RCSS Policy Studies 10 

Nobody can effectively answer this. But, we at the RCSS think this is an important question to pose and address collectively in the region. My predecessor, Dr Iftekharuzzaman had the foresight to do this and set up this as one of our earliest collaborative studies in South Asia. The best strategic analysts in the region were requested to participate and we are grateful for their prompt response. I have great pleasure to present to you the result of their analysis in three consecutive RCSS Policy Papers.
RCSS Policy Paper No 10, includes two Chapters. One from Jasjit Singh providing a South Asian view. Another from Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema who provides a Pakistani perspective. I hope these comprehensive studies will provide sufficient material for an ongoing debate in the region.

Dipankar Banerjee
Executive Director

March 2000
 

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In assessing defence spending in South Asia, we need to be clear of the definition and its implication, of what constitutes the region. South Asia is no doubt a defined region in historical and civilisational terms. But we must ask, can it be considered a region in strategic and geopolitical terms, especially for analysing security policies? The security of countries in South Asia is directly and indirectly affected by the military postures and policies of many countries, both within South Asia, as well as beyond it. As a consequence, the defence spending of the countries of South Asia is affected not only by the military postures and capabilities of countries within the traditional South Asian region, but also by those at least on the borders of the region. For example, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 had a deleterious and direct negative impact on Pakistan, which has left deep influences years after the Soviets withdrew. At the same time, this intervention had a direct negative impact on India’s security, resulting in large-scale acquisition of military equipment in the early 1980s, which also raised defence spending by 1985 to the highest level since the Sino-Indian war in 1962. China, an otherwise ‘non-South Asian’ country, with which India has had a long difficult and disputed border, impinges heavily on Indian defence policy and posture. This study, therefore, looks at defence spending in South Asia in terms of issues related to countries in the region, as well as those on its immediate periphery.

The State of Our Knowledge
At the outset it is necessary to look at facts related to defence expenditures in countries of South Asia. Defence spending in South Asian countries, like in most other countries, is governed substantively by the threat perceptions. Some may argue that the interests of the ruling elite also influence this, especially where the military maintains hold over a significant proportion of the national power structure. This, however, remains an element of defining threat perceptions, and for purposes of our analysis, this factor is not being evaluated separately. The defence spending of five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), taken as a whole, was 1.69 percent of the global defence expenditure in 1995, although South Asia is home to one-third of world’s population (and accounted for 2.2 percent of the global GDP).1  This proportion would appear to be quite small, especially when viewed from the perspective of conventional wisdom (and Western articulation) that South Asia constitutes a ‘hot spot’ of rivalries and conflict prone to even a possible nuclear war! But this does not invalidate the need to reduce even this level of defence expenditure since the region also contains great poverty and underdevelopment. What is needed is to reduce the proportion of national resources devoted to sustain military power to the barest minimum.

Any attempt at reducing defence expenditure must, therefore, seek to diminish the proportion of national resources allocated to defence to the lowest possible level. The data that is relevant from this perspective relates to defence spending as a proportion of the GDP, as well as a percentage of the total government expenditure in the countries concerned.2  Depiction of defence spending, as a proportion of the GDP (and government expenditure) is standard practice the world over. This also obviates the problems of comparing national currencies and other inaccuracies that result if the criteria were to be based on expenditure in current terms. At the same time it is necessary that an examination of defence spending should cover a reasonably long period, and yet not too long to become less relevant to the current situation. For our purposes, a time span of the past ten years will be adopted, although the longer term perspective will not be ignored.

But the state of current knowledge is greatly handicapped by the fact that there is very little transparency related to defence spending in most of the key countries whose policies influence defence postures/policies and expenditures in countries of South Asia. For example, India has to take China’s military capabilities and posture into account while formulating its own defence policies. But China started to publish figures of its defence expenditure only recently. More important, the official defence expenditure (ODE) data does not add to our knowledge of the subject and compounds the uncertainties related to the capabilities and posture adopted by that great country. It is almost the unanimous assessment of most strategic analysts, institutions and governments that China’s ODE does not reflect the true picture. Estimates of China’s actual defence expenditure vary widely ranging from three to eight-times the official figure.

