RCSS Policy Studies  11

Contents
Preface
Defence and Development in Bangladesh: The Need for Reordering of Priorities
Abrar R Chowdhury
Defence Expenditure in Sri Lanka: Prospects for Reduction
Frank De Silva

PREFACE

Defence expenditure has been a major issue and an ongoing concern in the developing world and in particular in South Asia. There have been several debates. The one between defence and development is perhaps a more sterile one. Notwithstanding various views around the world, nobody can dispute that money spent on arms, in a developing economy, must be at the expense of more pressing needs of social and infrastructure development. Yet, defence is a prime responsibility of the state and maintaining an autonomous capability to defend a nation’s sovereignty and enhance national interests are one of the principal responsibilities of governments. The question remains, however, how much is enough?

Nobody can effectively answer this. But, we at the RCSS think this is an important question to pose and address collectively in the region. My predecessor, Dr Iftekharuzzaman had the foresight to do this and set up this as one of our earliest collaborative studies in South Asia. The best strategic analysts in the region were requested to participate and we are grateful for their prompt response. I have great pleasure to present to you the result of their analysis in the second of three consecutive RCSS Policy Papers.

The two papers in the RCSS Policy Paper No 11 are from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, countries from where an analysis on this vital topic is not often found. In two slightly different ways the issue has been comprehensively addressed. We have great pleasure in placing their views for your consideration.
 

Dipankar Banerjee
Executive Director        March 2000

Social power, not technological means of destruction,
is the strongest guarantor of human freedom
Jean Sharp

Major and rapid changes have taken place in many regions of the world since the end of the cold war. Changes in which negotiations rather than use of arms became the principal means of resolving disputes between adversaries. This, in turn, has led to the abatement of arms races and lowering of expenditure in military weaponry. The South Asian region has remained impervious to such change, as inter-state rivalries continue, entailing increased expenditure on defence by states. Little progress has been made by some states to settle their unresolved bilateral disputes. All these have resulted in the persistence of an atmosphere of distrust. In addition, internal security considerations have also played a very important role in the continued efforts towards beefing up of armed forces and acquiring military hardware. Consequently valuable resources have been channeled into the defence sector at the cost of economic and social development sectors.

Bangladesh has 117,500 persons in uniform with her defence budget estimated to be US$503m in 1996 (IISS, 1996/97). In 1990 Bangladesh has spent $118m or 0.6% of its GDP on the health sector, compared to $300m (1.5% of GDP) on defence. In 1991 per capita allocation for defence accounted for $3, for education $4 and for health a meagre $1. In 1990, with a per capita GNP of $184, public expenditure on a soldier was $2193 as against $26 on a student. The skewed nature of development priorities is reflected in the fact that for the total 106m people in 1990 there were only 16,900 physicians, while 105,000 men were in uniform. It can be argued that in the absence of a clearly laid out defence policy, the scarce resources channeled into the sector have not necessarily augmented national defence, enhancing Bangladesh’s security. In that context, a diversion of funds from such source would contribute immensely to human resources development efforts, which is the fundamental prerequisite for economic development, and eventually the state security of Bangladesh.1

The narrow conception of national security based on arms needs to be rejected and a broader definition of the concept, that attainment of national security is intrinsically tied with human security favoured.2  As Mahbub ul Huq points out, “national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve but arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls while military expenditure rises” (UNDP, 1997: 64).3

It is necessary to focus on the nature and quantity of Bangladesh’s defence spending and its impact on other sectors, particularly the social sector commencing with an analysis of the level of defence spending and also discuss external and internal imperatives for augmenting the defence establishment as justified by the defence planners. Then an attempt needs to be made to relate the level of defence spending, in terms of opportunity costs, against the backdrop of the ever-growing demands from competing sectors, especially the social and human development sectors. The third section will focus on the role and effectiveness of a conventional army in Bangladesh, particularly in the face of its geopolitical reality. Finally, the paper will attempt to suggest some alternatives to Bangladesh’s current defence structure and strategies.

Bangladesh’s Defence Spending
Except for the initial four years after independence the military in Bangladesh has continued to receive increased allocation in national spending. This has been due to the fact that between 1975 and 1991 it was the military, which, for mostly, ruled the country. To keep the army content, the post-91 civilian regimes maintained the flow of funds. Critics have pointed out that the defence establishment has become ‘virtually unaccountable’ and has appropriated a disproportionate share of resources for its perpetuation and enrichment.4  Although the Defence Ministry is technically under the control of civilian bureaucrats, the military exerts substantial influence over its operations (Makeig,1989:218). National security considerations have kept the military above scrutiny. Issues of defence planning, defence strategy and the defence budget have never been subjected to any public debate in the media or in academic circles. There has not been any worthwhile discussion on these issues in the national parliament. In this context, one can explain the level of measure in the size of the Bangladeshi military, its procurement programme, and the concomitant rise in the country’s defence expenditure.

