Negotiating for Peace
If unconventional strategies do not end internal wars, the only other option
available is negotiations. Here again, governments do not, in every case,
engage the militant leaders directly in negotiations even though they are
the combatants who need to be pacified for any peace deal. Instead, in many
cases, the moderate leaders are brought up to play a key role in a peace
process with the view not only to reaching a political settlement, but also,
in the process, to marginalizing the militant groups.1 This approach to
the peace process appears to be guided by, or be an extension of the government’s
divide-and-rule strategy analysed in Chapter 3. Possibly, negotiations with
the moderates take place against the backdrop of the continuation of fighting,
or after defeating or weakening the militants. Sometimes the governments’
failure to strike a meaningful peace deal with the militants itself will
find a role for the moderates in a peace process.
Negotiating with the militants is the last option for any government. It
may be done under their military pressure since the governments are unable
to weaken or defeat them even after sustained military operations. If the
moderates are so weak that they cannot help the government in restoring
peace, and the latter is convinced that the militants alone hold the key
for the success of a peace process, negotiations with them are inevitable.
Talks are held with or without the help of a mediator, preceded by a declaration
of cease-fire in most cases. Putting preconditions (such as surrender of
arms by the militants and the return of troops to their barracks) for talks
by either of the parties shows its position of strength from where it wants
to negotiate a deal. It means that unconditional talks are between two equally
strong or weak adversaries who need peace. It must also be noted that all
negotiating processes are pursued with the objective of peace in mind. In
some cases, the militants participate in peace talks to gain a respite for
themselves, and for regrouping and refurbishing. It means that they still
enjoy enough strength to carry on the war and are uncompromising on their
goal.
In South Asia, the search for a negotiated settlement is not an integral
part of war-ending strategies in every case. Some of the wars have seen
this process with the governments talking peace either with the moderates,
or militants, or both (in that order). Many wars (in East Pakistan, Baluchistan,
Assam and Punjab) have proceeded or ended without any political dialogue
between the respective government and militant groups. Such cases are those
in which unconventional strategies have worked well to the advantage of
the concerned government. After the outbreak of the war in East Pakistan,
the prospect for any meaningful peace process was bleak because the East
Bengalis had crossed the point of accepting anything less than a separate
state. If the state’s violence pushed them to that level, the resistance
put up by the Mukti Bahini with the direct military support of India steeled
their determination to achieve Bangladesh. As such, a negotiated political
settlement involving a compromise on the original goal of a separate state
was out of the question for the AL leadership.
In Punjab, the reason why the Indian government refused to negotiate with
the militants was to do with the favourable military situation resulting
from the success of its war-ending strategies. Although the militants kept
up sporadic violence in the state, it became clear from the beginning that
they were waging a no-win war. Spectacular military gains for the government
forces in their successive operations had foreclosed the necessity of engaging
the militants in any peace talks. The only government that showed some interest
in negotiating with the militants was the short-lived Chandra Shekhar regime
in 1990. But there was no serious effort made to start the process.
A similar military reason can be attributed to the government’s refusal
to hold talks with ULFA, which turned down all political overtures of the
Assam government. While remaining committed to its goal of a separate state,
the ULFA leadership made it clear that it would negotiate peace only with
the central government on the agenda of sovereignty to Assam. That it is
quite unwilling to compromise on the separatist goal despite its military
weakness to force the government to negotiate makes the process a non-starter.
The inference drawn here is that governments do not easily hold talks with
militarily weak militants, who are set to lose the war, if they maintain
a tough position on their secessionist goal.
In such cases, negotiating with the moderates and concluding a peace accord
with them will be a measure of reconciliation in a war-torn society. Even
an offer of peace talks in a half-hearted manner without, at the same time,
engaging the adversary in any political dialogue is to convince the aggrieved
ethnic group of the government having only a superficial interest in a democratic
settlement. This is what happened in the Baluch war. While refusing to hold
talks with the inconsequential Baluch militants, Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto,
at the height of the war in 1974, declared his desire to negotiate a political
settlement with the moderates. He held secret talks with the NAP leaders–Bizenjo,
Mengal and Marri–and allegedly coerced them to accept a settlement while
they were in prison (Sayeed 1980: 119). Such a settlement was understandably
not to concede the autonomy demand of the Baluch, but to win the NAP leaders’
cooperation in restoring normalcy in the province. That the Bhutto regime
was not interested in any substantive negotiations on the Baluch issue was
evident from its refusal to engage the NAP leader Wali Khan in a serious
peace parley. Similarly, Gen. Zia followed the same tactics in a different
way. He kept talking to the moderates for about two years regarding insurgency,
released the political prisoners, agreed for a cease-fire, offered amnesty
and withdrew the army. But he was never serious in discussing the substantive
issue of autonomy to Baluchistan. At the end, the moderate leadership got
disgusted with the manipulative tendency of the regime and pulled out of
the process.
This leaves only five wars on which there have been substantive negotiations
for a political settlement. While the Sri Lankan government negotiated both
with the moderates and militants alternately, the Bangladesh government
held negotiations only with the PCJSS that controlled the Shanti Bahini.
In India, the central government negotiated peace with the moderate Akali
Dal leaders in Punjab and with the militant leadership in Nagaland and Mizoram.
Interestingly, in Punjab, negotiations preceded the active implementation
of the war-for-peace strategy, whereas in Bangladesh it started after the
same strategy failed to yield the expected result. In the wars in India’s
north-east and in Sri Lanka, the negotiation process proceeded along with
the war-for-peace strategy, or was pursued at regular intervals.
Negotiating with the Moderates
Generally, the preference of any government interested in a negotiated end
of internal war is to engage the moderates in a peace process. There are
many reasons for this choice. First, the general belief is that the moderate
leaders will have a political bent of mind to negotiate a peace deal seriously
and show strong faith in peaceful settlement of the war. As such, a peace
accord negotiated with the moderates will have an enduring effect: the chances
of its success are far higher than that of a deal entered into with the
militants. Since they enjoy a wide spectrum of people’s support and maintain
a grass-roots political network, it is easy for the moderates to sell a
peace accord to the people. In other words, the process of implementation
of a peace accord with the moderates is likely to be smooth. Second, the
process of negotiations with the moderates is likely to be easy because
they display political maturity and believe in “give and take”, meaning
that they would be willing to compromise on their original goal to accept
a new peace formula. Third, for a government, engaging the militants in
negotiations will mean according political legitimacy to them–it otherwise
means accepting their violence and terror tactics.
Engaging the Sri Lankan Tamil Moderates
The Government of Sri Lanka was unwilling to talk to various militant
groups for about two years (August 1983–July 1985) after the outbreak of
the war in 1983. It involved only the moderate TULF in the peace process
held under India’s mediation. The exclusion of the militants from the peace
process was a conscious decision of the Jayewardene administration, which
did not want to recognize them as representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils.
Its basic objective was to deny political legitimacy to them. It must be
noted that the peace process was held against the backdrop of continued
fighting in the north-east of the island, and much of the credit for initiating
it goes to India, an interested external party in the war. India’s interest
arose out of its regional security concerns resulting from Sri Lanka’s policy
of cultivating some of the extra-regional powers, as well as the threat
that the ethnic violence in the island posed to the internal stability of
India. The exodus of refugees to India was another important factor that
developed its stakes in the war (Muni 1993: 50–67). As such, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi maintained that Sri Lanka could not treat India as just another
country in the war (Statesman, 6 August 1983). In preferring to mediate
between the Sri Lankan government and the Sri Lankan Tamils, India became
an interested third party. Its prime interest lay in finding an amicable
solution to the war.
Initially, Sri Lanka was not well disposed towards India’s peacemaking role.
Its resistance resulted from three factors. First, in view of India’s open
sympathy with the Sri Lankan Tamils and clandestine support to their militants,
Colombo suspected that New Delhi’s role would not be impartial. Second,
for the Sri Lankan government, the acceptance of India’s mediation would
mean endorsing its regional hegemony, which Sri Lanka’s foreign policy always
sought to counter. Third, and most important, Sri Lanka seemed to be overconfident
of securing direct military assistance from Western and other sources to
crush the Tamil militancy. When the West refused to live up to this expectation,
the disappointed Sri Lankan government was left with only two options–to
accept India either as a mediator, thereby safeguarding the island’s territorial
integrity, or as an intervener aligning with the Tamils to pose a threat
to the island’s sovereignty. The Sri Lankan government reluctantly chose
the first option. India’s mediation offer was easily acceptable to the Sri
Lankan Tamils; the moderates hoped that India’s role would be supportive
of their original conflict goal (greater autonomy). However, some of the
militant groups were not committed to the peace process. Groups like the
LTTE had the objective of securing maximum empowerment from India’s intermediary
role: once it was empowered politically and militarily, the LTTE sought
to set the limit for India’s role. Thus, it was India’s power and potential
to control the conflict structure and process that enabled it to impose
its intermediary role on the adversaries. It was powerful not only because
of its strong military–bureaucratic establishments to undertake mediation,
but also the relative weakness and the dependence of the Sri Lankan adversaries
on India to achieve their respective conflict goals.
India’s strategies were not uniform throughout the period of its involvement
in Sri Lanka.2 Initially, when India began the peace process in August 1983,
its intention was to play a limited role of facilitator of communication
between the adversaries. Both Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her emissary
G. Parthasarathy persuaded President Jayewardene and TULF leader A. Amirthalingam
to start a political dialogue without any precondition. It was a measure
of success for Indian diplomacy when the Sri Lankan President agreed to
hold talks with the moderate leaders without insisting that they formally
renounce their Eelam demand. On its part, the TULF indicated its willingness
to accept a solution within the framework of Sri Lanka’s Constitution. But
talks could not be started immediately because there was no reasonable framework
for conducting negotiations. A wide gap remained between what the Sri Lankan
Tamils demanded as an alternative to Eelam and what the government was prepared
to offer. This resulted in expanding India’s role–from facilitator of communication
to formulator of proposals. Parthasarathy formulated a set of proposals
on the basis of his discussion with Jayewardene and Amirthalingam. Popularly
known as “Annexure C”, it envisaged the creation of Regional Councils through
the merger of District Councils in each province and recognition of Tamil
as a national language. It also proposed the setting up of a High Court
in each region, framing of a national policy on land settlement, and making
the representation of ethnic groups in the army and police in proportion
to their percentage of the national population.3 However, the proposals
were not acceptable to a large section of Sinhalese political forces that
insisted that the unit of devolution should not be larger than the district
councils. This led to an impasse in the peace process.
At this critical juncture, India realized the need for involving the militants
in the peace process. It successfully urged Colombo to include them in the
Thimpu talks in 1985. This was the first time that the militant groups took
part in negotiations with the government. The failure of the Thimpu talks
due to the intransigent positions both of the militants and the government
delegation led to the exclusion of the former from the peace process for
about a year. Both the militants and the security forces fought fiercely,
yet there was no total breakdown of the peace process. Under India’s pressure,
the TULF kept the process going with the Sri Lankan government, although
there was no forward momentum.