There is also no transparency in Pakistan’s defence spending. Compared to the regular 85 page published details of the Indian defence budget, Pakistan puts out only a single line figure of the total expenditure for the year. It is also not clear what criteria are adopted to calculate the expenditure. For example, it has been stated that the major weapon acquisition is funded from allocations outside the defence budget.3  It also needs to be noted here that India’s defence expenditure has been declining from 3.6 percent of the GDP in 1987-88 to below 2.3 percent of the GDP in 1996-97. The expenditure of the other four countries of South Asia have remained comparatively lower, although it can be argued that their need for military forces is even lesser (Table 1).

Year Bangladesh                 India                Nepal           Pakistan Sri Lanka

1986           1.23                  3.58                  1.26                  7.57                  8.92

1987           1.22                  3.59                  1.20                  7.61                  5.79

1988           1.20                  3.37                  1.38                  8.56                  4.60

1989           1.46                  3.17                  1.26                  7.62                  5.02

1990           1.54                  2.88                  1.31                  7.16                  5.48

1991           1.31                  2.65                  1.47                  7.74                  4.84

1992           1.50                  2.49                  1.16                  7.45                  5.64

1993           1.53                  2.68                  1.29                  6.49                  4.72

1994           2.50                  2.43                  1.10                  6.88                  4.40

1995           2.50                  2.45                  1.00                  6.88                  4.90

Source: Asian Strategic Review, (for relevant years) IDSA, New Delhi.

Coping with Revolutions
It is necessary to be clear at the outset about the need for reducing defence spending. It is obvious that resources saved from the expenditure on defence could be available for human development purposes. In recent years greater imperatives have emerged requiring greater resource allocation for human development. Essentially, they are shaped by three revolutions, all global in nature, but which affect developing countries, like those of South Asia, to a greater degree. The greatest global challenge that faces the international community today is the current transnational revolution of rising expectations. International order, peace, and security in the future will substantively depend on the progress of this revolution and the way international community, states, and societies inter-relate to it.

Human expectations inevitably keep growing with human progress. In fact, a degree of divergence between expectations and satisfaction is necessary to provide the driving force for human endeavour. The rate of growth not only defines the productivity, but the gap in the rates of growth has a powerful influence on human responses. But when expectations start rising at a rate far exceeding the rate at which achievement and satisfaction of those expectations rises, social turbulence starts to increase. Any further increase in the expectations-satisfaction gap would correspondingly increase instability in the socio-political order with a deleterious effect on the economic activities. At some point, a pattern of dynamic instability gets created which then results in a socio-political upheaval. Another revolution, that of information and communication, has expanded the scope and effect of the first revolution. Globalisation of trade, information flows, especially through satellite communication systems, has not only shrunk the globe, but has rapidly increased the awareness and aspirations of people.

The consciousness and perceptions of relative deprivation of a large segment of world population has been increasing particularly because of the increased awareness of a better quality of life, which could be, or should be, within reach. Revolution in information technology and human awareness of a better quality of life economically, socially, and politically, is producing a powerful effect on attitudes and actions. By the early 1980s this factor had begun to alter the dynamics of attitudes in the Soviet Union, and was to rapidly lead to the rapid transformation and the opening up of a closed, authoritarian, dogmatic system. Tian-an-men was another manifestation of this phenomenon. This has set in motion the struggle to alter the elite structures and systems controlling economic opportunity and social justice. Peoples across the globe are looking for prosperity, already an obsession with large groups; and they are in a great hurry. The willingness to seek any or alternate means to meet their aspirations is tending to jettison cultural beliefs/roots and even societal norms and religious precepts. Socio-economic development, which provides a better quality of life, has become a central goal for people. Greater urgency and poignancy now mark the development debate.

At the same time a major transformation of military affairs is under way, shifting armed conflict from the classical military-to-military inter-state regular warfare to unconventional, non-linear and irregular warfare. Increasing vulnerabilities of modern states, both developed and developing, are making war-waging far more costly and destructive in all aspects. On the other hand, regular warfare is moving into an ever higher level of technological capabilities. Wars of the Clausewitzean model are less likely; but the for the same reason, capabilities for adequate defence need to be built on state-of-the-art military technology. The broader trends in this regard, especially after the end of Cold War and the Gulf War (1991) all point toward greater demands on financial resources. The challenge in the short to medium term, therefore, is to ensure that defence spending does not increase, and that a basis for reductions in the medium to long term is created. To be able to evolve feasible approaches for reductions, it is necessary to examine some of the factors that drive defence spending.