There has been a steady increase in the size of the armed forces since independence in 1971. In 1973 the strength of the Bangladesh military was below 20,000. By 1975 the services absorbed two groups, defence personnel returning from Pakistan and the former members of the disbanded Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Guards). There was a modest increase from 71,000 to 77,000 troops between the 1977-78 and the 1981-82 period. This was followed by a major expansion in the mid-1980s under General Ershad, who at the time was attempting to ‘civilianize’ his rule. By 1990-91 the Bangladesh military had a strength of 103,000. The process of burgeoning the size of the armed forces continued under the premiership of Khaleda Zia. By 1995-96 the Bangladesh military was 117,500 strong. The size of the Bangladesh armed forces increased steadily throughout the decade at an annual rate of 3 percent.  However, the increase in the military budget far outstripped the increase in the actual size of military. IISS sources inform that the defence expenditure registered an increase ten-fold, from $51.5m in 1976-77 to an estimated $503 in 1996.  In contrast, the physical size of the military increased from 71,000 to 117,500 personnel (IISS, 1996-97).

With respect to the import of arms, figures indicate that, Bangladesh, on an average, spent $21.5m annually on arms imports in the years between 1973 and 1982 and more than double that amount, $50m, in the years between 1983 and 1993. The expenditure on arms reached a staggering $110m in 1989, when it accounted for 3 percent of total imports into the country.   In April 1998, concerned agency of the Ministry of Defence of Bangladesh had finalised a deal on a French frigate reportedly worth US$100m. Reports5  suggest that purchase of several (presumably 1 squardon) Mig 29 (each plane costing between US$20-22m), one C-130 aircraft and some helicopters are in the shopping menu of the Ministry.6

Imperatives for Defence Expenditure
External Security Environment
The military in Bangladesh, like militaries in any other country, sees its role in terms of defending the country against foreign threats and ensuring national sovereignty and integrity. The geopolitical reality of Bangladesh, with India surrounding three sides of the country, contribute to the general perception that India constitutes the principal source of external threat to the country. The tendency of the policy makers of India to regard South Asia as an integral security unit reinforces such perception. Non-resolution of some of the outstanding problems, including those of river water, maritime and land boundary disputes between the two countries, has given rise to mutual distrust.6  In addition, alleged illegal immigration from Bangladesh into India, and charges that one country is aiding tribal insurgents of the other, have further embittered the relationship between the two.

Bangladesh‘s relations with her other immediate neighbour, Myanmar, have been severely strained by the periodic influx of minority Rohingya Muslims from the adjoining Rakhine state. The two rounds of refugee inflows in 1978 and 1991, each time involving about a quarter of a million of refugees, and the continued build-up and consolidation of Myanmarese army positions along the eastern border of Bangladesh have heightened tensions. The occasional intension of the land border by the Myanmarese army and border security forces, in chasing the ethnic insurgents, is a major irritant in the relationship between the two countries.

Internal Security Issues
Soon after independence the Awami League regime mobilised the armed forces in quelling the political opposition. The army was directed against the splinter left groups in northern and southern districts of Bangladesh. These groups believed that the war of national liberation was yet to be completed and regarded the Awami League government as subservient to Indian ‘expansionist interests’. The principal target of the JRB was the opposition political parties, particularly, the left and the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party), an organization formed by the Awami League dissidents.

Perhaps the most important engagement of the Bangladesh security forces has been in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in the south eastern part of the country. The tribal peoples of the region, particularly the Chakmas, have been adversely affected by a number of initiatives over the decades. Building of the Kaptai Dam, inundating their prime land and places of worship, without adequate compensatory measures in the 1960s,; denial of the tribal people’s special status while framing the Bangladesh constitution in 1972, resort  to a military solution for a political problem in the 1970s and 1980s and the policy of settling people from the plains in the hill districts, have all contributed to a sense of alienation in the tribal people’s minds, with thousands seeking asylum in the Indian state of Tripura and a section of them resorting to arms struggle under the banner of the Shanti Bahini. The agreement recently signed between the Awami League government and the political wing of the Shanti Bahini, the Chittagong  Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Society, with the aim of bringing an end to the cycle of violence in the region, has faced major obstacles from the mainstream major opposition parties, on the one hand, and from a section of Chakma groups, on the other.

The failure of successive governments in Dhaka to integrate the tribal populace with the mainstream nation building efforts and their resort to a military solution have led to the creation of a massive counter-insurgency machinery by the military and paramilitary forces in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. All these have made major demands on the national exchequer.

From time to time, the Bangladesh armed forces have been called  upon to  provide assistance to civilian administration. The most common form of use of the military has been to ‘manage’ crises in times of political upheaval. Essentially it involves the maintenance of law and order. The police and the Bangladesh Rifles are mobilised first to confront such situations and the military is used as a last resort. Occasionally, the military is used to run essential services such as managing ports, airports and power-plant facilities, during work stoppages and strikes by concerned workers. In 1987 the Ershad regime moblised the military to perform such tasks in the face of a wave of strikes by the opposition political parties.

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Roles
Bangladesh military has been one of the most active participants in United Nations peace keeping operations. So far the Bangladesh army has been engaged in operations in Bosnia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia.

Another role of the military has been to facilitate disaster relief. Over the years during times of natural calamity the military has been involved in rescue operations, food, medicine and other forms of relief distribution efforts.