India’s strategy in the post-Thimpu phase was to evolve a comprehensive
framework through an exchange of proposals between the leaders of both the
communities. The assumption underlying India’s strategy was that before
embarking on direct talks, a common ground should be created between the
Sinhalese and Tamil leaders. It continued to persuade them to formulate
their own proposals and counter-proposals. Apart from playing the role of
a messenger who transmitted draft proposals from one party to another, India
clarified the views of the adversaries on specific issues. Then, each party’s
views were passed on to the other. This formed a direct input into the formulation
of proposals. Both the Sri Lankan government and the TULF exchanged several
proposals through India. At the same time, the militants rejected all the
government proposals and insisted on the cardinal principles, which they
put forth in the Thimpu talks, as a basis for any negotiations. Finding
the militants’ position tough, India urged them not to oppose the TULF–Colombo
peace parleys. But they could not hide their displeasure over their isolation.
Questioning the legitimacy of the TULF’s involvement in the peace process,
the LTTE claimed that the Tamils had full trust in the militant leadership
alone (The Hindu, 22 August 1986). This was a militant strategy to delegitimize
the peace talks and seek a role for them in the peace process. But Colombo’s
desire to deny legitimacy to the militants was made very clear: it felt
that no useful purpose would be served when the militants, specially the
LTTE, showed intransigent positions on the Eelam demand.
Thus, by mid-1986, it had become very clear that India’s limited intermediary
role would not yield any constructive result. An expanded role for India
was, therefore, felt. As such, two central ministers held extensive talks
with the Tamil and Sinhalese leaders in Chennai (Madras) and Colombo in
December 1986. This resulted in the formulation of a new set of proposals
called the “19 December Proposals”. The main thrust of these proposals was
to carve out a Tamil linguistic unit in the northern and eastern provinces.
This was to be done by excising the Sinhalese-dominated Ampari district
from the east and linking up the remaining two districts with the north.
As regards devolution of powers to the Tamil areas, the proposals made a
definite advance on the earlier peace packages (The Hindu, 20 December 1986).
The Indian proposals evoked a mixed reaction. While the LTTE rejected them
openly, the other groups merely expressed their reservations. President
Jayewardene first accepted them, but retracted later under pressure from
the hardliners in his cabinet.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan government embarked on a large-scale military
offensive to forestall the LTTE’s unilateral declaration of Eelam and imposed
an economic embargo on Jaffna. India responded by suspending its mediation,
and, later, intervening militarily to stop the fall of Jaffna to the government
forces. The Indian intervention in the form of paradropping of food and
medicines in Jaffna on 4 July 1987 (Operation Eagle) had a limited but important
objective. It was for both the Sri Lankan government and the militants to
give up their military approach and to accept India’s mediation. The army’s
success in capturing Jaffna was not acceptable to India, because it would
mean the loss of bargaining power of the Tamil groups vis-à-vis the Sri
Lankan government. It would also lead to India’s complete alienation from
the war structure. India’s preference was for a military stalemate so that
the combatants would be forced to seek a political settlement. The expectation
was that such an approach would provide India with a definite chance to
resume its mediation. Since the chance for a military stalemate was bleak
due to the power disparity between the combatants, India opted to put a
halt to the military moves of Colombo. Its limited military intervention
achieved its objectives: the Jayewardene administration stopped its military
offensive and lifted the economic blockade on the Jaffna peninsula.
The immediate aim of New Delhi after the suspension of the military offensive
was to resume its intermediary role. Within a fortnight of the Indian military
action, steps were taken to enlist Colombo’s acceptance of Indian mediation.
President Jayewardene welcomed India’s offer, but envisaged a new role for
India. He wanted it to be a direct participant in the conflict and not a
mediator. He insisted that any accord to settle the war had to be between
the two governments, and not between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil
groups. (Silva 1993: 125). Despite its initial hesitation, India finally
accepted the offer. Hectic negotiations between the Indian and Sri Lankan
governments in June–July 1987 culminated in a bilateral agreement, which
Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene singed on 29 July 1987.4
The agreement had the prime political objective of ending the war. Its preamble
underlined Sri Lanka’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It
implied that India would stand against the forces seeking the division of
the island. The preamble also acknowledged the multi-ethnic character of
the island and recognized the distinct cultural and linguistic identity
of each ethnic group. This provision had a far-reaching implication for
the Sinhalese Buddhist ideology, which conceived of Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese-Buddhist
nation. The northern and eastern provinces were recognized as a traditional
homeland of the Tamils and were to be merged to form a single Tamil linguistic
unit with an elected Provincial Council, a Governor, a Chief Minister and
a Board of Ministers. But their permanent merger would be decided by the
people of the eastern province in a referendum. Further, the agreement provided
for cessation of hostilities, the surrender of arms held by the militants,
the lifting of the emergency in the north-east and the return of the Sri
Lankan security forces to barracks within a specified time frame. The Sri
Lankan President would grant a general amnesty to all political prisoners
and those who were accused, charged and convicted under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act and other emergency laws. Finally, the agreement provided
official-language status to
Tamil along with Sinhalese and English.
The agreement and its annexure listed
a wide range of obligations to be discharged by India. While guaranteeing
the implementation of the agreement, India agreed to take the following
steps in the event of the Tamil militants’ refusal to accept the agreement.
First, India’s territory would not be made available to the militants for
their activities prejudicial to Sri Lanka. Second, the Indian Navy would
cooperate with the Sri Lankan Navy to prevent the Tamil militants’ activities
from affecting Sri Lanka. Third, Indian military assistance would be extended
to Sri Lanka, as and when requested, for the implementation of the agreement.
The request came immediately. India sent a contingent peacekeeping force
on 30 July 1987. All these commitments were high enough to characterize
India’s role as an active participant in the conflict. In return, it received
some security rewards (Muni 1993: 110–17).
The entire process and pattern of negotiating the agreement were unique.
Starting as a mediator, India became a key negotiator for the Sri Lankan
Tamils. The Tamil moderate and militant opinions were subdued: at the most,
they were given consultative status. This showed the desperation of the
Sri Lankan government to end the war with direct Indian help. But neither
India nor Sri Lanka ever thought that they would have to face such tremendous
challenges from both the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils while seeking legitimacy
for the agreement. A larger Sinhalese opinion was critical of the peace
deal: many hardliners believed that India coerced the small island nation
to accept an unequal solution to the war. Even the Sri Lankan Tamil opinion
was sharply divided. India managed to convince the moderate and non–LTTE
Tamil groups to accept the accord by assuring them that it would try to
rectify the shortcomings of the proposed framework to meet the legitimate
aspirations of the Tamils. Even if such an assurance was not forthcoming,
the non–LTTE Tamil groups dependent on India did not have sufficient power
to restrain the determined Indian government from signing the accord. But
it was the LTTE that became a powerful opponent of the agreement: every
political effort of India to enlist the Tigers’ support failed. In the end,
the use of heavy military pressure on the LTTE became inevitable to save
the agreement from total collapse.
Thus, it was ironical that instead of ending the war, the accord created
another phase of it. This clearly showed how important the militants are
in ending war, and the limited role that the moderates can play in the entire
process. If the militants are so weak that they can be ignored for achieving
a negotiated end of the war, one or more of the unconventional strategies
are sufficient to make them irrelevant to the war-ending process. The moderates
cannot play a critical role if the militants are very strong: it means that
direct negotiations with the latter will have to be pursued at some stage.
This is what really happened in Sri Lanka in 1990 when the Premadasa regime
offered peace talks with the LTTE. But the failure of the militants–government
peace parleys will make it inevitable to resume talks with the moderate
leadership. The assumption is that while at war, governments like to continuously
search for peace if the cost of their military engagement rises with every
passing year. This explains the second round of peace talks (1991–92) between
the Tamil moderates and Sinhalese leaders under the framework of a Parliamentary
Select Committee (PSC).
The PSC experiment was undertaken when there was a total breakdown of the
peace process following the failure of the Indo-Lanka Agreement and the
war was raging intensely in the north-east after the withdrawal of the IPKF.
Unlike the earlier India-sponsored peace process (1983–87), this exercise
was less structured and involved only those party leaders who had representation
in Parliament. It was not strictly between the government and the Tamil
groups, but an all-party political exercise aimed at evolving a framework
of a solution to end the war. Constituted in August 1991 at the initiative
of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) MP Mangala Moonesinghe,
the PSC had 45 members, the majority of whom belonged to the Sinhalese parties.
Consensus was the key element of the decision-making exercise in the PSC,
because the Tamils accounted for only six members.
In the PSC, the Tamils bargained for greater autonomy to the north-east.
A proposal submitted by CWC leader S. Thondaman demanded that both the Tamil-dominated
provinces be merged “unconditionally” and constitutional safeguards be evolved
to protect the interests of the Sinhalese and Muslims living in the Tamil
areas.5 A permanently-merged single Tamil-linguistic-unit demand was not
acceptable to the Sinhalese, and a consensus on this issue was most improbable.
In his proposal (called the Concept Paper) to work out a consensus, Moonesinghe
suggested two separate units of devolution for the north and the east with
an apex institution, a Regional Council, linking both through a system of
provincial representation (Matthews 1994: 237). Later, he presented an Option
Paper, which proposed Regional and Provincial Lists of devolved powers.
The matters relating to land, finance and law-and-order were to be listed
under the Provincial List, while the Regional Council was to exercise control
over planning and development. The Provincial Councils were to have power
to control the legislative process in the Regional Council. There would
be only one Governor and one Chief Minister for the region covering both
the provinces, and the provincial administration was to be under the overall
control of a Board of Ministers headed by an Executive Minister. The posts
of Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister of the region were to be rotated
between the two Executive Members of the Northern and Eastern Provincial
Councils. Further, the paper suggested the creation of a “coordinating and
mediating” Devolution Commission, a full-fledged Finance Commission and
a second chamber in Parliament with its powers being restricted to an advisory
role (The Hindu, 7 November 1992).
The Tamils did not accept these proposals and insisted on a territorial
merger of the north-east; their position on this was non-negotiable. At
the same time, the mainstream Sinhalese parties rejected the merger demand.
What finally emerged in the PSC was, therefore, a Sinhala consensus on devolution
and not a general consensus among all the PSC members. It was based on the
proposal of the UNP, which sought to introduce a system modelled on the
Indian Constitution without changing the unitary system of Sri Lanka. The
SLFP and other Sinhalese parties endorsed the formula, but the Tamil members
rejected it. In a statement, they described the reported consensus as “nothing
but the unilateral imposition of the narrow, chauvinistic outlook of the
major Sinhala political parties on the long suffering of the Tamil people”.
They also complained that in the PSC, “there was no serious consultation,
no sign of any compromise by the UNP or SLFP and certainly no consensus
with the Tamil parties on any matter” (Hindustan Times, 16 December 1992).