The Driving Force
Countries will spend on their defence what they perceive to be necessary to spend, in order to attain the level of security they feel is necessary. In some cases the interests of the ruling elite tend to drive the pressure for creating and sustaining the level of military capability bought by the expenditure levels. But even in such cases, necessary ideological foundations are sought to legitimise higher levels of expenditure. In other cases, superior capability is also sought for national prestige and status.

Competitive Security
Conceptually, it is clear that a competitive paradigm has been in operation governing the national security policies of states and their defence spending. Such a competitive paradigm of international security has been in existence for more than three centuries. Since the 17th century, the shift from dynastic kingdoms to nation-states has also led to the emergence of a competitive paradigm of inter-state security. The concept of a sovereign state, with the inevitable ego-centred state system at its base, implies building up state security to the maximum possible limits. This pushed nations to seek security at absolute levels. In turn, this inevitably generates threat perceptions in other countries and since these are sovereign states themselves, they then seek national security at ever higher levels. An implicit and explicit competition for achieving a higher level and assurance of security between states gets established.

Competition among states has become an established phenomenon as a result of social, political, economic, and technological competition among people, societies, and states. The competitive paradigm of security has intensified over the centuries, reaching new dimensions with the introduction of nuclear weapons into security equations. There are a number of reasons for a competitive model, which we need not go into. But it is clear that there is a need to move towards a paradigm of co-operative security, which would seek increasingly higher levels of co-operation with potential adversaries and unfriendly states.

Technological Imperative
There is also a powerful technological imperative that affects defence spending in a substantive way. Military equipment has a defined design life and must be replaced on completion of this period. Re-equipment becomes a necessity if force levels are to be maintained. Technology, especially military technology, has been advancing at an exponential pace during this century, and has accelerated during the past four decades. Superior military technology is a key factor in deciding military efficacy in combat. A ten percent advantage in lethal range of a weapon, for example, confers a hundred percent advantage since the side with greater lethal range can hit the other side before coming within the range of its weapon. Considering that, generally speaking, the technical life of weapon systems averages around twenty years, the progress in military technology virtually assures that the replacement would be far more capable, sophisticated, and, hence, more expensive. In many cases, in fact, weapon systems tend to become obsolescent and even obsolete before reaching the end of their design life because of acquisition of more modern weapon systems by the perceived adversary. Since no two countries, except possibly military allies, would co-ordinate their procurement programmes, the asymmetric process of acquisitions drives the operational imperative for modernisation. These processes drive the cost of defence upwards, often at a rate higher than the growth rate of a country’s GDP.

Strategic goals and objectives, besides ideological goals are important factors in providing the driving force for the nature and extent of military capability that a country acquires. Military doctrines also grow out of these elements and then influence the force levels and structures. Defensive orientation, for example, tends to weigh toward greater manpower strength, while doctrines based on offensive action tend to build force with greater mobility and firepower. Depending on the relative costs, each has an influence on what a nation finally has to invest in defence. Military aid and assistance in various forms also tends to affect the military balance and have a consequent effect on national investments of resources.

olitical Relations and Threat Perceptions
While the above and other factors tend to drive defence spending, the most powerful driving force is the perception of threats to national security that a country faces. These arise out of complex set of elements and include a great deal of variables and subjectivity often built on mistrust or even psychological factors. Historical experiences, perceived and real grievances, efforts to protect the turf by elite groups, and a host of factors, impinge on the threat perceptions. The overall effect results in the nature of political relations among states and the level of trust and mistrust in the aims and policies of other countries; the degree of self confidence and breadth of decision-making base; and finally, driving the security policy of a state and, hence the level of spending that it is willing to commit to meet the perceived challenges. The state of the economy naturally has a controlling influence. Resource crunch becomes a powerful factor limiting defence spending, while economic well-being and growth provide an incentive to spend more heavily on military capability.