It is against the backdrop of this external and internal security environment that defence strategists argue for building a modern, well equipped and well trained military. Under such a formulation, higher pay and other benefits, expansion of opportunities for training, and continued upgrading of weaponry and equipment, through purchases, are presented to be legitimate requirements in national interest. However, the role of the military has not been limited to defending the country against foreign threats and ensuring national sovereignty and integrity. In effect, the Bangladesh military had far exceeded its constitutional bounds and encroached upon the political processes of the country on several occasions, thwarting their autonomous evolution.

Military Intervention in the Political Process
The military in Bangladesh has played a very important role in shaping the political processes of the country. The armed forces have dominated Bangladesh politics for a good part of its twenty five years of history. In the initial years of Bangladesh’s independence the military was small in size. It comprised officers of the erstwhile Pakistan Army who joined the Liberation War and a section of the civilians commissioned during the war. The period-1971-August 75- was marked by absolute civilian control over the military. The Awami League government of the time pursued a policy of developing and strengthening a new paramilitary institution, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB), comprising recruits loyal to the party. The trimming of funds, the disbanding of the East Bengal Regiment and the favouring of officers who were involved in the Liberation War in terms of pay and promotion, had already created dissatisfaction among a group of the repatriat officers. In such a situation, the creation of the JRB, and the channelling of funds to strengthen it, was not well received in the military circles. It is in this context that a section of the mid-rank officers staged a coup and assassinated President Shaikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975.

The period following the fall of Mujibur regime was marked by a total domination of the political process by the Bangladesh military under Generals Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Ershad. Their rules were marked by periods of direct martial law, where absolute power was arrogated by the military strongmen. Under such dispensations constitutional provisions were kept in abeyance, constitutional amendments were made by military fiat; all forms of political activities were suspended; civil administration was made subservient to the military, and there was direct military interference in all matters of the state, including judicial administration and the system. In short, state institutions were made appendages of the military, and there was no room for civil society to function. With the consolidation of these regimes there is a transition to quasi-military rule, where overt military presence is minimised as military leaders attempt to ‘civilianize’ their rules through holding referenda and elections. During this phase the rulers continued to rely on the military, as civil administration began to function with relative autonomy with civil society being accorded space, albeit a limited one.

Extended periods of military rule in Bangladesh have contributed to the erosion of confidence in the civilian regimes to assert their authority vis a vis the military. This helps explain the exaltation of the military and the patterns of responding to its demands for increased budgetary allocations by the post-military-dictatorship civilian regimes of Khalida Zia and Shaikh Hasina. National defence strategy, national security and issues such as resource allocation to the military, its pay and benefits and promotions continue to remain almost the sole preserve of the military. Rreassessing of national priorities in the backdrop of social development and opportunity costs has, therefore, become necessary.

Social Development and Opportunity Costs
Bangladesh has a complex and endemic poverty problem. In 1991-92  47.8% of the rural population and 46.7% of the urban population were poor. Urban poverty is spiralling upwards at a very rapid rate - a 1995 study by the Planning Commission found 60.86% of urban population to be poor (GOB,1996). For Bangladesh, poverty alleviation is therefore, an overriding development objective. The principal thrust of the strategy to achieve this objective will have to be the development of human resources and the environment.
The linkage between poverty, environment and economic trends in Bangladesh has a number of critical dimensions. The long term economic growth rate in Bangladesh is around four percent. With a population growth rate of approximately two percent this growth rate is hardly sufficient to make a dent in alleviating poverty conditions. The processes of a slow growth and a rising population mingle in the backdrop of a very fragile environmental condition to spawn poverty.

The magnitude of the poverty problem is such that it cannot be addressed by marginal adjustments of economic policies. Poverty alleviation in Bangladesh demands the adoption of  a growth-oriented strategy. This implies that there will have to be schemes to create higher economic growth rates. And the sources of such growth will stem from those areas of the economy where the poor operate. Finally, the poor shall have to be transformed to be able to actively and rewardingly participate in the process of growth. Each of these three tiers - economic process, human resource development and environment - will determine Bangladesh’s success or failure in reducing the poverty levels.

Therefore, helping the poor become agents of growth has to be the key element for any development strategy for Bangladesh. The profile of a poor person in Bangladesh is that one is young, illiterate, in poor health and unaware of one’s entitlement. As an economic agent a Bangladeshi does not possess any skill beyond what has been traditionally passed on from generation to generation. These skills, valuable as elements of cultural heritage, may not have much use in helping one to exchange one’s labour - whatever labour poor health will permit one to expend so as to obtain the necessities of life at the market place. Thanks to globalisation, the markets which one has to reach are no longer the village bazaar, they are far away possibly even beyond the borders of the country.

It is in this context that the issues of human resource development and social empowerment become indispensable. It is true that significant achievements have been made over the last few decades in some sub-sectors of human development in Bangladesh, and in a few cases, it has fared better than its neighbours. These include literacy among girls, child immunization and safe drinking water supply. However, a cursory glance at the basic indicators adequately establishes the fact that a lot still needs to be done in the human development sector in Bangladesh.

