Confidence Building and Regional Dialogue

 Participants: International conference on Confidence Building Measures &
Regional Dialogue : Retrospect and Prospect

Confidence Building Measures are steps governments take to avoid unnecessary conflict, develop confidence in each other and through this process, build peace and harmonious relations between potential adversaries. Its history is long. But, since the Cold War, it has become almost a growth industry. The process received a particular fillip in the West through the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Based on the acceptance of territorial status- quo in Europe, it developed a whole range of measures that defused conflict there. It helped maintain peace and stability even as the Soviet Empire collapsed.

In collaboration with the UN Department Affairs and the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Government of Canada, the RCSS organised an international conference. This was held at Wadduwa, Sri Lanka, from June 17-19, 1999. The object was to learn the lessons of CBMs from different parts of the world and consider their applicability in South Asia.

The Conference was essentially exploratory in nature. The RCSS objective was to bring civil society and experts together and facilitate a discourse. this was eminently realised. The agenda covered a wide spectrum. A Conference Proceedings in book form is likely to be published in the near future.

kodikara  AWARDS  1999/2000
Research grants under the Kodikara Awards for South Asian Strategic Studies for 1999/2000 sponsored by RCSS have been offered to six young South Asian scholars. This is the third in the series of grants being made. The selected fellows are: 
Ms. Lailufar Yasmin of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka (Law and Order Situation and Gender-based Violence: Bangladesh Perspective) 
Mr. Sushil J. Aaron of Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, (Christian Evangelicals and Political Conflict in India: with Special Reference to Gujrat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa)
Ms. Monica Bhanot of The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, (Order, Welfare and Legitimacy in the Regional Context of South Asia: An Ultima Thule?)
Ms. Smruti Pattanaik of Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, (Elite Perception in Foreign Policy: Role of the Print Media in Influencing Indo-Pakistan Relations 1989-99)
Mr. Salman Humayun of  Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad (The Role of Media in Religious Conflicts: A Case Study of Shariat Bill); and 
Ms. Aruni John of The Panos Institute of South Asia, Kathmandu, (Investigation of the Potential for Militarization of the Bhutanese Refugee Youth in Nepal and Related Security Concerns for the Region).
The scholars are expected to produce research monographs on the identified themes to be published as RCSS policy studies.
Applications for next year’s grants will be received during March- April, 2000. (More on the Kodikara Awards...) top

CBMs Post Cold War South Asia

P.R. Chari
Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are recognizable as “arrangements designed to enhance…assurance of mind and belief in the trust-worthiness of states…confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military strategy. In fact the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical and social relationships”. This suggests military and non-military initiatives undertaken by antagonistic states to reduce tensions and enhance mutual confidence. CBMs are designed essentially to increase understanding by reducing suspicions. They are separable into military and non-military CBMs and into those having a unilateral, bilateral or international content. Military CBMs are also classifiable into transparency, communications and constraint measures to perform the related functions of information, notification, observation and stabilization.

        CBMs can further be catalogued into provisions enabling information exchange, mutual access to observation or arrangements to handle incidents and crises. A counsel of perfection suggests their pursuit in all these separate directions. But, “Negotiating and implementing CBMs requires political will, but only modest amounts of capital need be expended to begin the process…[CBMs] have met the minimal requirements of not worsening any state’s security and not increasing existing levels of hostility.”

Forging “ Security Consensus” in South Asia
Empirical experience informs that a foundation must be laid for negotiating CBMs before such commitments are made. This is crucial in South Asia where abiding suspicions require meaningful communications being established between States before negotiating conflict-avoidance and confidence-building measures. Indubitably, the region comprises a discrete geo-strategic region. But: “Crucial to the success of regional approaches [to meet security threats] is the forging of a security consensus in each region”. The significance of CBMs and regional dialogue for constructing this  “security consensus” cannot be over-emphasized. By way of analogy a web of CBMs and regional dialogues have succeeded in fostering peace and tranquility in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

        But synthesizing a “security consensus” in South Asia has proved difficult since four seminal factors lie at the roots of insecurities in the region. They are:

• The bitter hostilities and tensions distinguishing Indo-Pak relations that have sparked several conflicts, overt and covert in the past, which casts a pall over the region. These enmities are deeply inter-twined with their domestic politics and have now acquired a palpable nuclear dimension.

