Understanding Internal Wars
Describing South Asia as a war-torn region may presumably produce more contending
than consensual views among the strategic community, conflict analysts and
policy makers. The conventional wisdom is that war can only be fought between
states, and, therefore, internal war as a phenomenon is quite incomprehensible
to many. They often tend to include scores of such events in a larger category
of violence or internal conflict–a generic concept without specificity to
describe an inordinately diverse set of coercive incidents–and insurgency
which, in the final analysis, denotes a violent behaviour of only one of
the adversaries in an armed conflict. Nevertheless, a casual usage of the
term “war-like situation” is often found in media reportage to explain the
intensity and magnitude of violent events.
“Internal war” is a consciously chosen term for the present study to describe
many armed conflicts in South Asia. Although the term has been in vogue
in conflict studies literature since the 1960s, its employment in the South
Asian context is highly restrictive. Many ignore the fact that a domestic
system is a potential war system which interacts with the larger international
system and with transnational forces. Based on the assumption that any indiscriminate
lumping of one form of violent conflict with another without measuring its
intensity and identifying the goal and target specificity of the adversaries
will lead to an “untenable conclusion” (Coser 1964: 88), the present study
underlines the point that “war” is the appropriate term to refer to all
those prolonged armed conflicts which have crossed a certain threshold state
of violence and contributed to political disorder in a given country. Such
a disorder may be unusually “bitter, deep and protracted”; it may even resemble
a “comic-opera coup” (Kelly and Miller 1969: 19).
A further discussion below sets the stage to sort out the problem of typology
and definition. Since the line of difference between internal and interstate
war is well established in the domain of knowledge, our concern here is
to clarify and identify features that characterize internal war and set
the criteria for distinguishing it from other armed conflicts. A careful
review of a growing body of literature on the subject reveals that there
has been little agreement on what characterize and constitute an internal
war structure and process. The earliest theorists used the term in a loose
and generalized sense. For Eckstein (1964, 1965), the use of violence in
a previously peaceful society where well-defined institutional structures
and patterns exist, aimed at altering state policy, rulers or institutions,
means internal war. This is a highly imprecise and questionable definition,
because inclusion of any kind of violence without its classification and
measurement of its intensity will give an interpretative meaning that fundamentally
all violent conflicts are internal wars. It is true that violence is one
of the core elements of internal war, but it is not the sole variable. Thornton
(1964: 73) provides a slightly upgraded, yet incomplete, definition that
emphasizes “terror” as the most critical variable in internal war. “In an
internal war situation,” according to him, “terror is a symbolic act designed
to influence political behaviour by extra-normal means, entailing the use
or threat of violence.” Considering internal war as a “means in the struggle
for authority”, Janos (1964: 130–31) includes in the definitional purview
of the term a diverse set of violent incidents, ranging from small riots
to civil wars. On the extreme side of impreciseness, we have Modelski’s
(1964) definition, which includes an assortment of violent events under
the broader category of internal war. Such a definitional fallacy in every
author’s argument, and the failure to determine at what point the term “war”
is to be held to apply, indicate the complexity of internal war and the
difficulties inherent in understanding its structural attributes. However,
almost all the definitions underline a common point–that is, internal wars
threaten the central authority of the political system, and that their progression
will have certain international ramifications.
The task of devising an operational definition of internal war should start
with a clear identification of all relevant variables and how they, in a
functional way, form an internal war structure. A number of variables can
be listed here. And the most important one, to begin with, is the goals
of the combatants. Internal wars are not fought over ordinary issues and
for limited goals, and the level of goal incompatibilities of the adversaries
is much greater so that their recourse to violence is explained. Each warring
party develops high stakes in winning the war, which is considered an effective
instrument of accomplishing its conflict goals to serve its dominant interests.
And losing the war is perceived to have a disastrous effect on the future
position of the party. Thus, the competing goals of combatants in internal
war should sufficiently approximate the following kinds: structural change
versus status quo maintenance; creation of a separate political entity versus
strengthening the existing system; changing or establishing a new political
authority versus maintaining the status quo; and revocation or introduction
of a policy versus continuing the existing policy. These do not make a complete
list, but are ideal goal-types that serve as useful tools of analysis and
explanation.
The scope of the conflict forms another critical factor in internal war.
The structure of internal war entails two diametrically opposite social
entities belonging to the same political system, at least in a formal or
legal sense of the term. The socio-political cleavage is so deep that their
boundaries in the society and polity are highly compartmentalized and easily
identifiable.1 As a corollary, there is a wholesome involvement of people,
who share and support the conflict goals of their leaders, as constituencies
and not necessarily as combatants in a given war. The local constituencies
provide the base on which the core internal war structure–the organization
of the parties–is built. It must be noted that an internal war does not
directly involve other social groups as participants, but they remain affected
by the war and have a stake in its outcome.