Fortunately, the South Asian countries have not adopted too narrow an interpretation of national sovereignty as some of the states of Europe did which resulted in the two World Wars, or the type of bitter confrontational ideological struggle that led to the Cold War. The nature of economic realities and the imperative of human development have placed a powerful brake on what might have been unrestrained military spending. There has been, for example, an intense debate in India throughout the past half century on the level of defence spending and its implication for India’s socio-economic development, which has continued to be the prime strategic goal. The human development imperative also drives the need to reduce defence spending to the lowest possible levels. If we are to seek ways and means of reducing defence spending in South Asian countries, then the process will have to start from building trust and confidence among states. States generally try and drive a balance between the resource availability and perceived defence needs. But almost invariably they tend to respond to perceived threats, often assuming the worst case scenario as the basis of defence planning. The key to reducing defence expenditure, therefore, lies in reshaping the security environment rather than simply responding to it. For India, China continues to be the central locus of its security policies. But for the purpose of the current study, the focus has been on India and Pakistan.

The India-Pakistan Dimension
India and Pakistan accounted for 91.5 percent of the $ 13.788 billion spent during 1995 on defence by the countries of South Asia. The other significant spender has been Sri Lanka. But internal security demands, due to the continuing ethnic conflict, have been the primary cause for the rise in Sri Lanka’s expenditure since the early 1980s. The resolution of the ethnic conflict and a mutually acceptable solution, restoring peace in the trouble island-state, will go a long way in creating conditions where defence spending would conceivable reduce to the earlier figure of around 1.5 percent of the GDP rather than the current figures of over 5 percent of the GDP. While there is scope for reduction in all countries, the key to reduction in defence expenditure in South Asia really rests with reducing defence expenditure in India and Pakistan.

India’s Defence Expenditure
Conventional wisdom would have us believe in the mythology of an ‘arms race’ between Pakistan and India and this is responsible for high defence spending. The term ‘arms race’ is frequently used to describe the military situation in South Asia. The Collins dictionary defines a race as ‘a contest of speed’, ‘any competition or rivalry’, a ‘rapid or constant movement’. An arms race, thus, would imply a competition or rivalry in the matter of arms acquisition and deployment. If we look at South Asia, it is obvious that there is not even a question or hint of such a competition and rivalry, or an arms race between all the countries of the region. In fact, it is nobody’s position that there is (or has been) an arms race between India and Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, or Maldives or, for that matter, among any of these countries among themselves. The only possible framework of an arms race in South Asia, therefore, would imply an arms race between India and Pakistan, but which is projected as a regional and South Asian arms race. But there is no empirical evidence of an "arms race" between India and Pakistan as such, and certainly not in the context the term had evolved during the Cold War to describe the East-West upward spiral of weapons and armament, which built up 55,000 nuclear warheads to deter each other and deployed 90,000 tanks, some 25,000 aircraft, and millions of soldiers across a 700-km front in central Europe.4  South Asia, as a whole, has normally accounted for barely one percent of global defence expenditure, compared to 8 percent by the Middle East, and over 10 percent by East Asia. The facts indicate that if there is an arms race between India and Pakistan, it could, at maximum, be a race at glacial pace!

India spent an average of 1.6 percent of its GDP on defence during the first 15 years after independence. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the opening up of a second theatre in the North led to substantive expansion of the defence force (essentially the army and the air force) to meet the new challenges. For the following quarter century, the defence expenditure averaged 3.1 percent of the GDP (Table 2).

Note: Data for 1994-95 and 1995-96 provisional.

Sources:
1.  Defence Expenditure (Def Ex) data of India, Defence Service Estimates of relevant years.
2.  Economic Survey, Govt. of India of relevant years (latest issue : 1993-94).
3.  INDIA - A Reference Annual, Min. of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India of relevant years (for GDP figures 1961-1984).
4.  Military Balance, (IISS, London) various years.
5.  World Military Expenditure & Arms Transfer, (Arms Control and Disarmament, US Govt., Washington DC), 1968-77, 1978-88, and 1991-1992 and 1993-94.