• Indo-centricity erects a psychological barrier that aggravates the insecurities of its small neighbours since marked differences in politico-military weight between states is hardly conducive to building confidence between them.

• Inter–and intra-state insecurities are linked and spill across national borders; they have often been fomented by the regional countries against their neighbours.

• The newer security threats in South Asia “largely arise from non-military causes like cross-border movements of population; ethno-political, socio-economic, and communal-religious politics; terrorism, with its seminal linkages to money-laundering operations, and drugs/arms smuggling; environmental degradation, spawning its related problems of deforestation and desertification; internal migration; chaotic urbanization, and so on”.  But regional elites are focused on traditional/military sources of insecurity.

Nature of CBMs in South Asia
Utilizing the CBM modality to stabilize adversarial state relations reveals several paradoxes. Before illustrating them, four characteristics of the CBMs established in South Asia may be noticed.

• First, their almost exclusive pursuit in the bilateral Indo-Pak context; this ensures a disproportionate emphasis on military CBMs. They have generally been emplaced following serious military crises like those associated with the Brasstacks Exercise (1987) and the Kashmir-related Spring crisis (1990). The CBMs negotiated consequently included an agreement not to attack each other’s designated nuclear facilities and installations (1988); advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and movements (1991); prevention of air space violations and permitting overflights/landings by military aircraft (1991); upgrading hotline communications between the Directors General of Military Operations (1991); and joint declaration not to use, produce, or stock chemical weapons, or transfer related technology to others (1992). It should be added that important non-military CBMs have also been negotiated between India and Pakistan; they include the much-esteemed Indus Waters Treaty (1960), and the Tashkent  (1966) and Simla (1972) Agreements.

• Second, inadequate recognition obtains of several momentous non-military CBMs established between India and its small neighbours. They include the agreement between India and Bangladesh (1997) to share the Ganges waters; India and Bhutan (1974) to construct the Chukha hydro-electric project and establish a power sharing arrangement; India and Nepal (1996) to undertake the integrated development of the Mahakali river; India and Sri Lanka (1998) to institute a free trade zone; and a decision to negotiate the sale of surplus power by Pakistan to India (1998).

• Third, Indo-Pak relations imperatively need stabilization after their sequential nuclear tests in May 1998; several nuclear CBMs were listed in the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying the Lahore Declaration (February 1999). These impulses lie buried presently on the snowy heights of Drass and Kargil, but they chart a future path for stabilizing Indo-Pak nuclear relations whenever the opportunity becomes available.

• Fourth, the belief obtains that dominant single issues must first be resolved before the CBM process could proceed. The Farakka dispute was one such issue, which has been addressed by the Indo-Bangladesh Accord in 1997. The Kashmir issue continues to frustrate the normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan identifies Kashmir as the ‘core’ issue to be settled first before the bilateral CBM process can evolve. India favours a multi-track approach in which Kashmir is included within a broad agenda. Further, India insists that Kashmir be bilaterally discussed, whilst Pakistan favours external mediation. In the overall India finds Pakistan’s proposal for re-introducing the UN Military Observers Group to monitor the line of control in Kashmir unacceptable. The conversion of the line of control into an international border is anathema to Pakistan. This impasse on Kashmir will come up again whenever the two leaderships resume their bilateral dialogue, but it is clear they have long run out of ideas.

Paradoxes in pursuing the CBM Modality
Proceeding further, three unresolved paradoxes can be identified in South Asia that afflict the practicability of the CBM modality; they also have relevance for other conflict-prone regions.
• First, CBMs admittedly “provide the atmospherics for improving inter-State relations, and providing the instrumentality to proceed further with an arms control and disarmament process”. They can establish trust between adversarial states; but the paradox obtains that trust is required before CBMs can be negotiated. The need for some limited confidence between adversarial states is therefore essential before CBMs can be negotiated.
• Second, CBMs are difficult to establish, but easy to disrupt. Continued adherence to them requires adversarial states to perceive the balance of advantage to lie in not abrogating them, particularly during crises. Experience reveals, on the contrary, that the hotline established between the Directors General of Military Operations became non-functional during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 due to telephones being either left unattended or manned by junior officers with no real authority. In addition, during the Brasstacks crisis (1987), “…information shared through the hotline was deemed unreliable because of mutual suspicions; hence, information supplied on Pakistani request was only minimally complied with”.  Obviously, hotlines can only be relevant in crises if trust obtains. They are known to work satisfactorily in times of peace. Hence the paradox that states may abide by CBMs in normal times, but ignore them in emergency situations.
• Third, public declarations can serve as useful CBMs to alleviate tensions and promote stability; they “can take the form of joint summit statements, negotiated agreements of a declaratory nature—such as non-attack pledges—and/or unilateral statements”. The historical record shows that national leaders in India and Pakistan routinely make conciliatory statements, but they are either meant to garner domestic support or impress international audiences or lower the Other’s guard. The paradox then emerges: “ Rather than promote security and confidence building, such declarations have often exacerbated existing regional tensions”.
Lessons & Recommendations
In the light of these considerations in South Asia the following recommendations can be suggested.

