievances
of the Mizos were not so strong that they could not compromise. In this
context, the Indian government’s divide-and-rule strategy helped in exposing
the weak arguments of the MNF and created a space for alternative forces
to work for peace. It can be hypothesized that “autonomy wars are more amenable
to negotiated settlement than secessionist wars, but the latter can be pushed
to resolution if the grievances of the group have a weak base”.
Third, in this context, the role of the patrons cannot be ignored. If their
support strengthens their client group’s capability to exert and withstand
military pressure, its withdrawal inevitably increases the latter’s interest
in the peace process. This was evident in the Mizo war where the varied
involvement of the MNF leadership in negotiations was determined by Chinese
and Pakistani support. As the level of support declined and the MNA suffered
reverses, negotiations yielded positive results. Similarly, it was said
that the Indian government indirectly played a limited role in facilitating
the 1997 peace accord in Bangladesh. Its support to the AL government and
pressure on the Shanti Bahini to wind up its bases led to strengthening
the peace process to the level that an accord became a reality. It was the
success of the AL government’s strategy to win India to its side. In the
Mizo war, cessation of Chinese and Pakistani support to the MNA could be
attributed to their strong feelings of futility in sponsoring a group that
was incapable of winning its goal.
Fourth, the nature of leadership that negotiates a settlement in an internal
war is also important. We stated earlier that militant leaders invariably
take intransigent positions on negotiations, and moderate leaders are more
willing to compromise. If a strong political wing controls a militant outfit,
it is the latter that decides the issue of war and peace, and the former
generally accepts it. It does not mean that the military wing is kept away
from discussions: it simply means that the onus of taking crucial decisions
lies on the political wing. The success of the peace processes in the Mizo
and CHT wars could be attributed to the fact that the MNF and the PCJSS,
which controlled the MNA and the Shanti Bahini respectively, subjected their
military wings to negotiations and to accept peace with the governments.
It was easier for the PCJSS to achieve this task than for the MNF, which
initially faced challenges from its military wing to the settlement.
Unending Wars
Three wars (Eelam, Naga and Assam) continue without any end, of which the
first two were negotiated for settlement but the accords failed to work.
In Nagaland, the Shillong Accord gave birth to a new leadership which continued
the war. Likewise, the LTTE’s opposition to the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord made
its breakdown inevitable in resuming the Eelam war. The only war on which
there has been no serious negotiation is the Assam war. Why do these wars
continue? Several reasons are identified here.
It is evident that although these wars have greater longevity, they have
not yet reached a situation marked by a mutually hurting stalemate. But
the military stalemates in these wars have not increased the prospects for
negotiated peace. The warring parties’ determination to continue their fight
until their goals are achieved has only increased. Both the Sri Lankan government
and the LTTE feel war-weariness, but it is not strong enough to hurt them
so much that they would accept a negotiated settlement. They are confident
of defeating each other even though the ground reality does not hold out
any such hope for either of them: they refuse to accept that it is a no-win
war. It means that they remain unrealistic even at the cost of their vital
interests. The same can be said about the wars in Nagaland and Assam. The
NSCN and the ULFA leaders have shown determination enough to continue their
fight against the Indian government: it largely arises from the fact that
the latter could not defeat them even after several years of military operations.
It is assumed that if militant groups survive the pressure of the security
forces for a prolonged period, they gain adequate confidence to tackle their
adversary militarily and refuse to accept a negotiated settlement. It does
not mean that the governments come down from their intransigent positions
to concede the legitimate demands of the militants. Conscious of the fact
that they have greater military and economic strength than the militants,
and, therefore, the latter cannot sustain themselves in war forever, governments
seek to prolong wars as a “tiring out” strategy. It is assumed that the
protracted involvement of militants in a war tends to tire them out at some
points in time, since they run out of strength and force to continue the
war. Even the militants tend to think along the same lines. Thus, the mutual
expectation is that the protracted war will eventually end in military victory
for one side–a hope that forms an obstacle to development of a mutually
hurting stalemate in the war process.
In this context, it is important to understand the role of belligerent leaders
in raising hopes of victory in wars. Deciding war and peace is entirely
the task of leaders who have varied interests to protect in the process.