Figures collected by the UNICEF suggest that 86 percent of both the male and female population of the country live below the absolute poverty line. This is very high compared with the South Asian average of 33 percent for male and 39 percent for female. Poverty contributes in turn to poor performance in health and education. The life expectancy at birth for a Bangladeshi in 1994 was 55 years, as against the South Asian average of 59. Owing to the government’s NGOs’, UNICEF’s and the donor community’s collective initiative Bangladesh has been able to provide 97 percent of its people with access to safe drinking water. The country’s performance in this regard has been the best in South Asia. With respect to adequate sanitation facilities the figure is somewhat less impressive as 66 percent of Bangladesh do not have access to such facilities. Bangladesh’s relatively better performance in water and sanitation facilities compared to its neighbours get eclipsed when one reviews the provision of health services. Only 45 percent of Bangladeshis have access to health care services, compared to a South Asian average of 77 percent. On the issue of nutrition, Bangladesh, and South Asia in general, need to embark on major programmes to improve the standards of nutrition of the population.

Although major progress has been made with respect to improvement of enrollment of girls in primary schools, at the secondary level the performance is still very poor. Only 25 percent of males and 12 percent of females of the relevant age group are enrolled in secondary schools in Bangladesh. This is much less than South Asian average of 52 percent for males and 32 percent for females. The adult illiteracy rate is as high as 65 percent in Bangladesh. In all counts Bangladesh needs to catch up with the South Asian average.

Women are particularly hard-hit when confronted by situations of poverty and scarcity of resources. The figures above indicate that compared to men, women have lagged behind in adult literacy, and school enrollment rates. With respect to the maternal mortality rate and the percentage of births attended by trained health personnel, Bangladesh trails well behind the South Asian average. When development indicators are used to measure the capacity of the country, Bangladesh ranks 143 among 174 countries (UNDP,1996). The low level of development is accentuated by disparities between the poor and rich, rural and urban and female and male. There is a pressing need for government intervention in human development initiatives. But unfortunately, the importance of these sectors has not been given due recognition and are regarded as mere social services. As a result, these sectors, are not treated as development priority sectors and periodically bear the brunt of budget cuts in the event of resource shortages. A strong case exists, therefore, for government intervention for ensuring human development because a high incidence of poverty prevents the majority of households from meeting their human development needs (Jahan, 1994:185).

Two essential prerequisites for human development are availability of funds, and commitment of the government. In spite of resource constraints room remains for restructuring the current expenditure pattern in favour of human development initiatives. The reduction of allocation in non-development expenditures, which reached 70.8 percent in 1990, is one way of releasing funds for human development. In this context reducing the mostly military budget; which accounted for 16 percent of total public expenditure, without compromising essential strategic interests, may be one of the first steps.5

Another step is the reduction in food subsidies. Following donor pressures Bangladesh has made a drastic reduction in public sector food subsidies. However, food subsidy programmes have continued to flow toward what is considered to be essential priority group, members of armed forces, the police and government employees. In order to assuage powerful interest groups, the level of subsidy has now been increased to 23 percent from 10 percent in 1974. Among other policy measures, the reduction of the military budget and withdrawal of the subsidy to special interest groups will generate a significant amount of funds to channel toward human resource development. The cardinal issue is whether policy makers comprehend the need and appreciate the importance and potentials of using more fruitfully funds released from such an unplanned and unproductive sector.

Rethinking Bangladesh’s Defence Strategy
Obviously any move to trim defence expenditure is likely to be resisted on the premise that it would undermine national security and affect the vital interests of the country. The contra-position to such arguments could very well be the question of whether existing defence strategy based only on conventional force, involving annual increases in the size of armed forces and the upgrading of weapons systems, guarantee Bangladesh’s security? This paper argues that it does not.

The geopolitical reality of Bangladesh, limits Bangladesh’s capacity to depend only on conventional strategy. India has the fourth largest military in the world and an ever-growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons system. Its defence industry is one of the most advanced in the developing world. Its population and economy is much larger than those of six other countries of South Asia combined. Bangladesh’s other neighbour, Myanmar, with whom Bangladesh shares a border in the east, is also a big country, rich in natural resources. Over the years, there has been a tremendous growth in the size of the Myanmarese military.

Under such an adverse power balance Bangladesh army can only provide limited deterrence by trying to hold off an enemy advance for a limited period. The country’s capacity to mount a conventional defence is circumscribed by its terrain, crisscrossed over by a number of rivers and tributaries. Military strategists reckon that such a terrain would allow guerrillas to hold out almost indefinitely. This makes Bangladesh a “defender’s paradise”.5  Indeed, during Bangladesh’s war of independence guerrilla tactics reaped major dividends against Pakistani occupation forces. Soon after independence a section of military commanders who participated in the liberation war favoured the idea of building a ‘people’s army’ in line with a guerrilla war doctrine. The issue did not receive any consideration from the senior commanders. The Bangladesh army continued to be built upon a defence strategy of deterrence by conventionally equipped regular forces (Makeig, 1989:223)

Thus far no serious attempt has been made to identify Bangladesh’s defence needs and to develop an appropriate defence strategy to suit such needs.6  Instead of internalising and building on the rich experience of the civilian based defence system of the war of liberation, the Bangladesh armed forces were crafted on the colonial and Pakistani heritage. It was developed on a narrowly defined concept of security based on firepower. Such a formulation emphasizes the development of a regular force and rejects active civilian participation. The latter is regarded as a passive recipient of protection that the military would provide. It also presupposes that the community has an obligation to cater to the disproportionate corporate needs of the military. A major limitation of such a formulation is that it contributes to the increase of the military’s power to an extent that it resorts to extra-constitutional means whenever it perceives its interests may be undermined Needless to say, such extra-constitutional means are justified in terms of national security.