• First, it would be unwise to conclude that military CBMs should be preferred to non-military CBMs or vice versa; both serve the laudable purpose of improving relations between antagonistic states. Military CBMs are designed to avoid or prevent conflict; they are prophylactic in character. Non-military CBMs can soften the edges of suspicion, and generate an atmosphere conducive to peace and stability by enlarging the areas of cooperation pertaining to the newer sources of insecurity like migration, transnational crime and so on. A realistic prognosis of their threats to national security would inform which CBMs should preferentially be sought in South Asia.

• Second, a pledge by the regional states that they “shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations” is of supreme importance. It is no secret that subversion and covert intervention in the internal affairs of their neighbours is national policy in South Asia. Numerous instances can be provided; hence, it is recommended that SAARC leaders issue a joint statement at their next summit meeting that they will discourage such activity in future, which could prove a very useful declaratory CBM.

• Third, past experience reveals that CBMs are best sought in an incremental fashion since; “An evolutionary step-by-step approach seems to work best, at least until core security issues must be tackled”. A building block approach commends itself; hence the military CBMs established between India and Pakistan could be enlarged before more radical measures are sought. Thus:-

 (a) The agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities and installations could be extended to identified population and economic targets.

 (b) The agreement on providing advance notice of military exercises could be broadened to associating military observers with major field exercises, and establishing crisis management centres.

 (c) The agreement on preventing air space violations could be enlarged into an ‘open skies’ arrangement to allow joint aerial reconnaissance of the line of control, which has been activated after the Kargil-Drass conflict.

• Fourth, greater attention needs being given to non-military CBMs that can, in a low-key manner, improve relations between India and its smaller neighbours, but also between India and Pakistan. Article III of the Simla Agreement provides a framework for such measures. It proposes:

 (a) Steps shall be taken to resume communications,postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights.

 (b) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

 (c) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

 (d) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.
 

The potential of this holistic agenda to pursue a range of non-military CBMs in South Asia is apparent; it provides the blueprint for a cooperative and comprehensive approach to national security.

• Fifth, the need for India and Pakistan to negotiate nuclear weapons related CBMs is both immediate and vital. They had pledged under the Lahore Declaration to provide each other with “advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests”; notify any “accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident”, maintain a “unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions”; “conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea”; “review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures”; “review existing communication links…with a view to upgrading and improving these links”; and “ engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues”. There are several complex technical issues involved in converting these expressions of intent into concrete agreements that could inspire confidence. In the absence of dialogue the resulting nuclear uncertainty is the single largest source of instability in South Asia. This has been accentuated by the long-range artillery duels and intrusions in Kargil that have perturbed the line of control in Kashmir casting serious doubts on the alleged stabilizing role of nuclear weapons. This is especially alarming since, as the earliest nuclear interactions between the United States and Soviet Union inform us, “nuclear equations are most unsettled and tension-producing at the outset of any such pairing”.

• Sixth, the “Graduated Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) strategy offers the best hope of successful incremental implementation of non-military CBMs between India and Pakistan”, since taking unilateral conciliatory steps could be politically difficult. The GRIT strategy would “ encompass initiating a positive action in order to elicit an appropriate reciprocating move from the adversary”. An example would be lowering tariff walls in respect of specified goods for a limited interval to explore the possibility of this gesture being reciprocated. This modality could be extended to military CBMs eg. by reducing troops in a designated border zone with further reductions being predicated on similar troop re-deployments being effected by the adversary.