The PSC exercise had exposed the weak bargaining position of the moderate
Tamils vis-à-vis the Sinhalese leaders. This, in turn, strengthened the
argument of the LTTE that the Sri Lankan Tamils’ rights could be won only
through a sustained war. With the war continuing since 1990 and after the
failure of the PSC process, there was no serious attempt at resuming the
political dialogue until October 1994, when the new government led by Chandrika
Kumaratunga offered an olive branch to the Tamils. This time, displaying
a sense of realism, she sought to negotiate with the LTTE for peace. But
history repeated itself once again when the government–LTTE talks failed
and the war resumed in 1995. Once again, the moderate groups suddenly assumed
importance in the current peace process initiated by the People’s Alliance
(PA) government. It has now keen to secure the moderate Tamil leaders’ support
for the 1995 devolution package, through which the government seeks to isolate
the Tigers from the Tamil society and eventually defeat them. The exercise
is being conducted since 1995 in the PSC, but without much success. At the
same time, there is a strong sense of disappointment among the Tamil moderates,
who feel that the PA government is not taking them seriously on the devolution
issue. Thus, marginalized by the government and threatened by the LTTE,
the moderate groups have become an ineffective political entity incapable
of influencing the government’s stand on autonomy to the Tamils.
Peace with the Sikh Moderates
Unlike as in Sri Lanka, the Indian government’s engagement with the moderate
Sikh leaders in a dialogue soon after the outbreak of the war was very purposeful
and constructive. The Rajiv Gandhi–Longowal Accord of 1985 testified to
the seriousness with which they held the political engagement for peace.
The negotiating process took cues from the pre-1984 talks between the government
and Akali leaders. Many of the issues on which an agreement emerged in 1985
were negotiated in 1983.6 Yet, it was not easy for both parties to clinch
the deal without several rounds of intense discussion over various issues,
first between Punjab Governor Arjun Singh and three Akali Dal leaders (Longowal,
Badal and Tohra), and later between them and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Arjun Singh held 14 secret meetings with the Akali leaders and played a
significant role in bringing about the accord.
The peace process started amidst continuing violence in March 1985 when
Arjun Singh was sent to Punjab as Governor. Soon, he initiated several conciliatory
measures, such as the release of several Akali leaders including H. S. Longowal.
With a peace deal in mind, the central government consciously cultivated
the Akali leaders by allowing Longowal to establish his leadership over
the moderate Sikh masses, even if it meant that he had to take a hawkish
posture. For this reason, the government was restrained in its response
to his belligerence as it felt that such a posture was necessary for him
to regain his credibility in Sikh society. When he changed his posture,
feelers were sent to the Akali Dal camp and behind-the-scenes efforts were
made to bring him around for peace talks. By May 1985, the Akalis had begun
talking in terms of a peace package with the government. As the secret talks
progressed between the state Governor and the Akalis, the central leadership
picked up the thread from there and plunged into it seriously. In July 1985,
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi formally invited Longowal for peace talks and
offered him a package. Longowal accepted the invitation promptly and went
to Delhi. The meeting between the two leaders proceeded smoothly, because
broad understanding on some of the issues already existed, reached during
the secret parleys between the Governor and the Akali leaders. At last,
on the appointed day, 24 July 1985, Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal signed what
was widely described as a historic accord to bring peace in Punjab.
The main thrust of the accord was to satisfy the Sikh community’s territorial
and autonomy aspirations spelt out in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1977).
It was agreed that Chandigarh, the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana,
would be given to Punjab; in return, Punjab would transfer some of the Hindi-speaking
areas to Haryana. A commission would be set up to determine the territories.
As regards other territorial disputes, the government would appoint another
commission and its findings would be binding on both states. The Akali Dal
maintained that the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was entirely within the framework
of the Indian Constitution: it tried to define centre-state relations in
a true federal framework, and its purpose was to provide “greater autonomy
to the states with a view to strengthening unity and integrity of the country”.
Accepting the Akali position, the government agreed to refer the autonomy
demands enshrined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution to the Sarkaria Commission
set up to make recommendations on centre-state relations. Besides, the accord
stipulated that the river water dispute between Punjab and Haryana would
be referred to a tribunal headed by a Supreme Court judge. The government
also agreed to enact legislation for the management of all Sikh shrines
in consultation with the Akali Dal (Indian Express, 25 July 1985).
While the central government considered that the accord was a sincere attempt
at reconciliation with the Sikh community, it evoked protests from other
Akali leaders and the militants. Initially, the Akali Dal (L) itself was
divided as two of its prominent leaders–Prakash Singh Badal and Gurcharan
Singh Tohra–questioned the rationale behind accepting the accord. They said
that the Sikhs wanted firm decisions and not commissions. Badal charged
Longowal and Barnala with having made a sell-out on the Anandpur Sahib resolution
(India Today 15 August 1985: 22). At the same time, Longowal argued that
the accord was a victory for the panth [the high priests]. He said that
this was an accord signed “not once but on each page”; it was as “good as
a treaty between two countries” (ibid.). Longowal managed to convince the
critics from his own party, but many moderates still remained opposed to
the accord. The militants were bitter about the Akali leadership’s cooperation
with the government in isolating them; it was demonstrated in their intense
militant activities in the state and, more vividly, in the assassination
of Longowal on 20 August 1985. By doing so, they tried to frustrate the
government’s efforts to strengthen the moderate opinion. If they succeeded
to some extent at the end, it was not solely because of their terror tactics
or popular appeal to the Sikh sentiments, but due to the government’s own
failure to implement the accord.
The accord ran into rough weather when Chandigarh could not be transferred
to Punjab on the stipulated date of 26 January 1986 because Haryana insisted
on the simultaneous transfer of two Hindi-speaking villages from Punjab.
The commission appointed by the government could not resolve the difficulties.
It was also found that many other provisions were nullified or not implemented.
An analyst found fault with the central government for the sorry state of
the accord, which was hastily formulated. He observed that New Delhi assiduously
groomed the Akali Dal leaders by extending a “tactical concession of political
power at the state level as quid pro quo for deflection, diffusion, and
de-emphasis on ethnic demands” (Singh 1996: 412). In the process, the government
drifted totally from its decision to create a peace constituency in the
state against the militants. This probably happened due to the fact that
with the upward trend in militant activities, the central leaders felt that
the moderates held a very limited role in containing militancy, because
the development in the post-accord period was seen purely from the military
point of view.
The failure of the accord signalled the end of the peace process with the
moderates. The government never made any attempt at reviving the implementation
process of the accord, nor did it concede the demand of other moderate leaders
like S. S. Mann for fresh negotiations within the framework of the Indian
Constitution (India Today 30 April 1988: 68). One reason why the government
did not resume the peace process was that the security forces continued
to gain the upper hand in their operations against the militants. In other
words, the success of the government’s war-for-peace strategy led to undermining
the peace process.
We have analysed two failed peace processes between the government and the
moderates. Both did not end wars even though they resulted in peace agreements.
While the Sri Lanka government found it expedient to hold talks with the
LTTE, the Indian government did not try the same option with the Sikh militants
even though it held negotiations with the Naga and Mizo militant leaders.
So did the Bangladesh government with the PCJSS.
Negotiating with the Militants
As stated earlier, for many governments, negotiating with militants is the
last option, meaning it is when their military tactics totally fail to end
wars. If negotiations become an inevitable result of an unfavourable battlefield
situation for the government, its success depends on the willingness of
the militants to compromise on their goal. In the same way, the militants
opt for peace talks under military pressure; if they are not inclined to
adopt a reconciliatory stance, cease-fire and peace parleys merely provide
tactical occasions for their respite and regrouping. A successful negotiation
process is the one in which both adversaries show utmost seriousness in
evolving a compromise framework of settlement.
Failed Talks with the Sri Lankan Tamil Militants
The Sri Lankan government held talks with the Tamil militants thrice since
1983. The first phase of talks was held during 1983–87 under India’s auspices,
in which half-a-dozen militant groups along with the moderate TULF took
part. The second phase (1989–90) was between the Premadasa government and
the LTTE, and the third one (1994–95) involved the Chandrika Kumaratunga
regime and the Tiger leadership. This means that the militants have been
engaged in peace talks at regular intervals, either under external (India’s)
pressure or whenever a new regime came to power in the country. If the battlefield
situation has been a compulsive factor for the government to negotiate,
the militant leadership accepted it for tactical reasons.
This was quite evident in the mid-1980s when the Indian government, in the
wake of the 1983 violence, initiated a peace process in the island. While
the Jayewardene administration denied the militants a role for about two
years, the latter always insisted on their inclusion in any negotiations.
More than anything else, what guided their respective position was the issue
of “legitimacy”. If securing political legitimacy was crucial for the militants
to be considered as freedom fighters, its denial was equally important for
the government. However, mounting insurgency and the inability of the security
forces to contain militancy made Colombo take a realistic approach to the
peace process. Under India’s pressure, the island government was prepared
to include the front-line militant groups for the first time in two rounds
of the Thimpu talks during July–August 1985.
The talks were preceded by a 12-week cease-fire between the Sri Lankan Army
and the militants. The choice of Thimpu illustrated India’s intention to
hold the exercise in a neutral setting. India wanted to play a limited role
in the talks, leaving the task of evolving a peace settlement with the conflicting
parties. Yet, it was present in Thimpu through its diplomatic contingent,
but it did not influence the negotiations. The LTTE and three other militant
groups took part in the talks under an umbrella organization called the
Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), and the Sri Lankan government delegation
was led by Hector Jayewardene. Most important, the first rungs both of the
militant leadership and of political leaders from the government side were
conspicuous by their absence in Thimpu; only the second rungs of leadership
represented both sides in the peace talks. It made the entire process lack
seriousness from the very beginning.
As expected by the delegates (and much to the disappointment of India),
the first round of the Thimpu talks collapsed due to the intransigent positions
of both the Sri Lankan delegation and of the Tamil groups. The former merely
reiterated the formula, which the UNP government presented in the APC in
1984 (i.e. devolution of powers at the district level and nothing more).
The latter insisted that any peace package should include four cardinal
principles: recognition of the Tamils as a national minority; the northern
and eastern provinces as the traditional Tamil homeland; the Tamils’ right
to self-determination; and fundamental rights for all Tamils (Times of India,
17 July 1985). In the second round of talks, begun on 12 August 1985, each
side rejected the other’s proposals in no uncertain terms. India’s efforts
to persuade them to take an approach of moderation to make the peace process
meaningful met with failure. Due to inadequate proposals on autonomy and
the Vavuniya massacre (allegedly masterminded by some parties interested
in continuing the war) by the army on 17 August 1985, the peace talks broke
down. Disappointed with the lack of sincerity of both delegations in Thimpu,
India ordered for the deportation of three Tamil leaders for their alleged
role in scuttling the Thimpu talks. (It revoked the order later under Tamil
Nadu’s pressure.)
The failure of the peace process in Thimpu was instructive of two points.
First, direct negotiations between the adversaries without a commitment
for a broad alternative peace formula would make the entire exercise unproductive.
Second, if the adversaries are intransigent in their attitudes and positions,
alternative formulas can be evolved only with the mediator’s expanded role.
But India was not immediately inclined to do so. It feared that, given the
intransigent positions of the adversaries, any peace formula designed by
it would meet the same fate as Annexure C in 1984. This was more so because
the Tamil militants desired to pursue an independent line in negotiations,
free of India’s pressure and direction. This reflected in their efforts
to forge greater unity among themselves in mid-1985. Such a move was also
designed to build up strong military pressure on the Sri Lankan government
so that it would pursue the peace talks according to the terms and conditions
of the militants.
