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 NEWSLETTERS

Vol 6 no. 3  July 2000
Letter from the Executive Director

Dear Friends,
The rains have been plentiful so far this year in all of South Asia and there is promise of a good harvest and a season of cheer. Yet, there are conflicts aplenty and internal strife and terror.  At the RCSS we try and do what we can.

The Winter Workshop was held at Tangerine Beach Hotel in April. Followed by two major conferences on Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in South Asia, and Conventional Arms in South Asia: Promoting Transparency and Preventing Small Arms Proliferation, in June, both at Sri Lanka. You will see their brief reports carried elsewhere in the newsletter. These conferences in particular allow the RCSS a meaningful role in emerging security issues in the world and we hope to continue to be engaged with them.

The Ford Foundation Review of the RCSS conducted by Farooq Sobhan and Peter Lyon is over. You will be pleased to know, the Consultants reported very highly on the Centre and have asked us to play an even larger role in South Asian security issues. Over the coming months we will consider plans to implement their recommendations and try to make our Centre even more vibrant and relevant.

Some RCSS Chapters are active. A report on an inaugural seminar at Karachi is included. Another Chapter Conference is planned at Shanghai in July. I would encourage others to propose meetings as well. You will also see report of a travel by Nayana Bose and others from Delhi to Pakistan. The initiative came from individuals from both sides of the Border and proved a delightful experience for all. If you have any such plans, we will try and support them modestly, but enough perhaps to make them happen. But, the initiative and arrangements have to be yours. That goes for meetings of RCSS Chapters as well.
The RCSS Community is growing rapidly and we hope to add another excellent crop at the Eighth Summer workshop at Kathmandu in September.

Dipankar Banerjee

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Designing Possible Transparency and Information Exchange Arrangements on Small Arms and Light Weapons
Mitsuro Donowaki

Former Chair of the UN Panel and Group of Governmental Exports on Small Arms

In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and it was only after a major military intervention by the UN multinational forces in early 1991 that Kuwait’s independence was restored.

According to the statistics published by ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) of the United States, Iraq imported close to 50 billion US dollars of armaments during the preceding eight years, from 1983 to 1990.

The five top-ranking exporters of arms coincided with the five Permanent Member States of the UN Security Council, and their share in the arms imports by the Middle East region was roughly 85%.

It was on the sobering reflection of this fact that the P-5 nations attempted to work out, in 1991 and 1992, some kind of restraint arrangements on the export of arms to the Middle East. Although they managed to issue the so-called London Guidelines, they failed to agree on concrete measures.

It was under such circumstances that Japan and the European Union, which was then called the European Community, took the initiative in 1991 in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly to establish the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The purpose of the register was not to restrain arms trade, but to establish a global transparency and confidence-building mechanism by which the UN Member States would be required to register the export and impoort of major conventional weapons such as battle tanks and combat aircraft. This was not an easy attempt at the time, because most nations still believed that confidentiality, not transparency, in military matters served their security interests.

The basic concept of the UN Register was to request UN Member States to report to the UN every year the number of major conventional arms they imported or exported during the previous calendar year with respect to the seven categories of conventional weapons listed in the annex to the resolution. Since General Assembly resolutions do not have a legally binding force, this was a voluntary register.

Of the establishment of such a regional register was for the specific purpose of bringing under control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, one would have to start with having close consultations among the military and police officials of the sub-region, including border guards and customs officials. The harmonization of national control laws and regulations of such weapons would also have to be carried out. Exchange of intelligence information as well as cooperation among the authorities of the nations in the sub-region would have to be promoted in order to curb the illicit trade in such arms, and also to combat criminal activities in which such weapons are used. In the process, the introduction of a computerized database would inevitably become a necessity. This kind of regional arrangements may be called a “regional network of information sharing” rather than a “regional register”. This should serve the purpose of helping to reduce and prevent the excessive accumulation of such weapons, and to promote transparency in such armaments. This statement more or less reflected the views of the members of the UN Panel on Small Arms which adopted its report later in the year.

In its report submitted to the General Assembly in 1997, the Small Arms Panel came up with twenty-four concrete measures for the reduction and prevention of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons. In endorsing the report, the General Assembly decided to convene an international conference on illicit arms trade in all its aspects no later than 2001, acting on one of the recommendations of the Pannel. Also, the same resolution requested the Secretary-General to establish a new follow-up Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and to prepare with the assistance of the Group a new report, (i) on the progress being made in implementing the recommendations of the Panel, and (ii) on further actions recommended to be taken. The follow-up Group appointed by the Secretary-General consisted of twenty-three governmental experts as compared to the sixteen of the previous Panel, reflecting the growing interest of the international community.

The Group’s report made a systematic analysis of the progress being made in implementing the recommendations contained in the previous Panel’s report, and also came up with twenty-seven recommendations for further actions. The report was endorsed by a resolution of the General Assembly in December 1999, and the same resolution decided to convene a UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all Its Aspects in June/July 2001.

When we talk about transparency in connection with the UN Arms Register, we naturally think in terms of confidence-building among states. Transparency in the transfer of larger types of conventional weapons may contribute to the dispelling of unnecessary fears that a potential enemy may be amassing weapons in preparation of a large scale cross-border attacks. Therefore, through the joint efforts of states for the voluntary submission of the data on the transfer of such major weapons, confidence-building among states can be promoted.

