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GROUP REPORTS |
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GROUP REPORTS |
The daily group discussions by syndicates culminated in three
group presentations on the last day of the workshop. Over the
days of the workshop, each group deliberated on one of the
following topics: 1. Regional and International Implications of
the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, 2. Global War on Terror, 3. Expansion
of SAARC.
Following are the group reports that comprise the issues raised
during the course of the group discussions, and elaborate on the
salient points made during the presentations:
Report of Group I
Regional and International Implications of US-India Nuclear
Deal
Members of the Group:
Shantanu Chakrabarti
Gao Qiqi
Ghulam Murtaza
Reshmi Kazi
Swapna Kona
Li Li
Peng Xiaojiang
Cyma Riaz
Navjot Bir Singh
Xie Daigang
Xue Chen
This report has been drafted on behalf of the group by
Navjot Bir Singh.
I) A Note on Group Dynamics:
Comprising of scholars from India, Pakistan and China; three
states with a history of differing positions on various issues;
the group meetings did witness heated debates while discussing
the group’s approach to the topic. However, as the interactions
progressed it became easier to shed internalized state positions
and to look at the issue more dispassionately.
Since the theme of the workshop was “Defence, Technology and
Cooperative Security in South Asia”, we interpreted it as
reflecting a neo-realist perspective. Therefore we have used
neo-realism to inform our understanding of the issue at hand. In
particular, insights from two important scholars helped us set
our parameters. While Robert Jervis’ work on concept of security
dilemma was used to see potential implications of the deal for
other relevant state actors in the region, we borrowed Barry
Buzan’s ideas to define what we meant by the region. As Buzan
has argued that earlier regional security complexes such as
South Asia have dissolved into a larger Asian Security Complex
after end of Cold War, we have tried to analyze implications of
the deal in terms of the Asian region as a whole rather than
focusing merely on South Asia.
Finally, to analyze what the deal implies for the international
system we decided to look at its impact on existing
non-proliferation regimes. After some discussion it was decided
that we would focus on Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in
particular on its important associated institutions: the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
II) What is the United States-India Nuclear Deal?
The US-India Nuclear Deal was signed on 18 July 2005 and follows
up on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership document of 2004
and the 10 year US-India Defence Framework Agreement of June
2005. This is important as it connotes the deal not merely
marking civilian nuclear energy cooperation but also implying a
larger strategic bargain between the sole super power (United
States) keen on maintaining this status quo at the international
level and a regional power (India) seeking to secure its status
within South Asia while also trying to achieve what it believes
is its long aspired rightful claim to being recognized as a
great power in the near future.
However, the deal will only become effective after two sets of
negotiations to determine its final terms are successfully
concluded. The first set of negotiations are the 123
negotiations between India and US to synchronize terms of the
two relevant drafts (already passed by the US Congress and the
Indian Parliament) that lay out the contours of cooperation
between the two states and spell out respective commitments and
obligations. The 123 negotiations would in turn impinge upon
parallel negotiations proceeding between India and the IAEA to
finalize a safeguards agreement to govern India’s nuclear
programme and also upon US efforts to secure support from
individual member countries to exempt India from provisions of
NSG guidelines.
Prima facie the deal is based on ‘a give and take’ arrangement
where India ‘reciprocally agrees’ to accept certain
responsibilities in exchange for civilian nuclear technology.
However, when viewed in terms of the larger context in which it
emerged, the civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement actually
represents a step towards greater benefits for both signatory
parties. From the perspective of India, the deal:
• Provides for US paving the way for a civilian nuclear
exception for India in the NPT framework. It thereby enhances
India’s energy security by ensuring access to uninterrupted
supply of uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear energy reactors
as well as to acquiring technical information and international
finance to expand its civilian nuclear energy programme. Nuclear
energy is seen as being both more cost-efficient as well as
cleaner than the energy available from depleting hydrocarbon
reserves
• Despite bringing India into the NPT framework provides it with
a workaround to deal with the non-proliferation regime and still
advance its interests in the international system. Thus, while
India does not have to join the NPT or accept full scope
safeguards it does get de facto recognition as a responsible
nuclear weapon state with safeguards on its civilian facilities.
This will be a critical exception as Indian political elite
believes that the coveted great power status in the form of
permanent membership of United Nations Security Council flows
from nuclear weapons and the legal sanctity provided to select
nuclear club by NPT.
• Also makes India a part of elite club developing the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); a
futuristic source of virtually unlimited energy
• Brings in its wake potential collateral benefits such as (a)
increased collaboration in combating terrorism as well as its
state sponsors (b) military joint training and infrastructure
development (c) increased opportunities for economic development
through greater investment and (d) significant improvement in
diplomatic engagement in international fora.
Having noted benefits accruing to India, it is important to
locate US stake in the deal too. For the US the deal:
• Facilitates a close strategic relationship with India that is
viewed as being vital to its national interests in light of the
emerging global balance of power where the primary US strategic
aim is to contain growing challenge from China and to ensure its
primacy in an economically and strategically indispensable yet
volatile West Asia and Central Asia
• Promises more effective cooperation in US led global war on
terrorism and its state sponsors. This would have particular
salience in Iran and Afghanistan where India could be a great
asset with its proximity
• Makes sound economic sense as it provides US nuclear energy
firms lucrative benefits from selling of civilian nuclear power
technology to India. It creates a potential US partnership in an
Indian economy that is growing at a rate of over 8 per cent per
annum
• Salvages some prestige in international institutions after
diplomatic failures such as in US withdrawal from climate change
negotiations and the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty and in
preventing undermining of nuclear non-proliferation order by
non-signatories such as Pakistan and India as well as by
signatories such as North Korea and possibly Iran. In such a
backdrop the deal promises a limited success by bringing a
hitherto recalcitrant India partly into the otherwise crumbling
non-proliferation framework. It is an important step because
existing non-proliferation regime has failed either to force
India to give up its nuclear weapons or to make it accept
international inspections and restrictions on its nuclear
facilities. The bilateral deal thus recognizes that it is far
better for the non-proliferation community if India works with
it rather than against it.