For about a year after the failed Thimpu talks, the militants were kept
out of the peace process. But a new development took place in November 1986
when New Delhi, recognizing the dominant position of the LTTE, attempted
to forge a dialogue between Jayewardene and Prabhakaran. The LTTE chief
was summoned to Bangalore (where the Sri Lankan President was attending
the SAARC Summit) from Madras. However, the meeting did not take place because
the LTTE, in response to Sri Lanka’s proposal for trifurcating the east
and a possible merger of the Tamil-dominated areas of Trincomalee and Batticaloa
with the northern province, was firm in its demand for a complete merger
of the north and east into a single Tamil linguistic unit. Further, it asked
for a cessation of state violence against the Tamils and the release of
all innocent detainees from prison. It turned down New Delhi’s suggestion
to improve upon Colombo’s proposal through talks on the ground that it would
consider participating in negotiations only if the Government of Sri Lanka
accepted its homeland demand (Frontline 29 November–12 December 1986: 16–19).
Anyway, Prabhakaran was pleased with the backstage consultations at Bangalore
because it marked his implicit recognition as the dominant leader by both
the governments of India and Sri Lanka. But India was disappointed with
the Tiger leadership, reflecting in its steps to de-empower the LTTE. It
came in the form of police raids on its camps in Tamil Nadu and restriction
on the militants’ movements in the state. As a result, Prabhakaran himself
decided to return to Jaffna peninsula.
Subsequently, Colombo tried to talk directly to the LTTE–without any success.
On 27 December 1986, the government sent a delegation to Kagesanthurai where
it held exploratory talks with the LTTE team led by Kittu (the Jaffna regional
commander). It was organized outside the framework of India’s mediation.
The Tigers did not budge from their earlier position on the merger, and,
therefore, the talks did not proceed. For the same reason, the LTTE rejected
the “19 December (1986) Proposals”. It became clear in 1987 that for the
LTTE, Eelam was its maximum and minimum programme. Its rejection of the
1987 Indo-Lanka Agreement and its subsequent war with the IPKF exposed its
entrenched position on a separate state: it was not negotiable as far the
Tiger leadership was concerned. But other militant groups have changed their
earlier positions in favour of greater autonomy.
India’s efforts to win the LTTE to support the accord included its promise
of political and economic incentives. First, Indian officials held talks
with the LTTE chief in Jaffna. Subsequently, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.
G. Ramachandran tried to persuade Prabhakaran to accept the agreement. Finally,
Rajiv Gandhi talked to the Tiger leader, leading to a fragile understanding
on 29 July 1987 whereby the LTTE seemed to have agreed to endorse the accord.
In return, India agreed to recognize the dominance of the LTTE in the proposed
political set-up in the north-east, and assured security to the Tamils in
the north-eastern province until an adequate Tamil security system was created.
More important, it promised to pay a relief fund on a monthly basis for
the maintenance of the LTTE until the formation of the interim government
in the north-east (Seevaratnam 1989: 203–23). The amount promised was Rs.
5 million per month; one instalment was paid by September 1987 (The Hindu,
26 April 1988). In the end, given its position on Eelam, such incentives
failed to win the support of the LTTE. The group’s activities in August–October
1987 proved that Prabhakaran’s intention was to delegitimize the agreement.
This became evident when the LTTE attacked the pro-Indian militant groups
and the Sinhalese in October 1987. India then decided to use military pressure
on the Tigers, and a full-scale war broke out between them and the IPKF
in mid-October 1987. The war lasted for more than two years. An important
phase of the peace process, thus, ended without achieving peace.
The LTTE had to pay a heavy price for rejecting the accord. It lost thousands
of well-trained cadres and control of the entire Jaffna peninsula where
it had established a de facto Tamil Eelam. There was no way it could come
back to the pre-1987 position as long as the IPKF remained on the island.
The Sri Lankan government also found itself in the same position. Having
got disillusioned with the presence of the IPKF, Premadasa wanted to neutralize
internal political criticism by implementing his 1988 election promise that
he would ensure the withdrawal of the IPKF on being voted to power. But
it was not easy for him to convince the Indian government to withdraw its
forces before implementing the agreement. The best tactical step, therefore,
was to open the doors to the LTTE. Having the common objective of sending
the IPKF off the island, the LTTE responded to Premadasa’s gesture of peace.
Contacts between Colombo and the LTTE headquarters in London were quickly
established in April 1989, and peace talks began on 4 May 1989. Most of
the top LTTE leaders (with the notable exception of its chief, Prabhakaran)
were brought to Colombo by the government. Premadasa met the LTTE delegation
several times and took keen interest in the outcome of negotiations at every
stage. He himself led the government delegation to the third round of talks
in November 1989; for the other two rounds, A. C. S. Hameed (a minister)
headed the government delegation.7 The first and second rounds lasted for
27 and 17 days respectively, whereas the third one was for a shorter duration.
The talks were held without any preconditions. Both the LTTE and the Sri
Lankan Army declared a cease-fire, but the IPKF was not a party to the truce.
As such, tensions on the ground persisted when the peace talks began in
Colombo. The LTTE considered the talks as a confidence building exercise,
and, in the initial stages, did not expect to hold substantive negotiations
for a peace package. In the first formal meeting on 5 May 1989, a number
of issues were identified for discussion. They were: the role and function
of the IPKF and the difficulties faced by the Tamils due to its operations;
disruption of economic activities in the north-east; the state-sponsored
colonization in the east; and conscription of youth into the Civilian Volunteer
Force (CVF) and their training by the IPKF. The need to negotiate a political
settlement to fulfil the aspirations of the Tamils formed the last item
(Weerakoon 1998: 149). However, the IPKF issue dominated the agenda because
both the negotiating parties had a common interest in its withdrawal as
quickly as possible.
The modus operandi for achieving this task included not only consensus making
among the conflicting parties, but also intense diplomatic pressure on the
Indian government by the Premadasa regime and its disingenuous step to arm
the LTTE against the IPKF. Diplomatic pressure started with an exchange
of a series of unpleasant letters between Rajiv Gandhi and Premadasa.8 Assuming
that the IPKF would stay on the island indefinitely, the Sri Lankan President
took the firm stand that the IPKF should cease its offensive against the
LTTE and withdraw from the island so that an essential condition for a political
settlement would be created. He rejected India’s contention that its forces
went to the island to implement the peace accord, and thus the accomplishment
of the assigned task was a prerequisite for the withdrawal of the IPKF.
Exertion of diplomatic pressure on, and mobilization of international opinion
against India convinced the LTTE of Colombo’s sincerity on the IPKF issue.
It, in fact, worked as a great source for building confidence between the
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government delegations at talks in Colombo.
The second source was the Sri Lankan government’s supply of arms to the
LTTE to fight the IPKF. The underlying assumption of Colombo was that strengthening
the firepower of the Tigers would not only enable them to survive the military
pressure of the IPKF, but also, as a corollary, harass the Indian forces
by inflicting maximum damage. This was expected to hasten the departure
of the IPKF from the island (Weerakoon 1998: 151). It is not clear whether
the LTTE delegation made a request for arms, or the government itself offered
them. But the issue was not discussed in the official talks, and, therefore,
the decision on this matter was perhaps taken at the highest political level
involving Premadasa when the LTTE team led by Balasingham met him. With
a consensus emerging on the IPKF issue to the satisfaction of both the negotiating
parties, the LTTE also proved its commitment to the peace process. On the
insistence of Premadasa, the LTTE took part in the APC (which discussed
20 critical issues concerning the country, including peace in the north-east)
after registering itself as a political party, the People’s Front of Liberation
Tigers (PFLT)–significantly, without the appellation Tamil Eelam. The LTTE’s
token participation in its capacity as a political organization was regarded
as Premadas’ achievement of his endeavours to bring it into the national
mainstream.
The issues that dominated the talks were: repeal of the Sixth Amendment
and dissolution of the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) ruled by the
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The LTTE made it
clear that resolution of these issues was an essential precondition for
its involvement in negotiating substantial issues for peace.9 It must be
noted that the government under Jayewardene promulgated the Sixth Amendment
in the wake of the July 1983 riots to safeguard the unity and territorial
integrity of Sri Lanka. The amendment prescribed extreme penalties for anyone
who supported or espoused the cause of establishing a separate state: it
includes the loss of civic rights, forfeiture of property and cancellation
of membership of Parliament. Furthermore, it required every Member of Parliament
and other representative bodies to take an oath to protect the unity and
sovereignty of the country. In 1984, 17 TULF members had resigned their
seats in Parliament under the amendment and the LTTE feared that it would
not be able to take part in the electoral process if the same legal structure
was in force. It created an impression that it was interested in joining
the national mainstream by contesting the Provincial Council and Parliamentary
elections. Premadasa understood the Tiger’s logic, but suspected their intention
in demanding repeal of the amendment.
Any repeal of the amendment was a risky proposition for the government when
the LTTE did not renounce its Eelam demand and was holding on to arms. There
was also a procedural difficulty that the government had to overcome before
accepting the LTTE’s demand. It did not have the required two-thirds majority
to repeal the amendment, and, moreover, lacked sufficient ground to convince
the hard-line Sinhalese to back its decision because scrapping a significant
piece of legislation would totally free the LTTE from accepting the inviolability
of Sri Lanka’s unity and territorial integrity. Therefore, the government
linked the issue of the Sixth Amendment to the surrender of arms by the
LTTE, but the latter maintained that it needed to keep arms as long as there
was no guarantee to the security of the Tamils.10
The LTTE’s demand for the dissolution of the NEPC was also a thorny issue.
It must be noted that the EPRLF was a pro-Indian militant-turned-political
group that not only extended strategic support to the IPKF operations against
the LTTE, but also helped India in implementing its Sri Lanka policy (at
least during 1987–90). For the LTTE, the emergence of the EPRLF as a political
force with the patronage of India was a challenge to its self-declared position
of being the sole legitimate representative of the Tamils. It feared that
the EPRLF’s political growth in the north-eastern society would develop
a greater neutralizing effect on the LTTE, specially because the former
governed the province with India’s active support. Even militarily, the
Tigers faced challenges from the EPRLF. The IPKF was instrumental in raising
the CVF involving the cadres of the EPRLF with the aim of protecting the
NEPC government from the LTTE. Thus, the real motive behind the LTTE’s demand
for the dissolution of the NEPC was to oust the EPRLF government. But by
seeking a fresh election, it tried to prove to the world that it was interested
in the electoral process.
But the government was to cross a constitutional hurdle before accepting
the demand. According to the Provincial Councils Act of 1987, the central
government could not dissolve any provincial administration without the
recommendation of the Chief Minister. In the case of the NEPC, Chief Minister
Varatharaja Perumal himself provided an opportunity for its dissolution
when he made a unilateral declaration of independence in November 1989.
The LTTE urged Premadasa to use the occasion to amend the Provincial Council
Act and dissolve the NEPC. But his delay in responding to the demand led
to the erosion of the LTTE’s trust in the central government. What deepened
the suspicion was the talks held between Ranjan Wijeratne (on behalf of
the government) and the EPRLF leaders in February 1990. Though the meeting
appeared to be totally inconsequential, the LTTE perceived it as a hostile
act by the government and an affront to the Tigers (Weerakoon 1998: 159).