• Seventhly, a larger engagement between the South Asian countries through regional and sub-regional cooperation should be sought through commerce and joint economic development agreements. This process is important, which suggests vigorous exploration of the areas of cooperation identified by SAARC, promoting the transformation of SAPTA into SAFTA, and exploring infrastructural schemes like the establishment of oil pipelines, power projects, communications, and exploitation of water resources. The extension of the Indus Waters Treaty into a spatial development plan for the integrated development of the Indus river basin is one such visionary concept that could be explored for its potential as a fruitful CBM.

Conclusions
Structural factors are important and have undoubtedly retarded the establishment of CBMs in South Asia. Nevertheless, CBMs can become the harbingers of peace and stability in the region. History reveals they have usually been negotiated following serious bilateral crises and/or the mounting of external pressures. The international community is seriously concerned with India and Pakistan entering the nuclear weapons community, but remaining unable to deter the savage Kargil conflict in the politically explosive area of Kashmir. International pressures can reasonably be expected to be exercised on India and Pakistan to revive the CBMs process and ensure against a nuclear conflagration. There are other systemic factors, which encourage optimism that the political will can be generated in South Asia to negotiate CBMs. They include the progressive assertion of civilian control over the military establishment; initiatives taken by the SAARC Chambers of Commerce to enlarge trade relations; the multiplicity of Track II efforts that are proceeding; apart from attempts being made by common citizens to re-establish trans-border personal and familial linkages. This encourages the belief that the people of South Asia are ahead of their governments in appreciating the need for peace and stability in the region. Besides, a third post-Partition generation is reaching positions of responsibility in these countries; they would be more largely concerned with their economic betterment, rather than dwelling on memories of bitter past conflictual history.

(From the text of the author’s presentation at the RCSS Conference on “Confidence Building Measures, Retrospect and Prospect”, June 17-19,1999)

From the bookshelf...

Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1999
Charles E. Morrison (ed.)
Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999

               Developments through 1998 – including the ongoing East Asian economics crisis, nuclear tests in May by India and Pakistan, the August launch of a multistage missile by North Korea, and renewed tensions in October- November between the Philippines and China over Mischief Reef in the South China Sea- underscore the continuing uncertainties in the Asia Pacific security environment and consequent difficulties of constructing a more stable regional security order. These and other events, as well as their near-term implications are explored in the 1999 edition of the annual Asia Pacific Security Outlook.

                Written for general audiences and security experts alike, the volume assesses perceptions of regional security, key defense issues and the contributions to regional and global security of 17 member countries of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

                The book, a centerpiece initiative of the Asia Pacific Agenda Project, is prepared through a collaboration among the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, the East-West Center, and the Japan Center for International Exchange.
 

Internal and External Dynamics of South Asian Security
Moonis Ahmar (ed.)
Fazleesons Pvt. Ltd. Karachi, 1998

              Essays in this volume are an outcome of a workshop on “Internal and External Dynamics of South Asian Security” organized by the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi.

              The volume focuses attention on the linkage between domestic and regional politics and underscores the non-military dimension of security which has a bearing on the security of South Asian nations. The linkage between internal and external aspects of security is also explored. The concepts of confidence building and conflict resolution constitute part of the discussion.

              The timeliness of the initiative is commendable in view of recent developments in South Asia which indicate encouraging, though not fully convincing signals of some progress towards stability. The book is an attempt to generate pragmatic and workable concepts of security which could yield results if implemented by decision makers.

Contributors: Moonis Ahmar, Shaheen Akhtar, Tazeen Javed, Ashok Kapur, Saba G. Khattak, Mussarat Qdeem, Mehtab Ali Shah, Akmal Siddiq, Farhan H. Siddiqui, Iftekharuzzaman and Talat A. Wizarat .

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Iqbal Fellow, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany

In many ways CBMs appear to be an extension of conference diplomacy. While secrecy breeds many interpretations, misperceptions,    distrust, and can cause risky behaviour, the openness tends to narrow down options and can act as an effective damage limitation mechanism. The secret diplomacy was viewed as one of the major cause of the First World War and after the war efforts were directed to transform the secret     diplomacy into an open dialogue or conference diplomacy.