On the other hand, small arms and light weapons are the weapons of choice for irregular warfare in regional and particularly in intrastate conflicts, as well as for terrorist and criminal activities. In most cases, they are not the weapons used for large-scale cross-border attacks, and therefore we cannot talk about transparency for the sake of confidence-building among states. The manufacture, transfer, possession and use of such weapons may often be a matter beyond the knowledge and control of most of the state authorities, particularly in the regions of conflicts and instability.

This does not mean that transparency in small arms is not needed. On the contrary, every effort should be made to expose the clandestine and illegal practices related to such weapons, and to track down and eradicate them. What is required for this purpose is the close cooperation among the military, police, customs and border control officers, particularly on a regional and sub-regional basis. In other words, what is needed with respect to small arms is not “a regional register” for the sake of the round-about way of confidence-building among states, but the immediate, concrete and cooperative actions among the states concerned to search, confiscate and destroy such weapons which are circulating excessively and illegablly.

Efforts in this direction are currently being made at various regional and sub-regional levels, particularly in West Africa and Southern Africa. Also, the Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials that came into force recently provides for such an arrangement for information sharing and cooperation, and should serve as a good example to other regions of the world. Such arrangements should be called a “regional network of information sharing and cooperation” rather than a “regional register.”

However, in addition to “the network of information sharing and cooperation” for concrete actions and measures in reducing the already excessive accumulation and transfers of small arms and light weapons, I wish to point out that there indeed exist several possibilities for promoting transparency in small arms for the sake of confidence-building among states, when it comes to the future supply of such weapons. For example, if the practice by some states of the covert supply of such arms to insurgent forces in other states were to be restrained, or at least to be made more transparent, this would contribute to the enhancement of confidence among states. aslo, the marking of small arms and light weapons, as was recommended in the 1999 report of the Group of Governmental Experts, should be another confidence-building measure to be promoted among states, because this would help to discourage the future supply of such weapons to the regions of conflicts and instability, although this might not be of immediate help in the reduction of the already excessive availability of such weapons. Lastly, as is envisaged in the European Union’s Joint Action on small arms, the establishment of “national inventories” of such weapons, and “regional registers on small arms and regular excchanges of available information on exports, imports, production and holding of small arms” would indeed be a confidence-building measure among states. In my opinion, however, these are the measure that can only be taken first by those capable nations in the developed regions of the world in order to show examples, rather than for the developing nations in the regions of conflict and instability who do not yet have the technical and administrative capacity to establish and maintain such inventories and registers.

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Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in South Asia

The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in collaboration with the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Government of Canada and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), organised a three day conference at the Kandalama Hotel, Dambulla, Sri Lanka from June 20-23. The principal themes of the workshop were

  • Problems of Small Arms and Light Weapons Flows in to South Asia
  • Domestic production, illegal manufacture and leakages
  • International experiences of managing the problem and lessons for South Asia
  • Preventing illegal flows and restricting domestic availability
  • Stockpile management and security
  • Marking
  • Evolving regional countermeasures.


The workshop brought together foreign ministry, military and police officials, heads of research institutions, researchers, and representatives of non-governmental organizations from the region and international experts and representative from the UNDDA.

The political and social dimensions of the problem as well as the internal and external security aspects were discussed at length with presentations from all countries of the region. Experiences of other parts of the world were shared. Possible regional countermeasures were discussed. This session concentrated on export control, domestic accountability and regional co-operation. A book on the Conference will be published shortly.

 

Conventional Arms in South Asia : Promoting Transparency and Preventing Small Arms Proliferation

A follow up to the conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in South Asia was held at Hotel Suisse, Kandy, Sri Lanka from 24-25 June, 2000. This Conference was organised in collaboration with the University of Bradford, UK and the UN DDA.

  • The role of information exchange to combat small arms proliferation and illicit trafficking.
  • Participation in and strengthening the UN register of conventional arms.
  • Registers and regional security co-operation.
  • Regional initiatives to combat and reduce small arms proliferation in South Asia.

The main objective of the Conference was to explore ways in which information exchange between South Asian states could usefully be developed and to explore ways of regional co-operation. Another aspect was to discuss ways in which consultation mechanisms could be strengthened between South Asian countries to enhance awareness of each other’s concerns and help to prevent destabilizing flows and accumulation of  arms. The discussion highlighted the importance of transparency and the role of public information. List of Participants
 

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Management and Control of Light Weapons in South Asia
Tara Kartha
Research Fellow, Instituite of Defence Studies and Analysis

There is a need to knit South Asia into the international control network, as well as to give it its very own set of control measures. Arising from the lack of awareness that pervades over much of the region, this will undoubtedly prove difficult. However it can be argued that policy measures in South Asia have hardly flowed - at any time - from a groundswell of public opinion. Policy is made, and continues to be made largely by elite groups within these countries.

Extent of proliferation

  • All countries of South Asia suffer from the scourge of  arms proliferation though in different degrees.
  • From a virtual zero in the 1980’s, there are now an estimated seven million seven hundred and thirty thousand AK-47’s only  on the loose in South Asia . If all types of guns including LMG’s , UMG’s and others are counted this figure could rise to around 4-5 times this figure . The core of weapons movement is the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
  • All weapons movement in South Asia are transnational.
  • At a rough estimation, over 80% of the more than two hundred thousand killed in South Asia are civilians unconnected with the fighting.