The situation reached a point that both the government and the LTTE started
distrusting each other. Yet, they did not break the peace process as long
as the IPKF was present on the island. The complete withdrawal of the IPKF
in March 1990 led to the LTTE’s mounting pressure on Colombo to accept its
demand. While the Tiger leadership was looking for a categorical rejection
of their demands by the government so that it could justify the resumption
of war, the Premadasa regime adopted tactics of delay: it wanted to buy
peace by continuing to talk with the LTTE. But it did not have the resolve
to accept the controversial demands of the LTTE. Towards the end, Colombo
appeared to have relented on its stand on the dissolution issue and holding
fresh council elections, but the LTTE was not prepared to accept elections
until the Sixth Amendment was withdrawn.11
The final break came in June 1990. Perturbed over the government’s inaction
on its demands, the LTTE captured police stations and ambushed army convoys.
Full-scale war broke out on 11 June 1990 between the SLA and the LTTE. Last-minute
efforts to avert the war did not succeed even though two cease-fire agreements
were reached in quick succession between the government’s chief negotiator,
A. C. S. Hameed, and the Tiger leaders in Jaffna. The LTTE was determined
to fight. Its leadership felt that they managed to escape from a “peace
trap” apparently laid by Premadasa.12 But the LTTE sought peace after declaring
a unilateral cease-fire on 31 December 1990. This time, the government was
careful not to get trapped by its opponent. While announcing a seven-day
cease-fire on 8 January 1991, Premadasa said that its extension would be
contingent upon the LTTE’s acceptance of a number of conditions. But the
army remained opposed to the government’s decision. When the LTTE failed
to prove its commitment to political talks, Colombo resumed the war with
a promise to defeat the LTTE in six months.
Accusations and counter-accusations of betrayal and deception followed the
breakdown of talks. It is true that the LTTE did not have a commitment to
the peace process: as a Sri Lankan analyst pointed out, it considered negotiations
as a political tactic, and the armed option as a strategic means (Jayatilleka
1995: 46). It often used the former to strengthen the latter. At the same
time, some found a credibility gap in the Premadasa government: its military
concessions not only in terms of supply of arms, but also giving away the
control of some army-held areas to the LTTE were to create military pressure
on the IPKF. Such a proxy-war strategy of Colombo did not make the LTTE
serious about negotiations. The power game within the ruling UNP and the
deliberate delaying tactics of the government to negotiate on the LTTE’s
demand resulted in a crisis of confidence between the two parties (Chandrakanthan
1998: 161–71). It was also stated that some of the government negotiators
took a hard-line position when they unrealistically demanded for arms surrender
by the LTTE and asked for its cadres to join the SLA and the police force.
Jayatilleka (1993: 179) held the view that “these twin errors were symptomatic
of the total failure of the hard-line elements within the regime and the
state to comprehend the nature of their enemy, the LTTE”.
For about four years (1990–94), the SLA and the LTTE fought many bitter
battles. Neither the government nor the LTTE sought peace talks until 1994
when the PA government led by Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power with a
mandate for peace. The change of regime in Sri Lanka renewed the hope for
peace. But for the PA government, the road to peace was not free of thorns.
Nevertheless, encouraged by the mandate for peace, Kumaratunga sought to
pursue a peace process with sincerity and determination. Her willingness
to go “very far for peace” was explicit. So was her refusal to accept peace
“without morality”.13 Giving a serious try for peace would remove the stigma
attached to her parents and fulfil the dream of her husband, Vijaya Kumaratunga.14
Whatever might be its intentions and calculations, the LTTE leadership welcomed
the new peace initiative15 and announced its desire to pursue the “path
of negotiations” to work out a “substantial alternative to Eelam”. This
being the explicit response of the LTTE, it also casually reiterated its
commitment to the principle of “self-determination” (Frontline 21 October
1994: 46–47), thereby contradicting its own statement on Eelam. But the
government sought to underplay the ambiguity in the LTTE’s stand for the
sake of initiating a peace process. By “substantial alternative”, the LTTE
meant creating a constitutionally guaranteed and internationally recognized
structure for greater autonomy to the permanently merged north-east province–a
traditional homeland of the Sri Lankan Tamils (ibid.: 48). Peace talks,
the LTTE maintained, would not be constructive and meaningful without both
parties agreeing to cease hostilities. “If the government agrees to declare
a cease-fire, we will construe it as a good-will sign and gesture of peace”,
Prabhakaran stated in an interview (ibid.: 51). Other demands of the LTTE
included the complete lifting of economic embargo and opening up of land
routes (at Elephant Pass and at Pooneryn) to ease the civilian traffic between
the Jaffna peninsula and the mainland. The LTTE did not view these demands
as preconditions for the resumption of peace talks, but as “essentials”
to engage in constructive dialogue.
The Sri Lankan government was initially not prepared to suspend the military
operations until the peace talks made headway. Given the LTTE’s track record
indicating its strategy of using cease-fire situations to acquire strategic
benefits vis-à-vis the army, Colombo maintained that a declaration for cessation
of hostilities should come in the process of achieving progress in peace
talks. This was intended to enlist the support of the army for the peace
process, as the government sought to convince it that it would not repeat
the mistakes of the Premadasa government in 1989–90.16 As regards the issue
of opening a safe passage to Jaffna, the government’s position had a greater
degree of incompatibility with that of the LTTE’s demand.
Nevertheless, both the parties’ desire to give a push to peace talks had
accelerated the interaction between them. After the exchange of two sets
of letters through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the government and the LTTE decided to hold talks in two stages. The first
stage was to involve discussions on the preliminary issues (such as the
lifting of economic embargo, cessation of hostilities and safe passage to
Jaffna) whose amicable settlement would create the ground for conducting
the political negotiations on the substantive issues in the second stage.
Thus, the real peace process (involving political leaders) with an agenda
of evolving a set of formulae to resolve the conflict would begin only after
success of the preliminary talks.
The first round of preliminary talks was held on 13–14 October 1994 in Jaffna
against the background of skirmishes between the LTTE and the security forces.
It was between the government officials and the second rung of the LTTE
leadership. The LTTE delegation pressed hard for a cease-fire agreement
and insisted on the withdrawal of the army camp at Pooneryn so that people
and goods could move freely to Jaffna via the Sangupitti route.17 No understanding
was reached at the meeting, nor was there any expectation for a compromise
solution because the entire exercise was meant to open the channels and
build mutual trust to get on with the serious agenda ahead. The talks, nevertheless,
enabled both the delegations to understand each other’s positions and design
their strategies accordingly for the second round of negotiations originally
scheduled for 24 October 1994.
The UNP leader and presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake’s assassination
delayed the resumption of the second round of preliminary talks. Its suspension
was felt necessary because of the public outrage suspecting the LTTE’s involvement
in his assassination. But the massive mandate for peace, which Kumaratunga
obtained in the presidential election in 1994, encouraged her to resume
the dialogue with the LTTE. This was a tactical move to deny the LTTE a
chance to point a finger at the government for breaking the peace talks,
specially when the Tigers unilaterally declared a cessation of hostilities,
beginning from the day Kumaratunga assumed the office of President, for
seven days.
A breakthrough was achieved during the second round of talks held on 3 January
1995. The government delegation agreed to the cessation of hostilities from
8 January 1995. An agreement to this effect was signed simultaneously in
Colombo and Jaffna on 5 January 1995 by Kumaratunga and Prabhakaran respectively,
and exchanged through the ICRC.18 That the Sri Lankan President and the
LTTE chief were the signatories to the agreement indicated the need felt
most probably by the government to enlist the total commitment of the top
leadership to the peace talks. Prabhakaran’s direct involvement in the peace
process seemed to be a departure from his strategy of committing his lieutenants
to deal with the government in matters like negotiations for peace.
The truce declaration, though a victory for the LTTE because the government
accepted it without any preconditions, did not convince the Tiger leadership
to start serious talks on the political agenda for a negotiated settlement
of the war. Rather, it insisted on the acceptance of its other demands too.
The LTTE’s argument had been that “the people must live in peace” before
initiating any talks on the political package.19 For this, apart from the
complete lifting of the embargo and making a safe passage to Jaffna, it
wanted the government’s Rs. 4,000 crore rehabilitation and reconstruction
package for the north to get under way before political talks began. Colombo
offered to set up a task force to implement the rehabilitation programme.
On the issue of withdrawal of the Pooneryn Army camp, Kumaratunga offered
to pull it back by 500 m to keep out of the “safe corridor”.20 For the LTTE,
the offer was too little to change its position on the camp issue. At the
same time, the government had been under pressure from the army not to make
any more concessions. Winding up the camp was not acceptable to the army,
for which it meant the loss of a strategic location to the LTTE.
The third round of preliminary talks, held on 14 January 1995, did not break
the ice. The only positive outcome of it was the government’s decision to
lift the ban on 12 more items. While agreeing to consider the LTTE’s suggestion
for the establishment of a Jaffna-based North-East Development Authority
to implement the rehabilitation programme, the government delegation rejected
its demand for relaxation of restrictions on fishing (The Hindu, 15 and
22 January 1995). Dissatisfied with the response of Colombo, the LTTE refused
to de-link the opening of substantive political negotiations from the acceptance
of its demands by the government. At the same time, Colombo was not keen
on continuing the preliminary talks any more. It was convinced that the
partial acceptance of most of the LTTE’s demands was sufficient to upgrade
the peace process to the political level so that the top leaders would address
themselves to more sensitive and thorny issues such as devolution. With
both the government and the LTTE taking irreconcilable positions, there
was an impasse in the peace process.
In March 1995, verbal volleys between the government and the LTTE created
uncertainties about continuing the peace process. The Tigers accused the
PA government of adopting a hard-line position and refusing to resolve the
urgent day-to-day problems of the Tamil people, thereby creating an impasse
in the peace process. In his letter to the Sri Lankan President, Prabhakaran
charged Colombo with practising “military subterfuge” and “deception” through
propaganda measures like the unilateral decision to open Elephant Pass and
the Pooneryn routes (The Hindu, 2 March 1995). The LTTE also viewed the
decision on safe passage to civilians as “propaganda yardage” meant to “deceive”
foreign donors and obtain aid for reconstruction and keep it for military
purpose later.21 Hence, their refusal to reciprocate on the reopening of
the routes to Jaffna until all other issues were sorted out. The PA government
was equally critical of the LTTE. Accusing the Tigers of slowing the peace
process by their inadequate response to the government’s efforts, Kumaratunga
stated that the Tigers were only keen on extracting concessions from her
government instead of agreeing to negotiations on substantive issues (ibid.,
2 February 1995). Significantly, the government indicated its consideration
of a carrot-and-stick policy, as it was talking of the inevitability of
a “military option” if the peace talks collapsed.22
Each party was stepping up its pressure on the other to accept its position.
Colombo’s unilateral decision to reopen safe passage to Jaffna was a tactical
move to create pressure on the Tiger leadership through the Tamils.23 Similarly,
the LTTE’s decision to release (on 18 March 1995) 14 service personnel from
its custody was a calculated step to pressurize Colombo to yield to its
demands. Also, by allowing some Colombo-based foreign diplomats to visit
Jaffna on 6 March 1995 for an assessment of the situation (necessary for
recommending project aid), the Tigers tried to drive home the message that
they were committed to peace, and it was the government which was to be
blamed for the deadlock in the talks. The government, at the same time,
sought to demonstrate its seriousness by announcing further relaxation on
fishing along the north-east coast and lifting the ban on fuel to Jaffna.