        CBMs seem to be the product of tensions and rigidity of the Cold War though some writers trace the origin to the Treaty of Versailles (following the defeat of Germany) and specifically referred to the treaty provisions dealing with the demilitarisation of the Rhineland and on-site    inspection. The inflexible attitudes of the major actors of the Cold War needed to be softened up before any major stride could be made towards the desired arms control measure. The decade of the 70s was not only accompanied by detente but also demonstrated an impressive growth of CBMs. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 gave birth to first generation of CBMs which primarily focused on transparency and openness with regard to       military affairs. Measures like notification in  advance (at least 21 days) of major military manoeuvres (beyond 25,000 troops), invitation of observers to military manoeuvres or exercise did inject certain amount of transparency. The underneath logic was that greater transparency might reduce mutual suspicions and fears of surprise  attack.

        The second generation of CBMs grew in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and were highlighted in Stockholm Accord of 1986. The Stockholm Accord emphasised not just upon the transparency but also stressed more heavily on ‘access measures’. The access measures implied observation and inspection of certain military  activities. Mandatory measures such as notific ation forty two day (previous was 21 days) in  advance of a major military exercise or concentration of forces, exchange of annual calendar by November 15 of all military activities, invitation of observers to all exercises or concentrations in excess of 17,000 troops, on site inspection by challenge etc. The terminology of  CBM was changed into CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures). Indeed the objectives       involved were enlarged and it now included transparency, observation and inspection of military activities, prevention of war by misunderstandings and   miscalculations, and reduction of the chances of political intimidation by employing an overwhelming force posture closer to target country’s  border.

        The third generation of CBMs were codified in Vienna Document of 1990 which included   information exchange provision, improving on site inspection, communications links,  encouraging contact among forces, consultation and cooperation regarding unusual and unscheduled military activities, conflict  prevention centre and number of constraint measures. The application of the CBMs paid the anticipated dividends in European context. Thus CBMs seemed a useful means to coveted ends. These are not end by themselves.

        The primary purpose of CBMs is to encourage the introduction of transparency and to arrest the dangerous drift towards crisis that could lead to a war. In essence CBMs tend to inject openness and reduce tensions as well as improve    atmosphere conducive to some form of cooperative behaviour. Openness can introduce qualitative improvement in the prevailing climate of   distrust and apprehensions, enhance better understanding of adversary’s perceptions and can help establish working relationships between the    antagonist states. Simply defined, the term itself clearly reflects a process to build confidence   between the adversaries. To inject confidence in an atmosphere where distrust reigns supreme is not an easy task. Even to begin negotiations in such a situation require political will and a      recognition of  dictates of time. Since it is easier to negotiate a CBM measure than an agreement or a formal arms control treaty, not only the popularity of the CBMs have been on the rise but they are emerging as essential means of preventing unintended escalation and minimising dangers of accidental wars.

CBMs and South Asia
Confidence building is not really a new     phenomenon in South Asia in general and between India and Pakistan in particular. Since the      hurried departure of the British from South Asia and partition of the Indian subcontinent, both  India and Pakistan have signed many agreements aimed to generate confidence and reduce tensions. Among them perhaps the most notables are; Liaquat-Nehru Pact (1951), Indus Water Treaty (1960), Tashkent Agreement (1966), Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968), Simla Accord (1972), Salal Dam Agreement (1978), and the establishment of the Joint Commission (1983). With the exception of Joint Commission, all of them were the product of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments. Similarly both India and Sri Lanka were able to secure agreements on stateless people  (Sirima – Shastri pact in 1964), the fate of Kachchaitivu Island was decided in favour of Sri Lanka in 1979. In addition Indian army has played peace-keeping role in Sri Lanka in the 80s. The main irritant between India and Bangladesh has been the Farrakha Barrage dispute which in    recent times has been resolved amicably in 1996 (Hasina and Gowda in Dec. 1960) though the  falling water level of Ganges does elicit criticism periodically from certain  quarters. Earlier the  border issues have been successfully resolved. The main sources of tensions between India and Nepal revolved around sharing of Waters of Mahakali river, 1950 treaty and migrations in the Terai  region. Almost all of them have been resolved in some form. With    liberal provisions dealing trade, transit and currency, some kind of economic union already exists.