National – Regional  measures
The two are taken together here since the objective is to evolve a South Asian framework rather than simply a national oriented one. Therefore the methodology to be adopted is to knit together national initiatives into an overall regional pattern which should ideally not only prevent weapons movements, but also act in itself as a tool of confidence building among states. The final objective would be to work towards a Regional Convention.

Border controls
A new approach to  better border management  - backed by strong political forces - would be crucial here. The need to shift away from the old practises of border management is necessary keeping in mind that no country can deal with proliferation on its own.

The fencing which India began on her western borders and eastern borders has been resented to an extent by neighbours. However if this fencing could be accompanied by joint patrolling – supplemented by joint training and habituated co-operation, the fence would be equally beneficial to the security of both parties. Bangladeshi border forces are highly professional in their expertise, while Nepal has the potential to form a highly mobile border control force out of her formidable “Gurkha” force, which are used to the terrain, and who are known for their integrity.  Pakistan has a highly trained force as well, though  pending the improvement of relations,  there is little possibility of co-operation.

Greater attention needs to be paid by India in capacity building in less developed  states. Given the extreme   (and unnecessary) sensitivity to the issue of Indian assistance, it might be advisable to again utilise SAARC as a forum where such assistance could be garnered. Strong border control programmes aimed at getting forces habituated to working together would be of immense use. At present the simply reality – that state anywhere really have no option but to work together to control small arms flows – has yet to permeate officialdom.

De-mobilisation and disarmament
Except for a short period in Assam, little or no attention has been paid to this crucial issue. From Sri Lanka, to Assam to Kashmir, - the poorly implemented disarmament initiatives have been  at the heart of the breakdown at the moment of opportunity. A well funded and unified approach to demobilisation is essential. Here the north east programme was well thought out, but had poor political support ( thus the emphasis on a unified approach). At present, Bangladesh is trying to implement the Peace Agreement with the CHT rebels. This agreement has a disarmament clause, with a related financial assistance clause. As with every other peace agreement in conflict zones elsewhere, there is no indication that the CHT rebels have at all given up their arms.

Intelligence co-operation
After a long spell of inaction, there are now  signs of co-operation in halting weapons smuggling, with cases of intelligence co-operation between  Myanmar, India and Thailand resulting in the seizure of  at least three shipments of weapons. Co-operation to restrict the movements of terrorist leaders among these countries as well as Bangladesh  and countries of South East Asia has been progressing. The leader of a north eastern group is now incarcerated in prison in Thailand, while another still remains in Bangladesh.  The end result of this co-operation is considerable. Bangladesh has finally been able to deal with the long festering problem in the Chittagong Hill Tracts while India seems to be getting to grips with the problem in Nagaland.

Raising awareness
Tragically the awareness of the gun as an enemy of society when in the wrong hands has yet to permeate into society, and indeed into an insulated bureaucracy. If there is one thing that South Asia has in common is the problem of a heavy, unresponsive bureaucracy that cannot act with the dynamism that is so vital in controlling a dynamic flow.

Multilateral/global measures

Controlling the trade – measures for arms manufactures
As established by empirical research, the vast majority of the weapons at present loose around the globe are not new weapons, but  have moved out of the old stocks that is the result of a  state to state legal transfers at an earlier point of time.  In the earnestness to institute technology controls, which is by far what most analysts are comfortable with, this critical aspect is often overlooked.

  • It is vital that   old weapons either be destroyed (the preferred alternative) or sold subject to the most stringent processes and as part of the UN Register.
  • The clear marking of weapons is an important input here. Unless the transfers are recorded on the weapon – an expensive process – the whole point of marking becomes irrelevant. Until a way can be found where further transfers would be made accountable, marking by itself cannot produce results.
  • It is vital that further licenses for production also be made part of the same strict controls which are being envisaged for the EU or the United States. Licensees are notoriously used by all kinds of actors ( including the original licenser) to route weapons for covert operations.
  • Industry and controls
  • Here industry could be co-opted by giving  highly lucrative small arms and equipment contracts in peacekeeping to those firms who are also willing to engage in arms destruction at the conflict zones.
  • There is also a  possibility  of incorporating industry into a key area of possible future controls - that of ammunition controls. Given that the 7.62 calibre weapons are the most commonly supplied ( in terms of the entire family of automatic weapons) it would be as well to quickly encourage a changeover of all remaining countries to the new 5.56 mm round ( especially in the former Soviet Union) .

The Grey market
None of the above would be at all useful unless measures were put in place to pull back defaulters on an emerging weapons control regime. At present the largest segment of the trade into South Asia and a good many other places is that of the Grey market.  The halting of weapons into Afghanistan (for instance)  - has to be a priority, and indeed UN special negotiators have tired of calling for a halt to weapons induction. However the trade continues, sometimes via arms brokers who’s business it is to “run” the embargo, and at other times by the state itself.

Keeping in mind that it is easier to “control” a state rather than a non state actor, then the following actions would be useful against a gun running state.

  • Cut off of weapons aid( limited sanctions)
  • Denial/suspension of membership in some multilateral  forums
  • As a final act - complete denial of even international forums – that is complete isolation.