If we examine the GDP growth data, we find that by the first half of 1960s, it had increased to an annual average figure of 5.37 compared to 3.49 percent in the second half of 1950s (see Table 2). Significantly, the economic growth seems to have been notably higher in the 1980s when the defence expenditure had reached its highest values since 1963 and serious concerns were being expressed about the negative impact of high defence spending.

Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, for different years and Asian Strategic Review 1995-96, IDSA, New Delhi, 1995.

But the GDP growth rate dropped to an average of 2.97 percent during the next five years (1965-69), further dropping to 2.52 percent in the following five year period. It may be recalled that 1962-1971 was marked by three wars (in 1962, 1965, and 1971) and two major skirmishes (Rann of Kutch in 1965, and Nathula in 1967). Besides many other factors, the wars no doubt had a negative influence on GDP growth rates. (Interestingly, the GDP growth rates had slumped to negative figures of -3.65 percent in 1965-66 and -0.32 percent in 1972-73 in the wake of two wars, while the growth rate in 1962-63, the year of the Sino-Indian war was down to 2.12 percent compared to the average of 4.99 percent for the five year period spanning it).

The correlation of GDP growth rates and defence spending indicates that an increase in defence spending seems to have coincided with increase higher GDP growth rates. At the same time it is worth noting that the defence expenditure, as a proportion of the central government expenditure, has been coming down in successive years, even during the five year block of 1985-89 when the defence expenditure as a proportion of the GDP showed an increase. The rise in GDP on a more sustained basis after 1975 coincides with the defence component of central government spending dropping below 20 percent. It could be argued that defence spending in India has had an overall positive impact on economic growth, as reflected in the GDP growth rates. This is also the conclusion of a number of expert empirical studies in recent years.5  Economic growth of developing countries has traditionally been strongly influenced by the availability of foreign exchange for developmental purposes. In the absence of indigenous defence industries to meet the requirements of defence forces, weapons acquisitions place a heavy demand on foreign exchange in such countries. Examining this aspect, Peter Tarhal came to the conclusion that ‘Indian defence expenditures appear to have a beneficial impact on growth and investment in spite of the fact that, historically, they have been a very heavy user of foreign exchange’.6

A SIPRI publication had concluded that ‘India seems to have acquired military security at the cost of economic security’.7  But the study does not include any statistical data to support the conclusion, and nor have any coherent arguments been built up in support of the thesis. It seems to have totally ignored the empirical evidence. On the other hand, a recent study on the economic causes and consequences of defence spending in seven countries of the Middle East and South Asia came to the conclusion that ‘From 1960-87 India ... experienced substantial periods of positive net economic benefits from defence expenditures’.8  The study also found little evidence that ‘India was forced into a regional arms race (although we did not test for Chinese defence expenditures), and, until quite recently, Indian defence expenditure has not really grown much faster than the economy as a whole. These factors have allowed India’s sizeable defence industry sector to benefit from military Keynesianism effects, while at the same time remaining below the level consistent with efficient resource-absorption. In short, even with three potentially hostile borders and their wavering international partnerships, India has managed to provide for its national defence at a cost that does not appear to have markedly impeded its economic progress and may, in fact, have aided the development of the industrial sector’.9

India’s per capita defence expenditure has been coming down in recent years and now stands at around $ 8.00 (1994) compared to $ 10 in 1988. This is lower than what Myanmar is spending. Pakistan’s per capita defence spending increased from nearly $23 in 1988 to $ 31 in 1994. Comparison of these figures with the figures of other countries of Asia confirms the relatively low level of defence burden in Pakistan and India. The proportion of defence expenditure in the central government spending in India has come down from the average of 16.35 during 1981-90 to 14.37 percent during 1991-95. Pakistan has been spending a higher proportion of its central government expenditure on defence, and this has increased marginally during the 1990s as compared to the decade of the 1980s reaching levels of around 37 percent.10  It needs to be mentioned here that a more representative picture can be obtained from the proportion of defence spending as a percentage of the total government spending (since only the central government carries the burden of defence, but state governments spend on non-defence sectors). India’s defence expenditure, as a proportion of total government expenditure, dropped from 10.66 percent in 1987-88 to 8.15 percent in 1993-94. Pakistan’s defence expenditure is nearly 26 percent of its total government expenditure, marginally rising in recent years.