III) Regional Implications:
The US-India Nuclear Deal brings benefits for both parties.
However, absence of measures in it to restrain India from
continuing to produce nuclear weapons constitutes a loophole
that along with strategic re-alignments induced by the new
partnership portends major implications for the Asian region.
By ensuring uninterrupted supply of imported nuclear fuel for
India’s civilian facilities the deal frees up all of its
domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many
more nuclear weapons than would otherwise have been possible.
This is not a mere case of oversight when one takes into
consideration the larger US strategic goals informing its
alignment with India and efforts at containment of China. The
deal in its present form with US objective of making India a
global or at least a regional military power to achieve its own
perceived interests could force major stakeholders to
re-evaluate their security interests thus leading to
transformation of regional alliance structures.
Apart from not restraining India’s nuclear weapons programme
based on its domestic resources of fissile material the
legitimate transfers of dual use technology and nuclear fuel for
civilian facilities also accentuates anxieties for China and
Pakistan. Their anxieties arise from the fact that these would
be vulnerable to being diverted for military purposes as was the
case earlier leading up to India’s first ’peaceful’ nuclear
explosion in 1974.
Pakistan has always had an India specific linear threat
perception that identifies security and national interest as
response to the perceived existential threat from its large
eastern neighbour. To offset this threat it has invested in
support of a superpower, mostly the United States. That is why
it resents the deal as it aims at making India a global military
power by providing it de facto acceptance as a nuclear weapons
state while according a symbolic status of a Major Non NATO Ally
to Pakistan. Pakistan regards the deal as ‘discriminatory’ and
‘unacceptable’.
Since Pakistan wants equal treatment it will go elsewhere for
nuclear support, with China most likely to provide this
assistance. China has already assisted Pakistan’s civilian
nuclear programme in the past and was named by Central
Investigative Agency as ‘principal supplier’ of Pakistani
nuclear weapons programme. If Pakistan’s threat perception is
compounded by the final shape of the deal it could exercise
other options including a possible strategic alliance with other
great powers such as China and Russia. Its enthusiasm for the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization initiative points to such a
possibility. Another grim option could be for Pakistan to seek
parity with India not only through expanded nuclear ties with
China, but also by a more aggressive pursuit of nuclear
technology from the global nuclear bazaar.
China has in its pursuit for economic power sought to improve
its relations with all its neighbours including India. Despite
growing economic relations and on going diplomatic initiative to
resolve the boundary dispute, it could also be drawn into a
regional arms race. China’s rise is a critical factor prompting
US to seek the deal as it sees India as the best bet to balance
China’s improved capabilities. If the deal alters the nuclear
balance between both neighbours China could go beyond supporting
Pakistan, by also choosing to fortify its own nuclear arsenal.
These fears of the deal resulting in qualitative and
quantitative improvement in India’s nuclear arsenal could weaken
prevailing deterrence in the region and trigger nuclear arms
competition involving Pakistan, India and China, thus
destabilizing the entire region. Changes in their respective
nuclear postures and arsenals will have impact beyond these
three states as a vicious spiral of security-insecurity in the
form of security dilemma could arise and engulf states from East
Asia such as Japan, Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea and
extend up to West Asia where Iran and Israel as it is have
precarious thresholds for exercising possible nuclear options.
In any such worst case scenario, which cannot be ruled out,
Russia could inevitably also be drawn in with its shared
boundaries and vital strategic interests in these regions.
Any analysis of regional implications must also take into
consideration the economic dimension since it is one of the
driving forces behind regional cooperation and integration.
In this context Iran is an important indicator of trends. India
and Iran share many strategic interests and have sought to give
form to their relationship by cooperating on the three state
Iran-Pakistan-India Oil Pipeline project. It ensures economic
benefits for all three parties and in particular promises India
access to energy supplies that are both critical in short term
(given that nuclear energy accounts for barely 3 per cent of its
total energy requirements) and more cost efficient than any
other form available including nuclear energy. In fact it has
been argued by dissenting sections of Indian strategic community
that meeting energy needs by importing nuclear reactors will
only lead to energy insecurity and exorbitant costs.
However, the deal has already cast its shadow over India’s
relations with Iran as India’s vote for US motion against Iran
in the IAEA was a clear fallout of the deal. It is evident that
successful realization and operation of the deal would be
contingent upon continued Indian support for sanctioning and
containing Iran and that in turn has meant additional
complications for the already stuck Iran-Pakistan-India
pipeline.
The deal has also slowed the process of regional economic
integration of South Asia in form of the South Asian Free Trade
Area (SAFTA) agreement reached by the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation member states on 6 January 2004.
To become operational, SAFTA requires ratification of the
agreement by the seven governments. Also, it requires India and
Pakistan along with Sri Lanka to bring their duties down to 20
per cent in first phase of the two year period ending in 2007.
The SAFTA has been plagued by problems after the US-India
Nuclear Deal as Pakistan is already slowing its feet. For
instance, its October 2006 move to include an additional 302
items in its positive list for trade with India, in clear
violation of SAFTA pact, can be seen as a ploy to continue to
deny the Most Favoured Nation status for India.
IV) International Implications-NPT Institutional Framework:
Any progress on actualization of the US-India Nuclear Deal
necessitates changes in IAEA and NSG guidelines. These are the
two vital institutions that govern the global non-proliferation
order.
As part of the deal, India must negotiate a safeguards agreement
with IAEA that would cover its entire civilian nuclear energy
programme. It would also have to sign an Additional Protocol
that allows more intrusive IAEA inspections on its civilian
facilities. However, India is hesitant about reaching an
agreement with the IAEA that places safeguards in perpetuity
unless it is guaranteed access to nuclear fuel in perpetuity.
In this context, India’s negotiations with IAEA to implement the
safeguards agreement for its civilian facilities are going
nowhere as IAEA is a regulatory, and not a policy making,
authority. It can, as such, provide no assurances of
uninterrupted fuel supply in perpetuity. The only way out of
this impasse is for US to prevail on IAEA to make an exception
for India in regards to safeguards being imposed conditionally.