It is said that they have fears and preferences, which may be difficult
to overcome (King 1997: 30). The fears may be related to their power and
position in the post-settlement phase, and the preferences may be to achieve
the goal for which they have developed a commitment and devotion. The first
reason explains their self-interest in continuing the war, because accepting
a negotiated settlement may help the dissidents to mobilize the disgruntled
constituency members against the top leaders. In the process, the original
leaders get sidelined or overthrown, and war becomes an agenda of the new
leadership. This is also applicable to the government (political) leaders,
who are always concerned about their electoral prospects while deciding
their stand on a peace process. On the other hand, the commitment of leaders
to their goal arises from the sacrifice (“entrapment” factor) which the
highly mobilized constituency members make, and their conviction that theirs
is a just cause.
It is evident that in all three wars, it was the militant leaders who decided
on war and peace. None of these groups (the LTTE, NSCN [two factions] and
ULFA) are under the control of a strong political leadership. Instead, in
every case, a strong military wing has controlled a weak political wing.
Decision making in these outfits is highly centralized and the top leadership
wields absolute power and authority in the entire structure. All these militant
leaders have their own fears and preferences: they do want to accept an
ignominious peace deal that will erode their power and authority and even
threaten their survival in the post-settlement phase. This is more clearly
spelt out in the Eelam war. For LTTE chief Prabhakaran, autonomy to the
Tamil provinces under a negotiated settlement means accepting a democratic
process in which the competition for power will be open to all, and the
victory and defeat of leaders will be the people’s decision. For a person
who has enjoyed a hyper-centralized position in Tamil society, this is not
just highly undesirable, but even unacceptable (Sahadevan 1995: 279–80).
Moreover, the LTTE leadership suffers from an acute feeling of insecurity.
While refusing to accept the condition for arms surrender in 1987, Prabhakaran
said that “in a situation where there is no security, it is better to fight
and die than to die on a large scale after laying down arms” (The Hindu,
14 August 1987). Likewise, the NSCN (I-M) leaders feel that their acceptance
to a negotiated peace deal with the government may help their rival faction
to discredit them in the eyes of the Nagas. In the process, they may lose
their representative character and the status of a dominant force in Naga
society. Similarly, for the ULFA leaders, all their glory and significance
come from the war they wage against the Indian State, and once they accept
peace, what will they be? They will be a part of a democratic process in
which they may not have a chance to achieve power and position. Also, some
leaders and cadres like to continue the war as it is a highly profit-making
military enterprise. Extortion and other illegal methods of collecting money
have made some of them prosperous, so that they oppose any step towards
negotiated settlement.
The self-interest of leaders is not the sole reason for their rejection
of negotiated peace. Instead, their commitment to the cause remains as solid
as ever. This is evident from the position of militant leaders in all the
three wars. Secessionism as a goal is non-negotiable as far as the LTTE,
the NSCN and ULFA are concerned. At least in both the Naga and Eelam wars,
the goal setting was based on a consensual decision of the society, which
mobilized itself for a sustained war until the goal was won. All war-torn
societies have made immense sacrifices for their causes at the instance
of the leaders. This has given rise to the feeling of “entrapment”, meaning
that each group is convinced that it has invested so much in terms of men
and material that it cannot give up the war without actually accomplishing
the original goal. Even the economic sops provided by the governments has
not, therefore, changed their minds. Accepting anything less than its original
goal through negotiations will not be commensurate with its investment.
It is this factor that has made the position of the LTTE (Sahadevan 1995:
262–69) and the NSCN intransigent in negotiations. But, at the same time,
the governments’ attitudes towards the militants are dictated by their own
self-interest defined in terms of winning their goals. Therefore, there
is very little space for compromise and consensus. It shows how difficult
it is to negotiate peace in secessionist wars.