Pakistan’s Defence Spending
Pakistan has been spending a much higher proportion of its national resources on defence. (See Table 4 for details). Its defence expenditure (official figures) as a percent of GDP has been around 7 percent every year. In recent years, its expenditure on account of defence and debt repayments have been around 84 percent of the central government expenditure. This high level of expenditure naturally shows a negative impact on economic growth and development. According to one study, ‘Defence expenditure in Pakistan have a negative impact on GDP when they increase to over 6.5 percent of the GDP for a decade or more. During 1978-88 decade, this threshold had already been crossed with defence expenditures averaging 6.8 %’.11  The study, covering a period of over a quarter century since 1960, also concluded that ‘An examination of budgetary trade-offs in Pakistan found that economic services as a whole were adversely affected by military expenditures’.12

On the other hand, India not only spends a much lower proportion of its GDP on defence, but its defence spending has been reducing as a proportion of its GDP since 1987-88 when it stood at 3.59 to 2.26 in 1996-97. This represents a more than 30 percent decline in defence spending particularly in a period when the GDP growth rate itself came down significantly. The current defence spending is at the lowest levels since 1962. At constant 1980-81 rupees, the defence expenditure remained stagnant during this period.13  The decline in defence spending in real terms has been marked, if we take into account the near 73 percent de-valuation of the rupee against foreign currencies witnessed since 1990. Few countries, including those released from the confrontation of the Cold War, have reduced their defence spending at this scale. This important fact may not have received due recognition or acknowledgement in Pakistan and some other countries. But such a marked decline can hardly be interpreted to represent even a semblance of India being engaged in an ‘arms race’. In ignoring this phenomenon, Pakistan seems to be losing an important opportunity to reshape its security relationship with its much bigger neighbour well set on its economic growth path.

The key to an objective assessment of the extent and direction of the relative allocation of national resources to defence by India and Pakistan lies in an examination of their defence spending as a proportion of their GDP. Figure 1 indicates the comparison and trends over the past ten years.

Lessons of Past Wars
Many lessons of past wars are relevant in relation to the risk of war in future and the ‘need’ for the security environment. There have been a number of wars and battles between Pakistan and India since August 15, 1947.1 There are a number of features common to these historical experiences which have a relevance to security and confidence building.

Firstly, all the wars (including 1971, though distinctly different) started off as irregular warfare/armed conflict under ideological imperatives, and then escalated into regular inter-military wars. The critical point of risk and crisis management, therefore, is more at the preliminary and intermediate stages, that is, during the irregular war period, and its escalation points. At these points, it is clear that the measures that need to be adopted are more in the political arena rather than purely military. The military implications and concurrent military risks of escalation deserve attention as potential CSBM areas. Secondly, it also stands out that the initiator in all the wars and conflicts was not India.2 Indian defence policy has, therefore, has been geared to ensure that another war is not imposed on it. (Table 4)

Sources:
1.Economic Survey (for various years) Government of Pakistan.
2.World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), US Government Washington, DC
3.Pakistan Government budget.
4.GDP for 1991?92 estimated by taking into account the GDP growth rate of 6.4 per cent for 1991?92 and 9.0 per cent inflation rate. GDP for 1992?93 is based on unofficial Pakistani estimates. GDP for 1994?95 is estimated on projected GDP growth rate of 7.0 per cent and 8 per cent inflation.

 Thirdly, external support (and perceptions of political and military external support) has been crucial in escalation to war. US military aid to Pakistan after 1954 generated perceptions in Pakistan of its military (especially, technological) superiority, and after India’s defeat in 1962, created the incentive to initiate the 1965 war.3 The expectations of external support and a favourable international response were important in the escalation of a military solution to the civil war leading to 1971 war. Fourthly, overall mutual political mistrust has intensified over the years. Both countries perceive a threat from each other, although the nature of the threat perception is different on either side. It can be argued that the legitimacy and the basis of these perceptions is questionable.

Similarly, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 reminds us of the factors of escalation (in this case from clashes between patrols along a difficult but disputed terrain), China’s politico-military doctrine of ‘teaching lessons’ for ideological and state reasons, and the external dimension (in reverse, to demonstrate the isolation of India). All the wars in the region had one singular characteristic: they have been the most restrained and limited wars of the twentieth century. This itself indicates the potential for CBMs.