Weapons to non state actors
The lone Canadian proposal to restrict the trade to non state actors must receive closer attention. Cries of “ foul “ are usually  from states with a very poor record of democracy or peace in their own countries. The right of self defence is not a right that does not carry with it a corresponding “duty”. It is the duty of the citizen not only to defend himself, but also to make sure that his defence does not harm someone else.

Ultimately the state has to be assisted to defend itself, even as all possible measures are overseen to persuade the Tigers to negotiate.

  • The UN needs to consider the building of such a common approach to issue like border management.   (UN Border management programme?) The thorny issue of terrorism may be set aside for the moment  while training is focussed on smuggling detection, legal education, streamlining of the processes itself and weapons destruction .
  • The UN may also need to get involved in setting up a regional press and information centre to facilitate the vital exercise of  data collection, analysis and dissemination on the issue of weapons smuggling ( this centre may include a few other issues like human smuggling, and narcotics but must not lose its focus by including just about everything under the sun – this has been the best way of destroying a centre before it even begins). The importance of such a centre cannot be overemphasised – especially in its outflow effects on universities and the youth.
  • At another level the UN could at very low cost liase with local institutions to facilitate the sharing of information between the state and NGO’s ( which is a major problem among most countries) as well as between states. The objective would be simply to increase awareness of the problem as well as the potential among existing institutions to deal with it. Sustained coalition building is as yet to start in this region on this sensitive issue since seminars tend to be one time events.
  • Other measures at an international level could include a dynamic UN web site devoted to bringing together news stories on weapons related measures – but focussing on illicit trafficking and Grey markets ( there are already enough institutions looking at the legal trade). Here the UN would only be involved in assisting data collection.

Going forward
The fundamental question then arises as to how South Asia may kick start this process to get governments to adopt a common position on the issue at the international level, as well as to be able to tackled the issues raised here. Here it would be useful to hold national workshops over a specified time period, after which the information generated here would feed into a regional level workshop. These recommendations would then need to be presented to the respective governments - whose representatives would need to be present.  There is clearly a long way to go, but the bottom line remains that South Asia really has no alternative but to go forward. For far too long attempts at co-operation have remained  shackled to  the past , - the basic reason why the region  remains at present  - tense.

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Setting Agenda for Regional De-Weaponization

The de-weaponization policy introduced by the new military regime in Pakistan is admission of the fact that proliferation of small arms is a major problem that needs to be contained. It is the first time that the central government has aimed at eradicating the menace of violence caused by the free availability of small arms. The policy, however, does not address the problem in totality. Keeping the focus on controlling licensed equipment would not necessarily help in curbing violence in the society.

The urge for political bargaining, political corruption, and lack of will were some of the reasons that the political governments failed to devise ways to curb the flow of small arms. The new regime in Pakistan appears better poised to find solutions to this problem. Understandably, the recently announced de-weaponization policy is instigated by the threat of enhancement in the domestic violence. The policymakers for once understood that unless the causes and source of violence were not rooted out, it would be difficult to ensure peace in the society and the much-desired socioeconomic progress. For Pakistan’s economic development and survival, it is equally important to clean up the society of the tools of violence.

The presence of weapons in the country and in adjoining countries, and the constant influx of equipment over two decades has resulted in producing a sustained chain reaction that may not be halted easily. There are non-state actors constantly trafficking weapons across the borders from and to Pakistan for monitory gains and other reasons. Domestically focused de-weaponization initiatives would require an array of measures and technologies to monitor the flow of equipment with the objective of checking this illegal traffic.

Understandably, it may be difficult to contain non-state actors, it is however, the time to realize that not checking such activities would never result in restoring peace in Pakistan or in the region. These groups use small arms as tools flowing in from various sources and through the porous borders around the country. As long as Islamabad fails to adopt a dual-pronged approach of aggressively discouraging these groups and curbing the supply of weapons, it would be difficult to restore a peaceful environment at home. The present regime’s broader agenda of socioeconomic progress and ensuring law and order in the country is appreciable. Nevertheless, these objectives would be hard to attain without clamping down upon all violent elements in the society and completely checking the trade of equipment that causes violence.

Suggested Measures to Curb Proliferation
A workable and more cogent de-weaponization policy has to be planned at both domestic and regional levels. Any regional arrangements could be bilateral or multilateral. The following measures are proposed at these two levels.

The Domestic Level

Encourage domestic awareness on the issue

  • Small arms and light weapons proliferation is a menace that cannot be eradicated without sufficient public support. It is recommended that efforts should be made to organize conferences and workshops to bring together civil society actors and stakeholders, and officials to share their views and to jointly devise strategies to root out the problem.
  • Development of NGO activity primarily focused on the issue.
  • The threat posed by proliferation of such equipment is a subject that should be discussed in educational institutions.
  • Developing a definition and categorization for equipment
  • Thus far, the manufacturers and buyers have gotten away with legal lacunas. Semi-automatic weapons not categorized as prohibited bore are adapted to fit a prohibited bore category weapon.
  • Development of Domestic Restraint Regimes for Private Manufacture
  • As a starting point, areas could be designated where weapons manufacture is carried out as a cottage industry. Of course, the small scale and insignificant production can not be monitored or stopped. Individuals with criminal intent may continue to produce equipment but that is more of a problem that can be addressed through better policing.
  • Strengthening law enforcement agencies
  • Improvement of the quality of the police force that includes better training and equipment
  • Cooperation between police and the citizens
  • Devolution of security planning to the grass-root level. It must be kept in mind that security is a service provided to the people; however, the state authorities have traditionally monopolized security planning at the exclusion of the subjects to whom the service is provided. From the standpoint of checking small arms proliferation, the responsibility of ensuring security is a responsibility that could be shared by the citizens and the local police.
  • Checking inflow of weapons through improving border control
  • Introduction of modern technology could help in monitoring areas that have been difficult to supervise for curbing the smuggling of small arms. Terrain in the province of Baluchistan has proved most difficult in checking smuggling of narcotics and weapons. The practice so far was to monitor activities through the Frontier Corps that has obviously not proved very affective.


