Indo-Pakistani Relations

· There is a need to work out a “final and partial” solution to the relations between India and Pakistan. This phrase meant to cover the notion that all options with a long-term timeframes have to be ruled out.

· Pursuit of composite dialogue and nuclear restraint regime is essential for the region. For such dialogues to succeed, the key actors need to be involved in this process. For Pakistan, this means that the military should be an essential part of this process since it is an important stakeholder. In recent years, there has been a softening of issues on both sides, which has made it possible to explore the possibility of Iranian gas pipeline through Pakistan to India, Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, etc.

· Kashmir issue includes at least four aspects of the issues covered by the composite dialogue. It is not sure whether we have reached a “hurting stalemate” for the resolution of the Kashmir problem, though the opportunities available for cooperation are greater today.

· Perception of the nuclear option is affected by the “China factor.” India continues to see the China factor important in shaping it strategic policy and considers technology transfer to Pakistan as a threat that needs to be factored in its military policy.

· Lobbies by the private sector and civil society are necessary in improving future relations between the two countries.

· No overt facilitation by third parties is possible or desirable in resolving the Indo-Pakistani problems, though it may be an important factor in defusing a crisis situation.

South Asia’s Nuclear Status

· There is international concern that Pakistan might have violated the non-proliferation policy, though it is not a party to the NPT. But it is not clear what international law A. Q. Khan’s case might have violated, though it might be possible that potential proliferators might be subject to its regulations and he could be tried in a country which is a party to the NPT.

· Limited war is a dangerous concept since one may “misjudge one’s own ability and underestimate the other side”. Controlling escalation of conflict may be even more dangerous. Past experience have shown that both India and Pakistan decision-makers can be responsible during crisis period, though the US role in South Asia has increased perceptibly as a result of its facilitation role during the crisis periods.

· India’s no first use (NFU) policy is subject to caveat that is usually overlooked by observers since it does not preclude using nuclear weapons in case it is attacked by other WMD.

· There is a stable military balance between India and Pakistan, even though acquisition of new technology might cause anxiety (i.e. missile defense, etc.), but will not destabilize the region.

· Nuclear weapons are here to stay in the region, and there is a greater need to address issues to make nuclear weapons safe. This includes developing a better control and command system in the region and greater understanding among the key parties to introduce crisis stability. The later part of the Workshop, however, questioned this issue and emphasized the need to strengthen the UN and international effort in the disarmament process and arms control, including the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world, as proposed by the Canberra Commission.

· Chemical, biological and radiological weapons pose a real threat in the region since it is easy to acquire, manufacture and conceal these weapons, and weaker states may rely on them to strengthen their capabilities. CWC has verification procedure, but nothing like that exists with regards to biological weapons.

· Nuclear CBM measures in South Asia are replicas of the Soviet-American model, but less detailed. The best model for the region to emulate would be the modalities and contingencies worked out in the Indus Water Treaty.

· Nuclear terrorism can have catastrophic effects and posses a real threat to the world today. However, it is also difficult for terrorist groups to get the required fissile material together (20kg) to build a nuclear device. The real danger is from radiological weapons.

Other Issues

· China’s may be able to contribute more to the South Asian cooperation scheme if SAARC + 1 process were established, thus emulating the ARF model.

· The roots of many of the conflicts in South Asia lie in internal problems, and their resolution need to be sought outside the military domain.

· The implication of India as an emerging power will depend on whether it takes a benign or aggressive approach. India as a more secure and confident power may bring stability to the region, but this is unlikely to happen overnight since it functions with a large and complex bureaucracy and any course correction it might wish to make is likely to be slow.

· A pattern exists among South Asian states in their failure to deal with the threat posed by terrorism in South Asia:

o There is sheer neglect by states when insurgencies first begins, often denying that the problem exists, until it is too late;

o The governments are then hit by shock and confusion since no administrative mechanism is in place to deal with the challenge that is posed;

o Then the states are unable to decide if the threat is to be addressed as a law and order problem or a high security threat; and

o There are no mechanisms in place that will allow sharing of information among states—and even within a country in case of multiple cases of insurgencies—as to how the threat can be dealt with in an effective manner.

· There is a need to think out of the box if conflicts are to be replaced by cooperation in South Asia. A wholistic design is needed if regional cooperation under the SAARC aegis is to move forward.