Another factor that needs emphasis here is related to the peculiar geographic
features of the war zones. One of the reasons why the Indian and Sri Lankan
security forces are unable to achieve a military end of wars is because
the militants have taken strategic advantage of the terrain (Chapter 2)
to prevent their defeat. It means that the terrain restricts the firepower
of the government forces, which are otherwise in a strong position to register
a victory against the rebels. Winning patrons has made little impact on
the military strength of the rebels, and even the divide-and-rule strategy
has not benefited the government. Also, war fatigue does not seem to be
a powerful factor in India’s north-east due to the fact that amidst the
continued exchange of violence, a modicum of uneasy normalcy prevails. The
political processes in Assam and Nagaland have not been disrupted, and there
is a powerful moderate force working for maintaining order. It means that
while providing a base for militancy, the people are not faced with extreme
hardships necessary for developing war-weariness that, in turn, contributes
to the peace process. The situation is different in Sri Lanka, where acute
war fatigue is neutralized by the sacrificial demands of the LTTE and the
Tamils’ perception that the Sinhalese do not accept their legitimate demands.
In conclusion, a number of observations are in order. First, the level and
extent of mobilization of groups determine the pattern of ending war. A
war in which both the political and military mobilizations reached a high
level is more difficult to end in military victory for the government or
in a political settlement. Second, it is easier for governments to reach
a negotiated settlement of war if a strong political wing controls a militant
group. Dealing with a militant group that subordinates its political wing
is always difficult. Third, the seriousness of group grievances and the
pattern of goal setting is also important in determining the pattern of
war ending. It is difficult to negotiate a war whose goal setting is endorsed
by the entire community and is based on its harsh experience with the adversary.
Fourth, either the longevity of a war or a military stalemate or both do
not always create a hurting stalemate, without which it is hard to achieve
a negotiated settlement. Fifth, beyond a point, it is difficult for governments
to impose a political solution, as the militants who have sacrificed and
are committed to their goal do not accept an ignominious peace deal. Instead,
they may allow a military victory to their adversary. Last, the participation
of multiple warring parties from the ethnic group’s side has both advantages
and disadvantages for the government. Its advantage lies in the fact that
the group’s cohesion is seriously eroded so that the war can be pushed to
a political or military end. Its disadvantage is explained by the fact that
if one group is brought to the political mainstream or defeated, another
one takes up the cause of the community. Thus, the war continues.
A number of policy prescriptions based on these findings can be advanced
here. First, although one thinks that encouraging a military victory for
one side seems the best way to end a war, it is an undesirable option because
it means denial of justice to the defeated side. Thus, an undemocratic end
of war creates uneasy peace in a war-torn society: negotiations and compromise
lead to democratic peace. Governments need to work constantly towards a
political end of wars. There is no quick-fix solution, and cumbersome political
processes are invariably protracted. Second, governments need to enlarge
the space for compromise with militant groups and narrow the differences
through negotiations. Negotiating with the moderates while fighting a war
with the militants is not always a productive exercise for a government.
Third, if trusted and encouraged by warring parties, intermediaries can
play a critical in role in a political end of wars. Last, it is easier to
achieve a political end of wars in their later stages than in their initial
phases. It means that the use of military tactics as a means to end wars
politically cannot be avoided. Ultimately, when and how an internal war
ends is determined by the war process alone.
Notes
1 In calculating the total longevity of wars, we have not excluded cease-fire
periods.
2 The purification campaigns were against the use of tobacco and alcohol
and eating meat. It was declared that not more than 11 persons should attend
a marriage party, and dowry was prohibited. The Sikhs were not allowed to
buy land from the Hindus who chose to migrate in the face of rising violence
against them. A directive was also given to change the crop pattern: the
idea was to encourage the cultivation of sugar cane whose fields provided
sanctuaries for the militants. Last, a dress code for the Sikhs was imposed.
Dr P Sahadevan is Associate Professor in South Asian Studies, School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He
held visiting fellowships at the University of Kent at Canterbury, the UK
(1993-94) and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,
University of Notre Dame, USA, (1988). He is author of India and Overseas
Indians: The Case of Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1995), Lost Opportunities and
Changing Demands: Explaining the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (University
of Kent at Canterbury, 1995), Ethnic Conflict and Militarism in South Asia
(University of Notre Dame, 1999), and numerous research papers on ethnic
conflict in South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular.
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