Regional/Bilateral level
Small arms proliferation in South Asia is understandably a regional problem. The illegal cross-border transfer of small arms, some of which are acquired by criminals or individuals and groups with terrorist intent, poses a problem that cannot be resolved without bilateral or multilateral initiatives. Regional or bilateral measures can be carried out at two levels: purely in the form of CBMs between states and concrete joint measures to curb this proliferation.

Bilateral or multilateral collection and exchange of data
This fits into the CBMs which are considered necessary if any arms control regimes have to be instituted in the region at some later date. The data relates to the sources of manufacture and supply of small arms in individual countries. In addition, states could consider exchange of information on the various organizations having terrorist inclinations.

Cooperative monitoring of manufacturing centers

  • A possible initiative would be to have scheduled inspection of manufacturing centers within states through bilateral cooperation agreements. This may not necessarily reduce proliferation but it would increase the level of confidence with neighboring states that may lead towards agreements to check proliferation.
  • Exchange of data and information on domestic collection of weapons
  • Destruction of collected weapons in the presence of international and regional observers. This is to ensure that the collected weapons do not get into circulation through any other means.

Cooperative border management
Adoption of cooperative methods for border management (including sea borders) to control the trade of small arms and other contraband items. This forms the second level of cooperation that goes beyond simple confidence building. Here the intent would be to adopt methods for active cooperation. These cannot be adopted without sufficient confidence building or in the absence of trust between states.

Formulation of Cooperative Security Zones
A starting point, at a bilateral level, would be to outline or designate territory as Cooperative Security zones. The idea is to define an area where all official military activity would be limited. Likewise, these areas would be jointly monitored to stop all illegal arms traffic. These areas would ideally be adjacent to the internationally recognized borders. Such a plan would largely depend upon the resolution of outstanding issues between the states.

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Fourth Winter Workshop April 2000

 The fourth workshop in the series titled, Sources of Conflict in South Asia: Ethnicity, Governance, Environment, was held in Hotel Tangerine, Kalutara, Sri Lanka, on Apri 17-25, 2000. The workshop focused on conflict related to: a) ethnicity and religion;
b) governance in plural societies and security

c) resources, development and environment.
The keynote address was delivered by  Radhika Coomaraswamy on women in conflict. The programme was intended for young professionals of South Asia. Participants  came from a varied professional background including public and private sector institutions, research, academia, media and NGOs. The Workshop was is interdisciplinary, and programmes ranged from lecture sessions to panel discussions and group activities.

Objective
The objectives of the Workshop are to:

  • equip participants with knowledge and skills necessary to understand the concepts and approaches to conflict, conflict resolution and conflict management with  specific focus on non-military sources in the context of South Asia;
  • provide participants with insights into how non-military issues evolve into conflict, and how they affect relations between communities and peoples;
  • offer training opportunity for the younger generation of professionals of the region to strengthen their skills in policy development and negotiation with particular emphasis on specific issues, actors and decision making processes; and
  • facilitate better understanding of problems and constraints, and promote collective consideration of alternative visions, options and approaches to resolve such conflicts.

In the long run, the workshop is expected to create a network for sustained interaction and communication between a growing body of a new generation of professionals in South Asia. By facilitating the evolution of alternative approaches with a regional perspective, it aims to advance the cause of cooperation, conflict resolution and conflict management in the region. List of Participants

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UNIDIR Fellowship
Visiting Research Fellowships - South Asia
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research is establishing a new Visiting Research Fellowship programme, funded by the Ford Foundation. Four researchers from a single region will be invited to Geneva for a period of 4-6 months. The researchers will work collectively on a single research paper, focusing on a particular question of regional security. The fellowship programme is scheduled to begin in October 2000. Fellows will receive a stipend for their time in Geneva; a return fare from the fellows’ places of residence will also be paid.

UNIDIR - Fellowships and Internships Coordinator
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research is seeking a Coordinator to manage and coordinate our growing fellowship and internship programmes. The post will be initially for one year, based in Geneva and at a salary in the range of US$ 35,000 - 50,000 depending on experience.

Requests for further information should be made to: Isabelle Roger
Administrative Assistant,

UNIDIR, Palais des Nations,

Geneve-10, CH - 1211 Switzerland

Fax : +4122 917 0176;

email: iroger@unog.ch

website: http://www.unog.ch/unidir.