The NSG is a group of 45 states that was established as a
reaction to the Indian test of 1974. It seeks to regulate
nuclear trade through export controls that preclude possibility
of any future diversion of nuclear technology provided to a
state for peaceful purposes to serve military needs. Further,
NSG guidelines explicitly limit nuclear trade to members of
either the NSG or the NPT.
This excludes possibility of any nuclear cooperation between
India and US or any other nuclear supplier for as long as the
NSG does not amend its rules or makes India specific exceptions
through a unanimous decision. Towards this end, the US has
already started approaching other NSG members to make such an
exception without abandoning NSG consensus rules or the full
scope safeguards condition of supply on all nuclear trade that
can be of dual use.
While member states such as the UK, France Russia and Canada
have been receptive to the initiative the view of hardliners
like Sweden, Denmark and Norway as well as of China remains
uncertain. The US efforts to convince NSG for an Indian
exception is particularly difficult when US is simultaneously
trying to prevent Iran and North Korea, both NPT signatories,
from gaining access to nuclear fuel and technology.
At a geo-political level, by asking for India specific
exceptions in IAEA and NSG, the US has adapted its
anti-proliferation stance to remove a major obstacle to strong
and reliable bilateral strategic relations with India. However,
the deal is likely to weaken NPT at a time when there appears to
be a renewed interest in nuclear weapons programmes in several
states. And this is the most important implication of the deal
for international security.
The basic spirit of NPT regime is enshrined in a grand bargain
enshrined in Article 1 of the treaty whereby the five great
powers keep their nuclear weapons to themselves and provide
other states civilian nuclear technology in exchange for their
refusal to produce nuclear weapons.
The deal undermines the NPT framework in two important ways.
First, by seeking exceptions for India into the NPT the US
creates a dangerous precedent and adapts its own
anti-proliferation stance. Second, the deal represents double
standards as it provides dual use nuclear technology to India
but does not subject it to requirements of disarmament that NPT
imposes upon other states.
As such the deal clearly undermines the present set of
international nuclear rules and the NPT framework. However, it
can be argued that the NPT was any ways crumbling and the deal
actually marks a concrete and practical step towards universal
application of IAEA and NSG safeguards.
V) Conclusion:
The US-India Nuclear Deal is still a work in progress and its
implications for regional and international security will only
be clear after the US Congress, Indian Parliament and the NSG
and IAEA whet it. It will be further dependent on the direction
of the on going India-Pakistan peace process and growing
Sino-Indian relations.
What is still clear is that at a regional level it sets the tone
for strategic re-alignment while at the international level it
tries to incorporate India into the non-proliferation order
through exceptions. Whether it actually resuscitates or damages
the NPT framework will depend on its final shape. In essence, US
has prioritized its interests in regional diplomacy over the NPT
regime, a move that suits Indian interests too.
Report of Group II
Global War on Terror: South Asian Dimension
Members of the Group:
Syeda Nazoora Ali
Ajaya Kumar Das
Siddhartha Dave
Dilip Gogoi
Zafar Habib
Sheikh Humayun
Sankhya Krishnan
Vinod Kumar
Li Jiejun
Sitara Noor
Zhang Lijun
This report has been drafted on behalf of the group by Sankhya
Krishnan.
I Introduction
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) launched in October 2001 has had
a visibly profound impact on the states of South Asia—on
Pakistan most directly and physically, of course, but in one way
or another on the others as well. However, its impact on these
states has been in certain key respects less traumatic—less
politically and socially destabilizing, in other words—than in
the case of countries in some other regions. This is in part
because South Asia, so far at least, has not been a primary
target in the war: it housed none of the so-called “rogue”
states, none of the notorious “axis of evil.”
One school of thought believes that like the Cold War, the war
against terrorism will be a very long struggle in which
ideological, political, and socioeconomic campaigns will be as
important as military campaigns. The spectre of transnational
terrorism has risen from being a peripheral issue in the 1980s
to one of the foremost security challenges facing the South
Asian region collectively. Terrorism has ceased to be a domestic
phenomenon, where a few disgruntled elements committed acts of
violence that were primarily aimed at gaining publicity and
showing the state in bad light. The aphorism that “terrorists
want a lot of publicity and not a lot of people dead”
exemplified the typical operating patterns of the past.
Terrorist groups avoided targeting patterns that would earn them
the hostility of the populace, and indeed did everything to
ensure that the cause and objectives they espoused had a degree
of legitimacy and sympathy among them.
By and large, terrorist groups had clear political ends, and
operated within well-known and well-defined patterns. Terrorism
thus was largely committed to serve political ends and evolved
as a separate activity of violence distinct from war or
conflict. Terrorism as we see it now has a specific
organizational structure with extraordinary destructive
capabilities and the readiness to sacrifice lives. The end of
the Cold War saw the emergence of non-state actors, inflicting
deadly damage to the civilian populace on a large scale.
Although non-state actors like terrorist groups are weaker than
the states they fight against, they have mastered the art of
asymmetric warfare.
A trend that needs to be reflected upon is that of increasing
linkages of regional terrorism with international terrorist
outfits exemplified by the appearance of large numbers of
foreign terrorists. What is making matters worse is that today
the terrorists are not only operating at a more lethal level,
causing far more indiscriminate damage and casualties, but are
also organised on more structured lines, with transnational
leverages in terms of sophisticated weapons, communication
technologies and above all funding. In fact some refer to
terrorist outfits as multinational corporations that have their
operational bases all over the world with terrorist leaders
acting as the CEOs of these corporations.
The GWOT has many theatres of operation including Southeast
Asia, West Asia, Africa and Europe. However the 9/11 terror
attacks in the United States had immediate repercussions in the
extended South Asian neighbourhood. Afghanistan emerged as the
initial battleground of the GWOT. Although the Taliban regime
was swiftly removed, many high value Al Qaeda and Taliban
targets remain at large even after five years, and the Taliban
is currently. regrouping to fight the US forces and their NATO
allies. Pakistan is a unique case; at one level it is a
frontline ally in the GWOT, having changed its priorities in the
wake of 9/11 and thrown its weight behind the US; on the other
hand, Afghanistan and India are still not convinced by the
efforts Pakistan has made in curbing cross-border infiltration
from its soil. While terrorism in Kashmir predates the GWOT, it
has since been incorporated into the GWOT because of the organic
linkages between terrorist groups fighting India in Kashmir and
those fighting the US. Though Sri Lanka and Nepal are also
afflicted by the scourge of terrorism, both of home grown and
transnational variety, this does not strictly come under the
ambit of the GWOT.