Civilian Based Defence7
Civilian Based Defence (CBD) rests on the theoretical premise that “political power, whether of domestic or foreign origin, is derived from sources within each society, namely by the people. By denying or serving these sources of power, populations can control rulers and defeat foreign aggression” (Sharp, 1990:7). CBD relies on the power of the society itself to deter, and defend against, internal usurpations and foreign invasions. Defence in this context means protection, preservation and the warding off of danger.
The narrow conception of deterrence and security studies focus almost exclusively on military force. Nonviolent alternatives typically are viewed as a means to be used by those who have little or no military armaments. It is a common understanding that military force is the ultimate, most powerful sanction that can be used to coerce. But the direct use of force has extremely limited utility. It can injure, displace or kill opponents, but it cannot get an adversary to do something. CBD proponents reject war and organised violence as the necessary means for social groups, including nation-states to regulate their conflict and provide their own security. They argue that organised violence is not the only way to defend social values, institutions and even territorial integrity (Vogele, 1991:25). An effective CBD system can frustrate the principal goals of an occupying force to exercise control over territory, population and resources, either directly or by setting up of puppet regimes.

Conventional military based strategy is geared towards preventing aggressor from attaining his objectives by repulsing his military forces with firepower. Here coercive force is deemed to be the principal instrument of defence. The CBD strategy on the contrary, focuses on denying the aggressors attaining objectives and makes impossible the consolidation of their rule, whether in the form of an imposed foreign administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers. This is to be attained by concerted nonviolent resistance, non-cooperation and efforts to weaken the effectiveness of the military forces by organising the fore mentioned shortages around various institutions of civil society - professional organizations, civilian neighborhoods, churches, labour unions, factory groups and public employees.

Under such a strategic formulation weapons are construed to be the tools or means, not necessarily material that may be used in military and non-violent conflicts. Nonviolent weapons are used to wage widespread noncooperation movements and to offer massive public defiance. Noncooperation and defiance are also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty of the attackers’ troops and functionaries, to convince them of the unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and ultimately even to induce to mutiny.

CBD emphasises harnessing and skillful application of the power potential inherent in societies to destroy oppression and tyranny and to deter and defeat aggression so effectively that military weaponry will no longer be effective and could be dispensed with. There exists examples in history where ‘armed’, with other weapons - psychological, social, economic and political”, people “were able to strike at the very sources of the usurpers’ and aggressors’ power”. Withdrawal of popular and institutional cooperation with aggressors and dictators diminishes and may sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers power weakens and finally dissolves (Sharp, 1990:20)

Several contemporary European governments have taken the potential of civilian resistance sufficiently seriously to incorporate it into part of their defence plans (Sweden and Norway) or at least given to it a serious study (Netherlands). The CBD strategy has recently been incorporated in the development of a national defence policies for Lithuania and Latvia as well.

There are major advantages of CBD strategy. Firstly, its reliance on means other than military armaments does not contribute to the feeling of insecurity of other states, which is normally not the case in conventional defence that often trigger off arms race. Secondly, the opponent’s important consideration would not only be establishment of physical control over occupied territories but also gaining the cooperation of its people, which would be a far difficult proposition given the strategic preparation of the target country. Thirdly, The diminished role of an institution monopolising the coercive power of the state reduces the scope for undermining the legitimate government through military take-over.  Fourthly, it releases funds for expenditure in social sectors which helps national efforts for human resource development and poverty alleviation and strengthens national security ;

Instead of pursuing  a secretive defence strategy the new post military defence strategy would be developed by careful and rigorous analysis through public debate, scrutiny and inputs from defence analysts, security specialists, government officials, military officers, strategists of non-violent struggle, scholars and members of civil society organised in various voluntary organizations, who would play an indispensable role in the CBD.

Conclusion
This paper focuses on the nature of Bangladesh’s defence spending and its adverse implications for a development of the social sector which is essential. It establishes that though in per capita or GNP terms Bangladesh’s defence spending appears to be within reasonable limits, it has major opportunity costs given the pervasiveness of poverty and the poor level of human resource development of the country.   A major thrust of the paper has been to assess the external and internal security environment of the country. The paper questions the relevance of existing defence strategy based only on conventional force, given the geopolitical reality and comparative military configuration in the region. It proposes a civilian based defence strategy for Bangladesh. The post-military defence strategy would also be in conformity with the social and economic needs of the country. The broader conception of security involves human development and social empowerment of the poor. Anchored in the rich experience of the war of national liberation the alternative defence strategy would primarily focus on active civilian participation in national defence. Such a formulation would, at least to an extent, deter extra-constitutional take-over, as there would no longer be one special interest group possessing a monopoly over coercive power.