It also revised its earlier decision of discontinuing the preliminary talks.
The fourth round of talks was held on 10 April 1995, but failed to produce
any result. Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan President desired to hold the fifth
round in early May with the hope that the LTTE would agree to political
negotiations on the peace package.
But the LTTE was not amenable. It set a deadline of 19 April 1995 (extended
from 28 March) for the government to accept its demands. When the latter
failed to comply with it, the LTTE chief ordered his men to attack naval
gunboats berthed in Trincomalee harbour, leading to the death of 12 sailors.
It was undertaken without any provocation: the LTTE did not give a notice
of 72 hours for terminating the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.
In retaliation, the government reimposed the embargo on the transport of
19 items to the north and reintroduced the restrictions on fishing. The
resumption of hostilities has once again led to conflict escalation. There
has been no end to hostilities since then.
No doubt, the LTTE’s hardened position on various issues had brought the
peace process to nought. It also showed that its earlier pronouncement on
an alternative to Eelam was a tactical ploy to strengthen its strategic
moves. It also needed an enemy to justify its war: this was so in view of
the fact that the PA regime was not a part of the past anti-Tamil decisions.
Besides the LTTE, some others too held the government responsible for the
breakdown of the peace talks. It lacked a sense of professionalism in negotiations
as it involved only officials and prominent citizens of the civil society
for talks with the LTTE. They could not evolve a mutually agreed framework
for talks. None of the four rounds of talks appeared to have been well planned.
The military was also opposed to the government giving any strategic concessions
to the Tigers. As such, the implementation process of certain positive actions
such as lifting of the economic embargo was slow (Perera 1998: 239–52; Emmanuel
1998: 271–85). The LTTE used this as a reason to blame the government for
continuing the sufferings of the people (Manogaran 1998: 260–63). Thus,
yet another opportunity for peace with the LTTE was lost. This, however,
revived Colombo’s political engagement with the moderates for a settlement.
Successful Negotiations with the PCJSS
The experience of Bangladesh in the peace process has been different. Though
peace talks between successive governments and the PCJSS were a protracted
exercise spanning about two decades, they eventually resulted in a settlement,
which restored peace. It must be noted that the peace process in Bangladesh,
whatever the level of its seriousness, started soon after the outbreak of
the war. It means that both the war and peace processes continued side by
side even though the former process assumed greater importance than the
latter in the war-ending strategy of the government. Unlike as in Sri Lanka
where the external intermediary role was a striking part of the multilateral
negotiation process, Bangladesh created a quasi-intermediary structure to
negotiate peace with the PCJSS.24
It came first in the form of a Tribal Convention, a broad-based political
forum set up in 1977 to negotiate peace between the government and the rebels.
It held four rounds of talks with the PCJSS during July 1977 and December
1978 with the aim of preparing a ground for political dialogue between the
two combatants. The convention had a limited intermediary role: it was not
to negotiate either for the government or for the rebels. However, at some
stage, it suggested a four-point peace plan to satisfy the demands of the
PCJSS. They were: an autonomous region status for the CHT; setting up of
a regional council; establishment of a separate Tribal Affairs Ministry;
and a separate secretariat to help the President to take direct interest
in CHT affairs (Ibrahim 1991: 41). The government held some discussions
with the convention leaders on this formula, and two important decisions
were taken. First, the government agreed not to go ahead with its plan of
settling Bengalis in the Hills, and, second, released the Shanti Bahini
leader, J. B. Larma (ibid.: 35). Yet, there could not be any serious peace
talks between the PCJSS and the government due to the political turmoil
following the assassination of Zia-ur Rahman in May 1981. However, the process
continued under the new regime headed by President Ershad. It revived the
Tribal Convention in August 1983, which worked towards creating public opinion
for a negotiated peace. A peace plan, announced in October 1983, promised
to suspend all the colonization programmes and offered amnesty to the rebels
and negotiations with their leadership to end the war (Shelley 1992: 139).
However, it took two full years to resume dialogue with the PCJSS. A liaison
committee held the first round of talks with the rebel leadership in October
1985, but the second round could not take place because the PCJSS put two
preconditions: recognizing autonomy as a political solution, and eviction
of the Bengali settlers from the CHT (Dhaka Courier 23 May 1997: 15). The
government rejected both the conditions.
This led to a fresh government initiative in August 1987. A National Committee
on the CHT was set up with the Minister for Planning as its head. It had
the mandate of working out a solution to the war. What followed was a series
of meetings between the government and the PCJSS: altogether, five rounds
of talks were held during 1987–88. They were marked by the presentation
of proposals and counter-proposals. For the first time after the outbreak
of the war, the PCJSS put its minimum acceptable programme open on the negotiating
table. Its five-point charter of demands insisted on: (a) autonomy for the
CHT with its legislature and constitutional recognition of the Jumma [Hill]
nation’s right to self-determination; (b) removal of non-tribal settlers
who entered the CHT after August 1947; (c) withdrawal of Bangladeshi security
forces from the CHT; (d) retention of the CHT Regulation of 1900 and a constitutional
provision restricting any amendments to it; and (e) deployment of the UN
peacekeeping force (The CHT Commission 1991: 26). Along with them, 25 other
demands were also put forth by the PCJSS. They reflected the tough bargaining
position of the rebel leadership during negotiations, but the government
rejected them on the ground that they remained outside the framework of
the Constitution. The PCJSS refused to budge from its stand, thereby creating
an impasse in the talks. As a counter-step, the government encouraged the
National Committee to prepare a nine-point peace formula based on the views
of the tribal people. It emphasized the creation of district councils with
some legislative powers (Shelley 1992: 141). The PCJSS rejected the scheme
and insisted on regional autonomy at the least as the basis for a solution
to the war. It was not acceptable to the government, which took a unilateral
decision to implement the nine-point peace plan by creating a district council
system in 1989. The PCJSS vehemently resented this step and pulled out of
negotiations. A peace process, so painstakingly built up, thus broke down
owing to the intransigent positions of both the parties and lack of a structured
bargaining process with the help of an intermediary.
Incidentally, the fall of the Ershad government soon after the collapse
of the peace talks renewed the chance of resuming the peace process. In
1990, the caretaker government in Dhaka formed a six-member liaison committee
headed by a tribal politician to mediate between the government and the
PCJSS. But the process could not be resumed owing to the insistence of the
PCJSS upon accepting three preconditions (to resume dialogue with the previous
regime) made in November 1990. They were: setting up of a parliamentary
committee on the CHT, appointing a minister to head the government delegation
and announcing the names of members of the delegation in advance (Shelley
1992: 147). These demands appeared reasonable, but the government, in its
wisdom, chose not to accept them.
But in 1992, the new government of Khaleda Zia, who declared her commitment
to a political solution through a constitutional process, appointed a nine-member
parliamentary Committee for the CHT with a mandate to evolve a framework
for peace. It was headed by Communication Minister Oli Ahmed and included
members from opposition parties in Parliament. The Shanti Bahini responded
to the peace offer by unilaterally declaring a cease-fire from 1 August
1992, which was extended routinely every three moths (about 35 times) until
December 1997. This was a remarkable decision demonstrating the unflinching
determination of both the warring parties to a negotiated settlement. It
also showed that the war was brought to an end even before a settlement
was reached. The cease-fire period was probably the longest in the history
of any internal war, surely in South Asia.
During the reign of the Bangladesh National Party, the PCJSS held seven
rounds of talks with the Committee and eight rounds with its subcommittee.
The entire exercise became highly protracted in view of the fact that both
the parties took tough positions in negotiations. For the PCJSS, the talks
would be meaningful only if the government considered its five-point charter
of demands. It displayed a sense of realism when, in December 1992, it modified
its demands. The revised charter, presented to the Committee, demanded:
(a) regional autonomy for the CHT with a Regional Council recognized by
the constitution; (b) restoration of land rights to the tribal people and
banning allocation of land to the Bengalis from the plains; (c) withdrawal
of the military from the CHT; (d) constitutional recognition of ethnic minorities
and a guarantee that their rights would not be altered without their consent;
and (e) withdrawal of Bengalis settled in the Hills since 17 August 1974
(Dhaka Courier 25 July 1997: 12). Since these issues were quite sensitive,
the government did not accept them. Yet, they continued to engage in negotiations
in the spirit of give and take. Although differences between them persisted
on several issues, they could carry forward the momentum of talks to a new
height by 1995. It reflected in their decision to draft an agreement to
end the war. However, in the last quarter of 1995, the entire peace process
came to a standstill in the wake of a political crisis faced by the ruling
BNP. The suspension of talks did not mean the failure of the peace process,
and, as such, the government urged the PCJSS to continue with the cease-fire.
A remarkable aspect of the peace process in Bangladesh in the 1960s was
its continuity amidst the change of government. In 1996, the AL government
stated its desire to continue the BNP government’s policy of peace and evolve
a framework of settlement based on consensus. Accordingly, on 30 September
1996, an 11-member National Committee (NC) was formed under the chairmanship
of Abul Hasnat Abdullah (the chief whip of Parliament). The members included
two MPs from the BNP and one from the Jatiya Party (the BNP members disassociated
from the NC). In line with the previous regime’s policy, the AL government
maintained the all-party representative character of the NC. It also set
up a separate expert committee comprising politicians, bureaucrats and military
officers to assist the NC. In its meeting held at Khagrachchari on 7 October
1996, the NC worked out the modalities of resuming the talks with the PCJSS.
Letters were exchanged between the NC and the PCJSS, in which the latter
demanded the release of arrested tribal leaders before the start of talks.
It was conceded by the government, yet the talks could not be resumed immediately
because the PCJSS revived its earlier five-point demands to ask for a role
for the UN in the resolution of the tribal problem (Ali 1996: 20). This
was totally unacceptable to the NC and the government. Since the PCJSS made
this as a bargaining chip, it did not take much time for its leadership
to correct itself in the face of rejection by the government.
The first two rounds (21–24 December 1996, and 25–27 January 1997) of peace
talks were essentially an exercise of assessing each other’s positions.
Apart from usual reiteration of both the sides’ commitment to peace, a decision
to extend the cease-fire was also taken at the meeting. The third round
(12–13 March 1997) of talks was more substantive as it focused on the tribal
leadership’s five-point charter encompassing 49 demands, which asked for
a special administrative area status for the CHT and autonomy under a regional
council system.25 This set the tone for discussions at the fourth (11–14
May 1997) and the fifth (14–18 July 1997) rounds of talks. Some of the demands
were fiercely contested by the government’s side because they asked for
revision of the Constitution. Specifically, the land issue dominated the
fifth round and both sides appeared to have narrowed their differences.