II Definitions of Terrorism
According to the US Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism 2004, “the term “terrorism” means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan endorsed the recommendation of
the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change: “For far too long the moral authority of the United
Nations in confronting terrorism has been weakened by the
spectacle of protracted negotiations. But the report of the
High-Level Panel offers us a way to end these arguments. We do
not need to argue whether States can be guilty of terrorism,
because deliberate use of armed force by States against
civilians is already clearly prohibited under international law.
As for the right to resist occupation, it must be understood in
its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately
kill or maim civilians.”
Annan added that “the Panel calls for a definition of terrorism
which would make it clear that any action constitutes terrorism
if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to
civilians and non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a
population or compelling a Government or an international
organization to do or abstain from any act. I believe this
proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world
leaders to unite behind it.”
In September 2006, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy was adopted by its member states. According to the UN
website, “this is the first time that all Member States have
agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism, not
only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in
all its forms and manifestation but also resolving to take
practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and
combat it.”
However the fact remains that there are only ‘definitions’ and
not ‘a definition’ of terrorism. Some states are still unwilling
to throw their weight behind the UN’s definition and the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy admits that there are
‘outstanding issues’ yet to be resolved even as it reaffirmed
“Member States' determination to make every effort to reach an
agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on
international terrorism, including by resolving the outstanding
issues related to the legal definition and scope of the acts
covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective
instrument to counter terrorism.”
Winning or Losing the GWOT?
Almost five years after Operation Enduring Freedom was launched
to wipe out the global terror phenomenon called Al Qaeda and
oust the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, security planners in
the US and other major capitals are struggling to find the
answer to one question: are the US and its partners in the GWOT
winning or losing? Being the flag-bearer of this campaign,
Washington finds itself trapped in a handful of conflict zones
where instead of eradicating the terror infrastructures, the
GWOT has triggered a new wave of insurgencies adding not just to
the collateral damage of civilians in this region, but also
increasing US casualties every passing day.
Though the campaign started on a positive note by exterminating
a major chunk of Al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan and
dethroning the Taliban from power, the decision to extend this
campaign to Iraq turned out to be a catastrophe virtually
pushing this country into civil strife and total anarchy. The
initial years of GWOT were deemed successful when U.S. forces
eliminated a sizable chunk of Al Qaeda commanders and cadre,
leaving out its highest leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Al Qaeda lost its central organisational capacity,
but in turn became a symbol and focal point around which
like-minded people could rally around. As an idea, it continued
to capture the thinking and indoctrination of thousands of
Muslim youth around the world. Besides, the success in
Afghanistan was not perpetual as the Taliban has recouped its
cadre and logistics. Not only have the initial gains of the
campaign been squandered, but the existence of the current
Afghan government is also under threat.
On the other hand, Iraq has turned out to be a huge strategic
blunder by the Bush administration as its plans of bringing
democracy and structural reforms have failed to take root even
as a bloody insurgency led by Iraqi Sunni groups, with declared
affiliation to Al Qaeda, has pushed the state into total
anarchy. The US and its allies are counting the body bags
flowing in from various theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq even as
the tentacles of global terror have spread to newer theatres in
South Asia and Europe. At no time was the desperation more
clear, when the US President pronounced the new wave as
‘Islamofascism’ - a statement which only helped alienate Islamic
states from the GWOT. The return of violence in the volatile
Middle East with the Hezbollah’s re-ascendancy and Israeli
belligerence against the Lebanon-based group further divided the
global community after bloody collateral damage was taken upon
innocent civilians.
The ‘long war’, which has merely covered two of its declared
phases so far, is already showing signs of irreparable fatigue.
The US and its allies have suffered casualties of nearly 4000
dead and over 20,000 wounded in the GWOT campaigns in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, none of these fronts show any sign of
stability with US-anointed governments struggling to hold the
polity together. The mistake of attacking Iraq in the name of
largely untraceable weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proved the
ultimate nemesis for the campaign. Al Qaeda used the opportunity
to establish a base in Iraq - which was largely secular during
Saddam's regime – and recruit mercenaries from other
nationalities to fight the US. As suicide attacks and misguided
targeting of civilians become the norm in Iraq, Washington is
caught in a quagmire from which it finds no room for escape.
This, in turn, has led to a general sluggishness in its
anti-terror campaign with a credible new plan eluding the
administration.
This fatigue has affected the overall GWOT campaign, with many
US analysts questioning the validity of continuing it. The
realisation has also dawned on the security establishment that
even as it eliminates each terrorist, more and more recruits are
joining the cause. Thereby, the strategy of measuring success
through the numbers game has proven to be counter-productive.
The US has also lost its soft power capabilities with even
friendly Muslim countries questioning the logic of invading
Iraq. In the process, the war on terror itself has come under
unprecedented criticism from even countries like Pakistan, which
have been frontline allies in this campaign.
Putting up a brave face on his part, President Bush continues to
declare that he would accept nothing less than complete victory
– though that part is becoming undefinable. As support for the
GWOT continues to erode, experts have called for reconsidering
the goals and defining achievable goals. The GWOT has certainly
failed on many counts and cannot be treated any more as a
comprehensive campaign, especially when it has conveniently
closed its eyes on terror movements in other conflict zones.
John Mueller argued in a Foreign Affairs article that the fact
that the US has suffered no terrorist attack on its soil since
9/11 suggests that the terror threat is massively exaggerated.
However it would be equally wise not to underestimate the threat
especially in the aftermath of the Iraq war, which has made the
US less safe than it was before.