Endnotes
1 Unless otherwise indicated all figures in the paragraph are from Sivard, 1996.
2 There is a plethora of literature on the issue. However, for a cogent discussion on it see Iftekharuzzaman, 1977:7-11.
3 Huq further states that “(s)ecurity is increasingly interpreted as: security of the people, not just of territory, security of individuals, not just of nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all people everywhere - in their homes, on their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment. … Today, the concept of security is linked with the enrichment of human lives” (UNDP, 1997: 84).
4 A.M.A. Muhith, former finance minister, quoted in Makieg, 1989:224.
5 See Malik, S ‘Can we peep into the shopping bag?’, the Daily Star, January 20, 1998 referring to Bangladesh Television news telecast of 10 January and Daily Sangbad of 11 January 1998.
6 It may not be out of context to posit this colossal expenditure against the Human Development Report for South Asia (1997) estimates that it costs $1 to immunize a child, $30 to maintain a child in primary education and approximately $5 to supply safe drinking water to one person over the course of a year.
7 The government is confident that the agreement reached with India in late 1997 and with the PCJSS in addressing the hill tracts problem will result in removing two major irritants in Bangladesh-India relations (Personal interview with Suranjeet Sen Gupta, M.P., parliamentary advisor to the Prime Minister, Dhaka, 20 April 1998).  This optimism is not shared by the major opposition political parties.
8 It may be noted that there is not much of a transparency in the budgetary data on defence. Huq’s statement with regard to India and Pakistan, also holds for Bangladesh. He states that “many details regarding purchases of equipment and the prices paid for such equipment are missing, making it almost impossible to attempt a rigorous analysis” (1997:84). Expenses incurred on paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, cadet colleges, road construction for military purpose and the like, are often placed under heads, other than defence.
9  Lt. Gen (Retd) Mahbubur Rahman, immediate past Chief of Army Staff, Bangladesh (Personal interview, Dhaka 18 April 1998).
10  Except for a few articles (Hossain 1986, Waheduzzaman 1992, Kabir-Talukder 1994, Ahmed 1997) no substantive work is available on the issue. The absence of such key policy instrument impedes short and long term planning. Without it phase by phase procurement programme cannot be pursued.  (Personal interview with some senior serving officers who preferred not to be cited, Dhaka, March and April 1998).
11 This section liberally draws on Sharp, 1990 and Seminar Synopses on Nonviolent Sanctions, Program of Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense  of Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
 

Bibliography

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Abrar R Chowdhury, Professor and former Chair, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is coordinator of the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) of the University. He holds PhD in Asian Studies from Griffith University, Australia. Prof Chowdhury’s recent publications include “Voluntary Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees”; “International Agreements and Environmental Management Follow-up in Bangladesh”; “Issues and the Constraints in the Repatriation/ Rehabilitation of the Rohingya and Chakma Refugees and the Biharis.”

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The Problem of Defence Expenditure
Defence expenditure presents a problem in the contemporary scene of Sri Lankan national security. The problem is at once one of phenomenal levels of expenditure for military purpose in the national economy. The problem was also one of recent experience, since about 1983 when a galloping rate of defence expenditure was seen. The change from moderate levels of military expenditure prior to 1983 and the trend thereafter was stark. The rate of increase has persisted since then and has reached critical proportions which the economy would no longer be able to afford.

The problem of high levels of defence expenditure is a mirror reflection of the problem of national security. In surveying macro-economic policies of Sri Lanka, Atukorale and Jayasuriya (1994), observed that conditions at the time of independence appeared benign and the transfer of power was smooth and peaceful. Despite wartime stresses the economy had not suffered serious dislocation and had provided a standard of living in 1948 that was well above that of neighbouring countries. However the peacefulness and order of the political and social scene in 1948, they observed, was deceptive as they masked underlying divisions among social classes and ethnic groups. Politically society was polarized between a conservative nationalist right and a Marxist oriented left which witnessed much industrial strife and social disruption. Ethnic antagonisms were present though ethnic  tensions were relegated to the background by political polarization.  All the main political parties were not racial-based and included members of minority ethnic groups in their leaderships.

These conditions remained latent within a context of a relative lack of any geopolitical pressures at about the time of independence in 1948, and for long thereafter. Post-independence governments in Sri Lanka pursued their economic policies and a drive for development independent of the struggle for national survival and nation building. There was absent a compulsive thrust in these policies to interact with the societies. Instead as a conscious response to political circumstances an extensive welfare system was developed during this period. Health, education and food subsidies were the major concerns in the drive for development. These measures were followed mainly in relevance to social conflict which possibly was avoided as a result.

Such strategy for security could sustain itself as long as the economy could support. But deteriorating economic conditions that followed, despite their temporary basis, had their effect on the internal security situation. Cuts in subsidies in food and services provoked explosive political reaction. The insurgency of 1971 and the first signs of militancy over the ethnic issue were symptomatic of the lack of alignment in the drive for development with the drive for national security and nation building. Defence expenditures began to rise directly as a result. At the same time significant reductions were made in subsidies and other welfare services, though the remaining subsidies were still very substantial. These hard measures could be justified to the electorate as the cost of dealing with the insurgency and the rising defence expenditures incurred, though the main reasons were due to other factors.