Looking at the organizational structure of the parties–the incumbents and
the insurgents or militants–the peculiarity of internal war as distinct
from other violent events is quite evident. It is indeed the organizational
set-up that determines the pattern and process of conflict behaviour (Pye
1964: 163), defined as “actions undertaken by one party in any situation
of conflict aimed at the opponent [to] abandon or modify its goals” (Mitchell
1981: 29). In an internal war situation, the protagonists develop strong
political and military organs so designed to meet the challenges posed to
their interests to achieve their conflict goals. The political organ of
the incumbents represents a core group of leaders who are constantly involved
in strategic decision making on the basis of the battlefield feedback provided
by the top military brass. Thus, there is close coordination between the
two organs in tackling an extraordinary situation created by the militants.
In contrast, the political organ of the militants in many cases is subordinate
to their military wing, whose leader(s) in the upper echelon decide war
and peace. Strikingly, even though the internal war field is an unconventional
one in which conventional battle forms become irrelevant and ineffective,
the soldiers see themselves as warriors and the militants, attired in military
uniforms, equally consider themselves as a regular force for their just
cause. Both the combatants have their own resource base in the society,
but the political incumbents, by virtue of their control of institutions
of power and authority, enjoy better material conditions and infrastructure
facilities. Like the incumbents (and to match their forces), the insurgents
try to follow a systematic pattern of recruitment of cadres, impart them
hardened military training, and indoctrinate and initiate them into the
group’s popular ideology of vengeance and sacrifice. When the internal war
becomes protracted without a decisive outcome and the rate of attrition
goes up, the parties tend to resort to conscription and even co-option of
mercenaries or surrogate forces to bolster up their organizational structure,
which otherwise is under severe stress.
In many cases–and not necessarily in every case–internal wars have spatial
concentration as a specific feature. It means that the war zone forms only
a part of the country’s territory wherein the insurgent group’s local constituency
and resource bases are concentrated. The breakdown of political order and
authority occurs only in that particular zone, although other regions are
also immune to variant war-effects and vulnerable to violence and chaos.
The underlying assumption is that the central authority keeps itself intact
in an internal war situation, without which it cannot participate as an
incumbent-adversary, and the whole country is not engulfed in a war, as
it may be in the case of a total civil war. Interestingly, there are cases
of multiple wars being fought simultaneously in more than one region of
the same country, with the same political incumbents being involved as focal
adversaries in all the wars against many groups.2
The important aspects of internal wars are those factors which are interconnected
to the battleground situation: longevity or duration of the military engagement,
capabilities and strategies of the adversaries, intensity of violence, and
indicator of the cost of war. Internal wars are generally, but not necessarily,
expected to be prolonged military affairs entailing intermittent, if not
continuous, fighting without any let-up in the preparedness of adversaries
on the field. Each adversary tries to sustain the fight against the other
until its goals are achieved. Violence does not occur spontaneously, but
is organized by the combatants for a longer span of time. It dominates the
entire war process with its physical intensity varying from “sub-violent
to highly violent acts, from intimidation to total destruction” (Janos 1964:
138). There may be a lull before every other round of attack or operation.
The battlefield tactics range from semi-conventional warfare to sporadic
attack, guerrilla warfare, and counter-insurgency operations. As argued
by Rosenau (1964: 70), the longer duration of fighting is a reflection of
two aspects of internal war: the “relative capabilities” of the combatants,
and the “compatibility of their goals”. If, by any means, the duration of
a war is short, it may largely be due to the drastic tilt in military balance
that results from massive external patron support to one of the adversaries.
Although the political incumbents enjoy an asymmetry of power (if not monopoly)
in the use of violence, a violent conflict enters an internal war phase
only when the other adversary–the insurgent–possesses sufficient strength
and capability in reserve and an undiluted commitment to his goals. “If
both the insurgents and incumbents survive the initial days of combat, internal
wars are almost bound to pass into a prolonged stage marked by stalemate
and irreconciliability.” And the war will continue as long as “neither side
is able to eliminate the other or force it to negotiate a settlement” (Rosenau
1964: 70–71). But a military conclusion is difficult if there is no greater
imbalance in the capabilities of the adversaries. And, at the same time,
greater incompatibility of goals can inhibit a political settlement of the
war. The underlying point is that prolonged military campaigns generally
characterize internal wars, because the adversaries enjoy sufficient military
capabilities amidst their greater goal incompatibilities. These factors,
however, do not remain constant throughout the war.