        The main conflict between India and Pakistan revolves around the Kashmir dispute. Despite the advent of so many CBMs, the normalisation still seems a somewhat an illusive pursuit. Since the end of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, many CBMs have been adopted with a pronounced emphasis upon military CBMs. The earliest one came immediately after the 1971 war. A ‘Hotline’ between the DGMOs (Director Generals of Military Operations) was established in 1971. The existing CBMs can be grouped in the following categories;

A. Communication Measures
A direct communication link (DCL) known as ‘hotline’ between DGMOs was established in 1971. Following 1990 crisis it was decided to use this line on weekly basis; DCLs are also in place between sector commanders; Establishment of hotline between Pakistan Air Force and Indian Air Force (1993); Communication between the naval vessals and air crafts of the two navies when in each others vicinity (May 1993); Establishment of a hotline between the Prime Ministers in 1997 after Male summit and People to people contacts; Track II diplomacy, NGOs, and dialogues between various non-governmental groups like Neemrana Initiative or India-Pakistan forum started since 1991.

B. Transparency Measures
Inviting observers to watch military exercises (Zerb-e-Momin in 1989 and 1990 Indian exercise and the US observers); Publication of Annual  Defence Report – India publishes it almost regularly;Public negotiations for arms procurement by both India and Pakistan and all notification measures and successfully concluded      agreements would fall into this category;

C. Consultation Measures
India - Pakistan joint Commission (1982) and Foreign Secretary Level Talks - periodically    interrupted - resumed after Sharif-Vajpayee talks in New York 1998.

D. Goodwill Measures
Various military goodwill measures (1993) and Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel (1992).

        Despite the above mentioned impressive list of CBMs, tensions between the two countries have not really subsided in a meaningful way. Does this mean that the CBMs have failed to deliver the expected dividends? Indeed the track record of the CBMs has not been very impressive. But this does not mean that they have failed miserably to     contribute towards the desired ameliorisation of the prevalent atmosphere. Different opinions have been expressed regarding the efficacy of the CBMs. While some attributed limited success, there were others who viewed the CBMs as     complete failure. Whatever one may say, the    indisputable fact is that since 1972 India- Pakistan have not really fought a full fledged war. During 1986-87 and 1990 the two countries came close to blows but war was averted. Part of the contributions were indeed made by the existing CBMs.

        The inability of the CBMs to effectively contribute towards the desired peace in South Asia is the product of many factors. First and perhaps the most important is the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Many Pakistanis view Kashmir as part of the unfinished agenda of partition and a symbol of Indian high-handedness and clever manoeuvring. They feel being outwitted and cheated by India. India took over states of Hyderabad and Junagadh on the grounds of overwhelming non-Muslim population and their geographical position whereas in the case of  Kashmir, India employed the principle of ruler’s right to accede. The ruler of Junagadh opted to join Pakistan and the Nizam of Hyderabad wanted an independent status, yet India invaded those states and occupied them. By employing delaying tactics India bought sufficient times to complicate the dispute and systematically projected various arguments for justifying its occupation of the Kashmir. India dislikes to be reminded of its application of different principles to different states and asserts that it is an integral part of  India. Many Indian writers also link the retention of Kashmir as an extremely important for its   secular polity.

        Second, to accord maximum respect to agreed principles and agreement does not seem to be very common in South Asia. Different interpretations of agreements often tend to further facilitate the strengthening of non compliance and non adherence. It is often stressed in some quarters that honouring the spirit of agreement is not as sacrosanct in South Asia as it is in Europe, Middle East and Latin America.

        Third factor revolves around perceptions and negative images. Both India and Pakistan continue to entertain negative images of each other. The most attractive view of India among the Pakistani elite and decision makers is that of a hegemonic and a bully. The Indian view of Pakistan is that of a theocratic and militaristic state. An objective view probably disagree with both of them. While there are many factors and developments that assist the formation of both perceptions and misperceptions as well as self and adversary’s images, three factors seemed to have contributed relatively more and strengthened such negative images; history, media, weak and irrational leadership.