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Pakistan Trip of the RCSS New Delhi Chapter (Ahungalla ’99): Report
Nayana Bose

They struck a chord in the heart of the city, when three Summer Alumni of the New Delhi Chapter arrived in Islamabad on an insightful 9-day visit in March, 2000 to uphold RCSS’ moto: “Dialogue, Network and Cooporate”. A brief account of the visit follows:
Papers were presented by the visiting Alumni Mr Arpit Rajain, PhD Student, JNU and Research Officer, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) New Delhi; Dr Suparna Dasgupta, Officer, Confederation of Indian Industry, (CII) New Delhi and Ms Nayana Bose, CANTAB, Research Scholar on South Asia/ Consultant at the United Nations, New Delhi, on “Confidence Building: The Indo-Pak Way.”

Discussion at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), Islamabad
Welcomed warmly by Dr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan,an in-house discussion with the Research Fellows and Associates  of  ISS topped the Agenda. Here, a free and fair duscussion was facilitated for the participants. Dr Iffat Malik, Ms Maria Sultan, Mr Sadat Malik and Mr Omar Farooq were among the participating members of ISS.

At a political level, Mr Rajain spoke on “Declaratory Statements, Nuclear and Missile CBMs”. His primary message was that CBMs are, quite simply, a reassurance that two or more adversaries will not attempt to surprise one another and mount a disabling military strike against the other.  They are also an investment in crisis and conflict management and may help in war termination if by chance hostilities eventuate.

On Economic CBMs Dr Dasgupta initiated “A Move Towards Non-Military CBMs; Economic Cooperation”.

India and Pakistan have deployed many CBMs between them, but most have been military based CBMs such as agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations, giving advance notice of each other’s military exercises and establishments of hotlines between military commanders of both sides near the Line of  Control (LOC).

She pointed out  that the economic cooperation between the two countries continues to be hampered owing to lack of awareness of potential of cooperation and costs of non-cooperation and also owing to the inability of India and Pakistan to resolve their political differences. Trade between India and Pakistan is a paltry amount of Rs. 1,200 crores risen from Rs. 800 crores, which is still far from Rs. 100 billion targeted to be achieved by 2003 by both countries.

Nayana Bose’s paper on “Non Military CBMs: The Role of  NGOs and the Media in Conflict Resolution”, reflected on a different dimension of CBMs. Following issues were underscored:

South Asia as a region languishes behind on social and economic indicators. Figures speak for themselves: the adult  literacy rate for South Asia is 36% (developing countries: 62%); female life expectancy at birth is 61.6 years, (developing countries: 84 years). Forty five percent of the world’s poor live in South Asia.

Indians and Pakistanis live under similar constraints of poverty and illiteracy.
  

Indicators

India

Pakistan

Urban population under poverty line 38%  20%
Rural population under poverty line  9%  31%
Population with access to health services   85% 55%
Population with access to safe water   81%  60%
Adult literacy rate  53.5%  40.9%
Infant mortality rate\1000 people  71  95
GNP per capita (in US $)  370  500

The GNP of a small country such as Congo is $ 670–India and Pakistan have a long, long way to go.

Rather than funding nuclear weapons and wasting valuable resources on defence , both India and Pakistan should pay some attention to the basics of life: health, education, shelter and food. Nutrition levels are abysmally low in South Asia.

Women’s NGOs and NGOs that are specifically aimed at increasing people to people contact at the Track 3 level, such as the Pakistan India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, set up in 1994 were cited as examples to encourage and follow. It is in crisis situations when governments are inflexibly locked that Track 2 and the peoples track can explore ways of re establishing dialogue and jointly build public support against the use of force to settle differences.

The media: electronic and print has enormous potential to better relations between India and Pakistan. Satellite television has brought the culture of one country into the living rooms of the other and vice versa. Instead of being used for propaganda, the electronic media must use its potential to build an interest and an understanding among our peoples.

Unfortunately, very little from Pakistan is seen on the satellite channels (Zee, Star). Human interest stories, serials, soap operas build up a following irrespective of nationality. Much before the time of satellite channels, Pakistani serials such as Tanhaiya were watched on videos in Indian homes. There is an intrinsic interest, a curiosity among our peoples to know more about the other. With realistic portrayal on TV, the media could help break some myths and go a long way in building ties.

A beginning can be made by making available the mainstream newspapers and magazines of both countries at every book seller, at every newspaper kiosk in the cities of India and  Pakistan.

A common consensus arrived upon was that it is imperative to create conditions through economic and social CBMs that make it conducive to talk about other -interactable issues such as Kashmir. The three presentations winded down with a healthy exchange of views.

Our deep appreciation to Dr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Chairman, ISS and Ms. Maria Sultan, Research Fellow, ISS (RCSS Alumnae, Ahungalla ’99) for accepting our initiative to hold talks at ISS and for making this such a productive and informative exchange of ideas, rounded off by a wonderful lunch for all who participated.

Presentations at Quaid-Azam University, Islamabad
Under the auspices of Dr. Rasul Baksh Rais, Director, Area Studies Centre, Quaid Azam University, Islamabad we were treated with long, lively discussion with students for more than an hour following our presentation of papers. It was an extremely interactive, challenging session. The questions ranged from Kashmir, (to the usual “first Kashmir, then other issues”) to how much American investment there is in India and is there any opposition to this, what does the average Indian think of Pakistanis, is there a lot of hatred for Pakistan, etc. The students were diverse in their interests and opinions and there were many takers for going ahead with economic and track 3 initiatives, instead of waiting for Kashmir to be resolved.   Again enthusiastic views were thrown in by the students. A very energetic dialogue and debate took shape leaving the friendly atmosphere undeterred.