But, at this stage, they could not reach an agreement on the issue of withdrawal
of the military from the CHT and the extent of devolution to the regional
council. Hence, much importance was attached to the sixth round of talks
(14–17 September 1997), which achieved a breakthrough. Both the government
and the PCJSS leaders prepared a draft agreement after four days of intense
discussions and agreed to sign it at the next round of talks. The seventh
round of talks, held on 26 November 1997, finalized the agreement, but its
signing was postponed due to impending opposition from the BNP, which mobilized
a large measure of anti-government opinion against the agreement. However,
it did not deter the AL government from executing its decision. On 2 December
1997, NC Chairman Abdullah and PCJSS leader J. B. Larma signed a landmark
agreement, paving the way for ending the long-drawn-out CHT war.
This was possible because of sustained efforts of both the government and
the PCJSS. They kept the peace process going for about 12 years and held
20 rounds of talks; changes in government did not alter the objective of
achieving peace. This long-drawn-out peace process is rare in internal war
situations, and its success in Bangladesh can be attributed to the genuine
desire on the part of both the parties to compromise on their positions
for a political solution. Interestingly, internal political forces, interested
in political use of war and peace, could not derail the process because
both the negotiating parties, for the most part, maintained secrecy until
the peace package was finalized. This does not mean that the agreement created
a national consensus: the BNP was in the forefront of opposing what it called
the “black accord”. It maintained that the accord violated the country’s
sovereignty, undermined the unitary character of the Constitution and curtailed
the powers of Parliament (Dhaka Courier 19 December 1997: 13).
The agreement was a sincere attempt at evolving a compromise solution to
the war.26 Both the government and the tribal leaders tried to accommodate
each other’s positions and interests. A major aspect of the agreement, which
sought to deal with the autonomy aspirations of the tribal people, has been
the introduction of a regional council system: it is formed by combining
three existing hill district councils introduced in 1989. The regional council
is a multi-ethnic forum, where not only all major tribes but also the Bengali
settlers are ensured representation. The members are elected indirectly
by the elected members of the district councils for five years. As regards
its functions, the regional council: coordinates the development activities
of three district councils; supervises the general administration and law-and-order
in the hill districts; provides direction in the disaster management and
relief programmes; protects tribal rules; and promotes social justice. Enactment
of any law relating to the CHT will require the advice of the regional council.
As regards its finances, the regional council is empowered to draw funds
from the district council, collect profits from all the property under its
control, receive loans and grants from the central government, and profits
from financial investments. Also, the agreement resolved the contentious
issue over land control amicably. It stated that the prior permission of
the regional council was required for leasing, selling, purchasing or transferring
land in the Hills; only in some cases did the central government have exclusive
power to decide on land allotment. The demand of the PCJSS to evict the
Bengali settlers was given up, and the compromise solution has been that
the government would check the land records and ascertain the rights of
possession of the tribal people if they had been alienated earlier from
their land due to Bengali settlement. The assumption was that land would
be returned to the Hill people if they established their ownership rights.
It was said that the government would also conduct a land survey in the
CHT and resolve all disputes relating to land through proper scrutiny and
verification in consultation with the regional council. For this purpose,
a provision for a land commission under a retired judge was included in
the agreement.
Also, the agreement ensured proper rehabilitation of refugees returned from
India. Economic development of the CHT was given priority. The PCJSS agreed
to surrender arms by the Shanti Bahini within 45 days of signing the agreement;
on its part, the government declared general amnesty and ensured security
of all the PCJSS members and their families. All the rebels would be released
from jail and cases against them withdrawn. Apart from soft loans to the
PCJSS members to start small-scale industries, all those who were employed
earlier would be absorbed in their respective posts and eligible members
of their family would be considered for government employment. On the contentious
issue of withdrawal of the army from the CHT, it was agreed that the government
would shut down all temporary camps of the security forces except the Bangladesh
Rifles. But the permanent cantonments in three district headquarters were
allowed to stay. Finally, the government agreed to set up a ministry on
CHT affairs with an advisory committee to assist its effective functioning.
An immediate effect of the agreement has been the end of war. Neither the
opposition of the mainstream Bengali parties nor the discontentment of some
of the tribal leaders affected the implementation of the agreement. For
the PCJSS, the agreement is a victory of sorts: perhaps it is gratified
with the fact that the protracted military engagement of its forces with
the Bangladeshi security forces has eventually yielded the expected results.
Search for Peace in Nagaland
Despite their strong determination
to pursue the war, both the Indian government and the Naga militant leaders
have tried peace with each other on three occasions. But, so far it has
been an unproductive exercise, as a permanent solution to end the war is
elusive even though the level of violence has come down drastically over
the years. It is evident that the battlefield situation has been a determining
factor for the peace process. Unlike the CHT war, it took almost eight years
for the combatants in the Naga war to come for negotiations, for the first
time in 1964. If the Naga militant leadership’s failure to advance its goal
in any manner amidst sustained military pressure from the Indian security
forces has increased its interest in peace talks, the government’s failure
to defeat the militants has narrowed down its options to seek peace through
negotiations with them. Interestingly, the peace process in the 1960s had
involved an intermediary structure, namely a three-member Peace Mission
(PM) set up at the initiative of the Baptist Church Council of Nagaland.
This coalition of intermediaries–B. P. Chaliha (Chief Minister of Assam),
Jaya Prakash Narayan (an active Gandhian) and Michael Scott (an Anglican
churchman and human rights activist)–carried forward the task of striking
a peace deal between the government and the Federal Nagas. In the other
two talks, the intermediary involvement has not been as structured as in
the 1960s: at the most, some individuals have played the role of facilitator.
The peace talks in the 1960s were held against the backdrop of the Indian
government gaining an upper hand over the Naga militant forces in military
terms.27 The Naga Army was under tremendous military pressure and, therefore,
NNC leader Phizo felt the need for a cease-fire. As early as in 1963, he
proposed a meeting with Nehru to discuss this matter, but the latter declined
to meet him. Subsequently, he suggested a joint declaration of a cease-fire,
which Nehru also rejected. Then Phizo pushed the proposal through Scott
who pleaded unsuccessfully with Nehru. Finally, Phizo sent feelers to Chief
Minister Shilu Ao, seeking his help to visit Nagaland. Consultations between
the state and central governments led to acceptance of Phizo’s plea on the
condition that they would not entertain him for any discussion if he espoused
the cause of Nagaland’s secession (Gundevia 1975: 105). Phizo did not accept
the conditional offer, but other leaders from the Naga Federal Government
utilized the Indian government’s changed attitude towards a peace process.
Their interest in talks was either a tactical step to ease military pressure
on the Naga Army, or to secure political legitimacy for their movement from
New Delhi. It was in this situation that the Baptist Church launched a peace
offensive by urging the central government to set up a PM to find ways and
means to end the war. Now, New Delhi’s stand on cease-fire changed and with
the PM interacting with the government and the underground Naga Federal
leaders, a draft cease-fire agreement was prepared by May 1964 and singed
in August.28 It came into effect on 6 September initially for one month,
and extended thereafter for another eight years, until the government unilaterally
terminated it on 1 September 1972. It must be noted that the cease-fire
continued much longer than the peace talks (which lasted until October 1967),
indicating the weakening position of the Naga Army vis-à-vis the Indian
security forces.
But, at negotiations, the Naga leaders took consistently tough bargaining
positions as if they were militarily strong enough to hold the Indian security
forces to ransom. The failure of three years (September 1964 to October
1967) of peace talks was attributable to their intransigence. The difference
between the two sides emerged first on the nature of the government delegation:
while the rebel leadership insisted on talks at a political level, the government
sent a delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Y. D. Gundevia. As regards
the agenda for talks, the government delegation proposed to focus on the
safeguards to the culture and autonomy of the Nagas within the Indian Constitution,
whereas the Naga leaders reiterated their demand for independence. While
the disagreement persisted on the maximum-minimum goal of both the parties,
a positive development occurred in the fourth round of talks on 13 October
1964. Both sides reached an understanding to demilitarize Nagaland even
before they worked out a solution to the war. Accordingly, the rebel leaders
agreed to renounce force for attaining their goal and give up arms; the
Indian government was to withdraw its security forces except those needed
for external defence. The PM was entrusted with the task of implementing
the understanding; it urged the Naga leaders to submit the list of their
arms and ammunition by 15 November and deposit them with the PM by 31 December
1964 (Mankekar 1967: 85–86). Realizing that giving up weapons before achieving
their goal was suicidal, the Naga leaders backtracked on their commitment,
and thus the entire demilitarization plan fizzled out.
Throughout the period of negotiations, the Naga delegation considered itself
from a separate country, holding talks with India on a bilateral basis.
It was made clear in the Naga Federal Government’s “Peace Declaration”,
which sought the international community giving a neutral country status
for Nagaland (Mankekar 1967: 88). The Indian delegation took strong objection
to this blatant attempt at internationalizing the conflict and was convinced
that there would not be any meeting ground for negotiations if the rebel
leadership refused to see reason and take a compromise position. At this
juncture, the PM intervened as an effective mediator to break the deadlock.
It made a proposal on 20 December 1964 which, while appreciating the divergent
stands of both the parties, appealed to them to show goodwill and understanding
on each other’s positions in the process of reaching a peaceful solution.
It urged both sides to evolve a mutually agreeable meeting ground for negotiations.
In this context, it suggested that the Naga Federal Government could, of
its own volition, participate in the Indian Union and mutually settle the
terms and conditions for that purpose. The Indian government, on its part,
could decide to restructure and recast the pattern of its relations with
Nagaland so as to satisfy the political aspirations of the Naga people.29
In sum, the PM urged both sides to renounce war as a means for settlement
and affirm their faith in political negotiations.
The major issue was not one of renouncing violence, but of how to reach
a compromise settlement. As the Indian position became defensive and with
the PM appealing for goodwill and accommodation, the Naga stand became
all the more intransigent. It insisted upon India’s recognition of Nagas’
right to self-determination and asked for a plebiscite in Nagaland to
decide its independence. The Indian delegation’s position, however, remained
unchanged; it by and large accepted the PM’s proposals, but the Naga delegation
rejected them. The talks held on 4–5 May 1965 and the PM’s frantic efforts
to narrow differences between the two parties did not succeed. In this
situation, the Naga Federal Government declared that it would not extend
the truce unless the Indian government agreed for talks at the ministerial
level and sent the PM to visit Phizo in London. New Delhi accepted the
first demand and rejected the other. Now, the Naga leaders wanted a summit
meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which the government reluctantly
accepted on the condition that they would hold discussions within the
framework of the Indian Constitution.
The first Delhi meeting between Indira Gandhi and a five-member delegation
led by Kughato (the self-styled ‘Prime Minister of the Naga Federal Government’)
was held on 16 February 1966. The PM played a limited role because. J.
P. Narayan kept himself away from the meeting. It was an exercise at reiterating
each other’s resolve to find a political solution and maintaining peace
in the Hills. In this regard, it was decided to reconstitute the Observer
Group to monitor cease-fire violations. No worthwhile political issues
were discussed during the meeting. But the Naga delegation made its unchanged
position clear to the media, viz., a commitment to achieve independence
and sovereignty for Nagaland. The Indian government was not perturbed
by this pronouncement and kept the doors for negotiations. Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi expected some real progress towards restoration of peace
in Nagaland from the second round of talks in April (Gundevia 1975: 173–74).