The post-1977 period saw a dramatic change in the economic policies in Sri Lanka. This period also witnessed the escalation of ethnic hostilities and communal violence, and with it a new phase in the Tamil community’s growing separatist movement. The 1971 uprising had signaled that the long period of peace and stability in Sri Lanka might be ending when simmering ethnic tension eventually escalated into large scale violence in 1983. This offered a new chapter in the history of the island and for national security and defence expenditures. A marked decline in growth after about 1983 reflected the damaging impact of ethnic conflict on growth (Atukorale and Jayasuriya 1994:28)

The political crisis of the late 1980’s  dealt a severe blow to the prospects of Sri Lanka’s economic growth. The cost of defence expenditure alone had risen from less than one per cent of GDP to nearly six per cent (ibid 106). The World Bank 1991 estimates put the extent of this damage closer to two thirds of the GDP. It was, therefore, natural to raise the question whether the policies pursued in the post 1977 period contributed to the aggravation of social and ethnic conflicts, particularly through their distributional effects.
The fact remained, however, that on account of these conflicts defence expenditure in relation to the economy and its growth were assuming critical proportions. A point may well be reached when the national economy can no longer sustain any further growth of military expenditure rates. Economic determinants could then have a significant effect. For the Sri Lankan situation that point may well have been reached. In providing for a defence expenditure of nearly Rs.50 billion for 1997, the Deputy Minister of Finance has remarked that a point has been reached where the economy cannot afford this any longer.

The problem of defence expenditure in developing countries reflects a tendency to maintain military expenditure at increasingly high levels. The increasing levels also reflect the extent to which military priorities continue to dominate political decision. Many developing countries are characterized and afflicted by internal conflict even as the political direction by civilian authority is weak. This would mean an ineffectiveness in the manner in which internal strife is dealt with by the political authority in the state. A lack of a cohesive purpose, nor a comprehensive strategy which includes its  many dimensions of the problem and thus presents a political end, would result in some other force to occupy the intervening space. It is then that military force assumes a significance as it stands out as a more cohesive and organized body than any parallel authority. The military is then the main determining factor and the dominant force. Variations of this situation are many but the broad picture yet stands out clearly in many developing countries.
Military decision will thus dominate the process and constitute the main determining factor. Military priorities will likewise determine in the main the course of events, the security strategy and perhaps the total response to the internal crisis. The dynamics that operate in such a situation are clearly important to an understanding of the total political process relevant to the crisis. In the absence of clear political direction security decisions will be dominated by the military and its concerns. The course of events, the  manner of response for the unraveling crisis and the budgeting for such response would be in the main, militarily determined. This situation is even facilitated by a dominance of military personnel in the relevant institutions and within the decision making process. Such developments have been characteristic of many developing countries, as even germane to such emerging situations.

These features are equally evident in Sri Lanka. Since the development of the crisis, a considerable dependence on military personnel and officers of such disposition was evident. The defence establishment which is led by the Ministry of Defence came to be headed by retired military personnel even as an axiomatic requirement. The decision making process too at other levels were then dominated by the military determinations. As the crisis assumed greater and graver proportions and as the conflict grew in intensity military dominance and priorities in the total focus became institutionalized. There was for some time a common acceptance of this feature as inevitable  under the circumstances. Later however was adopted a conscious departure from this position, or at least as an effort to redirect the process, in the appointment of a civilian officer to head the defence establishment. This only gave expression to hitherto muted concerns that military determinations were predominant where political direction was inadequate. Till then the military priorities were the main determining factor.

The thrust of the anti terrorist effect would then largely be a matter of military determination. The expenditure required for the purpose, the procurement of arms and other resources and in fact the response to the separatist threat, would in the main be the  product of military determination. The manner of this determination would proceed as in an inexorable process, self-sustaining, self-impelled and even self-fulfilling. In the resulting position the military dominance over the total process becomes greater and greater as the intensity of the crisis increases, with one reinforcing the other. A security dilemma ensues, one in which a ready financing and resources gives the conflict an increasingly costly and dangerous dimension. A similar situation obtains on  the side of the separatists too. A traditional rivalry is then invested with new ambitions which in turn stimulates the appetites for ever greater expenditures and weaponry. When this occurs the knot of the security dilemma is but tightened further, making the situation less tractable to political resolution and negotiation. Determining security requirements in military terms not only distorts national priorities, it also has the effect of an inclination to rely on military means of coercion for the handling of conflicts.

This process hardly permits changes of its own momentum and shift of its directional force. It is not constrained by time schedules as other similar determinants. Only occasional would then be any compulsive shifts in the trend. Political direction would impose itself in such instances to stem the efflux and urge its direction. As much as such external impulses are occasional, they are also temporarily impelled, even ephemeral in their long term effect. Soon after, however, the thrust and drive lapses and the subsisting rhythm resumes. Budgetary determination would reflect this pattern of military impulsions and keep its progress on an even keel.   Annual   budgetary   allocations   and  even mid year supplementary  provisions are but a function of such military determination. No critical shifts of expenditure pattern or the upward sloping curves of defence outlays are likely to take place for some time. For the first time during the period of the recent ethnic conflict has it been envisaged that military expenditure would be significantly reduced by 1998.

Scope of Study
This study then focuses on military spending in Sri Lanka which is at once a phenomenon in the current social and political scene, and is perceived as a problem in that context. The aggregate levels of military spending over the last decade have assumed   problematic proportions both in absolute terms and in respect of relative values. It is a phenomenon that has attracted attention only recently in Sri Lanka’s independent history. A study therefore of military expenditure in Sri Lanka is then of topical interest as a phenomena of recent experience, as a problem in its impact on other sections of the economy, and in its influence on a more comprehensive concept of national security.