III Changing Dimensions of the GWOT
As the GWOT moves on with inherent ambiguities and lack of
direction, terror groups have opened up more fronts in Europe
and Asia, even as existing insurgent groups in the South Asian
region have synchronised their terror campaigns in India and
Pakistan with the global jihad led by Al Qaeda. As a result,
major terror attacks were witnessed in both countries, as well
as the infiltration of Pakistan based groups into Indian groups,
as displayed by the Mumbai blasts.
The most notable shift in the global terror phenomena is the
ascendancy of Al Qaeda and jihad as an inseparable brand and
identification with it by Islamic insurgent groups across the
world from Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Russia to
Europe. As a result, terror campaigns under this brand have
spread out to regions as far as Bali in Indonesia and in Europe,
where terror cells have reportedly sprouted in the Asian
community. In South Asia, more groups have emerged in recent
years, especially in India, which have established identities
with Pakistan-based groups. As for Pakistan, the increasing
crackdown by the government has led to many of its groups
changing attire and identities to evade detection, while
enhancing cooperation with groups operating on the northern
theatre and with Al Qaeda operations.
Responding to these changes, the GWOT waged by the US and
individual counter-terror actions in South Asia have displayed
new dimensions. In Afghanistan, the US is downsizing troop
placements and has instead concentrated on the Afghan-Pakistan
border. While the hunt for Osama and other Al Qaeda leaders is
still on, the US momentum in this direction has toned down, and
it has handed over security duties in southern Afghanistan to
NATO. While Pakistan as a frontline state has raised many
objections to the GWOT as enacted on its frontiers, Washington
has initiated an enhanced level of cooperation with India on
counter-terrorism strategies, though the latter is neither a
military ally nor a frontline state. Such realignments in South
Asia spell new direction for the regional war on terror. Though
India continues to raise the status of terror groups operating
in Pakistan, there is greater understanding in New Delhi and
Washington to allow Pakistan its own time and space to uproot
the infrastructure in its territory.
Another new dimension in the global terror campaign is the new
improvisation in the resources used by terror groups across the
globe. As surveillance has been increased, terror groups have
improvised their own technology to avoid detection. The Mumbai
blasts, where new chemical combinations were reportedly used,
and the London conspiracy, where liquid chemicals were planned
to be used for blasting many airliners, are cases in point. At
the other end is the threat from WMD terrorism. Though no
evidence has emerged on Al Qaeda or other groups acquiring
chemical, biological or nuclear technology, there are reports of
their intense attempts to attain such know-how. New initiatives
have been launched at the global level to tackle this impending
threat. South Asia, though not envisaging a WMD terror scenario
in the immediate future, being known for as a WMD proliferation
and terror hub, is seen anxiously by the rest of the world as a
potential epicentre of WMD terrorism.
Lastly, another new feature of the GWOT is the restructuring of
terror theatres. From concentrated hotspots in Afghanistan,
Kashmir, Chechnya, the new scene of Islamic terror and
counter-terror is spread across territorial thresholds like the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, European frontiers, Southeast Asian
isles, Bangladesh and hitherto undisturbed destinations in
India, Pakistan and elsewhere. Though traditional flashpoints
like Delhi, Mumbai, Karachi, Srinagar and Kabul continues to be
targeted, terror modules and operatives are now increasingly
based out of safer bases like Aurangabad in India, Peshawar,
Dhaka, the Northeast of India, Kathmandu and many spots in
Southeast Asia.
South Asia and the GWOT
On the eve of 9/11, the peace process between India and Pakistan
was back on track after having been derailed by the 1999 Kargil
conflict, although it had suffered a setback at the Agra summit
in 2001 when the two sides could not agree upon a joint
declaration. But President Musharraf’s military regime was still
out of favour with much of the outside world, especially the US.
Afghanistan was also a ground for contending interests of India
and Pakistan, as each country was supporting a different party
in the civil war.
The events of 9/11 had major repercussions on South Asia. The
strategic importance of the South Asian region in general and
Pakistan in particular increased tremendously as the bordering
region of the main battleground. The GWOT changed the strategic
perceptions of the states in the region. Pakistan’s abandonment
of the Taliban and its joining hands with the US as a frontline
state in the GWOT did not go well with the strong religious
community in the country. President Musharraf faced a backlash
with increased acts of terrorism including several assassination
attempts on his life. This created a growing realization in
Pakistan that terrorism was a domestic problem as well that
could potentially destabilize the state.
The jihadi groups based in Pakistan were forced to disappear
from the scene and their activities were to a large extent
halted by the changed circumstances. Pakistan arrested more than
400 most wanted terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan. Islamabad
banned a number of jihadi groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and
the Jaish-e-Mohammad, which were linked with anti-US activities
and also operationally involved in Kashmir, though most of these
groups continued to operate under new names. For example the
Lashkar-e-Taiba, floated a political outfit called the
Jamaat-ud-Dawa, besides reportedly cooperating with other groups
like Jaish-e-Mohammad, to enhance operations in India.
India’s basic concern was cross-border infiltration from the
Pakistani side. Though Pakistan had joined the US led GWOT, it
still viewed India’s own ‘war on terror’ as a legitimate
struggle for Kashmiri independence. In the wake of changed
circumstances, the distinction between a freedom struggle and
terrorism got increasingly blurred and Pakistan had to
reconsider its policy of supporting the activities of non-state
actors in Kashmir.
Despite Islamabad’s efforts to tackle cross border terrorist
activities, violence continued in Kashmir. India repeatedly
blamed Pakistan based militant groups for several attacks
including the Srinagar state assembly attack in October 2001 and
the New Delhi parliament attack in December 2001. India held
Pakistan responsible for these attacks and amassed troops on the
border, threatening Pakistan with war. The US got involved in
brokering peace between the two countries and India backed off
after getting assurances from President Musharraf that Pakistan
will not allow its soil to be used for any terrorist activities.
But the incident demonstrated how the activities of terrorists
could take India and Pakistan to the brink of conflict.