The answer, therefore, lies in serious dialogue to discuss the historical experiences and mutual threat perceptions. Unless these are aired, at least nationally, and preferably in a bilateral framework, and in some cases exercised, there is little hope of improving the security environment. These lessons indicate political mistrust and ideological divergence at the root of tension. These will require sustained effort by both sides to change the framework of political discourse. But they also indicate a high degree of restraint and responsibility to contain and limit wars between states. This provides the basis for optimism in reshaping the security environment so that greater priority can be given to human development in South Asia.

Reshaping the Security Environment
Although there is no evidence of an ‘arms race’ in the region, it would be desirable to reshape the security environment towards a more relaxed and possibly friendly direction. Without such vectoring, an expectation of reduction in defence spending is totally unrealistic. The route to reducing insecurity and the costs of security, besides reducing the political and military utility of conventional and nuclear weapons, lie on confidence and security building measures followed/supported by conventional arms control. Past attempts have been centred around CBMs (although they were not termed as such), and the extent and number of such steps taken over the decades belies the popularly propagated sense of perpetual hostility and inability to manage tensions peacefully.14  The CBM approach can be reinforced by conventional arms control provided they enhance (or at least do not degrade) the security of the countries concerned.

But the primary focus of the strategy should seek to establish greater trust and confidence rather than search for more difficult to achieve arms control measures. Some of the steps which can be taken to improve security and reduce the danger of war in South Asia include:

• Continuing and institutionalised political discourse to build trust and confidence, reduce tensions, and harmonise ideological and political goals of the states. This discourse should seek to establish (i) bilateral and multi-lateral CBMs, (ii) the framework and process of arms control in the region, especially between Pakistan and India, and (iii) commitments by extra-regional powers to strengthen cooperative security in the region without direct or active intervention in the process.
• Commitments and re-affirmation of agreements and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes on the principles of mutual and equal security, respect for borders and lines of control, and agreement on non-use of force.
• Greater transparency in military postures and power.
• Harmonise and shift national strategic (politico-military) doctrines and postures towards ‘non-offensive defence’ and defence sufficiency.
• Peace-time military deployments (especially of strike forces) to provide adequate cushion of time and space against surprise attack/pre-emption.
• Bilateral and multi-lateral agreements for conventional forces reductions (CFR) especially of armoured and strike forces (more on this later).
• Development of national technical means of verification followed by agreements such as the ‘open skies’ treaty to extend upto 100km from international borders/lines of (actual) control.
• Bilateral and multi-lateral agreements on no first use of nuclear capabilities against each other.
• Bilateral and multi-lateral agreements not to attack population centres and economic targets. (Extend the Indo-Pakistan agreement on non-attack on nuclear installations to include other countries of the region).

There is a need to re-assess the nature of defence postures, force structures, and policies of the countries of the region. Some acquisitions are an inevitable consequence of the modernisation imperative and the forward march of military technology. There is, undoubtedly, a strong element of defence policies influenced by an action-reaction phenomenon since re-equipment and acquisition programmes of defence forces in the region cannot be coordinated and harmonised for obvious reasons. But there is no evidence of an ‘arms race’ in the region, whether related to conventional weapons and forces, nuclear capabilities, or missile capabilities. What is possible (and needed) is greater transparency and continuing dialogue, at least among the strategic community in the region, to reduce misperceptions and errors of assessment. The fact that even the wars in South Asia have been far more restrained and have avoided collateral damage and targeting of civilians is a positive factor, supporting the view that greater mutually-negotiated arrangements to reshape the security environment are feasible.

For example, conventional force reductions, appropriately crafted, which should seek substantive reduction in what have come to be accepted as more offensive and threatening weapon systems is possible between India and Pakistan without weakening the military security of either. This level of force reduction would bring the capital stocks down to that of thirty years ago. On the other hand, such a step will enhance economic and social security. The political impact of such an agreement would go a long way (and far beyond the numerical values) in reducing threat perceptions on either side.

Window of Opportunity
Pakistan’s economy is in serious difficulties. Former Finance Minister, Senator Sartaj Aziz, had cautioned in 1995 about the