        Given the less than expected performances of the CBMs in South Asia, what recipe can be  pursued in order to make them work. At the outset it needs to be recognised that the CBM is not a device to resolve conflict, it is just a piece in the process-an important piece that needs to be promoted. With the nucleariastion of South Asia, it is somewhat imperative for both India and   Pakistan to demonstrate their rational qualities. Both sides should not only encourage a balanced approaches to history writings and positive pursuits by media, the political leaders should also demonstrate their determination to resolve the   outstanding issues impeding the progress on peace path. Both the Indian and Pakistani PMs have demonstrated rational behaviour in recent times. PM Vajpayee’s tough stand against Shiv Sena’s threats to Pakistani sports teams’ Indian visits was matched by Nawaz Sharif’s equally strong measures against the disruptive activities of Jamat during Vajpayee’s Lahore visit. Such pursuits would indeed resuscitate the effectiveness of CBMs as well. Besides, there exist a need to introduce more CBMs in economic and social  areas. This is not to suggest that military CBMs are not injected. In fact there should be web of more and more CBMs. The following suggested CBMs could further improve the atmosphere enabling the two governments to address the   contentious issues with patience and perseverance.

A. Military CBMs
More transparency in Defence budgets;Publication of annual calendar of exercises; Increasing the number of observers including international observers for military exercises;  Allowing participation from across the border in Defence Colleges’ courses; Exchanges of military instructors at various levels; Registration of weapons sales agreements with SAARC; To promote joint security studies; No War Proposal in some acceptable form; An agreement in principle for reduction of forces without going into details   initially; Proposal for collaborative arrangement for nuclear waste disposal; Withdrawal of troops from border areas and creating a ten miles (on both sides) a troop free Security zone and Proposal to freeze defence budgets for at least two years initially.

B. Economic CBMs
Encouraging Chambers of Trade and Commerce contacts-exchange of visits; Promoting SAPTA and SAFTA; Joint Ventures-may be initially in third country; Joint Commission on  Agriculture; Promoting increased trade-mutually agreed increase in the trading items and Collaborative schemes tackling two countries energy  problems.

C. Cultural and Social CBMs
Joint archaeological excavation and monument preservation; Visa relaxation-country visa should be introduced instead of continuing with city visa-drop police reporting; Visits tours to historical and religious places needs to be   encouraged and facilitated; A cultural agreement need to be finalised; Flow of books, journals and newspapers need to be encouraged; Contact between medical and scientific institutes; UGC of the two countries must plan joint project-exchange of student and teachers initially for a short period but later could be extended; People to people contacts must be encouraged-track II diplomacy-NGOs work; Joint research projects  regarding minimising the adverse effects of religious intolerance; Energising SAARC-revamping it by improvising its charter-establishing SAARC Chairs and Establishing contact between Professional Associations.

D. Political CBMs
Inviting election observers from across the border; Encouraging contact between parties and parliamentarians; Holding Speakers conferences; Curbing propaganda; Adherence to non interference in each others internal affairs and creating institutional linkages-like Judiciary etc.

        While one can think of many CBMs, it needs to be kept in mind that progress in core areas as well as regarding the outstanding disputes is   absolutely imperative. While a core dispute like the Kashmir remain unresolved and no progress towards its resolution is registered, the achievements in other relative less significant areas would soon be eroded. Thus it is important that the two sides clearly recognise what they consider as the core issues.

(From the text of the author’s presentation at the RCSS Conference on “Confidence Building Measures, Retrospect and Prospect”, June 17-19,1999)

               In the death of Eqbal Ahmad- the brilliant Pakistani political scientist, journalist, activist and thinker-South Asia has lost one of its most illustrious sons. 

              Despite knowing him for some thirty years. I came close to Ahmad only during the last decade or so. Strangely because it gradually became obvious to us that, while we shared almost nothing of each other’s larger vision, we agreed on virtually everything that was of immediate political and intellectual concern to us. Eqbal and I soon found out, that the immediate concerns we shared did indeed cover a huge range of activities.

              From the visionary courses on the sources of violence in South Asia that the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo organises to the Saadat Hassan Manto Lectures on South Asian theories of violence that the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies hosts at Delhi. In the last three years, everything I have done has involved him in some way or other.

              Eqbal was a Bihari. Like most westernised upper-class Biharis these days, Eqbal had a touch of the wandering, itinerant intellectual about him. Only he began his journey early, in the wake of the massive bloodshed and the uprooting that accompanied the division of British India fifty years ago. The tiredness of those fifty years had begun to show in recent years. Those like me, who feel maimed by his sudden death , may like to console themselves by thinking that he deserves his rest now.

In the passing away of Eqbal Ahmed, South Asia has lost one of its brilliant scholars. At the RCSS, with which he has briefly associated, we deeply mourn his loss.