Day trip from Islamabad to Muree and Burban, organised by the Institute for Strategic Studies
Along with eight members of ISS, Arpit, Suparna and I thoroughly enjoyed the visit to these picturesque little towns, from where one could look onto the snow capped peaks of “Azad” (POK?|) Kashmir. The drive up was very pretty and gave us more of an opportunity to interact with ISS fellows and associates, on a one-to-one basis, which was a unique opportunity to speak our minds on contentious and other issues.

We were then taken to Burban, the smaller of the hill stations to the famous Pearl Continental Hotel for a sumptuous lunch. The hotel is landscaped into the mountains, with its terraced gardens, swimming pool and amphitheatre and is rumoured to be the best five-star hotel in Pakistan. It certainly was beautiful and we were privileged to be there.

The RCSS link…..
This trip to Pakistan would not have been possible without the  help, hospitality and support given unconditionally to us by RCSS Alumni, all participants at the Summer Workshop, Ahungalla, 1999: Nadeem Iqbal, Akabir Rehman, Waqar Ahmad Sheikh, Sarah Bokhari, and Maria Sultan.  To Nadeem and his wife Dina, went the dubious honour of hosting us for our stay in Islamabad. We were looked after so well that we felt we now had a “home” in Islamabad. We ate at the best restaurants, and saw the best of Islamabad. To them, our friends, we owe a huge thank you.

Our trip was timed such that we were able to attend Waqar’s wedding in Lahore, which was one of the highlights of our visit to Pakistan. Showered with warmth and affection by his relatives with whom we stayed, we spent four wonderful days in Lahore, sightseeing by day, celebrating by night. The hospitality we received from his family remains unparalleled. Akabir and Sarah came from Islamabad and with them we saw the sights of Lahore: the Minare Pakistan, the Lahore Fort and Badshahi Mosque. It was a pleasure to see how clean the city is, and how good the roads, all over, are.

We were struck by the similarity and terminology (mehendi, Baraat) of customs at the wedding. People were curious: “ How do  you know Waqar? We would not allow our girls to go unescorted for a wedding to India! Is India really like what we see in Hindi films? Is our food the same?  As for the food: we have NEVER eaten as much as we did in Lahore….but that is what Lahore is famous for!
Not once did we  feel that we were in a foreign “hostile” country. The replicas of  the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles on roads and floats on the canal in Lahore were a subtle reminder but paled in the warmth and friendliness that we received everywhere.

To the RCSS we owe a debt of gratitude for making this unique and enriching trip a possibility. A “Thank you” seems inadequate.

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RCSS Karachi Chapter: Meeting on CTBT
Moonis Ahmar

The Karachi Chapter of the RCSS in collaboration with the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi held a seminar on the CTBT controversy: Different Perceptions on April 29, 2000 at Crown Ball Room Hotel Regent Plaza, Karachi
In the inaugural session, the Vice Chancellor, University of Karachi, Dr. Zafar H. Zaidi, the Dean Faculty of Arts, Dr. Arifa Fareed, the Chairman Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Prof. Sikandar Mehdi, Prof. Talat Wizarat, Professor, Department of International Relations, Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Program Director and Ms. Shaista Tabassum, Coordinator of the Program presented their views on the CTBT controversy and its relevance in the case of Pakistan.

The theme of the second session was the Concept of CTBT. The session was chaired by Mr. Fatehyab Ali Khan, Chairman, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi. The first paper was presented by Mr. M. B. Naqvi on the economic, political and security dimensions of CTBT. He talked about the need of Track III diplomacy and people to people contact between India and Pakistan. He then touched upon the actual economic conditions of Pakistan, which he stated were depressing and therefore an arms race with India was largely futile. He said that despite deterrence, a miscalculation might trigger nuclear war. He concluded by saying that the possession of nuclear bombs has made the South Asian region insecure.

The second paper was presented by Mr. Ahmar Bilal Sufi on the legal dimension of CTBT. His objective presentation unfolded the fact that CTBT does not require the ratification of NPT and shall enter into force after 44 states sign and ratify it. It does not restrict the right of a state to multiply its nuclear capability. Moreover, withdrawal from the treaty can take place with prior notice of six months. He was of the view that the Lahore Declaration was infact a mini CTBT with both sides agreeing to “continue unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests”.

The themes of the third session were international and regional dimensions of CTBT and public perceptions and CTBT. The session was chaired by Lt General (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin. The first paper in the session was presented by Ms. Shaista Tabassum.  She stated that the concept of nuclear non-proliferation emerged in the post WWII scenario and efforts for nuclear non-proliferation also took place in this era such as the establishment of IAEA in 1956 and the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone as well as the signing of the NPT in 1968, which came into force in 1970. The US Congress passed the Symington, Glenn, Solarz and Pressler Amendments for restricting the spread of nuclear weapons, however, the US Senate by not ratifying the CTBT has exposed the American position on nuclear weapons.

The second paper was presented by Dr. Moonis Ahmar.
According to him, the stands of both the countries were unprincipled because of the inconsistencies in the positions of both India and Pakistan. As far as convergent and divergent perceptions are concerned, Dr. Ahmar was of the view that there were points of convergence of the rejectionists of CTBT, which are,

1. The CTBT being a US conspiracy to dismantle nuclear weapons.

2. Sell out of national interests.

3. An imperialist attempt to subordinate the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan. Moreover, there were points of convergence of those who favor the signing of the CTBT, which are, 1) The signing does not put curb on nuclear weapons program of both India and Pakistan. 2) Signing and ratifying the CTBT can lessen isolation of the two countries. 3) The two countries can obtain substantial financial assistance. He stated that Pakistan’s policy is Indo centric while India has extra regional concerns.