A significant spin-off of the GWOT was the impetus that was
thrust on India and Pakistan to initiate a peace process and
devise concerted actions to tackle issues of terrorism in the
region. With the Musharraf government declaring its decision to
stop all acts of cross-border terror from Pakistan territory and
becoming a frontline state in the war on terror, the stage was
set for greater reconciliation between the two nuclear
neighbours. After a ceasefire agreement announced in December
2003 (which continues till date), a composite dialogue was
launched at the secretary-level in January 2004, and a variety
of CBMs were introduced as a means for creating the mutual trust
necessary to progress towards a final settlement of the Kashmir
dispute. Though Kashmir continues to be a major obstacle, the
mutual understanding to take the process ahead and alternatively
work on solutions for the dispute ensured sustained
negotiations, though occasionally interrupted by terrorist
attacks in India.
Thereby, the peace process should be seen as a by-product of the
changing dimensions of the GWOT with both Pakistan and India
understanding their mutual pains arising from this scourge. Yet,
there are hiccups galore as India feels terror groups on the
prowl are mostly still based in Pakistan, and that Pakistan is
not doing enough to remove them. Though Pakistan has called for
greater cooperation in this regard, it is a point that the GWOT
has yet to make inroads in clearing the terror infrastructure
which might be lingering in parts of Pakistan. In fact, the
diminishing results of the GWOT are also due to its neglect of
other major terror spots and groups operating in the South and
Southeast Asian region. Also, by concentrating the GWOT on the
Islamic groups, and ignoring other terror movements, the
comprehensiveness of this campaign is lost which affects its
credibility.
The peace process remains at the mercy of terrorists who act as
spoilers. The most recent example was the Mumbai blasts in July
2006, which forced India to suspend the peace talks. India’s
tendency to reflexively blame Pakistan after every incident may
not be helpful for creating a conducive atmosphere between the
two countries. However Pakistan’s refusal to cooperate with
India in similar situations in the past has also contributed to
the trust deficit between the two countries. Pakistan’s
suggestion that both countries conduct a joint investigation of
such incidents has been treated with skepticism by India. But if
Pakistan is indeed serious about such a proposal it would be
highly desirable for both sides to undertake such joint
mechanisms which could act as an important CBM between the two
countries.
IV Future Action Plan
There are several incremental steps that could be taken to build
mutual trust and confidence and mitigate the possibility of
future terrorist attacks holding India-Pakistan relations
hostage:
• Joint monitoring/patrolling of the Line of Control.
• Joint investigation of terrorist attacks.
• Intelligence sharing on terrorist groups on either side of the
border.
• Using SAARC as an active platform to discuss terror related
issues.
• Promoting track two and people to people contacts.
• Promoting military to military contacts and exchanges.
• Greater restraint in the media and from government
functionaries.
• Working out a mutually accepted disengagement formula from
Siachen with verification mechanism.
• Resolution of other contentious issues between the two
countries like Sir Creek, Wullar/Tulbul, Baglihar, Kishenganga
etc to ‘narrow the conflict space’.
• Softer borders and greater autonomy for both sides of Kashmir
with defense, currency, foreign affairs with respective central
governments.
Report of Group III
The Expansion of SAARC
Implications for Vitality, Coherence, and the Future Role of
the Organization
Members of the Group:
Farah Arbab
Saira Bano
Azeema Cheema
Luo Dandan
Fanny Deng
Deepti Mahajan
Jiang Tao
Sadia Tasleem
Narendra Tripathi
Gao Ziping
This report has been drafted on behalf of the group by Azeema
Cheema.
I Introduction
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was
established by the governments of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal, and Maldives in December of 1985. The
organization that has now completed over twenty one years of its
life was created to encourage social progress and economic
cooperation, specifically through enhanced levels of trade,
among its member states. SAARC has been criticized on several
fronts for the Associations’ inability to achieve significant
progress in its primary objectives in two decades. Analysts have
identified SAARC’s major failure as not being able to establish
a definitive role for itself within the region, either as an
integrative forum to assist member states in the resolution of
their bilateral disputes or as a successful facilitator of
regional trade. The status of SAARC as a regional player has
therefore always remained peripheral.
There is growing concern among member states over the question
of ‘reorienting’ SAARC. A number of proposals have been put
forward to improve the effectiveness of SAARC. Relatively new
among these is a proposal for the expansion of SAARC. Since its
inception in 1985, the membership of SAARC has expanded to
include Afghanistan, and observer status has been granted to
China, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and the USA. The
purpose of this discussion paper is to analyze the possibilities
for SAARC to expand. The team identified two specific tracks for
expansion --- Widening and Deepening.
By ‘Widening’, we take the literal definition of expansion,
which is extending the scope of SAARC beyond its original
membership. ‘Deepening’, however, is an alternative concept to
increasing the number of member states. It implies expanding the
current mandate of SAARC to include a greater role in the
international politics, economics, and cooperative initiatives
among its existing member states. SAARC could potentially define
a strategic niche for itself as a credible facilitator in the
implementation of such initiatives among states in the region.
The future role of SAARC has been discussed in light of both
widening the scope of membership, and deepening the mandate. One
element, which was identified at the outset as both an enabler
and an obstacle in the functioning of SAARC, is India-Pakistan
relations. The state of bilateral relations between the two
countries has a profound impact on the region and was a
recurring theme in our discussions. The analysis presented here
therefore takes into account the future of SAARC, not only in
the case of improvement in India-Pakistan relations but also in
terms of how SAARC can play a role in stabilizing the political
environment in the region.
II Widening the Membership
The Group examined the potential for widening the membership of
SAARC on a case by case basis. The individual cases studied in
this context and discussed below are Afghanistan, China, Japan,
the United States, South Korea, and EU/ASEAN.
• Afghanistan
Afghanistan is the latest entrant in the existing pool of SAARC
members, being accepted as the eighth member on November 13,
2005. Though there are many conflicting interpretations of the
geographical status, as being part of Central as opposed to
South Asia, Afghanistan’s long border with Pakistan gives it
significant potential to have an impact on the political and
economic environment of the South Asia region. The Afghan
government’s enthusiasm for inclusion in SAARC stems mainly from
their optimism about cooperation required from the South Asia
region for reconstruction and peace building. Conversely for the
original SAARC member, the incentive is that Afghanistan could
provide a big margin for business, once peace is restored.