Internal wars can incur as much as–or sometimes–more cost than any interstate
war of the recent decades. Fighting a war, in the words of Ikle (1971: 1),
can cost “more in blood and money than any other undertakings in which nations
engage”. It is also true of internal wars, which essentially, as in the
case of interstate wars, involve conquest and defeat. Each adversary’s prime
targets are the other’s bases, facilities, establishments and symbols of
power and support, and their constant attack and retaliation, apart from
inflicting collateral damage on life and property of civilians, which take
a heavy toll on soldiers and insurgent cadres. There is hardly any distinction
between combatants and non-combatant populations, battle-related deaths
and politically motivated massacres when war becomes intensified (King 1997:
16–17). Above all, the economic cost of the war tends to mount with every
passing year. The political incumbents end up spending a good fortune of
the country’s resources on the war, thereby putting developmental projects
on the back-burner. They try to mobilize additional resources through special
tax-collection and external assistance, whereas the insurgents tax their
local constituency, resort to extra-legal means of resource mobilization
and seek support of external patrons.
The last point brings to the fore another important factor as a determinant
of internal wars. Since every internal war is bound to invite external intervention
in variant forms and scales, no internal war can ever be totally internal
(Modelski 1964; Kelly and Miller 1969; King 1997; Rosenau 1964). Herein,
we find the linkages between the duration, intensity, and external dimensions
of internal wars. Guided by their own self-interests or general interests,
external actors–countries and organizations–intervene either in support
of one of the warring parties or in favour of bringing them to a negotiated
settlement. Intervention is initiated by the external parties themselves
or by the warring parties, depending upon the nature of relations between
the two sides and the extent to which large-scale violence has brought human
misery and regional and international disorder. Additionally, when an internal
war spills over to the neighbourhood, it is certain to invite the concerned
country’s intervention, aimed primarily at protecting its interests. That
almost every war in recent decades has experienced one or the other form
of external intervention is an empirically proven proposition (Brown 1996;
Gurr and Harff 1994; Midlarsky 1992; Heraclides 1991; Rayan 1990).
Having outlined the structural features of internal war and reasoned out
its peculiarities, the task now is to operationalize a definition that will
put the study in a proper framework. We use the term “internal war” in a
restricted sense to mean a “large-scale violent incident entailing a constant
and prolonged military engagement and confrontation between insurgents or
militants and security forces of the state”. There is a certain degree of
organization and organized fighting on the part of both the adversaries
and continuity in armed clashes and operations extended over a considerable
part of the country’s territory. While the criteria set by the definition
differentiate internal wars from other types of incidents occurring in internal
settings, there is only a thin dividing line between civil wars and internal
wars.
Many analysts use both “internal” and “civil” war interchangeably (Rosenau
1964), and some actually mean “internal war” when they employ the term “civil
war” (Licklider 1993; King 1997). This, in a way, does not appear to be
erroneous because every civil war is fought within a national territory,
and, therefore, it qualifies to be an “internal war”. However, the present
study seeks to make a conceptual delineation by emphasizing the delicate
functional, if not structural, distinctions between the two phenomena and
argues that while every civil war can technically be an internal war, not
all internal wars are civil wars.3 The assumption is that governments cannot
possess, at the outbreak of a civil war, either a “monopoly of violence
or political control”. And there may occur an almost “equal division” within
government military forces which play a combatant role against each other
by even adopting “conventional military techniques” (Edmonds 1972: 18–21;
Small and Singer 1982: 214). In some cases, “warlords declare their independence,
military headquarters lose control of the warring groups as the government
loses political control” (Enzensberger 1993: 15). Of course, a regional
internal war can transform itself into a civil war when violence spreads
and the rule of law in the “society as a whole” breaks down or loses its
foundation, leading to a state of anarchy.
There is a tendency among many analysts and observers to describe internal
war as insurgency or guerrilla warfare. The latter is merely a tactics employed
by one of the adversaries in internal war, and counter-insurgency strategies
of the incumbents are not included in its purview. In other words, it is
not a broad concept to indicate the behaviour and goals of all sides in
an armed conflict. Moreover, as King (1997: 19) rightly points out, bestowing
the label of “insurgency” on an internal conflict will remove any “legitimacy”
from the political aspirations of one of the contestants and buttress the
“claims” of the incumbents. Finally, about the term “small wars”, which
some American analysts are of late using. For them, small wars are not only
those intrastate armed conflicts but also interstate wars, which are “intense
but short or long but characterized by fairly low levels of violence” (Olson
1995: 9; Beaumont 1995). The fact that all small wars are not essentially
categorized as internal wars leaves no scope for a conceptual clash.