As with public expenditures, military expenditures too are subject to a similar budgetary formulation and allocation process that is generally applicable. Any problematic nature of the aggregate levels of defence spending must be seen  then as it is processed through the same procedure. An adverse effect from any overbalanced allocation would necessarily be dealt with in the general processing taking into account their contending impact on other sectors of the economy and their budgetary allocation. Initially therefore, this study focuses on the manner in which defence expenditures are determined, whether the basis for its determination is in line with the determination in respect of other governmental expenditure. It is natural to expect that  common procedures obtained during a period before defence expenditure took on problematic proportions, probably before 1983.  Where however, since then, defence spending escalated even exponentially it would be pertinent to examine the manner in which the normal budgetary formulation process coped with the stresses and strains from military priorities on the allocation of scarce resources. Undoubtedly variations from the standard procedure were evident. But these were ad hoc in being hastily contrived in  response to the exigencies of the developing situation as they unfolded.

These additional budgetary formulation procedures were intended to check the growing military expenditure and to impose a measure of economy in its disbursement. The result however has been otherwise, with expenditure level increases proceeding apace and unrestrained. The upward sloping expenditure graphs only showed that the growing trend was relentless. The effectiveness of the measures adopted for stricter budgetary control of defence expenditures was then open to question. The nature of these measures, the manner in which they were expected to effect any checks or restraints, and their efficacy, need close review. These aspects are but integral to the total process of budgetary control, as itself the critical concern of a public expenditure.

The study must  then extend to a closer examination of the budgetary process for its role in the face of the escalating defence expenditures. Whereas effective controls have been exercised through such procedure, it would be pertinent to identify the factors behind the growth of military allocation. These factors would be of a negative nature, that which permitted the growth of these trends, and those of a positive effect which would have constituted the active driving force behind the escalating expenditures. Control mechanisms are instituted at various levels before ultimate decision; they range from controls within the particular military agency or department, at the Ministry of Defence, and then at the level of the Treasury. The final approval is by the Parliament which would attract public control over these expenditures. Escalating military expenditures over the years would reflect on the adequacy of these instituted mechanisms for control, leading on to the search for the more active influences on expenditure determination. The positive factors behind the growth of military expenditure must then be sought within the defence establishment and its compulsive influences.

It is then evident that the public finance aspect of defence expenditure is in default in this process. A closely structured budgetary formulation process which takes into the reckoning the public concerns and priorities in the allocations, the macro-economic framework within which such expenditures can be incurred, the strategic determinations of the quantum of expenditures, and a review and evaluation of expenditure incurred are aspects that are not sufficiently incorporated into the process. Not even a  semblance of a cost-benefit analysis is suggested. It is then these aspects that require to be studied as possibly a contributing cause for the unrestrained escalation of defence expenditure.

These are important considerations in national budgeting. However the public finance aspect of defence budgeting has not only a national or domestic dimension, but an equally important extra-territorial dimension in the total concept of national security. These have important consequences for national budgeting. This study must then extend its scope to the manner in which extra-national realities impact on national security. It would even include international trade and its effect on national security. An alignment with the principles or for that matter an absence of a due consideration of these issues would have direct consequences for the strategic determination of optimal national security and its required budgetary formulation.

It has been stated that problems of national security in countries of South Asia arise not so much now from inter-state rivalries as from conflicts within the country. Thus considerations of political legitimacy of the state, the capacity to contain within it  its internal strife and conflict through interaction with the societies, and an ability to deal with ethnic and other tensions and avoid polarization of dissident forces are relevant. Internal disorder would serve to attract external influences. These have a concomitant effect on national security and its related expenditures.

An incorporation of these several related aspects would ensure that the process is more structured through a rigorous specification of the requirements. It would then be possible to say that expenditure determinations are strategically driven.This, however, requires an appropriate institutional mechanism which would bring to bear all the relevant aspects on the ultimate decisions. This would invariably ensure that financial commitments are in specific relation to the objectives identified and are not incurred in an ad hoc manner, year to year, with no clear strategy in view. There is then little possibility or otherwise that any economies can be exercised on the growing levels of spending.

There has been no focused study in the Sri Lankan case of the impact on the national security situation of a proliferation of light arms and weapons. Such studies have been in respect of Pakistan and India. It would be useful to anticipate those effects in the Sri Lankan situation too, the extent to which such influences have already impacted on the local situation and also possible developments that it would entail. In the South Asian region the proliferation of light arms and weapons has served to build up internal tension into hostile situations. Incipient problems are thereafter exacerbated by the continued supply of arms and funds, fueling the hostilities. Conflicts that may have been politically resolved are now irreconcilable because of the ready supply of arms and funds. The cumulative effect of all these factors on the national security and the national economy is considerable in other contexts, and a similar relevance to Sri Lanka is only to be anticipated.

This study is focused on a specific issue, on defence expenditure in Sri Lanka and prospects for their reduction. It is apparent, however, that the problem of defence expenditure has wider ramifications which are relevant to the study. It is, therefore, not possible to confine the examination to the technical aspects of the problem and of its specific mechanics. Yet this is the starting point of the survey. Other dimensions emerge from this point unraveling the wider scope of the study, refl