|
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Group Members:
Adnan Ali Shah
Amit Kumar
Hu Xiangqun
Ishrat Afsshan Abbasi
Li Haidong
Sanjay Pulipaka
Shandana Rauf
Tanvi Madan
Tejal Chandan
Zheng Fei
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are considered to be those
weapons, which cause unacceptable damage in the quantitative
and/or qualitative dimensions. There are four categories of
WMD -- nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological
weapons – and they can be used by either state or non-state
actors. Their use can cause casualties, panic and economic
damage. There is a huge debate going on about nuclear
weapons, however, there tends to be a lack of enthusiasm on
the part of the arms control communities to take cognizance
of biological, chemical and radiological weapons despite the
fact that the taboo for the use of these weapons might be
considered weaker and therefore makes their use more likely.
Given the weak institutional framework in many of the South
Asian states, the non-state actors in South Asia have the
capabilities to acquire/manufacture chemical, radiological
and biological weapons. This paper is divided under the two
broad headings of Threats and Measures.
I. THREATS
a.
Threat from nuclear weapons.
-
Threat from:
o
State actors: Through
authorized or accidental use, or complicit or unintentional
proliferation.
o
Non-state actors: Through
intentional use or facilitating proliferation to other state
and non-state actors.
o
State use is considered to
be more likely as non-state actors are unlikely to obtain
delivery mechanisms and fissile material easily and the
weapons are hard to manufacture.
b. Threat from biological weapons.
- Threat from:
o
State actors: Use is
possible and there is no verification system. Bio-defence
work has the potential of assuming offensive dimensions.
o
Non-state actors: Use is
definitely possible since access to material is easier and
cheaper; facilities are easier to hide; and these weapons
are easier to use through multiple delivery systems such as
weapons, food material and livestock.
-
Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons have been
used on a few occasions in the recent past.
-
Conventional military defence mechanisms cannot
effectively detect and stop the usage of biological weapons.
-
Lack of information and detection capabilities might
delay reaction time, causing higher casualties.
-
Material and facilities are used in various
industries (especially the growing biotechnology sector) and
therefore cannot be restricted outright.
c.
Threat from chemical weapons.
-
Threat from:
o
State actors: Less
possible, most countries have signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention with strict verification mechanisms, and
militaries often do not consider it a useful weapon.
o
Non-state actors: Use is
possible since access to material is easier and cheaper;
facilities are easier to hide.
-
Technological know-how is publicly available.
-
Facilities and materials are the same that are used
in commercial activities and therefore access is hard to
control.
d. Threat from radiological weapons.
-
Two types:
o
“Dirty bombs” – use of
explosive device to spread radiological material
o
Simple radiological
dispersal devices (RDD) -- spread radiological material (for
eg. by contaminating water) without the use of explosives.
-
Use of such a weapon is likely to render an area
uninhabitable and unusable through radioactive
contamination.
-
Threat from:
o
State actors: Not likely as
they are not considered effective mass casualty weapons –
the amount of damage that would be done is not commensurate
with the stigmatization that use would bring on a state.
o
Non-state actors: Possible
but materials are dangerous to work with, higher activity
radioactive materials (often fissile material), which cause
greater damage, are harder to obtain.
-
More feasible option for non-state actors than
nuclear weapons since most radioactive material can be used
in them including medical isotopes.
II. MEASURES: WHAT CAN THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES DO?
a. At the domestic level.
-
Conduct detailed threat assessment and develop
comprehensive strategy.
-
Improve the security and surveillance of
installations where materials are available and facilities
with manufacturing capabilities. Institutionalise security
and scrutiny measures at research laboratories.
-
Verify personnel at above-mentioned installations.
-
Consider licensing mechanisms for materials and
technology transfers.
-
Strengthen domestic legislation to prevent misuse of
technologies and materials.
-
Identify and harden obvious targets.
-
Improve facilities to deal with aftermath of attack
and ability to detect source of attack.
-
As on date the South Asian states do not have
National Disaster Management Centres (NDMCs) to respond to
various calamities and crisis. Hence, creation of
institutional mechanisms such as NDMCs to ward off threats
of WMD would be an important step in right direction. These
NDMCs will develop plans to meet various crisis situations
involving use of WMD. It should be noted that the
consequences of use of WMD are akin, if not exactly similar,
to that of natural calamities. Hence, NDMCs will also evolve
disaster mitigation and disaster management strategies
pertaining to natural calamities. Such an approach will help
NDMCs to constantly evaluate/review their strategies to
address the consequences of use of WMD in light of
experiences gained from various natural calamities. A few
functions of NDMCs could be:
o
Build capacity of
countries’ healthcare systems to respond in the case of an
attack.
o
Develop better
communication between private and public sector; improve
reporting mechanisms for example from hospitals
o
Develop preventive
inoculation strategies. This would also require stockpile of
vaccines and antibiotics. The success of various health
campaigns such as Pulse Polio Campaign in India demonstrate
that the South Asian states have the capacity to implement
massive health programmes, provided there is a clear
strategy, pre-defined objectives, clear lines-of-control and
accountability mechanisms. NDMCs can develop such clear
strategies.
-
Internal oversight mechanisms for the biotech
industry.
-
Create public awareness on threats and measures to be
taken in the event of an attack.
-
Train first responders in order to improve reaction
and detection capabilities.
-
Research the models provided by other countries and
see what is applicable; this is a more cost and time
effective option.
-
Building institutional mechanisms such as National
Disaster Management Centres to develop and implement
emergency response initiatives
-
Educate regarding hazards of WMDs
-
Create databases mapping sensitive National Labs.
b. At the regional level.
-
Exchange information on strategies and legislation.
-
Improve communication on disaster management
-
National Disaster Management Centres of all the South
Asian countries can coordinate their activities and develop
South Asian Reaction Plan to meet the various exigencies.
-
Mock exercises among the regional countries
-
Establish communication channels between India and
Pakistan so that in the event of an attack, they do not
automatically assume that the other is to blame. In this
regard, leaders should also refrain from making
irresponsible statements.
-
Regional cooperation among the customs and border
guards to prevent transfer of illicit materials.
c. At the international level.
-
Ensure own compliance with Conventions that have been
signed and ratified and all commitments to the international
community in this regard.
-
Work towards building a consensus on international
treaty regimes for example regarding biological weapons.
-
Consider pushing for international models of
legislation that could then be applied at the domestic
level.
d. Specific measures (these include domestic, regional and
international measures).
i.
Nuclear weapons threat
·
Strengthen command and
control systems. Develop, establish and strengthen the
institutional framework to facilitate better decision-
making processes
·
Officially constitute a
clear, practical, reliable and complete nuclear strategy.
·
Formalise pre-notification
of missile launches and avoid any missile and nuclear tests
in a crisis.
·
India and Pakistan should
consult with other nations to develop nuclear safeguard
technologies and processes.
·
Strengthen export control
regimes.
·
Establish nuclear risk
reduction centres.
ii. Radiological weapons threat
·
Research newer ways of
discarding and destroying devices that contain radioactive
materials.
South Asia is a cradle of long and colourful civilizations.
It’s a region beholding great future. To ensure that it can
realize its potential it is imperative that the countries of
the region do everything possible to prevent the use and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only
regionally but also internationally. |