However, these incentives are highly questionable, given the
fact that the existing scenario offers rare possibilities for
peace, both within Afghanistan and for good relations with
Pakistan.
There are many analysts who support the argument that at this
time, Afghanistan presents more challenges than opportunities.
It seems that this entry is strongly driven by the political
interests of the larger powers. India’s support has been largely
motivated by the desire to “redefine regional boundaries”. Also
for India, added political support is going to be a big
advantage, particularly the opportunity to encircle Pakistan.
Pakistan’s continuing struggle in maintaining good relations
with the Afghan government has driven apprehensions of these
developments. Consequently Pakistan began to push China’s case
forward.
• China
China’s interests in SAARC are driven by a natural inclination
towards South Asia mainly due to geographical contiguity, and a
strong desire to increase potential influence far beyond its own
borders to counter any potential threat from the West. SAARC
provides a great prospect for China to exert its influence at
the political and strategic level, through a more direct and
legitimate framework. China sees a chance for diversification of
relations, mainly with both India and Pakistan, and peripherally
with the smaller states aimed at the broader goal of
multilateralism to minimize US unilateralism.
Although, China already holds observer status, the issue of full
membership is highly contested. The implications are both
positive and negative. While China’s economy is a point of
strength and could be of great advantage (broadly speaking), its
political presence is an issue of serious concern, particularly
for India. There is also a somewhat diluted hope that China’s
entry will stabilize SAARC by taking away from Indo-Pak
hostility that has derailed the efficiency of SAARC for so many
years.
• Japan
Japan is also an observer in SAARC. India is strongly supportive
of the case of Japan in order to minimize the influence of
China. The entry of Japan was attractive to the other members as
it has the potential to bring in huge economic benefits, as well
as technical assistance.
• United States of America & South Korea
In April 2006, the United States and South Korea made formal
requests for observer status, which was granted on August 2nd,
2006 by the foreign ministers of SAARC countries.
For the US, the motivation was the opportunity to maintain its
strategic interests in South Asia and also to observe the India-
Pakistan dynamic.
Of these two cases, the entry of US can have serious
implications. Members fear that the presence of the US will make
SAARC a chess-board of power-politics eroding the geographical
identity of SAARC, and granting more influence to a global
hegemony. In this case, challenges are more obvious than
advantages.
South Korea is perhaps the only individual country case
discussed up till now whose interests are mainly driven by the
desire to generate greater economic activity and the question of
observer status is not tainted by the spillover of alliances.
• EU & ASEAN
The EU expressed similar interest in SAARC as the US and South
Korea, however in a less formal manner. Nonetheless, observer
status was granted to the EU at the same time as the US and
South Korea.
Observer status of EU or ASEAN can be advantageous at certain
levels. For instance, SAARC (a weaker organization) can benefit
from the experiences of these regional organizations that are
far more integrative, mature, and successful. Furthermore the
presence of these organizations might generate good-will for
SAARC, as an organization, driving serious interest of the
member countries of both EU and ASEAN. Both the EU and ASEAN are
well-placed to help SAARC evolve more efficient mechanisms to
improve its performance especially in terms of economic
activity.
• Analysis of the Overall ‘Widening’ Scenario
Given the cases discussed above, there are both pros and cons
regarding the question of widening the scope of SAARC. Each
individual case presents a varied set of pros and cons for every
existing member -- and a complicated picture for SAARC as an
organization. On the one hand there are strong prospects for
high level economic activity in among SAARC countries, which
serve the primary goal for which the organization was
established. And the presence of such opportunities is thought
to be a potent factor to divert SAARC’s focus from Indo-Pak
bilateral hostilities to other serious issues of concern for the
whole region.
However, critics believe that South Asia’s trade potential is
not vast enough to benefit from the opportunities that are going
to come up as a result of expansion. There are also serious
apprehensions; e.g. increased membership has the potential to
push SAARC away from its simple objectives to the more
complicated scenario of power politics. In discussing the
individual cases, it was clear that each membership instigates a
domino effect in terms of states grappling for alliances, which
catalyses the case for the next member. Considering this trend,
‘over-widening’ will probably push SAARC beyond regionalism to
extra-regionalism that will overshadow its real cause.
While the interests of major powers can jeopardize the basic
agenda of SAARC, the presence of China and the US is also likely
to hasten inter-state rivalry that can possibly have extremely
serious repercussions on the overall working atmosphere of SAARC.
However, this analysis does not imply that the possibility of
expansion be entirely ruled out.
III Deepening the Mandate and Role
While examining its deepening (that is, increasing the mandate
and role of SAARC to maximize effectiveness on current issues)
four broad rubrics were discussed – politics, economics,
culture, and structure.
• Politics:
a. Bilateral issues:
As the recurring theme in our discussions, it is considered an
established fact that the functioning of SAARC has been held
hostage to bilateral issues – mainly the Indo-Pak conflict.
There is currently no mechanism in SAARC to address bilateral
issues as the charter does not provide such latitude, and voices
are divided over whether such a provision should be brought into
effect.
While some contend that regional facilitation, mediation, or
arbitration may prove to be an effective instrument for
resolution of bilateral problems, others argue that bilateral
issues will hijack the agenda of SAARC and become an impediment
to regional cooperation. Practically speaking however, the
latter point is moot as most analysts agree that it is simply
impossible to expect SAARC to function in a cooperative manner
unless existing members are willing to cooperate with each
other. In short, SAARC will not improve unless relations between
members improve.