It was held on 26 April without the intermediary role of the PM, which
came to an end with the resignation of J. P. Narayan on 25 February 1966
over his differences with the Naga leaders. At the meeting, Indira Gandhi
ruled out the separation of Nagaland from the Indian Union and agreed
to consider any proposal for autonomy. But, mostly in public platforms,
the Naga leaders kept reiterating their goal of sovereignty. These tactics
were continued until the third round of talks on 10 August 1966, when
the Naga delegation submitted a 14-point memorandum contesting India’s
claim over Nagaland (Mankekar 1967: 122–24). This brought down the seriousness
of the talks and thus the fourth round in October 1966 turned out to be
an exercise in affirming each other’s desire for peace. For about 18 months,
there could not be any talks and the last round held on 6 June 1967 was
a meeting involving the lower-rung Naga leaders and officials and ministers
from the Indian side. The final breakdown came when Indira Gandhi cancelled
the talks scheduled for 5–6 October 1967 for an unforeseen reason after
the Naga delegation came prepared to Delhi. Before leaving for Nagaland
with disappointment, it issued a note accusing the Indian government of
duplicity in enforcing the cease-fire and conducting peace talks. Thus,
the protracted first phase of peace process ended on a discordant note.
The talks failed to bring peace owing to the intransigence of the Naga
leaders. It appeared that they wanted a respite in the war, so that the
peace process would enable their cadres to consolidate their military
position, specially after the return of a number of Chinese-trained men.
It is this group of Naga men who were violating the cease-fire agreement
by resorting to sporadic violence in the Hills and preparing themselves
for resuming the war. It was also found that the hardliners kept the Naga
Federal Government leaders under pressure not to compromise on the sovereignty
goal. The non-participation of Phizo in the talks was another major drawback
for the peace process. Being a top leader, who forged the militant movement
towards secession, his role could perhaps have made the bargaining process
more constructive. Of course, given the Nagas’ commitment to their cause,
it was anybody’s guess whether his participation would have led to a peace
deal.
Continuing military pressure by the Indian forces and growing dissidence
in the Naga movement had renewed the prospects for another round of peace
talks in the early 1970s. In 1973, a breakaway faction (the Revolutionary
Government of Nagaland) surrendered their arms and accepted the Indian
Constitution. Subsequently, India made peace overtures to dissident elements
in the movement and tried to co-opt them in its efforts to restore peace
in the Hills. The Shillong Accord (1975) was the result of this sustained
process. Disgruntled with the war approach of the front-line Naga leaders,
a section of them came forward to hold four rounds of talks with the government
representatives. Unlike the 1964–67 peace talks, these were not directly
with the central government, nor did they take place at the political
level. The Governor of Nagaland, L. P. Singh, negotiated on behalf of
the central government with a five-member delegation of rebels. Two state
government officials and a Joint Secretary in the Union Home Ministry
assisted the Governor. A five-member Observers Group set up during the
earlier peace talks also took part in the discussions. It turned out to
be a productive exercise in the sense that it resulted in an agreement–a
first of its kind in the Naga war–without much difficulty.
It was a somewhat unusual peace accord. It was not intended to redress
the grievances of the Nagas but to end the war by accomplishing the rebels’
surrender, which formed the precondition for formulating political issues
for “discussion” aimed at final settlement. All three operative clauses
of the main accord (of 11 November 1975) stated that the representatives
of the underground organizations accepted without any condition the Indian
Constitution and agreed to surrender their arms, the details of which
were worked out under a supplementary agreement on 5 January 1976. Accordingly,
the collection of arms was to be completed by 25 January 1976, and they
would be handed over to Peace Council teams at the respective places of
collection. The Peace Council would transport the arms to a peace camp
at Chedema for safe custody. It was also decided that the surrendered
militants would stay at peace camps set up at various places and the Peace
Council would arrange their maintenance.30 Subsequently, many undertrials
were released and the government assisted in setting up the peace camps.
It was the Indian government’s mistake to expect that the Shillong Accord
would end the war. As stated earlier, only a small section of the NNC
leadership took part in the peace process, which was unequal both in terms
of its exercise and outcome. The accord testified to the Indian government’s
strong position from which it negotiated. Hence, it was an unequal deal
to end the war. Several front-line Naga leaders including Phizo repudiated
the accord; it also resultantly led to significant marginalization of
Phizo’s position as the anti-accord forces consolidated themselves under
the NSCN (two factions) to carry on the fight. Thus, since the 1970s,
the Indian government has had to deal with a more formidable force while
trying to restore peace in the state.
For nearly 22 years after the Shillong Accord, Nagaland did not witness
any serious peace process. Neither the Indian government nor the NSCN
leaders tried to negotiate for peace. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s efforts
to hold secret talks with the rebel leaders did not materialize. So was
the result of peace initiatives by the Narasimha Rao government. As such,
the war remained their sole preoccupation. But a change occurred in their
attitude in 1997, due mostly to increasing war-weariness of the militants.
Informal facilitative roles played by influential political leaders from
Delhi and Kohima and the Baptist Church in Nagaland led to establishment
of contacts between the government and the NSCN (I-M) leadership. As a
resultant, the NSCN leaders met Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda in Zurich
on 3 February 1997 and what followed was a series of initiatives to start
unconditional talks to find a political solution. Its endorsement by both
the Atlanta peace meet organized by the Baptist Church in July 1997 and
the All-Naga Tribes Ho Ho meeting on 26–27 February 1997 gave further
impetus to the initiative. As a measure of goodwill and confidence, the
government withdrew international arrest warrants issued against Isaac
Swu and Muivah. In turn, the NSCN (I-M) declared a three-month cease-fire
with effective from 1 August 1997. It has been extended since then, initially
every six months and now every year from August 1998 onwards. With the
NSCN (K) declaring a unilateral truce in April 1999, the war in Nagaland
has been virtually suspended.
Three rounds of preparatory talks were held between the NSCN (I-M) leaders
and the Indian government officials in Paris, Zurich and Bangkok by the
end of 1997. They were to pave the way for summit meetings at the political
level for substantive discussions on the core issues. The NSCN (I-M) was
unwilling to continue talks with the officials and sought a direct meeting
with the Prime Minister. While refusing to accept this for lack of progress
in preparing the ground for political talks, the government kept the process
alive. With a view to giving a major thrust to the peace process, in June
1998, Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee appointed an interlocutor, Swaraj
Kaushal, who held several rounds of talks with the NSCN (I-M) leaders
in Zurich, Bangkok, Paris and Amsterdam. He also arranged their meeting
with Vajpayee in Paris on 30 September 1998. These meetings worked to
reassure the NSCN (I-M) of the government’s desire for a political settlement;
it made some of the rebel leaders return to Nagaland in May 1999 after
33 years of exile.
Yet, there has no worthwhile progress on the peace talks. The NSCN (I-M)
have often declared their commitment to political means of settling the
war, but have not been categorical in their position that they would renounce
their secessionist goal and accept a solution within the framework of
the Indian Constitution.31 At the same time, the government is unwilling
to accept any discussion on independence for Nagaland. It also remains
opposed to the “Greater Nagaland” demand, on which the Naga leaders have
taken an unrelenting position, and also to holding political talks in
a third country. Further, what ails the peace process is its exclusivity
in the sense that it has included only the NSCN (I-M) and kept out other
groups such as the NSCN (K) and the NNC led by Phizo’s daughter, Adinno.
Participation of all these groups in broad-based peace talks is essential
for restoring peace in Nagaland. Negotiations are not conducted within
a time frame; they also lack a structured framework. Thus, the combatants’
desire to end the war is not accompanied by their greater resolve to work
for peace through a sustained process. At the moment, the war is suspended,
but peace is elusive.
Negotiated Peace in Mizoram
The experience in Mizoram was quite different. A sustained peace process
buttressed by mounting military pressure made peace a reality in the state.
It took 10 years for the MNF to realize the imperative of creating peace,
and an equal number of years for the government to clinch a political
deal whose enduring effect has virtually ended the war and restored peace
to the satisfaction of the people. This is one of the few success stories
in India, and, therefore, always remains an important reference point
in any discussion on ending internal wars.
Yet, the road to peace was not smooth for the government. The process
began in 1975 when RAW established contacts with Laldenga after his departure
from Pakistan to take exile in Geneva. Being faced with the problem of
shrinking external bases and support and increasing military pressure
in the Hills, the MNF chief was persuaded to accept negotiations. On the
insistence of an interlocutor from RAW who played an important role in
the process, Laldenga gave his interest in political settlement of the
war in writing. In his letter to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, he said
that since the problem in Mizoram was political, it was possible to find
a solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution, provided special
safeguards were evolved to protect the sociocultural and religious traditions
of the Mizos. He expressed his confidence in convincing his underground
colleagues to accept peace and asked the government to facilitate his
visit to the Mizo Hills. He came forward to issue a unilateral instruction
to the MNA to suspend its operations, and expected reciprocal action from
the government (Nibedon 1980: 208–10). This was a significant change in
the Mizo leadership’s strategy, which the government tried to utilize
for a serious peace process. Its first task was to make the rebel leaders
leave their sanctuaries in Pakistan: RAW spent $15,000 for their departure.
Then, it facilitated Laldenga’s meeting with other MNF leaders in Cologne
in November 1975.
The Cologne meeting revealed the simmering discontent in the MNF to Laldenga’s
peace plan. Three leaders32 who met the MNF chief expressed their resentment
and advocated a sustained armed struggle. But their disagreement proved
to be a blessing in disguise for the Indian government’s peace strategy.
Conscious of the emerging challenges from within the MNF to his authority
and out of his desire to consolidate his leadership by denying a chance
for the government to engage the other dissidents in peace talks, Laldenga
was determined to subordinate the MNA to his political control. He wanted
to commit his cadres to negotiations. In the process, he ignored the opposition
from the movement to his peace plan.
Negotiations started in right earnest in New Delhi in January 1976. The
MNF chief managed to get other leaders to his side for talks with the
Indian government officials. They were held in camera and the government
maintained absolute secrecy. After five days of intense negotiations,
both the sides signed an agreement on 18 February 1976. It was a victory
of sorts for the government, which easily secured the MNF leadership’s
commitment to end violence without, on its part, promising any political
concessions to satisfy the aspirations of the Mizo people. Drawn, by and
large, on the spirit of the Shillong Accord to end the Naga war, the agreement
enlisted the MNF leadership’s acknowledgement of Mizoram as an integral
part of India and their desire to accept a solution within the Indian
Constitution. But there was no mention of the kind of solution that the
government was willing to offer. Further, the MNF delegation agreed to
ensure the stoppage of all violent activities by the MNA, and collect
all the underground cadres with their arms and placed them in camps with
the condition that they would not leave the camps without prior permission.
The arms so collected would be handed over to the government within one
month of a meeting that the MNF was permitted to organize at Calcutta
with the purpose of seeking a wider consensus among the Mizo leaders on
the agreement. India agreed to extend adequate help in running the camps
and suspend military operations, excepting those against militants who
were crossing Mizoram or the international border. But the formal declaration
of this was to be made only after the rebels stopped their activities.33
The agreement brought the internal bickering in the MNF to the fore, but
Laldenga sailed through the Calcutta convention and managed to secure
the majority support of the delegates. This was also recognition of his
absolute control over the MNF. Pleased with the outcome, the government
went ahead to publicize, o
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