The third paper was presented by Ms. Arshi Saleem. Her paper concerned CTBT and public perceptions in Pakistan. She stated that the debate over CTBT demonstrates the power of a particular form of discourse on the nuclear issue. She stated that foreign policy is an elitist business and the common man does not possess specialize knowledge and skills about the issue.

The theme of the fourth session was Divergent Perceptions on CTBT and was chaired by (Retd) A. R. Siddiqui. Thefirst paper of the session was presented by Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor Department of Physics, Quaid - I-Azam University, Islamabad, His paper was on the divergent perceptions on CTBT. He was of the view that it is in the interest of Pakistan to sign CTBT whether we take a non-proliferationist point of view or from a state centered Pakistani nationalistic perspective.

Mr. Tarik Jan presented the second paper. Mr. Jan is a Senior Research Fellow at The Institute of policy Studies, Islamabad His paper was on CTBT: A tool for US supremacy. He presented the other dimension of the CTBT debate totally rejecting the option of signing CTBT and called it a conspiracy of the West. He said that we couldn’t base our policy on fears for it is not only a matter of economy only but of human self respect and dignity. According to him the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan is a source of pride for us.

Lt Gen Kamal Matinuddin, former Director General Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, presented the third paper. On the need for consensual approach on CTBT and said that Pakistan has been taking keen interest in the pursuit of nuclear proliferation. He tried to clarify some misperceptions regarding the CTBT. According to him in CTBT, there is no mention of down grading of existing nuclear weapons and linking CTBT to FMCT is not correct. He stressed that Pakistan must go for a war denying strategy instead of spending heavily on defence. According to him by signing CTBT, Pakistan will get certain economic benefits though not to a great extent.

The theme of the fifth session was the future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia and the nexus between nuclear nationalism and religious extremism. Maj. Gen (Retd) Ghulam Umer, Former Administrator, The Pakistan of Institute of International Affairs, Karachi presented the first paper. He asserted that countries having nuclear capabilities cannot roll back their ability to produce nuclear weapons so the realistic approach should be to accept the two countries that is India and Pakistan as having nuclear weapons.

The second paper in the session was presented by Mr. Mutahir Ahmed, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi. His paper was on the role of nuclear nationalism and religious extremism and the issue of CTBT in South Asia. He based his argument on the notion that the issue of CTBT has become highly politicized and emotionalized in both India and Pakistan. In this region the nuclear issue is not just a matter of armament but it has become a political issue that can be exploited.

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A South Asian Children Workshop on Alternative Water Management
Imtiaz Ahmed

This event was held at Dhaka under the auspices of FISAA and organized jointly by Centre for Alternatives, Dhaka, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Kathmandu and Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad at the BIISS Auditorium, Dhaka on 3-4 June 2000. The occasion was graced by the Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University, Professor A. K. Azad Chowdhury who made the opening speech and presented the keynote paper.

The following FISAA Fellows attended the workshop and conducted the various sessions: Dr. Ashis Nandy from India; Mr. Ajaya Dixit from Nepal; Dr. Sasanka Perera from Sri Lanka; Ms. Sharmeen Murshid and Professor Imtiaz Ahmed from Bangladesh.
This workshop, the first of its kind, was attended by school children from Classes IX and X, including teachers and scholars, from Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The following schools from Bangladesh attended the workshop: Government Laboratory High School, Holy Cross School and College, South Breeze School, Manarat School, Alia Madrasha, St. Joseph’s School and College, and Scholastica.

Background
The last 50 years of water management in South Asia has been the story of an unfolding disaster. Throughout the region, the water requirements of cities and villages have confronted decline in both quality and quantity. Unthinking attempts to mechanically bolster supply have almost invariably ignored existing scientific and social knowledge and ended up by being a disgrace to the principles of good governance. The arsenic crisis in Bangladesh and West Bengal is perhaps the cruelest example of such development.

Water management and water development in the region have been fragmentary. Not only has it dealt with sea, river and groundwater separately, it has been “land centric’. Water management, we believe should centre around water; it must be based on the recognition of the wholeness of water and its intrinsic function in nature. A comprehensive view also demands critical interventions in the curricula at all levels of education. The principal challenge is, therefore, to integrate the global and the local, to alter the structure and nature of current decision-making models, and the educational context within which they are generated, not only to accommodate a plurality of views, but also to generate options that would reflect the larger reality of water in nature and human society. The transition towards a more secure future for water begins with participatory, consensus seeking, democratic, accountable governance.

The South Asian Children Workshop on Alternative Water Management is a search for ways to introduce a common but alternative management and holistic concept of water management that is soiled in local culture, literature and practice. It is a small move to open new doors for children to allow them to perceive the world of water in a new light. Behind it lies the hope that schools, both private and public, will feel inspired and encouraged to introduce such courses in their schools.

Workshop objectives

  • To begin a process of creating an alternative regional vision and mind set on water.
  • To create a regional water vision for children with the participation of a selected group of children