According to current practice, bilateral issues are the topic of
informal discussions among leaders at SAARC summits during a one
day long retreat. Whereas these sessions are useful for policy
makers to develop a better understanding of their counterparts,
they achieve little in practical terms as representatives have
no legitimate authority to commit to any cooperative
initiatives.
b. Responding to terrorism:
SAARC approved a Convention on Terrorism in 1987. However, there
has been no work on its implementation. One pitfall in dealing
with terrorism globally is the lack of consensus on its
definition. Even within SAARC terrorism has no mutually
acceptable definition, even in broad terms. The countries need
to agree on a common understanding of the issue, share
intelligence, and cooperate on sharing leads on terrorist
activities, narcotics trade and money laundering. However, given
the overall political scenario cooperation even on petty crimes
is not possible.
c. Coordination and cooperation:
Countries in SAARC fall into the same category of developing
nations and face similar socio-economic problems. It would be
greatly beneficial to development practitioners in all fields,
if SAARC countries had mechanisms for regular exchange of
information on successful policies and programs so that success
stories of development projects may be replicated across the
region. NGOs in different SAARC countries may work together and
network for knowledge and skill-sharing. However, this is one
potential area of cooperation that has not been looked into very
much and currently there are no existing mechanisms that can
support this. Particularly countries that have signed the Paris
Declaration should cooperate on its implementation and share
their strategies for achieving MDG targets. Although these are
economic initiatives, considering the structure of SAARC, and
the volatility that sometimes faces governments in this region,
they require political support and must be carried out through
these points have been discussed as part of political
cooperation as most group members agreed that for such
initiatives to last for a sustained period of time they must be
carried out through political channels.
d. Representation:
There needs to be a mechanism for ensuring genuine
representation of peoples within the organization. Even though
elections on the lines of the EU framework may seem implausible,
some steps need to be taken in this regard. SAARC has a long way
to go in terms of developing an integrated structure. In the
meantime at least minimum standards for democratic
representation need to be specified.
• Economics:
a. Free Trade:
There is already a consensus on the need for free trade in SAARC.
Concrete steps need to be taken to bring tariff barriers down to
zero. Currently, only 4 per cent of the global trade is carried
out amongst SAARC countries. There is a great deal of debate
regarding the maximum potential of free trade even in the face
of zero tariff barriers. The potential for free trade is
severely compromised in the face of unstable political
relations.
The Group also considered the possibility of devolved trade
blocs under the umbrella of SAARC. A good example of the
potential of these sub-organizations is existing trade
cooperation between eastern states of India and Bangladesh.
While it was argued that regional sectors have greater affinity
due to geographical contiguity and greater cultural
similarities, it was eventually agreed that an effective
sub-organization would have to be supported by a strong parent
organization in order to be remain effective over a sustained
period of time. Otherwise the sub-organization may undermine the
purpose of the parent organization and weaken it further. SAARC
is not yet a strong enough parent organization to be able to
replicate a successful regional bloc in all other sectors of the
region.
b. Development Fund:
The SAARC countries need to put in place a fund – raised both
internally and externally – that may be used for regional
development programs. Many IFI’s are already implementing
regional technical assistance programs. If SAARC could establish
a legitimate role for itself in the development practice of the
region, it could prove to be an invaluable modem for South
Asians to take ownership of their own development agenda.
c. United policy stance at international fora:
SAARC countries are largely dependent on agriculture for trade
and revenue generation. The countries must therefore arrive at a
consensus and speak in one voice at fora such as the World Trade
Organization summit, etc. SAARC should provide a buffer for
member countries to resolve their common issues before
participating in international fora, as having a divided stance
further weakens their bargaining position.
• Culture and Communication:
a. Academic exchange:
There should be opportunities for students from one SAARC
country to pursue studies in another. Scholarships should be
provided for exchange programs and such initiatives among
countries in conflict with each other should especially be
encouraged. Academics and scholars should be supported in the
pursuit of joint research projects (which bring together
individuals/groups from different SAARC countries). There are
various mechanisms through which to set up these exchanges –
RCSS is one such contributor.
b. Arts and culture:
There should be an attempt to facilitate exchange of arts and
culture amongst SAARC countries. Artists, performers, and those
working to preserve dying arts should be allowed to travel
easily.
c. Increased airline and train activity:
The Group noted that currently there are no direct flights
between many of the major capitals in SAARC countries. Where
SAARC has negotiated visa exemptions for parliamentarians of
member countries, it would also be beneficial for the region if
SAARC played a role in enhancing communication channels through
direct flights and an improved railway network.
• Structure:
a. Secretariat:
The current role of the secretariat is to coordinate and monitor
the implementation of SAARC activities, service the meetings of
the association, and serve as channel of communication between
SAARC and other international organizations. The administration
within SAARC needs to be strengthened so that it can gain a
certain amount of credibility with the bureaucracies of member
countries. A stronger secretariat should then attempt to
minimize the involvement of national bureaucracies.
b. Decision-making:
Even though the ‘unanimity principle’ in which all countries
have equal vote and veto power makes it difficult to reach
consensus, this has generally been seen as a fair and equitable
arrangement. Continuing difficulties to reach consensus have
fuelled a certain level of frustration regarding the
effectiveness of the unanimity principle and the discourse on
whether it should be changed is deeply divided.
c. Institutionalizing research initiative:
A SAARC research centre must be established where issues are
identified and researched on, and feasibility reports are
prepared. It will form a common pool of resources for academic
learning and policy-making.
In addition to the recommendations based on the analysis above,
the Group also had the following suggestions:
• Some countries currently not full members of SAARC should be
allowed ‘Dialogue Partner’ status which implies a position
in-between being a full member and observer. There is scope for
extra-regional powers to get involved in the workings of SAARC,
but the pace of their integration needs to be moderated.
Introducing ‘Dialogue Partner’ status will serve this purpose.
Dialogue partners should be allowed to participate in
discussions at SAARC summits but not vote on issues. They should
be integrated into economic arrangements in a manner that they
are able to contribute to the funds available for development in
the region and offer technical assistance, while at the same
time SAARC countries get to retain ownership of the agenda. The
terms of engagement with all “extra-regional powers” should be
clearly defined so that there is no space for coercion by
economically stronger countries.
• There should be regular, institutionalized contact with the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Economic Cooperation
Organization, and Iran. Even though expanding membership at this
stage does not seem plausible, avenues for future expansion
should remain open.
• Like all SAARC member countries, SAARC itself also suffers
from weak implementation of policies and programs. Policy
implementation mechanisms within SAARC need to be strengthened. |
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