Contextualizing the Study and Research Tasks
What do the principles and parameters of internal war, as set forth above,
mean to a plethora of armed conflicts in South Asia? Can they qualify to
be treated as internal wars? In a careful scrutiny of cases and application
of identified criteria, we reach an easy conclusion that many of the post-colonial
armed conflicts in the region have structures and follow the processes that
feature in any internal war situation. The list includes a half-a-dozen
conflicts in North-East India–Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura4
–and Punjab; Baluchistan and former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); the
north-eastern province of Sri Lanka; and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
of Bangladesh. We do not include the Gorkhaland and Uttarakhand conflicts
in India, the Pakhtun and Mohajir conflicts in Pakistan and the Drupka–Lhotshampa
conflict in Bhutan, because the use of violence is neither organized nor
high. They are treated as peripheral violent events. Although the Kashmir
conflict satisfies some of the internal war criteria, it is not included
in the study for two reasons: first, the spatial concentration of the conflict
spreads across two national territories, and consequently; second, it is
essentially an international conflict with a strong internal component.
The “combat approach” has so far been the dominant method of analysis of
armed conflicts in South Asia. A number of scholars and experienced participants
(Marwah 1995; Ali 1993; Bhaumik 1996; Harrison 1981) have written at length
on various dimensions of the insurgency and counter-insurgency strategies
of combatants without devoting enough attention to the general patterns
and the process of ending internal wars in the region, or the obstacles
to their negotiated settlement. In other words, we know more about the origins
and courses of internal wars than their net outcomes, i.e., how they end.
Why do some of them resist a negotiated settlement while others are amenable
to such efforts? Why are some of the negotiated settlements unstable? What
are the possible ways out of internal wars? Some wars in South Asia have
ended with an outright military victory for one adversary, and only a few
were settled through political negotiations. Incidentally, many wars persist
without any end, as they face serious obstacles to their settlement. Several
recent studies on the subject with a global focus have constantly omitted
or merely made passing references to the South Asian cases of internal war-ending
in the process of their attempt at theory building or development (Licklider
1993; Zartman 1995). A full-length study of this kind, therefore, seems
imperative to fill the void in the otherwise growing body of literature.
Since the central focus of the study is on ending internal wars, it is necessary
at this point to conceptually clarify what we mean by the “end” of an internal
war. The existing literature on the subject is not very helpful to set the
criteria. Whatever criteria have been suggested are either based on the
ideas of “interstate war-termination”, or an individual analyst’s approach
influenced by the methodology of his or her own study. One such instance
are the criteria set forth by Licklider (1993: 10) in the civil war context.
For him, since “the distinguishing qualities of war are multiple sovereignties
and violence”, the ending of both will mean the end of war. As far as the
present study is concerned, an internal war can reasonably be said to have
ended when the adversaries “cease” all forms of violent hostilities and
“political processes” are restored in the strife-torn region. But the restoration
or maintenance of political processes without cessation of hostilities does
not qualify a war to have “ended”. In some situations, an uneasy peace may
prevail between the parties, and the underlying sources of conflict may
well remain without triggering off further violence.
The task in the subsequent chapters is arduous. Chapter 2 will map out internal
wars in South Asia by identifying the war-generating sources, the process
and levels of mobilization for war, and the nature and types of wars. In
Chapter 3, we analyse various war-ending strategies of the warring parties.
Chapter 4 deals with political negotiations to restore peace in war-torn
societies. While identifying the general patterns of ending wars in South
Asia, Chapter 5 answers why some wars persist without end. It also draws
some broad theoretical insights and presents a few policy prescriptions.
Notes
1 One may still find an obvious exception to this analogy. Since the political
system is not yet completely broken, an overlapping of constituency support
may occur in an internal war. To illustrate, even though a soldier fighting
the insurgents is a part of the latter’s social group and constituency,
he is loyal to the incumbents by carrying out their orders on the battlefield.
2 This phenomenon is described as “concurrence”. India is by far the most
notable concurrent adversary as is engaged, at a time, in multiple contests
with several ethnic groups–the Nagas, Mizos, Sikhs, Kashmiris, Bodos, Assamese,
Tripuris, and Meiteis. See Sahadevan (1999).
3 This distinction is made to have conceptual relevance to South Asia where
the use of the term “civil war” to describe many armed conflicts is not
quite appreciated. There is a comparative empirical basis for such a view
that refers to a larger violent event, such as the turmoil in Afghanistan.
Whereas the Afghan situation is clearly a civil war because of the total
breakdown of order and prevalence of anarchy in the entire country, the
effects of armed confrontations in South Asia have almost totally disrupted
the civil order in a particular region or territory of the strife-torn country.
4 However, we have included only three wars and kept another three (in Assam
[the Bodos], Manipur and Tripura) out of analysis in the study in view of
the problem of manageability, and in order to avoid imbalance in the representation
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